

MODELS FROM THE PAST IN ROMAN CULTURE

Historical examples played a key role in ancient Roman culture, and Matthew Roller's book presents a coherent model for understanding the rhetorical, moral, and historiographical operations of Roman exemplarity. It examines the process of observing, evaluating, and commemorating noteworthy actors or deeds, and then holding those performances up as norms by which to judge subsequent actors or as patterns for them to imitate. The model is fleshed out via detailed case studies of individual exemplary performers, the monuments that commemorate them, and the later contexts – the political arguments and social debates – in which these figures are invoked to support particular positions or agendas. Roller also considers the boundaries of, and ancient alternatives to, exemplary modes of argumentation, morality, and historical thinking. The book will engage anyone interested in how societies, from ancient Rome to today, invoke past performers and their deeds to address contemporary concerns and interests.

MATTHEW B. ROLLER is Professor of Classics at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of two earlier books: *Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome* (2001) and *Dining Posture in Ancient Rome: Bodies, Values, and Status* (2006). Apart from exemplarity, he is interested in aristocratic competition in the early Roman Empire, and in the younger Seneca's moral philosophy.

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MODELS FROM THE PAST IN ROMAN CULTURE

A World of Exempla

MATTHEW B. ROLLER

The Johns Hopkins University



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For Sebastian

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Acknowledgments

This book had its beginnings in a seminar on “Tiberian Literature” led by Martin Bloomer, which I attended in (I think) 1990 as a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. Martin’s aim being to destabilize his students’ received ideas of “golden” and “silver” Latinity – for into what category should “Tiberian literature” be placed? – he led us through extensive readings of authors we scarcely knew existed, whose works had accumulated virtually no scholarly apparatus to provide assistance, and who assuredly did not figure in our PhD Latin reading lists: Seneca the Elder, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, and Asconius, for starters. A true intellectual adventure, this seminar awakened in me an enduring interest in the exemplum as a rhetorical device, as an affordance for moral thinking, and as a means of encountering the past.

A project nearly thirty years in the making can be expected to have accumulated some debts. Unfortunately I cannot begin to remember them all, let alone actually to thank all the individuals or audiences who since the 1990s have heard, read, or commented on versions of the arguments presented in this book. Nevertheless, a few debts stand out. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin-Madison granted me fellowships for academic year 2000–1 in which to complete this book. I made some important progress in the delightful environment of the Old Observatory (my little office, overlooking Lake Mendota, was directly under the refractor), but to say that the project didn’t quite get done during the fellowship year would be an understatement. It will be a pleasure, eighteen years later, to present this volume to the Institute, and I deeply regret that several colleagues who took a lively interest in my work at the time – notably Paul Boyer, then the Institute’s director, and John D’Arms, then ACLS president – did not live to see it completed. Subsequently the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung granted me a research stipend in 2007–8 to complete this book in the warm embrace of the Institut für

Altertumskunde at the University of Cologne. Once again I came up a little short. But my sponsor, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, along with the phalanx of creative, imaginative ancient historians in Germany to whom he introduced me, fundamentally reshaped the questions I posed and altered my approach to addressing them. The large quantity of recent German scholarship cited in this book's notes and bibliography offers some testimony to these scholars' impact. In this case, I will at least be able to present the completed volume to Karl before he retires. Supporting my scholarly and teaching needs for the last two decades in the Sheridan Libraries of Johns Hopkins University is Donald Juedes. He has worked with me to acquire or access literally thousands of volumes and other resources, without which I could never have completed this book. In the last eighteen months I received bracing feedback from anonymous referees for Cambridge University Press (expertly tapped by Michael Sharp and his editorial machine), first on the project proposal and then on the near-final manuscript. One of these, Christina Kraus, deserves thanks by name not only for her anonymous refereeing but for her engagement, support, and numerous suggestions regarding this project over many years.

As we have still not figured out how to credit scholars for building and collaborating on digital projects (see Hutton 2014 for reflections on this matter), I would like to express my gratitude to those who have created the constellation of electronic resources – ever expanding and increasingly indispensable – on which my work in this project (and beyond) depends. Almost every page of this book has been touched by the Packard Humanities Institute database of Latin texts, digitized in the 1980s and currently browsable and searchable via Peter Heslin's excellent Diogenes tool (among other interfaces). Almost equally indispensable are the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database of Greek texts, conceived by Marianne McDonald and long developed by Maria Pantelia and her team; the Clauss/Slaby searchable and browsable database of Latin inscriptions; and the GreekKeys polytonic typing system, created and maintained over many years by George Walsh, Jeffrey Rusten, and Donald Mastronarde. The Perseus Project team digitized (and formatted!) Lewis and Short's *Latin Dictionary* and the Liddell-Scott-Jones *Greek-English Lexicon* many years ago, changing forever the way I work with lexica. Other digital resources I have exploited for this project include the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* and *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* online, the Suda On Line, *Brill's New Jacoby*, and *Brill's New Pauly*. This list is far from exhaustive. I thank all the scholars, most of whose names I do not know, who contributed their learning, labor, and skill to creating and maintaining these resources.

Portions of this work have appeared previously, in earlier stages of development and tailored for other purposes. The introduction and first two chapters contain material from “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Coclès and Cloelia,” *Classical Philology* 99 (2004): 1–56 (© 2004, The University of Chicago). Part of chapter 3 appeared in “The Politics of Aristocratic Competition: Innovation in Livy and Augustan Rome,” in W. Dominik et al., eds., *Writing Politics in Imperial Rome* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 153–72. Parts of chapter 4 appeared in “The Exemplary Past in Roman Historiography and Culture,” in A. Feldherr, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 214–30, and in “On the Intersignification of Monuments in Augustan Rome,” *American Journal of Philology* 134 (2013): 119–31 (© 2013, The Johns Hopkins University Press). Chapter 5 is substantially similar to “The Consul(ar) as *exemplum*: Fabius Cunctator’s Paradoxical Glory,” in H. Beck et al., eds., *Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 182–210. Chapter 7 includes material from “Demolished Houses, Monumentality, and Memory in Roman Culture,” *Classical Antiquity* 29 (2010): 117–80 (© 2010, The University of California Press), and portions of the conclusion appeared in “Precept(or) and Example in Seneca,” in G. Williams and K. Volk, eds., *Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 129–56. I thank all these presses for granting me permission to re-present these materials in this format. Thanks also to David Gilman Romano for granting permission to reproduce and modify a portion of the *Mapping Augustan Rome* 1:3000 map for use in this book. All translations are my own.

As we shall see, Romans were partial to the view that certain kinds of performances run in families. Cicero seemed to imagine that, by addressing his dialogue “On moral duties” (*De Officiis*) to his son Marcus, he would socially replicate himself. Presumably he deemed this a good thing. But as this book is no *De Officiis* and I am no Cicero, it is with a more nuanced conception of exemplarity in mind that I dedicate this book to my son Sebastian. If he reads it one day, I hope he will grasp the important conclusion that the deeds of one’s father may provide not only models for imitation (at least occasionally, one hopes), but also, and perhaps more importantly, models for avoidance – such as shying away from projects with three-decade timelines.

Baltimore, Maryland

Abbreviations

For authors and works cited in the notes or parenthetically in the main text, standard Anglosphere abbreviations are used, sometimes slightly expanded or compressed. For these see the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, 1st ed., Oxford, 1982, ix–xxiii, or 2nd ed., 2012, xviii–xxx; or the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 4th ed., eds. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, and E. Eidinow, Oxford, 2012, xxvii–liii. All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated. I use the following abbreviations for scholarly journals or reference collections:

<i>BNJ</i>	<i>Brill's New Jacoby</i> (ed. I. Worthington, Leiden, 2006–; referenceworks.brillonline.com)
<i>CA</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> (Berlin, 1862–)
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> (ed. F. Jacoby, Leiden, 1923–59)
<i>ILLRP</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae</i> (ed. A. Degrassi, Florence, 1957)
<i>ILS</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> (ed. H. Dessau, Berlin, 1892–1916)
<i>InscrIt</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Italiae</i> (Rome, 1931–63)
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
<i>LTUR</i>	<i>Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae</i> (ed. E. Steinby, Rome, 1993–2000)
<i>MAAR</i>	<i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i>
<i>MDAI(R)</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung</i>
<i>OLD</i> ¹	<i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> , 1st ed. (ed. P. Glare, Oxford, 1968–82)


<i>ORF</i> ²	<i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> , 2nd ed. (ed. E. Malcovati, Turin, 1955)
<i>RE</i>	<i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> (eds. A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, Stuttgart, 1894–1978)
<i>REL</i>	<i>Revue des études latines</i>
<i>SCI</i>	<i>Scripta Classica Israelica</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>TLL</i>	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> (Leipzig, 1900–)

Map of the Principal Monuments and Sites Discussed in This Book


The following map uses the *Mapping Augustan Rome (MAR)* Central Area 1:3000 scale map as its basis. To reduce visual clutter I have removed indications of many sites and monuments found on the *MAR* map that do not pertain to my discussion. I have also added indications of certain sites and monuments not found on the *MAR* map that do pertain to my discussion. For monuments included in *MAR* that I discuss, I retain *MAR* numbering for ease of reference. Sites and monuments that I have added to the map are labeled with capital letters. I follow the *MAR* practice of indicating approximate locations with circles (or freehand shapes) containing numbers (or letters). All dates are BCE.

- 32: Porticus Metelli, from ca. 140; renovated ca. 30 as the porticus Octaviae
- 32a: Temple of Iuno Regina (ad circum Flaminium), from 179
- 32b: Temple of Iuppiter Stator (ad circum Flaminium), from ca. 140 and contemporary with the porticus Metelli
- 33: Temple of Apollo Medicus, supposedly from 431; known as “Sosianus” from ca. 30
- 34: Temple of Bellona, erected after 296
- 109: Forum of Augustus, in use perhaps from ca. 10. The line of small stars along the southeastern enclosure wall indicates the gallery of *summi viri* who are not Iulian ancestors
- 109a: Temple of Mars Ultor, from 2
- 119: Curia Iulia, from 29
- 120: Augustan or west rostra (speaker’s platform), initiated 42 and achieving the form shown here by 12
- 149: Temple of Iuno Moneta and *domus* of Marcus Manlius Capitolinus (approximate), supposing that the house stood on the *arx* where the temple would later stand

- 152: Tarpeian rock (approximate)
- 158: Temple of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus, from the late sixth century
- 163: *Aequimaelium* (approximate)
- 168: Temple of Ianus (apud Forum Holitorium), erected after 260
- 198: Porta Carmentalis (approximate)
- 199: Porta Triumphalis (approximate)
- 226: Temple of Iuppiter Stator (approximate), according to legend dedicated by Romulus. The statue of Cloelia stood near this temple
 - A: Curia Hostilia, before ca. 50
 - B: Republican *comitium*, shown in the circular form it manifested from the third to first centuries (as reconstructed by Coarelli). The statue of Horatius Cocles stood in or near the *comitium*
 - C: Republican rostra (speaker's platform), on the southern flank of the *comitium*, before ca. 29
 - D: General area within which the *columna Maenia* (erected after 318), *columna Duilia* (after 260), and the Naulochos column (after 36) probably stood
- E1: Area in which Cicero's house and neighboring properties may have stood, supposing that they were located on the northeast slope of the Palatine facing the Velia
- E2: Area in which Cicero's house and neighboring properties may have stood, supposing that they were located on the northwest heights of the Palatine facing the Capitoline hill
- F: *Domus* of Marcus Manlius Capitolinus (approximate), supposing that it stood in the saddle between the two summits of the Capitoline hill



Map 1 Map of central Rome, including monuments and sites ranging from the middle Republic to the early imperial age



Introduction

The Work of Examples

0.1 Why This Book?

This book is about ancient Roman examples. By “examples” I mean specific instances that people adduce as evidence when making an argument: when they say “for example...” or “take the case of...,” seeking to persuade others that some proposition is or should be true. The ancient Romans were enthusiastic users of examples – *exempla*, in Latin – and above all examples set by figures from the past who were famed for performing great deeds for the benefit of the community. Such *exempla* were persuasive thanks to their moral authority: they provided norms for others to accept as their own and models for them to imitate. However, they could only appear morally authoritative and persuasive in light of particular beliefs about how the present relates to the past – specifically, the belief that the past is accessible, understandable, and relevant to present concerns. *Exempla*, therefore, are rhetorical devices that effect persuasion; they constitute a form of moral discourse; and they evince a particular historical consciousness. It is no surprise, then, that they are found pervasively in the literatures of the Roman Republic and Empire, in Greek as well as Latin texts. The built and visual environment of ancient Rome was also shaped by the concern to produce and transmit *exempla*. One might say that *exempla* are everywhere in Roman culture, and that to study Roman examples is to pursue a particular perspective or range of perspectives – rhetorical, moral, and historiographical – on the entirety of Roman culture.¹

My aim in this book is to show how *exempla* work in the thought, literature, and material world of the ancient Romans, a topic I call

¹ Ancient authors and modern scholars use the Latin word *exemplum* to refer variously to (1) the performer of a deed; (2) the deed performed; (3) a narrative or other monumental form relating or referring to a deed; and/or (4) the model or moral standard such a performer or performance sets. When my purposes require such distinctions, I use the formulations “exemplary actor,” “exemplary action,” “exemplary narrative,” and the like.

“Roman exemplarity.” Over the past decade or two, scholars have increasingly thematized examples in their investigations of Roman authors, texts, historical or legendary figures, monuments, and social practices. Some of my own earlier studies have contributed to this field, and have been widely cited. It seems timely and useful, at this point, to synthesize the results of all these investigations, and to place them within a general framework characterizing the operation of exempla in Roman culture. To this end I examine a series of exemplary figures from Roman legend and history, seeking to describe the social, ideological, and material building blocks out of which these figures are constructed. I further investigate how they are deployed and contested in persuasive rhetoric, how they generate moral standards that are potentially binding upon others, and what forms of memory and historical consciousness they instantiate and propagate. Ultimately, I hope that students of Roman history, literature, philosophy, and culture, along with anyone who is interested in examples and their cultural ramifications, will benefit from this study of how exempla work in ancient Rome.

This book builds upon my previous investigations and publications. Elements of Roller 2004 appear in the introduction and chapters 1 and 2, 2009a in the introduction and chapter 3, 2009b and 2013 in chapter 4, 2011 in chapter 5, 2010 in chapter 7, and 2015b in the conclusion. Some of these earlier studies appeared in collected volumes, and were framed to serve those volumes’ needs; also, my ideas developed over time and key frameworks are present in these earlier studies only in preliminary and piecemeal form. Yet I undertook all this work with a view toward producing, eventually, a unified, synthetic study of Roman exemplarity in which all elements would all have their proper place. I have consequently reframed, revised, expanded, and updated all previously published material to reflect developments in the field and the evolution of my thinking in the years since the original publications. The introduction, along with chapters 3 and 4, contain especially large amounts of new exposition. Chapter 6 has never been published in any form. All this material, moreover, has been organized and extensively cross-referenced to achieve, I hope, a coherent exposition following the framework I lay out in the subsequent sections of this introductory chapter.

In what follows, then, I expound a general model of Roman exemplarity. This model seeks to account for the structure, operations, and cultural implications of exempla, focusing on their rhetorical, moral, and historiographical dimensions. While this model in its full elaboration

was the endpoint of my work on this topic, it appears at the beginning of this book to provide suitable structure to the chapters that follow. In this introduction I also discuss key themes and directions in the broader scholarship on exemplarity; and I describe in greater detail the topics, contents, and arguments of the successive chapters. To adumbrate the issues at stake, however, it is helpful (and singularly appropriate) to begin with an example.

0.2 An Example of a Roman Exemplum

The historian Polybius, writing around the middle of the second century B C E, describes for Greek readership the *ethismoi* – habits or customs – that enabled the Romans to rise from a regional Italian power to the dominant power in the Mediterranean in just over fifty years. Among the customs to which he points is the aristocratic funeral (6.53–4), in which the deceased is conveyed in a cortège to the rostra. A eulogizer, normally a scion of the family, recounts to the assembled public the dead man's virtues and the deeds he performed on behalf of the community. Other family members wear masks and costumes representing distinguished ancestors of the deceased, and once the eulogizer has finished praising the newly dead, he recounts the exploits of those ancestors as well. All this pomp, says Polybius, is socially efficacious. Young men who observe this spectacle are fired with the longing to endure and risk everything for the community, in order to win for themselves the renown that derives from performing splendid deeds. Polybius then provides an example of such a performance (6.54.6–55.4):

(54.6) Many such stories concerning many men are related by the Romans, but one notable instance will suffice for the present, offered as an example and as proof. (55.1) It is said that one Horatius Cocles was fighting against two adversaries on the opposite end of the bridge over the Tiber that lies before the city. When he saw a large force of enemy reinforcements approaching, fearing that they would force a passage and storm into the city, he turned to those behind him and shouted that they should withdraw immediately and tear down the bridge. (2) While they did as he bid and tore it down, he stood fast, receiving a large number of wounds, and checked the onslaught of the enemy, his adversaries being astounded not so much by his strength as by his resolution and boldness. (3) Upon the collapse of the bridge, the enemy was prevented from attacking and Cocles, hurling himself into the river in his armor, purposefully gave up his life, reckoning the safety of his fatherland and the renown that would accrue to him thereafter more valuable than his current existence and the portion of his

life remaining. (4) Such, it seems, is the desire and ambition regarding noble deeds that is engendered in Roman youths by their customs (*ethismoí*).²

Polybius explicitly says that he is citing Horatius' great deed as an example (*hypodeigma*): an instance supporting his prior general statement that living Romans are stirred to perform great deeds when they contemplate the deeds performed by past heroes, and that they pursue similar renown for themselves. In Polybius' telling, Horatius himself foresaw that his deed would garner fame (55.3), and indeed the Romans often tell his story (54.6), presumably in a laudatory vein like this one, thereby creating narrative monuments commemorating the deed. The textual record bears out Polybius' suggestion that Horatius' story was resonant. More than thirty narratives of or references to this deed can be found in surviving Roman literature, whether in Greek or Latin. Sometimes, as in Polybius, there is a full-scale narrative, while other times his name is mentioned in passing, with the expectation that the reader can supply, from his preexisting store of knowledge, whatever details of the story are pertinent to the context. Several non-literary monuments to this hero also survive or are attested, as we shall see (ch. 1). Polybius thus shows his reader the social and moral ramifications of Horatius' deed – its embeddedness within a cycle of action, evaluation, commemoration, and imitation or norm setting, a cycle that itself constitutes one of the key Roman customs of which Polybius speaks.

0.3 A General Model of Roman Exemplarity

Roman exemplarity is, I suggest, a cultural phenomenon encompassing a particular set of social practices, beliefs, values, and symbols. These are organized and linked together by the cycle of four operations just mentioned: action, evaluation, commemoration, and norm setting, proceeding

² Polyb. 6.54.6–55.4: πολλὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἱστορεῖται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἔν δ' ἄρκουῖν ἔσται πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐπ' ὀνόματος ῥηθὲν ὑποδείγματος καὶ πίστεως ἔνεκεν. (§55.1) Κόκλην γὰρ λέγεται τὸν Ὠράτιον ἐπικληθέντα, διαγωνιζόμενον πρὸς δύο τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπὶ τῷ καταστῆναι τῆς γεφύρας πέρατι τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ Τιβέριδος, ἣ κείται πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἐπεὶ πλῆθος ἐπιφερόμενον εἶδε τῶν βοηθούντων τοῖς πολεμίοις, δέισαντα μὴ βιασάμενοι παραπέσωσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, βοᾶν ἐπιστραφέντα τοῖς κατόπιν ὡς τάχος ἀναχωρήσαντας διασπᾶν τὴν γέφυραν. (2) τῶν δὲ πειθαρχησάντων, ἕως μὲν οὗτοι διέσπων, ὑπέμενε τραυμάτων πλῆθος ἀναδεχόμενος καὶ διακατέσχε τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐχ οὕτως τὴν δύναμιν ὡς τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τόλμαν καταπεπληγμένων τῶν ὑπεναντίων. (3) διασπασθείσης δὲ τῆς γεφύρας, οἱ μὲν πολεμιοὶ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐκωλύθησαν, ὁ δὲ Κόκλης ῥίψας ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις κατὰ προαίρεσιν μετέλλαξε τὸν βίον, περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενος τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἀσφάλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐσομένην μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτὸν εὐκλειαν τῆς παρούσης ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ καταλειπομένου βίου. (4) τοιαύτη τις, ὡς εἰκε, διὰ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐθισμῶν ἐγγενῆσθαι τοῖς νέοις ὁρμὴ καὶ φιλοτμία πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων.

in approximately this order and then returning to the beginning. Toward gaining a more comprehensive and abstract understanding of this phenomenon, let us examine the four operations in greater detail.³

0.3.1 *Action*

Someone performs an action in the public eye – that is, an action witnessed by representatives of the larger community. This community consists of people who share with one another, and with the actor, a structured set of values, orientations, and beliefs. Romans ordinarily constitute the core community of witnesses, but non-Romans too, especially in military contexts, may be key witnesses to a Roman's action. In such cases, the non-Roman witnesses are presented as holding values and beliefs that overlap sufficiently with the Romans' values to allow them to judge Roman performances competently. Polybius calls these structured values *ethismoi*; in Latin texts they may be called *mos* or *mos maiorum*, “custom(s) / of the ancestors,” which underscores the sanction conferred on them by past practice.⁴ In Horatius' case, his action in the public eye is his solo fight on the bridge, in full view of the Roman and enemy armies on the opposite sides of the river. Polybius stresses that Horatius maintained verbal and visual contact with the Romans working to demolish the bridge, and he expressly remarks on the spectatorship of the enemy forces (“his adversaries being astounded . . .,” 55.2).⁵ Regarding the values he manifests, the enemy is astounded by his “resolution” and “boldness” (*hypostasis, tolma*, 55.2), and as readers we infer – in other texts it is clearer – that his Roman comrades agree with this judgment. In sharing a set of values with the actor, the witnesses may regard him as standing in a synecdochic relationship with themselves: the actor's performance is theirs; he or she embodies, or stands as a surrogate for, the community they represent.⁶

³ The following schema refines and elaborates earlier versions presented at Roller 2004: 4–6 and 2009b: 216–17.

⁴ Much has been written in the past twenty years on the nature and content of the *mos (maiorum)*, and the values associated with this term: in particular, Bettini 2011[2000]; Wallace-Hadrill 2008: 218–31; Braun 2002; the various articles in Linke/Stemmler 2000 and Braun et al. 2000; Hölkeskamp 1996: 316–20.

⁵ Other sources specify that the enemy army is Etruscan; see ch. 1.1. On “spectacular” episodes in Polybius, see Davidson 1991: 11–18.

⁶ Synecdoche and surrogacy: Roller 2010: 126–7, 136–7, Vigour 2001a: 128, Feldherr 1998: 81–123, Joplin 1990: 62–8. See further chs. 2.3, 7.3.1, 7.4.

0.3.2 *Evaluation*

These eyewitnesses, which I call the “primary” audience, evaluate the action’s significance for their community, judging it good or bad in terms of one or more of their shared values and thereby assigning it to one or more moral categories. In Horatius’ case, the relevant moral category is usually martial valor – *virtus* or *fortitudo* in Latin, *aretê* in Greek – in respect to which he is judged positively. Indeed, Polybius says that the positive report, *eukleia*, which Horatius expects to gain among his countrymen is what makes him willing to die in battle, and the enemy soldiers too, as just noted, vouch for his resolution and boldness. In other cases, audiences may determine (for example) that an actor displayed irreverence toward the gods, judging him negatively in the category of *pietas* (ch. 3.3.4); or that she violated an agreement or contract, judging her negatively in the category of *fides* (ch. 2.3), and so on. In its witnessing and judging, then, the primary audience picks one particular action out of the vast flow of human action, “marks” it as worthy of special attention, and defines its contribution to the collective good. These judges thereby imbue the selected action with social significance, converting it into a “deed” (*res gesta*) with implied or explicit normative force.⁷

0.3.3 *Commemoration*

This deed – that is, the action, its performer, and the evaluation(s) it received – is commemorated via one or more monuments. A monument is any sign capable of summoning the deed to recollection or creating awareness of it. Texts are an especially important monumental form thanks to the density of information they accommodate, their special capacity to transmit narrative, and their ability to circulate widely even in antiquity (and of course surviving texts are the chief vehicle through which we moderns know about Roman society). But many other media

⁷ The “gaze” in Roman literature and art has received intensive scholarly attention in recent decades. This discussion has focused on the “erotics” of viewing, or on viewers’ pleasure (e.g. Fredrick 2002). Morally evaluative viewing, such as I describe here, has not received systematic discussion, yet is omnipresent in Roman culture. For starting points on the moral gaze see Bartsch 2006: 191–208, Kaster 2005: 28–65, and Solodow 1979: 252–60. It is most intensively discussed by military historians and literary scholars who examine war narratives, as they consider how generals and other soldiers view, evaluate, and reward individual military performances. See e.g. Lendon 1999: 310–14, Feldherr 1998: 4–19 (and *passim*), Goldsworthy 1996: 150–63, 276–79, Davidson 1991: 14–18. But the moral gaze is not limited to military contexts.

also discharge monumental functions, and may reach much broader audiences at particular times and places than texts can: speeches or narratives in oral form, honorific statues or names, collections of spoils, commemorative inscriptions or paintings, built structures like temples or tombs or roads bearing names or other commemorative associations, toponyms or narratives attached to topographical features, wounds or scars or other bodily markings, rituals or other incorporated bodily practices, dramatic performances, and so on. Monuments include things purpose-made for specific commemorative ends, and preexisting things to which commemorative meanings come to be attached.⁸ In Horatius' case, the narratives that Polybius implies Romans orally recounted to one other are monuments to his deed, as is Polybius' own narrative (further monuments to Horatius are examined in ch. 1.2). The aristocratic funeral, for its part, has a key monumental function in Polybius' account, as it commemorates the deeds by which Horatius himself was inspired. Monuments disseminate knowledge of an action and its ascribed value, transmitting that knowledge beyond the circle of eyewitnesses to people distant in space or time. People who learn of a deed by encountering a monument I call "secondary" audiences. It is through monuments, then, that a deed (i.e. an action and its evaluation) is inscribed into the structure of the *mos maiorum*, marking it as something "memorable." Actions not taken up into the witnessing-judging-monumentalizing process remain unmarked and are culturally "forgotten," as they lack a structure and context that can make them available and intelligible to people elsewhere and *elsewhen*.⁹

⁸ My use of "monument" requires sensitivity to the word's etymological relation to *monere*, "to warn, advise, remind" (e.g. de Vaan 2008: 387, Maltby 1991: 392). This relation supplies the primary sense of *monumentum*, "a carrier of memory, spur to recollection, *aide-mémoire*" (TLL s.v.; the Latin word most commonly refers to statues, tombs, temples, and texts). The connotations of imposing appearance and durability that accompany the modern concept of "monument" are not essential to the Roman *monumentum*: these features may enhance, but are not prerequisite to, an object's capacity to "remind" and "advise." The bibliography on monumentality is vast; recent scholarship helpful to this project includes certain contributions in Nora 1992 and Stein-Hölkeskamp/Hölkeskamp 2006 (all on "lieux de mémoire / Erinnerungsorte"); also Morley 2011, Lentano 2007: 147–54, Thomas 2007: 168–70, Walter 2004a: 131–79, Hölkeskamp 2003 and 1996: 302–8, Hölscher 2001: 188–207, Späth 1998: 37–41, Feldherr 1998: 21–37, Jaeger 1997: 15–29 (and *passim*), Connerton 1989: 41–104, Assmann 1988a: 12–13 (expanded in other works).

⁹ Ardener 1989: 24–6 contends that events become "memorable" by being "registered" into structure as they occur. "Unregistered" actions may, of course, be retained in the individual memories of actors and observers, as long as these individuals live. The "forgetting" entailed in defacing or obliterating monuments, which alters the valence of a memory that has already been registered into structure, is a different matter, but a valuable study in its own right: e.g. Flower 2006, Roller 2010: 144–66, Hedrick 2000: 89–130, and chs. 7.4–5.

0.3.4 *Norm Setting*

Audiences, both primary and secondary, are enjoined to accept the deed – now inscribed via monuments into the moral framework of the *mos maiorum* – as normative, i.e. as having a morally prescriptive or obligatory character. That is, the deed is taken to set or confirm a moral standard by which audience members should judge other actions they observe in their own time and place, or to provide a model that they themselves should imitate or avoid.¹⁰ Horatius, according to Polybius, exemplifies the youth who is inspired to perform a great deed by learning during a funeral about great deeds done in the past; thus he is imitating, or instantiating a norm derived from, deeds commemorated in the monument he encountered (here a funeral oration). The acceptance of a deed as providing a standard for judging or a model for performing future actions therefore primes the pump for a return to operations (1) and (2), performing and evaluating actions in the public eye. Roman exemplarity's four operations are thus both sequential and cyclical: actions are observed, evaluated, and commemorated, creating standards and models that inspire and shape new actions; these are observed and evaluated in their turn, and so on, in an endless loop of social reproduction.

0.4 Supplemental Comments on the Model

Three supplementary comments on this model seem necessary. First, the looping character of the four operations entails that Roman exemplarity always has both a retrospective and a prospective logic. Any action in the public eye can be viewed, by the actor and/or the judging audiences, both retrospectively for its relationship to earlier performances that may have supplied it with models, and prospectively for the norms it may supply to future actors and judges. In either case, performers and audiences look beyond the current cycle of exemplary operations to cycles that

¹⁰ On the morally binding quality of the *mos maiorum*, see Bettini 2011[2000]: 104–7, Hölkeskamp 1996: 318–20, Assmann 1988a: 14–15. By “norm” I mean a relatively specific form of action, evaluated within a category of moral value, that underpins a reasonably widespread belief that one “ought” to act like this. In the moral category of “martial valor,” Horatius’ exemplary performance may be regarded, depending on context, as setting the norm of “one should fight to the death” (in Polybius’ version), or “one should not shrink from fighting against greater numbers,” or “one should incur wounds in defense of the fatherland” (in versions where he survives), or “one should fight with the aim of gaining eternal renown,” and so on; Horatius’ name may be associated with any such norm when it is articulated or implied. My thinking is indebted to Flaig 2005: 209–10, 215 (borrowing some of his language) and Haltenhoff 2005: 92–4, 99–100; 2001: 214–15; 2000: 17–19 and n. 11.

were completed in the past or that will be carried out in the future. This looking-out beyond the current cycle commonly introduces a competitive dimension to exemplary performance. Social actors, as imitators attuned to the glory and prestige of prior performances, inevitably strive to be judged not just as matching, but as surpassing, those prior performances in their chosen arena. Furthermore, as we will see, these actors and their judging audiences are usually aware of the standards and models they themselves are setting for future actors, who of course will try to equal or surpass them in turn. Competition is thus inscribed into the logic of the system, and indeed is found pervasively in Roman exemplarity.

Second, if Roman exemplarity is understood as consisting of a set of practices, beliefs, values, and symbols, organized and linked in a particular manner by the operations just detailed, then we moderns are seriously hampered by being unable to observe these social practices as they occur, or to access directly the associated beliefs and values. We have access only to the *discourse* of exemplarity, or to its *logic*, which alone survives for us to interpret – the system of interlinked visual and verbal signs, ensconced in monuments of all sorts, by which Romans represented to themselves the relevant practices, beliefs, values, and their interrelations. From these discursive elements, the otherwise unobservable practices, beliefs, and values must be reconstructed – as I seek to do in this book. Indeed, the discourse itself, consisting of signs and symbols sedimented in monuments, is part of the practice of Roman exemplarity. But since this practice cannot be observed directly as the Romans carry it out, elements of it that escape symbolic representation are now lost forever.¹¹

Third, Romans across a broad social spectrum participate in exemplary thinking and action. The evidence, to be sure, is biased toward elites. Certain monumental forms, such as buildings erected from war spoils, triumphs, and honorific statues, were created only by and for elites who had access to the magistracies that entitled them to hold military commands. Literary texts too were generally written by, and tend to address the concerns and interests of, the higher social strata. Thus the exemplary figures who feature in these texts tend to be aristocrats engaged in socially exclusive activities, like (say) victorious generals. Yet this bias does not exclude other Romans. It is literary texts, for example, that furnish information

¹¹ This semiotic articulation of “discourse” echoes aspects of the term’s usage by Michel Foucault, Roger Chartier, and other post-structuralist theorists of culture. My own earlier discussions (Roller 2004: 4–10, 2009b: 216–17) did not distinguish carefully enough between discourse (a symbolic system) and practice or action (some dimensions of which escape symbolic expression), and the ways in which these different phenomena may be accessed.

about Siccius Dentatus, a non-elite who was among the most decorated and celebrated of all Roman soldiers; and Iulius Caesar's war narratives feature non-elite centurions as the principal vectors of traditional Roman military valor.¹² Certain other monumental forms, like scars and military decorations, commemorate the deeds of elite and non-elite actors without distinction. Funerary monuments survive in vast quantities from non-elite social strata, especially in the imperial age; these monuments' iconography and inscriptions – exposing the “epigraphic habit” of non-elite Romans – show such people engaging in exemplary thinking and behavior. Finally, monumental forms of every sort could be interpreted by secondary witnesses of any status. The import of a scar, triumph, honorific statue, and the like was patent to everyone. And even literary texts, which might be thought inaccessible to those of limited literacy, could be made accessible (along with any exemplary deeds they commemorate) through recitations and other types of performance.¹³ The quantity, variety, and social accessibility of monumental forms thus suggests that actors of every status took care to submit their actions to judging audiences that were socially diverse and thereby represented the *entire* Roman community in whose interest these actions were performed.

0.5 Three Cultural Dimensions of Roman Exemplarity

I step back now from the particulars of the model to consider more generally the social and cultural work that exempla do in ancient Rome. First, exempla are central to Roman argumentation and persuasion, hence can affect how Romans actually behave. Second, they are a key component of

¹² Siccius Dentatus: Dion. *Rom.* 10.36–8, Val. Max. 3.2.24, Plin. *Nat.* 7.101, Gell. 2.11; see ch. 1.3 on Caesar's centurion Scaeva. Val. Max. 3.2.6 says that elites in the good old days fretted about being outdone in valor by people beneath them in social status. On forms of cultural production and ideologies that encompass elites and non-elites alike, see e.g. Lobur 2013: 317–19, Bell 1999: 273–6, Hölkeskamp 1996: 303–12, and Horsfall 1996: 109–114 (and *passim*). Elite and non-elite values overlap, but are not identical and may cohabit uneasily: see Horsfall 1999, Alston 1998, and Lendon 1997: 237–66 on the army as a distinct society and culture; also de Libero 2002: 179–85 and Leigh 1995: 200–5 on the class and status implications of wounding.

¹³ Habinek 1998: 45–59 discusses literature as vehicle for elite acculturation, but Bell 1999: 264–7 (and *passim*) discusses how oral readings of literary texts may make them available to non-elites and even non-readers. Within literary texts, the audiences described as observing and judging an action are often representative of the Roman people as a whole: for instance, in Livy the observers of “spectacular” deeds are often the army in the field, the mob in the forum, or the voting tribes and centuries at the elections. These groupings include elites and non-elites. On the social range of exemplarity in general, Bell 2008: 14–19.

Roman moral discourse, hence to the establishment, reproduction, and modification of social values. Third, they presuppose a particular relationship between present and past, and so constitute a kind of historical consciousness. These functions may be closely interconnected. Persuasive rhetoric often involves moral discourse, and the morally freighted exemplary figures employed in Roman argumentation tend to be drawn from the past. Therefore Romans must make certain assumptions about how their present relates to the past, in order to be persuaded by moral arguments that depend on invoking past figures. These three dimensions of exemplarity – the rhetorical, the moral, and the historiographical – are thus central to the work that examples do in Roman culture, and all are pertinent, in varying degrees, to each case study presented in the chapters to follow. To clarify how they pertain, let me expand on these three dimensions in turn.

0.5.1 *The Rhetorical Dimension*

Exempla commonly appear in argumentative contexts, in which a speaker or author seeks to persuade an audience that some proposition is true or false, or urges the audience toward a particular course of action.¹⁴ The fundamental rhetorical structure of the exemplum is a general statement followed by one or more particular examples that should affirm the general statement's correctness. Speakers or authors may adduce exempla *illustratively*, as particular instances that substantiate the general assertion. The passage of Polybius discussed earlier (ch. 0.2) illustrates this usage: Polybius seeks to persuade his Greek readers that Romans are inspired to perform great deeds when they learn of great deeds performed in the past, and he invokes Horatius as an example corroborating this general claim.¹⁵ The operation of illustrative exempla is fundamentally logical, the argument being that any example adduced is typical and there are others like it. Norm setting (operation 4 as described above) takes a back seat in this deployment, since the immediate point is not primarily a moral one.

¹⁴ The role of exempla in making arguments persuasive, particularly in deliberative or forensic speeches, is heavily theorized in ancient rhetorical treatises, and has received significant scholarly attention: e.g. *Rhet. Her.* 4.62; *Cic. Part. Or.* 96, *Inu.* 1.49, *Or.* 120, with recent discussion by van der Blom 2010: 65–72 and Bücher 2006: 152–5 (with full bibliography). The Roman theory partially overlaps with Aristotle's theory of the *paradeigma* as set forth in *Rhet.* 1356–7, 1393, 1398 and elsewhere: Bücher 2006: 152–5, Stemmler 2000: 152–5, Maguire 1982, Alewell 1913: 11–18.

¹⁵ Polyb. 6.54.6 (quoted above): "One notable instance will suffice for the present, offered as an example and as proof." Modern argumentation is no different: here I have adduced a particular passage of Polybius to substantiate my general claims about the rhetorical structure of the example.

Alternatively, speakers or authors may adduce exempla *injunctively*, to urge a particular course of action they regard as efficacious or morally correct under the circumstances, or to furnish a moral standard for their audiences to adopt as their own when evaluating the actions of others.¹⁶ The operation of injunctive exempla is fundamentally moral, defining “how things in general ought to be done” or, more pointedly, “what specifically ought to be done, or is acceptable to do, now.” Typicality is not essential here, and indeed the “model” case may be highly distinctive (ch. 0.5.2). To adduce an exemplum in either the illustrative or injunctive mode, then – to make a claim about what is *likely* to happen or *ought* to happen – is to assume or project, for the purposes of persuasion, that present or future actions will be similar to actions performed, and outcomes that resulted, under similar circumstances in the past.¹⁷

But contestation arises around the matter of establishing just how similar those circumstances are, and therefore how well a particular exemplum “fits” the situation in which it is adduced – or, alternatively, how well a particular example supports the general heading under which it is marshaled. Establishing “fit” is pivotal to establishing how likely the future is to resemble the past, and hence to whether the argument is persuasive. Consequently, a speaker who adduces an exemplum in support of an argument always shapes it to maximize its congruence to the situation at hand. An adversary arguing the other side, conversely, may seek to discredit the exemplum by contending that the fit is bad. He may allege that the situations are different (perhaps leading him to invoke an alternative exemplum), or that the old story lacks credibility, or that the recommended action is badly rather than well done and is therefore contrary to the *mos maiorum* (i.e. that the performance is being evaluated within an incorrect or inappropriate moral category), and the like. In short, no invocation of an exemplum is ever “neutral.” All are tendentious and partisan, as befits their argumentative context.¹⁸ Rhetorical adversaries may also dispute what

¹⁶ The terms “illustrative” and “injunctive” were suggested to me by Noel Carroll; for the distinction see Barchiesi 2009: 46, Harvey 1992: 195, 208. My discussion of this matter at Roller 2004: 52–3 is confused; Lowrie 2008: 165 n. 3 points to one gap. In Roller 2015a I develop this distinction further. For other taxonomies of exempla that meet other needs, see Chaplin 2000: 137–40, 162–5; Stemmler 2000: 158.

¹⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.8 expressly asserts the future-orientedness of exempla invoked in deliberative situations, though the idea that the present and future are likely to look like the past is older (e.g. Thuc. 1.22.4, Polyb. 12.25b.2–3; discussion by Rösen 2005: 11, Haltenhoff 2000: 25–6, Chaplin 2000: 197–200). For a real case, see Cic. *Phil.* 5.25–7, with van der Blom 2010: 109–14.

¹⁸ Non-“neutrality” of exempla: van der Blom 2010: 62, Lowrie 2008: 173, and Dowling 2000 (foundational). Shaping examples to fit the immediate argumentative context long predates the Romans: see Alden 2000: 23–38 and Willcock 1964 for this phenomenon in Homer. Tendentious

specific performance, or aspect of a performance, a particular monument commemorates, or whether a given object is a monument at all; whether judging audiences have identified the implied norm correctly; whether a later action constitutes a proper imitation; and so on. They may even turn an exemplum to diametrically opposed ends in the selfsame debate.¹⁹ In the chapters to follow, I will show how these and other strategies are put into action to affirm or deny the fit of an exemplum to the situation at hand, hence to dispute the vision of the present or future that the exemplum implies. Interpretive flexibility and rhetorical contestation are endemic to Roman exemplarity, and indeed are its lifeblood, as the relevance and implications of an exemplum adduced in a given situation – defining what happened in the original case, what is the same or different about the current case, whether this case has been brought under the correct general heading, and what may or should happen now or later – are argued from this side and that.

0.5.2 *The Moral or Ethical Dimension*

I remarked earlier that established social values, usually regarded as belonging to the *mos maiorum*, provide a structured moral framework, hence a set of categories, for sorting actions that an audience of community members has witnessed. This remark may seem to imply that categories defined by abstract values take epistemological and axiological precedence over the particular actions they subsume. In fact, in Roman culture the reverse is true. As many scholars have observed, Roman authors rarely discuss abstract values as if they were *a priori* givens, let alone derivable from universal laws or connected to broader doctrine. Rather, Roman authors tend to present values as being *implicit in*, or as *emerging from*, particular exemplary performances. If Platonic ethics, for example – or any other formalized philosophical “system” – asks, “What is the nature of the good,

shaping: Polybius says that Horatius Cocles died defending the bridge; yet in every other extant version he survives (usually wounded). I speculate that this death is Polybius’ invention, introduced into the received tale to enhance its “fit” to his argument: ch. 1.2.5 and n. 43.

¹⁹ Cicero says that an orator needs a good stock of exempla on hand, to support whatever kind of argument is required (*Part. Or.* 96). Quintilian offers strategies for undermining your opponent’s exempla (*Inst.* 5.13.23–4). Recent scholarly discussions touching on “fit,” and on the strategies for affirming or discrediting particular exempla, include Langlands 2011: 106–10 (and *passim*), van der Blom 2010: 103–28 (esp. 112–16), Bücher 2006: 322–5, Walter 2004a: 63–70, Flaig 2003: 77–81; further instances are analyzed by O’Gorman 2011: 272–7, Chaplin 2000: 39–40, Lyons 1989: 19 (on Erasmus), David 1980: 79–81. Ch. 7.4–5 offers detailed analysis of a rhetorical battle waged through competing deployments of exempla.

or courage, or love (etc.), and how is it manifested?”, a Roman actor who embraces an exemplary moral outlook would declare, in the injunctive mode, something like this: “I must measure my own and others’ performances against the standard of Horatius Cocles (who displayed courage).” Thus Roman values typically manifest a concrete-to-abstract movement, rather than the reverse, and are inextricably linked to specific actors and their concrete deeds.²⁰ Indeed, actions that seem most “pregnant” with some value – thematizing or highlighting it, appearing *notably* right or wrong in their manifestation of that value – tend to make the transition to exemplary status. It is these actions in particular that are plucked from the vast flow of human action, “marked” as significant, registered into the moral categories of the *mos maiorum*, granted commemoration (hence saved from oblivion), and so constituted as normative.²¹ Such deeds and their performers assume their particular moral authority not despite, but precisely because of, their rarity and exceptionality.²² In its moral dimension, then, Roman exemplarity privileges the concrete performance over the abstract value.

While one should not overstress the sharpness of the boundary between the formal, doctrinal ethics often associated with the late Classical and Hellenistic philosophical schools and the more casuistic ethics manifested by exemplarity and other “popular” styles of morality, it may nevertheless be said, with due caution, that doctrinal ethics provides an alternative to exemplarity, a different way of thinking about how values, actions, and social context interarticulate. I will say more about this alternative in the conclusion (ch. 8).²³

Despite the foregrounding of particularity and contingency in Roman exemplarity, individual actions must be categorized according to values

²⁰ This is not to resurrect the false old generalization that Greeks think abstractly and Romans concretely (e.g. Kornhardt 1936: 20–1, 34). Indeed, Aristotle already rejects Plato’s abstract, idealistic ethics in favor of a situational, applied approach (Hedrick 2009: 425–6). My point here is that idealizing philosophical ethics foregrounds the general, seeing the concrete as instances; while exemplary ethics foregrounds the concrete, seeing the general as emerging from the specific. Further discussion in Haltenhoff 2005: 86–91 and 2000: 22–7 (emphasizing Roman values’ “Handlungsgebundenheit,” or connectedness to action); also van der Blom 2010: 68, 77; Hölscher 2001: 199–200.

²¹ See Flaig and Haltenhoff, cited n. 10 above. Warnick 2008: 35–9 likewise describes “the exemplary” as that in which some quality or value is particularly salient.

²² Rarity of unusual displays: Lyons 1989: 32–3. On the *auctoritas* of an exemplum, see Cic. *Inu.* 1.49, further developed at *Ver.* 2.3.209; also *Rhet. Her.* 4.49.62 insists on the importance of naming the *auctor* of the exemplary performance. Discussion by van der Blom 2010: 65–6; Stemmler 2001: 224–6; 2000: 150–5.

²³ See Morgan 2007: 333–40 on this boundary, especially in relation to the moral discourse of fables and *gnomai* (which she considers, like exempla, to be forms of “popular morality”); also 15–17 on the “systematic” character of these popular moralizing modes.

that the community shares and deems significant, if the actions are to acquire meaning and have consequences for the community at large.²⁴ This categorizing, in fact, is what audiences do when they evaluate actions (the second operation) and assign them to moral categories. An exemplum, in other words, acquires social relevance only by being an example *of* a larger, more general, superordinate moral category. Without a superordinate category to provide organization, particulars are not “examples,” but rather “cases” (in, for example, the psychoanalytical sense): occurrences or events, presented *seriatim*, from which patterns or organizing principles may, or may not, be inferred on a provisional and ever-shifting basis, subject always to revision in light of the next case in the series.²⁵ In assigning an action to a moral category, a judging audience renders the action comparable to and commensurable with other actions that have previously been assigned to the same category, and that already stand as examples of it. Moral categorization thus “flattens” the contingency and particularity of individual performances, rendering them *equivalent* insofar as they share the particular moral quality that the category predicates of them. Consequently, if a speaker presents an argument requiring an exemplary instance of some moral quality – say, *fortitudo*, of which Valerius Maximus (3.2) presents about forty discrete actors and actions – then any performance assigned to this category ought to serve equally well: each stands as a “typical” instance, equivalent in respect to this category with all other exempla assigned to the same category. This “typicality” of exempla, their propensity to be grouped with other exempla under rubrics corresponding to broadly accepted moral values, is the ultimate source of their moral content and social power. So while exempla are “unique” in the circumstances of their production (and, as I will argue, in the specific argumentative contexts in which they are invoked), they are “typical” in sharing with other

²⁴ The question of how humans abstract and generalize at all, since we live in a phenomenal world that confronts us only with discrete objects and events, has engaged philosophers from Plato, who articulated the theory of forms, to Derrida, who labels the whole question “exemplarism” (e.g. Hollander 2008: 1–2, 51–4). Cognitive linguists have pursued this question from a different perspective. On the “passage” of the exemplum from particularity to generality, see Barchiesi 2009: 45–7; Hollander 2008: 51–4; Harvey 1992: 199, 213–15.

²⁵ A series of cases may presuppose the existence of an organizing principle that is undiscovered or perhaps changeable. Alternatively, such a series may point to a form of knowledge that dwells only on the level of the particular and moves analogically from one case to the next, without ever adducing or presupposing a taxonomy in which a “general” subsumes the particulars. Such a form of knowledge constitutes another “outside” to exemplarity, and indeed to much of western metaphysics. See Lüdemann 2014, esp. 120–1; further reflection on taxonomies and relations of particular to general in Lowrie/Lüdemann 2015 (with other contributions in this volume), and Lyons 1989: 20–8 (earlier views).

exempla a predicate derived from a shared moral category. Their ontology is double in this way, and they exhibit the one face or the other depending on the circumstances under which they are adduced.²⁶

In fact, individual examples of a given value once again show their “unique” faces as soon as they are adduced in a particular argumentative context. For the details of a specific exemplary performance relate to the details of the specific argumentative context – which is to say, the exemplum “fits” its context or frame – in a distinctive way that is unlike the fit any other exemplum would produce, even if drawn from the same moral category. An audience’s perception of a given exemplum’s “fit” to its context will affect how morally compelling and persuasive the overall argument appears to be. An exemplum may, for example, seem to fit badly by exceeding the framing situation, displaying elements or implications that go beyond the point notionally being argued or illustrated. Alternatively, the moral complexity that performances in their particularity often display – admitting positive evaluation in one category but negative evaluation in another, with different audience sectors offering divergent categorizations – may seem to vitiate the fit, and hinder the easy acceptance of the exemplum as providing a norm.²⁷ Finally, even within a given moral category, the particularities of specific exempla, or even the order in which a list of exempla is extruded, may create internal groupings or “speciation” linking some instances more closely together than others. I will point out instances of all these “particularity effects” in the chapters to come.²⁸

Monuments present particular challenges to secondary audiences looking to derive moral information from them. Secondary audiences may

²⁶ Kornhardt 1936: 49 already observed that exempla partake of typicality and uniqueness; recent discussion by Barchiesi 2009: 46–7, Gelley 1995: 1–3, and the works cited next.

²⁷ On categorical disagreements see Langlands 2008: 172 and n. 49, and more generally Langlands 2011 on “situation ethics.” Quintilian (*Inst.* 5.11.24) illustrates a simple form of categorical disagreement: you can try to discredit your opponent’s exemplum by asserting that the deed he adduces was badly rather than well done. Examples in chs. 1.2.3, 3.3.4, 4.6, 5.3.1 below. Seneca offers a sweeping Stoic critique of the moral categories of Roman exemplarity and the criteria for assigning actions to those categories; see the conclusion (ch. 8).

²⁸ On the “excess” that examples display, see Goldhill 1994: 58–9, 70, Harvey 1992: 195–6, Lyons 1989: 34. This characteristic was noticed and concisely articulated around 30 CE by Velleius Paterculus: *non enim ibi consistunt exempla, unde coeperunt, sed quamlibet in tenuem recepta tramitem latissime evagandi sibi viam faciunt, et ubi semel recto deerratum est, in praeceps pervenitur* (2.3.4); see also Lowrie 2008: 173. Matters of “fit” and of moral complexity arise frequently in this book: see especially ch. 2.2, 3.4, 5.5, and 7.4–5. For the dynamics of exempla in lists, where interactions between particular items may produce effects that transcend or undermine the relations authorized by their shared predicate, see Roller 2015a: 87–90 (and *passim*); also Langlands 2008: 162–3, Belknap 2004: 6–8, 15–35, Harvey 1992: 196–206, 214–15; particular instance in ch. 1.3.

modify or reject entirely the judgments that they find sedimented in monuments created by primary audiences – deciding, perhaps, that an action should be evaluated negatively rather than positively (or vice versa), or placed in a different moral category, in order for it to impart a relevant standard or model to the present. Secondary audiences may further disagree among themselves or be uncertain about how to interpret a monument: that is, they may struggle to “reconstruct” from a monument an exemplary performance along with a norm or norms that seem pertinent to the present.²⁹ They may even disagree whether the object under discussion is a monument at all. Finally, secondary audiences commonly create further monuments to a deed: they may restore an old statue, erect a new one, or write a text that narrates the old deed anew (e.g. when invoking an exemplary figure to support an argument, as Polybius does with Horatius). In so doing they often make reference to the monument(s) by which they came to know of the deed in the first place, either confirming or altering the valuation they interpreted that monument as carrying.³⁰ All such debates about the moral value and significance of exempla, and about the meanings of monuments, not only contribute to the ongoing work of relating events in the phenomenal world to the moral categories that bestow social meaning, but also enable judging audiences to develop their faculty for making nuanced, defensible moral judgments and for distinguishing among moral concepts.³¹

0.5.3 *The Historiographical Dimension*

Exempla have a timelessness about them. The sequence of operations expounded earlier (ch. 0.3) presupposes that deeds performed in the past, together with the beliefs and values that motivated them, are comprehensible, morally compelling, and reproducible in the present. The looping of these operations further implies that deeds performed in the present will be similarly meaningful to future audiences. This assumption of eternal comprehensibility and relevance is a consequence of, and has implications for,

²⁹ On the “reconstructability” of monuments see Assmann 1988a: 13, 2011[1992]: 26–8; Bettini 2011[2000]: 118–19 (in different terms). Uncertainty about or errors in the interpretation of monuments: Jaeger 1997: 10–12, 121–3, Wiseman 1987a: 90–5, Keesling 2005: 49–57 (Greek example).

³⁰ Consequently, monuments often “cross-reference” one another: a text mentions an honorific statue or cognomen, an inscription reports a triumph, a temple dedicated by a victor contains a painting of the battle during which the temple was vowed, and so on. Many cases of cross-referencing are discussed in this book: see especially chs. 1.2.4–5, 4.4, 6.3, and 7.4.5.

³¹ On moral conclusions that everyday moral actors may draw from their encounters with art (the form taken by many monuments discussed in this book), see Carroll 2002: 7–19, Mullin 2002: 144–8.

how the past as a whole is viewed. The past (and by implication the future) is taken to occupy a space of experience that is, if not identical to the present, then transparently continuous with or analogous to it, so that past and present actions can be compared and evaluated according to the same standards. The past is not separated from the present by ruptures or profound changes that would render the motivations and meanings of past actions opaque to present viewers. Viewing the past as “close” and easily accessible to the present is thus the condition of possibility for deploying exempla.³² Conversely, to invoke and deploy exempla is to *project* the past as being close, accessible, and continuous or analogous with the present – even if those exempla are invoked in support of innovative, unprecedented courses of action. Romans are always on the side of the *mos maiorum*, and the rhetoric of following *mos* is more or less compulsory. This rhetoric serves to legitimate any course of action, even an innovation, by presenting it as sanctioned by exemplary precedents emerging from a “near,” accessible past. Arguments *against* a given course of action, conversely, commonly assert that it is contrary to the *mos maiorum*.³³ To presuppose or project a past that is similar enough to the present that it can provide norms via exempla I will term the “exemplary” view of the relationship between past and present.

The construction and maintenance of the “exemplary” view depends upon a particular feature of monumentalization: namely, that a monument detaches an action performed under specific social and historical circumstances from the bulk of its original context. When a speaker or writer invokes an exemplum to support an argument, for example, the monumental form in which he presents the past deed is a “paranarrative,” an inset narrative of or reference to events whose temporality, locality, and cast of characters differs from those in the surrounding material.³⁴ Once it

³² Morgan 2007: 345–56 discusses how “popular” moral systems, including examples, presuppose societies that are stable over time; Bücher 2006: 320–2 remarks on the “closeness” of the exemplary past, and the absence of epochal distinctions that might render it unable to ratify the present; Koselleck 1985[1967]: 22 speaks of exemplary argumentation as melding past and present into a “continuous space of experience.” See also Vlassopoulos 2011: 166, Hölkeskamp 2003: 233–4, 2001: 98, and Walters 1996: 80–8, 94–7. Knapp 1989: 124–34 examines the relationships of continuity and analogy that present interpreters may project onto the past, to make it serve present needs.

³³ For this rhetoric, van der Blom 2010: 81–2, Wallace-Hadrill 2008: 235–6, Walter 2004a: 66–7, Braun 2002, Bettini 2011[2000]: 107–113, Chaplin 2000: 156–62; more generally Warnick 2008: 116–17. Scholars have consequently remarked that, in Lévi-Strauss’ terms, Rome is a “hot” society (one that experiences significant change over time) masquerading as a “cold” society (one that does not): see Bettini 2011[2000]: 113, Walter 2004a: 60–2, and Assmann 1988b: 107–10.

³⁴ For example, Polybius relates Horatius’ deed not as part of a continuous narrative of the wars marking the birth of the Roman Republic (its “original” context: ch. 1.1), but as a “paranarrative” inserted into a description of the mid-republican aristocratic funeral. For the “paranarrative” quality of examples, see Lyons 1989: 30–1, Alden 2000: 1, 23–38.

is stripped of its original social and historical context and inserted into an entirely different one, the deed is liberated from limits on interpretation that the original context might have imposed, and can receive new meanings that accord with its new context. Visual monuments, such as honorific statues or inscriptions, function similarly in that they adduce and insert into any given viewer's contemporary context deeds performed by other people at other times and places. Indeed some inscriptions directly address their future readers, insisting on the relevance of the commemorated person or deed to that reader's own experience.³⁵ By their very deracination, then, monuments of all sorts stimulate and encourage their viewers to relate them to their present context, to ascribe meaning to them here and now, and to praise and blame the commemorated actions by the same standards they apply to actions they personally witness.³⁶ Hence the "timeless" character of exempla, the sense that through them the past speaks to the present in an eternally valid language of morality. The metaphor "time island" neatly captures this dynamic of de- and recontextualization: the monument is an isolated outpost of the past surrounded by the ocean of the present, where present viewers and judges encounter and seek to comprehend that past within their own frameworks of value and possibility.³⁷

This "exemplary" view of the relationship between past and present may be contrasted with the "historicist" view, long dominant in the academy, which posits that societies undergo structural and moral change over time. Such change means that the social positionality and motivating values of past actors, who operate *ex hypothesi* within a different social and moral framework from present observers, do not necessarily lie open to

³⁵ On the temporal dislocation or decontextualization that enables exempla to stake out diachronic moral claims, see e.g. Lucarelli 2007: 296 ("Dekontextualisierung/Umkontextualisierung"), Kraus 2005 (on this phenomenon in narrative historiography), Walter 2004a: 46 ("zeitlos"), 411–12; Flaig 2003: 90–1, Engels 2001: 144 ("zeitlos" ... und leichter auf andere Situationen übertragbar"), Witzmann 2000: 78–9 (on inscriptions that address the reader), Späth 1998: 46 ("décontextualisés, comme significations abstraites"), Hölkeskamp 1996: 314–15, 323–4 ("metahistorisch"), Hampton 1990: 10–11 ("momentary universality"), Lyons 1989: 11–14. In this book, monuments to past heroes that are explicitly and systematically related to a later viewer's own present include Cloelia's statue as described by Seneca (ch. 2.2), Duilius' column as appropriated by Augustus (ch. 4.4) and the "statue of Cornelia" in the context of the porticus Octaviae (ch. 6.4).

³⁶ Scholars have observed that the stock of knowledge monuments provide about the past is morally binding on the present: Assmann 2011[1992]: 26–8, 1988a: 13 (on "cultural memory"), Hölkeskamp 2003: 233–4, Hölkeskamp 1996: 312–13. Yet it is the present that identifies this knowledge as such, and ascribes to it (hence imposes upon itself) its binding force. On the exemplary linkage of past to present and present to future see Assmann 2011[1992]: 17, Walter 2004a: 55–6.

³⁷ On "time islands" ("Zeitinseln"), see Assmann 1988a: 12. Jaeger 1997: 15–18 shows that temporal dislocation is constitutive of any encounter with a monument, and that Varro (*Lat.* 6.49) was already attuned to this dynamic.

the latter's immediate apprehension. The past, on its face, is strange and distant – a “foreign country,” in David Lowenthal's famous formulation – and the present observer who seeks access to it must reconstruct, via scholarship and imagination, its social structures, value system, and horizons of possibility. While there may be certain diachronic regularities or features persisting from past to present, the historicist view remains fundamentally *relativist* in holding that an historical actor's actions and motivations must be interpreted in the context of the structural, material, and moral particularity of her own time and place, and that these differ from the observer's. The paramount importance of an action's original context, in the historicist view, forecloses the monumental dynamic described in the previous paragraph: that the action can be thought to give meaning to or receive meaning from its later contexts. According to the historicist view, past actions do *not* supply norms that posterity can immediately accept, and there is no simple or direct way to “learn lessons” from the past. An observer of past actions whose outlook is governed by historicizing assumptions is therefore not a “secondary witness” who feels called upon to accept those actions as normative, but rather is what we moderns would call an “historian.” By the same token, the exemplary performer is not an “historical” actor. The moral import of an exemplary deed does not really require the deed to have been performed precisely as the monuments allege, or indeed to have been performed at all. The possibility of an historicist understanding thus constitutes another kind of boundary to exemplarity, an alternative epistemology providing a fundamentally different way of conceptualizing the present's relationship to the past. I will probe this boundary further in chapter 4.

A larger question thus arises regarding the relationship between the exemplary view of the past and actual events that occurred in the past. The sequence of four operations traced above exposes what Romans from the middle Republic onward took to be the normal way in which actions were performed and evaluated, and values thereby established and instilled. In some cases this sequence may describe the actual unfolding of an action in the public eye, its evaluation by a judging audience, and its transmutation into monumental and normative form. More importantly, however, Romans commonly *assumed* that the operations of exemplarity hung together in this way, and this expectation was so strong that any given element (or perceived element) in the sequence of operations could attract or spawn the other elements required to complete the sequence. For example, if an object looked as if it might be monumental, it was liable to get attached to a performance, whether already known or manufactured

ad hoc, that it could be regarded as commemorating. Each operation presupposes and implies the others; each finds its meaning in the context of the ensemble. The dynamics of exemplarity thus tend toward connecting elements that may not, in historical actuality, have been connected, and may even lead to the outright fabrication of actors, deeds, and monuments as required to fill out a sequence of operations. Regarding Horatius, even ancient writers questioned the veracity of this legend, but this doubt did not reduce his efficacy as an exemplum of military valor. Horatius is undoubtedly an exemplary performer, but probably not an historical actor.³⁸

The distinction between “exemplary” and “historicist” views of the past was first articulated in the 1960s in pathbreaking essays by Reinhart Koselleck and George Nadel. These scholars argue that, from antiquity to the late eighteenth century, much historical writing turned the past to moralizing, didactic ends involving heavy use of exempla. Social actors in any given present could discover from the successes and failures of past actors what their own duties and obligations were, and how to fulfill them. Renaissance and Enlightenment writers, in fact, often used classical quotations – particularly the Ciceronian tag *historia magistra vitae*, “history [is] life’s teacher” – to authorize their moral and pedagogical deployment of the past, and to align their own historiographical practice with what they took to be that of the ancients. The “historicist” approach, meanwhile, crystallized within German Romanticism of the early nineteenth century (though its roots are older), and was central to the development of history as a modern academic discipline.³⁹ For this book’s purposes, I employ the Koselleckian “exemplary”/“historicist” distinction. Other scholars, however, have presented alternative taxonomies of historical consciousness to

³⁸ Examples of “backstories” assembled or fabricated for the sake of a compelling exemplum include the explanation for the cognomen Coclēs (ch. 1.2.4), details about Fabius Cunctator’s childhood (ch. 5.6), and the occasion for the erection of the “statue of Cornelia” (ch. 6.3); Solodow 1979: 261–4 provides fundamental discussion of the phenomenon. Horatius’ plausibility doubted: Livy 2.10.11; Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(10).3. On the irrelevance, within the logic of exemplarity, of whether exemplary deeds were actually performed, see Felmy 2001: 78–81, Späth 1998: 47, Hölkeskamp 1996: 320–3. On the extent to which the actual past matters for the claims that the present makes about the past, see Knapp 1989: 123–4.

³⁹ Koselleck 1985[1967], Nadel 1964; early reflection on Koselleck’s problematic by Stierle 1972 (esp. 183–6), and more recently by various contributors to Lianeri 2011 (especially Burke, Vlassopoulos, Morley, and Grethlein); also Kinneging 1997: 91–100, 306–8. Hedrick 2006: 1–7, 48–57 provides a lucid overview of the exemplarity/historicism distinction. For *historia magistra vitae* see Cic. *De Or.* 2.36. Other commonly cited classical authorities for exemplary historiography include [Dion.] *Rhet.* 11.2 and Polyb. 1.1.1–3.

meet other needs.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the exemplarity/historicism distinction is not absolute, but reflects only an overall orientation. In fact any discourse about the past, in any era, displays some admixture of these outlooks. First, there can plainly be no “pure” historicism in which a past is known to the present exclusively on its own terms, without any imposition of present frameworks or concerns. For no historian can avoid posing and answering questions from within her or his own horizons of possibility and value, which *ex hypothesi* differ from those of the past under investigation. Thus any discussion of the past is always pre-infused with present purposes.⁴¹ Second, a “pure” exemplary outlook that regards past and present as absolutely identical is equally impossible. Even before the advent of historicism as an articulated philosophy of history, certain changes over time were obvious to all observers.

Indeed, as I will argue, Roman historical consciousness does allow for (limited) change over time, but only in ways compatible with an exemplary outlook. For example, narratives of moral improvement or moral decline are omnipresent in Roman historiography, as is the idea that changing fortune (*fortuna*) elevates or abases individuals and groups in alternation. These narrative trajectories undeniably acknowledge change over time, as they present particular performances as exceeding or falling short of prior models. But the underlying, long-accepted categories of action and value persist; actors and actions past and present are always commensurable within this unchanging set of categories. Such change is entirely compatible with the logic of exemplarity (chs. 4.5, 5.2). A more fundamental challenge to exemplarity arises from change over time *in the*

⁴⁰ E.g. Rüsen 2005: 9–39 elaborates a fourfold taxonomy of historical consciousness, of which one category is labelled “exemplary.” Rüsen’s taxonomy is collapsed to three categories by Walter 2004a: 51–63, 84–89, 319–29. Knapp 1989: 124–34 adduces “continuity” and “analogy” as modes of relating present to past, in contrast to a concern for “the actual past.” Some scholars stratify the past into distinct epochs that relate differently to the present. Thus Feeney 2007: 68–107 and others posit a more recent “historical” epoch and a more distant “mythical” one, each with a distinct epistemological and rhetorical status, and separated by a “floating gap.” However, Roman exemplarity processes all performances similarly, regardless of temporal distance, and presupposes no stratification of the past into epochs (so Felmy 2001: 78–80; Purcell 2003: 33–4 and Gehrke 1994: 247–9 also reject the myth/history distinction). Assmann offers a stratified theory of memory, distinguishing a current and recent realm of “communicative memory” from a remoter realm of “cultural memory,” separated again by a “floating gap” (1988a: 10–16, 2011[1992]: 34–41). But Assmann’s taxonomy fits awkwardly with ancient Rome, where features of both these memory realms can be found at every temporal distance (see ch. 6.6; also Bücher 2006: 106–9; Hölkeskamp 2005: 259–60, 2003: 233–4; Fraas 2000: 38; Borsdorf/Grütter 1999: 4–5; Späth 1998: 42–6).

⁴¹ Theorists of historical method have long sought to understand and characterize the inescapable presentism of historicism: e.g. Gadamer 1979: 152–60, 2004[1960]: 291–306, Ricoeur 1981, and Ricoeur 1976 discuss the historian’s encounter with the past as a hermeneutic process.

moral categories themselves – change that might render the motivations of past actors opaque to present observers and hinder the exemplary transmission of norms. While such change might seem capable of generating an historicizing outlook, it does not typically seem to do so (ch. 4.6). For even moral change, if its scope is limited and it unfolds incrementally, may be accommodated within a fundamentally exemplary outlook – for instance, a modest, evolutionary expansion in the scope of a single moral category (ch. 5.4), or a change in the kind of actor regarded as a legitimate performer in a particular category (ch. 2.3–4). Such evolution may tug at the *mos maiorum*, modifying its structure slowly and incrementally. But no values are created or destroyed; the present always has access to all the moral resources it requires to evaluate and extract norms from past performances.

0.6 This Book's Contribution

The great variety of practices, beliefs, values, and symbols that constitute or participate in Roman exemplarity, and the diversity of texts and other monumental forms by which exemplarity is accessed, make the phenomenon difficult to grasp and analyze as a whole. By the same token, scholarship in many different fields of classical studies (and other fields) impinges upon one or another of its aspects, and any investigation of exemplarity impinges in its own turn on these varied fields of inquiry. Here I describe some of the fields with which this study connects, as well as those with which it does not connect (i.e. defining where its limits are), and I offer some justification for the structure this study manifests.

Within Classics, large and ever-growing bodies of scholarship address such topics as the role of spectacle in Roman civic culture, the memorial dynamics of various cultural products and practices (texts, genres, built structures, triumphs, funeral processions, etc.), the construction and validation of value systems (like the *mos maiorum*), the deployment of exemplary figures in specific Roman literary genres or texts and in other monumental types, and the place of examples in ancient rhetorical theory. The semantics of particular words or phrases pertinent to exemplarity have also been examined.⁴² As just seen (ch. 0.5.3), philosophers of history

⁴² Key Latin terms that have received useful semantic studies include *exemplum* / *exemplar*, *monumentum*, *documentum*, *mos* (*maiorum*), *primus*, *res gesta* / *rem gerere*, *laudo* / *laudatio*, *existimo* / *existimatio*, *intueor*, *sequor*, *imitor*, and the value categories of *virtus*, *pietas*, and *fides*; in some cases corresponding or overlapping Greek terms have also been studied.

have described different forms of historical consciousness; while in the burgeoning field of memory studies scholars have considered how societies (Roman and other) preserve and transmit their past in the service of the present. Scholars of medieval and early modern literatures have reflected on the moral and rhetorical dimensions of exempla in the texts they study, which sometimes offer illuminating parallels to Roman practice. And contemporary philosophers have investigated the dual ontology of examples as simultaneously unique and typical, along with the issues of singularity, representativeness, inclusion, and exclusion that this ontology entails (ch. 0.5.2). If I may use the parable of “touching the elephant,” all such scholars, while pursuing other questions, have put their hands on some part of the ungainly beast that is Roman exemplarity, and have done much to trace its contours. This book, however, attempts to see this elephant whole – to present these varied objects of scholarly investigation as aspects of a single cultural phenomenon. One aim of this book, then, is simply to make the case that this phenomenon constitutes a reasonable object of investigation – to contend that this elephant exists, or at least is useful to believe in for certain purposes.

A second and more interesting aim, supposing I achieve the first, is to pursue a fine-grained investigation of how Roman exemplarity actually works. I elucidate how the various practices, beliefs, values, and symbols work together to constitute this system; I discuss in greater detail the workings of the four operations; and I probe more systematically how exempla function as building blocks of Roman argumentation, morality, and historical consciousness. Such a study could be organized in a variety of ways. Chapters might, for instance, be devoted to specific moral values such as *virtus*, *pietas*, and *fides*, investigating the kinds of performance and monumentalization through which these values are constituted and transmitted. Or the discussion might be organized according to specific monuments or monument types; one would then ask what kinds performance and value are associated with (say) scars, or the Capitoline hill, or honorific statuary, or funeral orations. Alternatively, the organizing principle might be how exemplarity is represented and deployed in particular authors or texts.⁴³

⁴³ Studies organized around values: McDonnell 2006 (*virtus*), Hölkeskamp 2000 (*fides* and related terms). Around monuments: Stein-Hölkeskamp/Hölkeskamp 2006 (many specific locations and associated events), Walter 2004a (monument types), Hölkeskamp 2001 (*forum*, *comitium*, *capitolium*). Around authors or texts: e.g. van der Blom 2010, Bücher 2006 (exempla in Cicero); Chaplin 2000, Feldherr 1998 (in Livy); Mayer 1991 (in Seneca); Tipping 2010 (in Silius); Lucarelli 2007, Engels 2001, Weileder 1998 (in Valerius Maximus).

In this book, however, I have chosen to organize my study largely around individual exemplary figures, to whom individual chapters are dedicated.⁴⁴ In each chapter I consider how the four operations of exemplarity apply to the figure under discussion: how an actor and his or her actions are constituted as exemplary by the primary judging audience, what judgments are passed upon them, what monuments commemorate them, and what norms posterity infers from these monuments, leading to further judgments or imitation. Furthermore, I examine the argumentative contexts in which exemplary actors are invoked, to elucidate their role in persuasive rhetoric; I analyze how audiences judge and act in light of these exempla, to grasp their moral dimensions; and I consider the relevance, replicability, and comprehensibility of past performances in the present, to grapple with the historiographical dimensions of exempla. Not every figure illuminates every operation and dimension of exemplarity equally: the discussions to follow vary considerably in their focus. Taken together, however, I hope that these discussions will richly illustrate and elaborate the features of exemplarity adumbrated so far, and more to boot.

These chapters do not constitute “biographies” of the figures they discuss. Most of these figures (allegedly) lived and performed their deeds in the early to middle Republic, yet virtually all texts and other monuments that survive to the present – by which we moderns are informed about these actors and their deeds – date from the late Republic to the high Empire, postdating the deeds they depict by anywhere from a generation to many centuries. Such late and often derivative evidence is far from optimal for historians seeking to reconstruct actual lives and events of the past. Yet exemplarity, by its nature, bridges long temporal gaps, and this same evidence demonstrates that these figures were vibrant moral and conceptual touchstones, of considerable rhetorical and moral power, for centuries after their alleged deeds. Indeed, as noted earlier (ch. 0.5.3), it is generally irrelevant to these figures’ impact as exempla whether they existed at all, and whether their exemplary performances happened as the monuments allege. The evidence rarely allows consideration of how biographically or historically “true” these representations may be, nor do my purposes as a student of exemplarity require such consideration.⁴⁵ My interest is in

⁴⁴ Other studies so organized: Briquel 2007, Barzanò et al. 2003, Coudry/Späth 2001, Hölkeskamp/Stein-Hölkeskamp 2000. In my book the exceptions to this organizational schema are chapter 7 and the conclusion (see summaries, ch. 0.7 below).

⁴⁵ It is questionable whether real people existed under the names Horatius Coclès and Cloelia (chs. 1–2), let alone performed the deeds associated with these names; likewise for the “kingship-aspirant” figures adduced by Cicero (ch. 7). Conversely, no one doubts that historical persons existed under

how these figures are constituted as exempla, and how they function in an exemplary mode, in the eras from which monuments survive to attest these exemplary operations.

Furthermore, the temporal and cultural span of these monuments define the limits of this study. As just noted, most texts and other monuments attesting the figures under discussion range from the late Republic to the high Empire. As late as the fourth and early fifth centuries CE, the historians Ammianus, Eutropius, and Orosius, along with commentators like Servius and the Latin panegyrists of the later emperors, still mention these exempla. However, most Christian writing is silent about these figures. To be sure, early Christian literature is awash in exemplarity, which closely resembles the exemplarity discussed in this book. But the values that exemplary Christian performances instantiate are those of early Christian ethics more generally – ascetic self-deprivation, the endurance of physical suffering, and humility (albeit spectacularly displayed) – which align awkwardly, if at all, with classical values. Furthermore, the performers of these deeds are “holy men” such as saints, martyrs, abbae, apostles, biblical figures, and Christ himself. While my study does not broach this cluster of performers and values, the model of exemplarity developed in this book would, I believe, illuminate early Christian exempla no less than the classical exempla that are its primary object of investigation.⁴⁶

0.7 Plan of This Book

This book’s organization is fairly modular, entailing that its chapters may be engaged individually and discontinuously as the reader’s interests dictate. The exemplary figures discussed here appear in the chronological order that the Roman historical tradition assigns to them. Chapter 1, which treats Horatius Cocles in greater detail, follows directly upon this introduction, where Horatius has already been thematized. Chapter 2, which examines Horatius’ younger contemporary and imitator Cloelia, follows chapter 1 logically as well as chronologically. For the remaining chapters, however, chronological order does not coincide with thematic

the names Appius Claudius Caecus, Gaius Duilius, Quintus Fabius Maximus “Cunctator,” and Cornelia “the mother of the Gracchi” (chs. 3–6). But it is unknowable how these people and their actual biographies relate to the exemplary figures and performances subsequently attached to their names. Ch. 5.6 offers explicit reflection on the gap between exemplary figure and historical person.

⁴⁶ Petitfils 2016: 141–252 offers a study of exemplarity in several early Christian texts along precisely these lines; Brown 1983: 15–21 is foundational.

development, and is not critical to the overall analysis of the operations and dimensions of Roman exemplarity. The reader's experience will not be compromised by reading selected chapters, or reading out of order. Only the conclusion, which examines Seneca's searching philosophical critique of the moral logic of exemplarity, presupposes a deeper familiarity with the system. It is best read after digesting at least one or two of the core chapters.

The figures examined in each chapter, and the chief themes that each examination brings to the surface, are as follows.

Chapter 1 pursues the investigation of Horatius Cocles, the bridge-defending hero some of whose exemplary functions have already been discussed. Richly endowed with monuments, and having his share of imitators, Horatius offers a particularly suitable vehicle for examining in depth the dynamics of commemoration, monumentality, and norm setting that lie at the heart of Roman exemplarity. Indeed, as the first military hero of the Roman Republic, Horatius assumes an ideological priority that marks him, one might say, as an "exemplary exemplum."⁴⁷ Nevertheless, we will see many cases in which the Horatius exemplum is tendentiously shaped to "fit" a certain context, or in which its meaning and value are disputed, or in which debate arises about whether a particular attempt at imitation is successful or unsuccessful, virtuous or vicious. Such polemics and contestation attest to the liveliness of this particular exemplum from the late Republic onward, while adumbrating the hermeneutic challenges and rhetorical contestation that are central to Roman exemplarity in general.

Chapter 2 considers Cloelia, a girl sent as a hostage to the Etruscans to secure a truce. The legend holds that she courageously escaped, swam the Tiber, and returned to Rome. She is commonly presented as Horatius' imitator, and as displaying *virtus* – military valor or, etymologically, "behavior appropriate to an adult male (*vir*)."⁴⁸ However, her gender and age raise categorical questions that complicate the interpretation of the texts and other monumental forms commemorating this hero, and require that audiences (primary or secondary) engage in nuanced moral reflection. Specifically: what does it mean to be a "manly maiden," a *virgo* who displays *virtus*? How can an underage, unmarried female be heroic, let alone

⁴⁷ First hero of the Republic: Livy 2.10 (also other narrative accounts of the Republic's foundation); Val. Max. 3.2.1 (first example of *fortitudo*); ch. 1.1. Both Polybius (see above) and Sen. *Ep.* 120.7 (ch. 8.3) present him as an example – maybe the *best* example – of a Roman exemplum. I do so as well, on their authority.

behave like an adult male? What norms might she provide for persons of various sexes and ages? Further complicating the moral evaluation of her deed is that, valorous though it may be, her escape abrogates the terms of a truce and potentially tars the Romans as perfidious. Certain texts relating her deed explore this complexity, illuminating this exemplum's rhetorical versatility. Another key dimension of this exemplum is its tendency to depict Cloelia as vividly "present" to secondary audiences in later times – as if they were primary audiences observing her deed and its immediate consequences, or as if she were projected forward into a later time to (re)perform for secondary audiences in their own day. This manifestation of exemplary "timelessness" seems to be localized around one specific monument: a conspicuous and well-known equestrian statue of a woman in the Roman Forum that was identified as representing Cloelia.

Chapter 3 deals with Appius Claudius Caecus, a prominent political figure of the late fourth to early third centuries BCE. The tradition ascribes to him important public works, high-stakes military activity, oratorical prowess, and various reforms of the state's constitutional, legal, and ritual infrastructure. Yet every area of his activity is represented as profoundly controversial, spurring both positive and negative evaluations from contemporary and later judging audiences. I dwell particularly on Livy's and Cicero's representations of Appius. Livy makes him an incompetent general who is forced to pursue alternative arenas of activity and achievement, while Cicero presents him as a "good old Roman" who instantiates upstanding, conservative moral values and who imposes a familial rebuke upon his louche, violent, impious descendants in Cicero's own day. These contrasting portrayals, I argue, may be ascribed not only to the differing rhetorical needs of these authors' works, but also to bifurcated moral judgments that are integral to this exemplum. Sandwiched between these author-centric analyses is discussion of the key monuments associated with Appius, which themselves display striking moral bifurcations: either contradicting the judgments sedimented in other monuments, or receiving contradictory evaluations in and of themselves. Overall, the figure of Appius is one around which contradictory and competing evaluations swirl, as his deeds receive both positive and negative evaluations from judging audiences and can be invoked as models either for imitation or for avoidance.

Chapter 4 treats Gaius Duilius, a consul and naval commander in 260 BCE who is credited with winning Rome's first victory at sea. The figure of Duilius insistently raises the question of change over time within an exemplary framework: how (and whether) the logic of exemplarity accommodates such change, and when (and if) such change spurs the emergence

of an historicizing perspective. I consider Duilius' performance in relation to the rhetoric of the "first" (*primus*), as he is regularly said to be the "first" Roman to achieve one or another feat. I also consider his place in a particular narrative of moral improvement over time, a narrative that Octavian/Augustus constructed as he sought to ratify his naval victory over Sextus Pompeius in 36 and to present it as rivaling or surpassing Duilius' achievement. A general consideration of moral improvement and decline as models of change over time leads finally to the question of moral change. Is it possible that the inability of later judging audiences to agree about the moral value of a past performance signals a break in the continuity of the moral values themselves? Is an historicizing perspective then necessary to bridge the gap between the old and new configurations of values? Close examination of a famous but morally contested monument associated with Duilius – his torch-and-flute escort – suggests that moral obscurity does not cause observers to assume an historicizing perspective, but spurs them to strive all the harder to construct an exemplary framework into which the anomalous monument can satisfyingly be fit.

The subject of chapter 5 is Fabius Cunctator, who allegedly pursued a distinctive strategy of military non-engagement, or "delaying," during the Hannibalic war. According to legend, Fabius was sharply criticized for cowardice until his strategy was vindicated by events, whereupon he was glorified for his foresight and concern for the commonwealth's safety. This striking revaluation of a performance from "bad" to "good" within a single moral category (*gloria*) comes about because Fabius is presented as recognizing a particular moral nuance in the circumstances of the Hannibalic war that none of his contemporaries recognize – namely, that seeking to display valor in battle does not, for the moment, support the long-term survival of the commonwealth. One key effect of the Fabian exemplum, then, is to give judging audiences the opportunity to distinguish more accurately among related but distinct moral concepts (especially *gloria* and *virtus*), and so to refine their capacity for judging what kinds of actions are in the community's interest. This refinement has crucial rhetorical consequences, as generals and statesmen thereafter invoke the Fabian norm to justify disregarding traditional values and practices when they believe circumstances require it.

Chapter 6 is devoted to Cornelia "the mother of the Gracchi," a matron of the second century B.C.E. Cornelia's chief monument is her epithet *mater Gracchorum*, a phrase that pervasively shapes how she is deployed as an exemplum. In particular, the "mothering" spotlighted by this epithet is manifest in her exemplary pedagogy and rhetorical prowess, as she reared

her sons Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus to be great men and great orators. It is also manifest in the fortitude she displayed in dealing with her sons' deaths, and in her virtuoso display of traditional sexual mores. A second key monument to Cornelia is a bronze statue on an inscribed base that stood in the porticus of Octavia from the early Augustan age onward, and was thought to have been erected by her own contemporaries to honor her maternal performance. Augustus, appropriating preexisting elements of the Cornelia exemplum and tailoring them to fit his own needs, made Cornelia (represented by her statue and its inscription) into an exemplary precedent for and pendant to his own sister Octavia; and made the two of them jointly into paradigmatic vehicles for the gendered values that he otherwise sought to promote during his reign. Cornelia as an exemplary maternal mourner of dead children also found resonance in Augustan ideology and in later consolatory contexts.

Chapter 7, investigating in greater detail how social performers use exemplary figures to authorize their own current or prospective actions, differs in structure from the chapters preceding. I examine a particular episode in the life of Marcus Tullius Cicero: the demolition of his house after he fled into exile in 58 BCE, and the consequences that followed. In the speech "On his house" (*De Domo Sua*), delivered upon his return in 57, Cicero reveals that his enemy Publius Clodius has assimilated him to three "aspirants to kingship" who are traditionally dated to the early Republic, namely Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius, and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus. These figures, evaluated negatively by judging audiences for seeking to overthrow the *res publica*, are said to have been executed and their houses demolished. Two additional negative exempla who also figure into the discussion, Marcus Vaccus and Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, were punished similarly though their transgressions differed. Cicero strenuously denies that these malefactors' situations and actions "fit" his own – he claims, in other words, that he himself is no "kingship aspirant" – and he turns these exempla against Clodius instead. He also adduces additional exempla in the effort to authorize his prior actions and tarnish those of Clodius. An analysis of the monumental structures erected on Cicero's and an adjacent house site reveals how a bitter, high-stakes political dispute can be waged partly in terms of exemplary models drawn from the past, and testifies to the persuasive and moral force such exempla were thought to possess.

A contemporary critique of Roman exemplarity is offered by Seneca the Younger, and it is his Stoic assessment of the system that has the last word in this book. Seneca is principally concerned with the moral or ethical

dimension of exemplarity, as befits a moral philosopher. He contends that observing individual actions performed by individual actors provides insufficient grounds for judging the actors' moral status overall. First, a judge evaluating a single action may mistake a virtue for a vice, and so misjudge the moral state of the actor. And second, since Stoic ethics places a high value on consistency, a person's true moral state becomes evident only over time and in the performance of many actions in many contexts; no single action (no matter how glorious) provides sufficient information to ground a valid moral judgment. These Stoic critiques impinge heavily upon the four operations of Roman exemplarity, invalidating operation 2 entirely and substantially vitiating operations 1 and 3. A Stoic form of exemplary morality is still possible, however, subject to appropriate revisions in the four operations. Seneca's critique reveals that "conventional" exemplarity as described and analyzed elsewhere in this book was by no means uncontested, and shows how formal, theorized philosophy can supply coherent principles to support a modified, alternative exemplary morality.

CHAPTER I

Horatius Cocles *Commemorating and Imitating a Great Deed*

1.1 Introduction: Horatius as Exemplary Exemplum

This chapter examines more thoroughly the exemplarity of Horatius Cocles, who figured prominently in the introduction. As noted there (ch. 0.2), Horatius is among the most resonant of exemplary figures in ancient Rome, with about thirty surviving narratives or references in literary texts dating from the middle Republic into late antiquity, and one surviving non-literary monument. Some of these monuments, in turn, refer to further monuments of diverse forms, which are described and sometimes interpreted but do not survive to be examined directly.

A few texts place Horatius in what might be regarded, from a historicist perspective, as his “proper” historical context: a continuous narrative of the foundation of the Roman Republic, traditionally dated to the late sixth century BCE. The most elaborate narrative is provided by the Latin historiographer Livy, who composed the relevant portion of his work (book 2) probably in the late 30s, about a century after Polybius. According to Livy (2.9–10), the attack that Horatius stymied was launched by Lars Porsenna, king of the Etruscan city of Clusium. The recently expelled king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, had recruited Porsenna to reinstall him by force upon his old seat of power. Porsenna’s army duly arrived on the west bank of the Tiber, opposite the city of Rome. A small Roman force, routed from its position, retreated into the city across the one bridge that then spanned the river, the *pons sublicius* or “bridge on piles.” This is the point at which – in Livy’s telling – Horatius blockaded the bridge by himself, holding up the Etruscan attack until his comrades could demolish the bridge under him and so prevent the enemy from storming into the city. In this and other continuous narratives, Horatius’ deed is conjoined with equally heroic, liberty-defending exploits of Cloelia (ch. 2) and Mucius

Scaevola.¹ These three figures sometimes appear as an heroic “triptych” securing the newly organized republican state’s liberty: for by their actions, they persuade Porsenna to call off his attack, putting paid for the moment to Tarquinius’ attempt to restore the *ancien régime*.

Most surviving references to Horatius’ deed, however, make little or no reference to this larger narrative context. Rather, they present his defense of the bridge in isolation, detached from its social and historical context. His deed is thus rendered an exemplary performance of timeless validity that can receive new meanings relevant to the context into which it is being inserted (as discussed in ch. 0.5.3). Polybius’ deployment of Horatius is of this sort. Polybius provides no context – he does not even name the war, the enemy, or the bridge – but cites Horatius merely as an example of a Roman inspired to perform great deeds when he hears, at a funeral, of great deeds done by earlier Romans. It is specifically the exemplary character of Horatius’ deed that I propose to examine in this chapter: how the four operations of exemplarity – especially the last two, monumentalization and norm setting – are presented in the surviving references to this performer and deed, and how the rhetorical, moral, and historiographical dimensions of this exemplum are manifested in the contexts and media in which it is invoked. Like other contemporary approaches to memory and commemoration, my approach here focuses on how any given present makes use of received accounts of the past, interpreting and reconstructing them in multifarious ways to meet its own needs.

This approach may be contrasted with other, longstanding scholarly approaches to the legends of the early Republic that focus in various ways on origins. These warrant brief discussion, to clarify the distinctive features of my own investigation. One approach, source criticism, is the attempt to organize the story’s many versions into family groups based on assumed cladistic descent from other versions. Its aim is typically to reconstruct earlier versions, and even to work back, through this method, to an “original”

¹ For continuous narratives and “historical” context, see (besides Livy) Dion. *Rom.* 5.23–5, Plut. *Popl.* 16.6–9, and Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).3–4 (derived from Livy). The chronology of Horatius’ deed is variously reported. Livy 2.9.1 and Plut. *Popl.* 16.5–6 place it in the consulship of Publius Valerius Publicola (II) and Titus Lucretius, the second year of the Republic. This consular year corresponds to 508 BCE on Varro’s chronology, and 504 on Livy’s. Dionysius, meanwhile, places the deed in what for him is the following year, the consulship of Valerius Publicola (III) and Horatius Pulvillus (II) (*Rom.* 5.21.1, cf. 5.35.3) – however, this consular year is unrecorded by Livy. On the confusion in the consular lists for these years (and hence in the dating of Porsenna’s attack) see Broughton 1951: 1.6–7; also Briquel 2007: 113 n. 49. On the complexities of early Roman chronology generally see Cornell 1995: 218–23, 399–402.

account. Source criticism commonly analyzes narratives into earlier and later, or “better” and “worse,” strands. Regarding the legends of the war with Porsenna, for instance, some scholars have identified “late” and false accretions to this tradition that they believe the late republican historiographer Valerius Antias foisted onto an older, purer, more “correct” tradition.² In a second approach, scholars influenced by structural anthropology and comparative religion have identified structures and motifs that early Roman legends share with legends of other Indo-European cultures. Through this approach, which is particularly associated with Georges Dumézil and his followers, Horatius has been connected with mythical figures from other cultural traditions who lack an eye or limb, and are seen (for example) either as embodying aspects of sovereignty or as resisting tyranny. This approach can be combined with source criticism, so that the Indo-European motifs identified by comparatists furnish the “original” version of the legend that some source critics posit.³ A third approach, more traditionally historical in its outlook, supposes that actual events or specific cultural formations underlie these legendary tales and their production. For example, scholars have argued that the heroic deeds of Horatius, Cloelia, and Mucius Scaevola were invented to dissemble the fact that Porsenna actually captured the city; or that these stories describe actual archaic religious rituals in a transmuted, misremembered form; or that these narratives received their historical (or pseudo-historical) form and content from a mid-republican narrative oral tradition.⁴ Characteristic of all these approaches is the quest for origins and univocality – the single earliest form of the legend, the underlying Indo-European gods or heroes, the period and sociohistorical context of the legend’s formation, or the actual events – and the concomitant desire to strip away variation and eliminate complexity. These are efforts, one might say, to replace the tradition itself and its array of variants with a unitary account that is affirmed as “original” or “true.”

For my part, I do not seek original versions, lost meanings, or univocality. Rather, I strive to grasp the Horatius exemplum in its full profusion

² For source criticism see (e.g.) Fugmann 1997: 37–49, Münzer, *RE* 8 (1913): 2331–6. Wiseman 1998 discusses Valerius Antias’ alleged interventions (p. 83 on Horatius), and the staged dramas (*fabulae togatae*) of the middle Republic that he believes decisively shaped these early legends.

³ See Dumézil 1988[1940]: 143–8 on Horatius. For responses to the Dumézilian approach – affirmative or critical – see (e.g.) Briquel 2007 (58–89 on Horatius), Lincoln 1991: 244–58, Solodow 1979: 266–7, Moeller 1975.

⁴ The view that Porsenna captured Rome is itself ancient: Plin. *Nat.* 34.139, Tac. *Hist.* 3.72. Discussion in Fugmann 1997: 38–9, Cornell 1995: 215–18, Forsythe 1994: 252–7 (on Horatius in particular), Gagé 1988: 242–5, Alföldi 1965: 72–5. Legends as transmuted accounts of rituals: Gagé 1988: 236, 241; 1973: 10–12; Ogilvie 1965: 258.

of variants, meanings, and functions, in all the cultural contexts to which surviving representations afford access. The object of my study is Roman exemplarity itself, which lives in and through the multivocal narratives, the welter of contested variations, and the multiplicity of uses to which Romans, under various conditions, put their exemplary figures.

I review briefly the first two exemplary operations associated with Horatius, to contextualize the analyses to follow. In discussing Polybius' account of Horatius' deed (ch. 0.2–0.3), I noted the importance of eyewitnesses, both Roman and enemy, who attest that the action is significant for their community – the first operation of exemplarity. I further noted that this primary audience evaluates his action positively in the moral category of military valor, with even the enemy marveling at the hero's "resolution" and "boldness" (*hypostasis, tolma*) – the second operation of exemplarity. Other Greek accounts, as we shall see, ascribe to Horatius *aretê* ("excellence") or *andreia* ("manliness"), broad virtue categories that can include military valor; while Latin accounts typically credit him with *virtus* or *fortitudo*, categories more specifically associated with such valor.⁵ *Virtus*, etymologically "behavior appropriate to a man," usually encompasses a very particular range of significant action, namely a soldier's bravery or steadfastness in battle. This is how the term functions in Horatius' case.⁶ My focus in this chapter, however, will be on the third and fourth operations of exemplarity, namely commemoration and norm setting. I will examine how wider audiences learn via monuments of Horatius' deed and of the evaluation it initially received (operation 3); and will consider how those audiences respond to the prescriptive, normative character of this performance (operation 4) – whether they take on the norm as a standard by which to evaluate other performances, or as a model for themselves to imitate in due course.

⁵ Latin moral categories: *virtus* is ascribed to Horatius also in *Culex* 358–61, *Sen. Ep.* 120.7 (see ch. 8.3), Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.10; *fortitudo* in Val. Max. 3.2.1 (who calls *fortitudo* a subset of *virtus* at 3.2.pr.), Cic. *Leg.* 2.10. In Frontin. *Str.* 2.13.5 Horatius exemplifies the proper way to retreat (*de effugiendo*). Greek categories: Plut. *Mor.* 317D–E calls Horatius an acolyte of Ἀρετή ("excellence" personified as a goddess), in contrast to those who follow Τύχη ("fortune"); Ἀρετή is also Plutarch's category at *Popl.* 16.9. Dion. *Rom.* 5.25.3–4 speaks of both ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία.

⁶ Etymology of *virtus*: de Vaan 2008: 681, Maltby 1991: 649. McDonnell 2006: 59–71 (and ch. 1 *passim*) shows how military achievement is conceptually and ideologically central to the moral category of *virtus*; his discussion supercedes most prior scholarship. For the place of *virtus* in the aristocratic economy of social prestige, see Roller 2001: 20–5, 97–108; for its place in the honor-community of Roman soldiers, Lendon 1997: 243–52. *Virtus* can also indicate a much broader range of excellences, especially when it is used to translate ἀρετή in philosophical contexts: McDonnell 2006: 105–41, with full bibliography.

1.2 Commemorating the Great Deed: Horatius' Monuments

For Horatius' monuments, as for all monuments, narrative is a critical element, whether presented in written, oral, or iconographical form. Among monumental forms, literary texts like Polybius and Livy are particularly suitable for conveying narrative, since such texts could circulate broadly (at least among those who were literate and had access to texts written on papyrus rolls), could be replicated for even broader circulation, and were durable enough to reach audiences well into the future. Other monumental forms, like accounts inscribed on stone or presented orally in funeral orations, might efficiently narrate an exemplary deed and reach a broader (or different) segment of contemporary society than a literary text, but were more limited in their spatial and temporal reach. Many monumental objects, however, convey no narrative in and of themselves, but require a narrative supplied from elsewhere to explain what deed was done, how it was judged, and how and why the object in question commemorates the deed. An object that appears monumental, but for which no narrative is immediately to hand, may remain mysterious, or – as we shall see – generate a search for a narrative that can affirm and explain its monumentality.⁷ And when one monument, in narrative or other form, accounts for or refers to another monument commemorating the same exemplary deed, the result is what I call a “cross-reference.” Cross-referencing is extremely common, and its widespread use suggests that any single monument was seen as just one element in a *network* of devices for preserving and transmitting knowledge of a deed and of its evaluation.⁸ In this section I discuss six monuments associated with Horatius that are non-textual and (in and of themselves) non-narrative, all but one of which are known only through “cross-references” in surviving texts but do not themselves survive to the present. I consider how these monuments become meaningful within the logic of exemplarity via the narratives supplied to account for them; how the supplied narratives are either drawn from widely attested elements of the Horatius tradition or are generated *ad hoc* to account for specific

⁷ On the critical role of text (or rather, narrative) in commemoration see Habinek 1998: 49–50. Narratives that account for monuments are sometimes dismissed by source critics as “aetiological myths,” i.e. secondary, inferior accretions that are merely retrojected from these objects and carry no independent explanatory value. Within the logic of exemplarity, however, such narratives and the monuments they explain are parallel means of commemoration – indeed, the narrative has ideological primacy *because* it is explanatory, regardless how and when it was actually produced.

⁸ If individual monuments are metaphorically “places of memory” (*lieux de mémoire*, per Nora), then – extending the metaphor – cross-referential networks of monuments constitute “landscapes of memory” (*Erinnerungslandschaften*, Hölkeskamp 2001: 99, 115–17).

monuments; and how all these interactions among monumental forms forge a commemorative network that, as a whole, retains the memory of Horatius' deed in its various particulars.

1.2.1 *The "Path of Cocles"*

I begin with the most obscure monument. Propertius in poem 3.11 implies that the temple of Apollo at Leucas, which commemorates Augustus' victory at Actium, eclipses all prior monuments and the great deeds they commemorate. He names several particular monuments that this temple overshadows. These include "the spoils of Hannibal," "the monument of defeated Syphax," "the broken glory of Pyrrhus," the Lacus Curtius (all vv. 59–62), and "the path of Cocles [which] bears witness to the cutting of the bridge."⁹ This "path of Cocles" is otherwise unattested, but must have been sufficiently familiar as a feature of the urban landscape that Propertius could expect his readers to recognize it by this bare mention and, thereby, to summon the recollection of Horatius' deed.¹⁰

1.2.2 *The Pons Sublicius*

Similarly the pons sublicius itself, or one of its features, may serve as a monument to Horatius' deed. The elder Pliny notes, in a discussion of remarkable buildings, that this bridge was built entirely of wood and had no iron nails, "after it was torn down with such difficulty when Horatius Cocles defended it."¹¹ The bridge evidently summons Horatius' deed to the memory of Pliny and his readers because this deed supposedly explains the bridge's distinctive, iron-free construction. This explanation projects the backstory that the bridge *did* contain iron nails up to Horatius' day, nails that hindered the work of Horatius' companions and so endangered the city. Pliny thus presents the ban on using iron as a pragmatic measure, to facilitate rapid demolition should the need arise again.¹² Modern scholars,

⁹ Prop. 3.11.63: *Coclitis abscissos testatur semita pontes*.

¹⁰ The text of Prop. 3.11.57–68 is vexed, with many readings and the ordering of the couplets in doubt; Heyworth 2007: 341–3 provides recent discussion. Nevertheless, the thematic importance of monuments, memory, and witnessing in these verses is clear: see Gurval 1995: 203–7.

¹¹ Plin. *Nat.* 36.100: *quod item* [sc. being constructed *sine ferreo clavo*] *Romae in ponte sublicio religiosum est, posteaquam Coclite Horatio defendente aegre revolsus est*. The bridge's precise location downstream from Tiber Island is unknown, but see n. 59 below.

¹² Dion. *Rom.* 9.68.2 similarly suggests (without reference to Horatius) that the bridge's wooden construction facilitated demolition in wartime; in general also Livy 22.8.7. Cf. Dion. *Rom.* 3.45.2, 5.24.1, and Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646, all implying that the bridge was already constructed exclusively of wood in

unsurprisingly, seek alternative explanations for this and other taboos associated with the *pons sublicius*, and reject the explanation involving Horatius.¹³ For my purposes, what Pliny's explanation attests is the broader Roman propensity to explain a puzzling feature of the built environment by attaching it to a narrative of an exemplary deed, which accounts for the feature and thereby turns it into a monument commemorating this deed (more on this dynamic in ch. 1.2.4). The exemplary deed, for its part, may be imitated in due course; hence Pliny can imply that Horatius' contemporaries were foreseeing a similar defense in the future when they adopted the new construction technique.

1.2.3 *Wound to the Hip or Leg*

A third monument consists in a physical trace of the deed that Horatius carries around with him ever after. While Polybius has Horatius die in the performance of his deed, Livy and a few other accounts bring him through alive and unscathed.¹⁴ Most accounts, however, split the difference and assert that he indeed survived, but suffered a crippling wound to his hip or buttock. Servius, the late antique commentator on Vergil, provides the following narrative for why Horatius was depicted on Aeneas' shield (Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646):

And when Porsenna sought to cross over on the *pons sublicius*, i.e. the wooden one, Cocles alone held up the enemy's attack until the bridge could be torn down behind him by his companions. Once it was down he threw himself into the Tiber wearing his armor and, though wounded in the hip, still overcame its currents. Hence the famous *bon mot* by him, when during the elections his hip defect was cast against him as a reproach: "With every step, I am reminded of my triumph."¹⁵

The point of Horatius' *bon mot* is that those who criticize his disability should, rather, recall his great deed when they see him limping along. War

Horatius' day; also Plut. *Numa* 9.2–4. In general on the taboo against iron see Griffith 2009: 296–301 with sources and references.

¹³ Griffith 2009: 313–15 with recent bibliography; for older views see Delcourt 1957: 177–8; Le Gall 1953a: 80–6; 1953b: 78–82. Tucci 2011/12: 201–5 discusses the possibility that by late antiquity the bridge was built of stone.

¹⁴ Livy 2.10.11 (*incolumis*); similarly Val. Max. 3.2.1 and Sen. *Ep.* 120.7.

¹⁵ Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: *et cum per sublicium pontem, hoc est ligneum, transire conaretur, solus Cocles hostilem impetum sustinuit, donec a tergo pons solveretur a sociis: quo soluto se cum armis praecipitavit in Tiberim, et licet laesus in coxa, tamen eius fluentia superavit: unde est illud ab eo dictum, cum ei in comitiis coxae vitium obiceretur 'per singulos gradus admoneor triumphi mei.'* Wounded also in Dion. Rom. 5.24.3, Plut. *Popl.* 16.8, *Mor.* 307D–E, 820E; Frontin. *Str.* 2.13.5; also n. 17.

wounds, and scars in particular, appear frequently in Roman texts as markers of valorous conduct. Wounds incurred during the proper activities, and located in the proper parts of the body, inscribe into the living flesh of the hero the record of his valor, for all the world to see, so long as he lives. Narratives of the conflict of the orders, for instance, portray veterans at risk of debt-bondage baring their scar-covered chests to public view; elsewhere we hear of trials in which defendants whose lives or property are at risk expose their scars to the judges. The aim of such display is to persuade the audience that one's record of valiant military service to the state, attested by scars, entitles one to favorable consideration in one's current difficulties.¹⁶ Horatius, then, by ascribing a particular cause to his limp (according to Servius), transforms it into a monument to his deed, one which he pointedly says reminds *him* of his defense of the bridge, and by implication should equally summon that deed to the memory of his detractors.

But why should Horatius be reproached for his wound in the first place? In a society where physical wholeness and perfection have practical, aesthetic, and ritual value, a person whose body is less than whole and perfect might be deemed less desirable or capable in key respects than one who is not so diminished. Indeed, the reference to elections indicates that Horatius is envisioned as standing for public office; someone then asserted that his injury made him unsuitable. Pragmatically, war wounds might render a person physically incapable of discharging the duties of a magistracy; two other accounts imply that Horatius' injury had precisely this effect.¹⁷ Alternatively, since Roman magistrates often had to perform religious rites, they might, like priests, need to be free of at least certain kinds of bodily defects for ritual reasons. Either explanation could lie behind the objection raised against Horatius' candidacy, as Servius imagines it.¹⁸

¹⁶ Display of scars by persons facing *nexum*: Livy 2.23.3–7, 2.27.1–2, 4.58.11–13, 6.14.3–8. By those standing trial: Cic. *De Or.* 2.124, *Ver.* 2.5.3, *Rab. Perd.* 36; Livy 6.20.8–9; Sen. *Cont.* 9.4.7; Quint. *Inst.* 6.1.21, 30. By soldiers demanding discharge: Curt. 9.3.10, 10.2.12; Tac. *Ann.* 1.35. At Dion. *Rom.* 10.36–8, the scar displayer is a plebeian demanding agrarian reform. On the values and aims associated with displaying scars see Flaig 2003: 123–36, de Libero 2002: 175–9 (and *passim*), Leigh 1995: 205–12, Gagé 1969: 196–202.

¹⁷ Dion. *Rom.* 5.25.3: ἀχρηστος δ' εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως διὰ τὴν πῆρωσιν τῆς βάσεως· καὶ διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν ταύτην οὐθ' ὑπατείας οὐτ' ἄλλης ἡγεμονίας στρατιωτικῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἔτυχεν. Similarly App. *Reg.* fr. 10; broader reflections on disability and magistracy by Ulpian at *Dig.* 3.1.1.5.

¹⁸ On physical incapacity see de Libero 2002: 179–80, 187–8; on ritual incapacity see e.g. Garland 1995: 63–5, with Lincoln 1991: 248–9 for comparative evidence, and Van Lommel 2015: 109–12 for sources and bibliography. Servius' phrase *cum ... coxae vitium obiceretur* smacks of the ritual objection, as *obicio* can be a technical term for introducing a religious objection to a course of action (*OLD* s.v., 9), and *vitium* is a technical term for an unfavorable augury (*OLD* s.v., 6).

But the electoral context also elucidates Horatius' riposte. In "monumentalizing" his limp, Horatius seeks to convert his injury from a liability to an advantage in the voters' eyes. The *populus Romanus*, assembled into its constituent tribes or centuries for the election, is the main audience for his words (and limp). It is they who cast the votes, and who constitute the community for whom his deed was significant – particularly so in the electoral context, since they would not be voting at all had his deed not prevented the king's restoration and so preserved the new political order of the *res publica*. Like others who display their scars in court or under other circumstances of risk and opportunity, Horatius is presented here as attempting to convert one form of social capital – the deference and respect that the *populus Romanus* grants him for meritorious service on their behalf – into another form, namely the honor of holding a magistracy, which he hopes the people will now confer upon him in gratitude and as further reciprocation for his service.

Servius has reason to imagine that Horatius might have sought to exchange his social capital in this way. In Sallust's *Bellum Iugurthinum*, Gaius Marius reminds the people that they elected him consul not because of his noble ancestry, but because of his military decorations and "scars in the front of the body." Likewise Plutarch, in his *Roman Questions*, suggests a reason why Roman office-seekers used to canvass in togas without wearing tunics underneath: perhaps they wanted their scars to be visible to the voters.¹⁹ That candidates might seek election (partly) on the ground that their bodies attest their martial valor is thus an idea with broader cultural currency, which Horatius could reasonably be imagined to invoke. Servius does not report this election's outcome, but perhaps Horatius' absence from the consular lists, despite his great achievement and evidently patrician lineage as member of the Horatian *gens*,²⁰ spurred the quest to explain

¹⁹ Sal. *Iug.* 85.29: *cicatrices adverso corpore*; Plut. *Mor.* 276C–D; cf. *Coriol.* 14.1–3. Leigh 1995: 195–203 contends that the rhetoric of military achievement, attested by scars, attaches particularly to *novi homines* like Marius and the elder Cato (e.g. Plut. *Cato Maior* 1.6–10) because they have only their achievement, and no distinguished ancestors, to recommend them for election. Scars may indeed be important for *novi homines*, but *nobiles* too display scars or other injuries to secure favorable outcomes: e.g. Marcus Servilius Geminus, cos. 202 (Livy 45.39.16–20, Plut. *Paul.* 31.7–10; analyzed by Flaig 2003: 123–36), M'. Aquilius, cos. 101 (Cic. *De Or.* 2.124, 194–6, *Ver.* 2.5.3, Quint. *Inst.* 2.15.7), Marcus Manlius Capitolinus (Livy 6.14.6–8).

²⁰ To the extent that his status ever comes into consideration, Horatius is imagined as an aristocrat. The Horatii were a patrician clan that claimed other prominent members in early Rome (Münzer, *RE* 8 (1913): 2328–31, 2400–04, s.v. Horatius, nos. 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15). Dion. *Rom.* 5.23.3 makes Cocles the nephew of the consul Horatius Pulvillus, and a descendant of one of the Horatii triplets (themselves of lofty birth, Dionysius says at *Rom.* 3.13.3, 3.17.4–5) who defeated the Curiatii of Alba Longa. So Cocles could be imagined as consular material by birth as well as achievements.

why he was never elected – hence, perhaps, the suggestion of a practical or ritual barrier arising from the injury.²¹ Explaining Horatius' lack of public career is perhaps the more pressing since Spurius Larcius and Titus Herminius, who in some accounts fought alongside him early in the battle but then dropped back (perhaps to cut the bridge) leaving Horatius to fight alone, appear as office-holders both prior and subsequent to Horatius' deed. They are thus credited with "normal" magisterial careers despite their relative obscurity and lesser heroism.²² At any rate, Horatius' war wound constitutes both the social capital on which he was imagined to trade in standing for office, and also the ground for why this exchange failed.

This Servian passage illuminates a further crucial characteristic of wounds-as-monuments: they are inherently contestable. A wound by itself does not convey whether the action in which it was incurred was significant for the community, nor whether the primary audience evaluated it positively or negatively. The wound's origins may reside in an heroic deed, or a cowardly one; or in circumstances of no moral significance such as sheer accident, illness, or a congenital condition. Indeed, this ambiguity – is the wounded person cowardly, brave, or neither? Are the marks on his body indications of glory (*decora*), disgrace (*dehonestamenta*), or are they not monumental at all? – is endemic in Roman discussions of wounds.²³ The wounded person is always on his mettle to persuade viewers that his injury is a monument commemorating a praiseworthy deed, lest others make it a ground for despising him.²⁴ So when Horatius (according to Servius) refers

²¹ Can these barriers be overcome? The figure of Marcus Sergius Silus, as described by Plin. *Nat.* 7.104–6, may point to a middle path. Heavily debilitated by war wounds, Sergius held a praetorship in 197 but was barred by his colleagues from carrying out religious functions (§105). Discussion by Beagon 2005: 296–7, Beagon 2002: 111–20, de Libero 2002: 172–5, 187–90.

²² For Larcius and Herminius see Livy 2.10.6–7, Dion. *Rom.* 5.24.1, Plut. *Popl.* 16.6, Serv. *in Aen.* 11.642. Briquel 2007: 90–117 offers a trifunctionalist analysis of these figures' role in the legend (and notes their "normal" careers, in contrast to Horatius' exceptionality, at 91–2). They appear as consuls together in the year following Horatius' deed at Livy 2.15.1 (apparently) and Dion. *Rom.* 5.36.1.

²³ Only in certain locations do wounds convey "inherent" information about their origin, and bear the applicable moral value: weapon wounds to the front of the body are good, showing one faced the enemy in battle; those to the back are bad, suggesting one fled – or, if they are whip marks, evincing slavish treatment (cf. Leigh 1995: 196–9). Wounds located elsewhere, e.g. the hip (Horatius) or the testicles (Marcus Servilius Geminus, Livy 45.39.16–20, Plut. *Aem.* 31.8–9), are ambiguous and require narrative supplementation.

²⁴ For these competing discourses about wounds, cf. Publ. *Sent.* N 12: *non turpis est cicatrix quam virtus parit* (suggesting that the default interpretation is negative); also Plaut. *Cure.* 392–400, Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.75 (parody or jest); discussion by de Libero 2002: 183–7. A widely circulated *chreia* involves a Spartan mother saying to her son, who is limping and complaining about a war wound, "with each step, you will remember your heroism" (Stob. *Anth.* 3.7.28; variants at Plut. *Mor.* 241E, 331B–C; Cic. *De Or.* 2.249; Val. Max. 3.7 ext. 8; and Callim. *Aet.* fr. 106–107a Pf.). Discussion by Harder 2012: 2.783–6, Massimilla 2010: 457–60, Briquel 2007: 70–4 (on the connection to Horatius).

to his wound's origin, he implies that it monumentalizes a valorous performance and thereby subsumes it within the logic of exemplarity.

1.2.4 *Cognomen and Eye*

Two further monuments are sometimes associated with Horatius' person: one inscribed into his body, and the other, closely related, incorporated into his name. The cognomen "Cocles" is explained as meaning "one-eyed," either by derivation from *co-* and *oculus*, or as a corrupted Latinization of the Greek word *cyclops*.²⁵ Several accounts say that Horatius earned this cognomen by losing an eye in an earlier battle. On this view, he already bore a wound evincing an act of martial valor, which furthermore received a monumental cross-reference in his nomenclature, *before* he fought on the pons sublicius.²⁶ This earlier heroic performance is never mentioned except as an explanation for the cognomen, and no details about this earlier performance, let alone a continuous narrative, are ever provided. It thus appears to be an "aetiological myth," retrojected from the name for which it allegedly accounts. Some scholars, indeed, have suspected that this explanation was manufactured only because no one could think of a satisfactory way to connect the cognomen Cocles with the defense of the bridge, the only deed for which Horatius was known.²⁷

What this explanation illuminates, then, is the Romans' propensity to order their world according to the logic of exemplarity. When Romans encountered an object, like a cognomen or wound, that they surmised was monumental (because such objects commonly were), they were inclined to account for it by projecting an actor and a socially significant deed that the object could be imagined to commemorate. That is, they could create

²⁵ Derived from *oculus*: Var. Lat. 7.71, *ab oculo cocles, ut ocles, dictus, qui unum haberet oculum* (cf. Suda ε 1610, κ 1921, ο 118). Derived from or synonymous with *cyclops* (κύκλωψ): Plut. *Popl.* 16.7, Enn. *Sat.* 67 (*apud* Var. Lat. 7.71). Cf. Plaut. *Cure.* 392–4, Charis. 1.40 Keil for *cocles* simply meaning "one-eyed" with no specific etymology implied. For the word's relationship to *luscus* / *luscinus* (also "one-eyed"), see Plin. *Nat.* 11.150, Serv. *in Aen.* 8.649. Further citations at TLL *Onomasticon* s.v. *Cocles*.

²⁶ Dion. *Rom.* 5.23.2: Πόπλιος δ' Ὀράτιος ὁ καλούμενος Κόκλης ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἑλαττώματος ἐκκοπεῖς ἐν μάχῃ τὸν ἑτέρον ὀφθαλμόν; Vir. Ill. 11.1: *Horatius Cocles, illo cognomine quod in alio proelio oculum amiserat*; Plut. *Popl.* 16.7, Suda ε 1610.

²⁷ Münzer, *RE* 8 (1913): 2335 ("man half sich mit der kläglichen Ausflucht"), Briquel 2007: 58–9; cf. Fugmann 1997: 41. Just one surviving ancient source connects the lost eye with the defense of the bridge: Plut. *Mor.* 307D–E (*Parallela Graeca et Romana*) says that an Etruscan arrow struck his eye before he swam back to the Roman side. This unique version (differing even from the version Plutarch himself gives at *Popl.* 16.7–8: see next note) was likely generated for purely local reasons: it aligns Horatius' story precisely with the Greek "parallel" immediately preceding (307D), in which king Philip II of Macedon suffers an arrow to the eye while swimming a river near Olynthus.

a “backstory” to or aetiology for the object by relating it to events, previously known or invented *ad hoc*, that cohere with it under an exemplary framework. In this case, the cognomen “Cocles” is explained as a monument cross-referencing a wound received in battle, during an individual performance that a primary audience had observed and judged positively. The logic of exemplarity thus confers meaning upon the name via a suitable narrative supplement.²⁸ This configuration of wound and honorific name also makes Horatius Cocles a precise parallel for Mucius Scaevola, the next hero of the war with Porsenna: the cognomen Scaevola (“Lefty”) is said to commemorate this hero’s loss of his right hand while performing his own valorous deed. In Horatius’ case this backstory also produces a further exemplary dynamic. For now his defense of the bridge, likewise resulting in a crippling wound (to the hip), appears to be an *imitation* of the earlier deed, which by the logic of exemplarity has established the norm that one should suffer wounds on behalf of the *res publica*. Horatius evidently takes on board the norm that his own prior performance has set, and imitates himself.²⁹ Through the logic of exemplarity, then, the Romans render the obscure cognomen “Cocles” comprehensible, transforming it into a monument freighted with social and moral value.

1.2.5 Medallion

The monuments discussed so far – the path, bridge, and two alleged injuries – are attested only as “cross-references” in surviving literary texts; no extra-textual traces of their erstwhile existence remain. One and only one monument commemorating Horatius’ deed survives entirely independently of literary texts. The object is a bronze medallion [Fig. 1.1], minted under the emperor Antoninus Pius between 140 and 144 CE. It is one of a series of thirteen medallions struck in these or subsequent years whose reverses feature early Roman themes. The occasion or reason for this series is obscure, and scholars have offered various suggestions. At the least, the

²⁸ Jan Vansina has termed such after-the-fact production of aetiological stories “iconatrophy:” see Keesling 2005: 43–9 for discussion and *passim* for examples involving Greek sculpture; also Roller 2010: 166–70 for backstories generated from toponyms. For the phenomenon in exemplarity generally, see ch. 0.5.3. Such explanations do not, however, entirely preclude skeptical alternatives. Plut. *Popl.* 16.7, for example, offers an alternative explanation: Horatius only *appeared* to have one eye, due to a physiognomic anomaly. Under this explanation the eye does not commemorate a socially significant deed, for the deed has disappeared from the story. The name still refers to the eye, but no exemplary logic underlies that reference.

²⁹ More on self-imitation in ch. 1.3 and n. 57.

series evinces this emperor's interest in Roman origins.³⁰ The reverse image shows a moment in the performance of Horatius' famous deed; the legend COCLES identifies the hero explicitly. The scene is observed from upstream, so that the Etruscans are on the right and the Romans on the left. The pons sublicius – shown arched, yet clearly supported by piles – passes between the belligerents. Horatius, in the water, swims through substantial waves to the Roman side, his shield slung over his back, his helmet on his head, and still wearing his breastplate (at least in this drawing; photographs of surviving specimens are less clear). The opposing forces at the two ends of the bridge lavish attention upon the hero in the water, underscoring the action's spectacular quality and constituting the "public eye" in which it occurs. An Etruscan poises a javelin, while a Roman wields the axe with which he has just chopped a gap in the bridge. Another Roman, at the far left, extends his right hand, palm upward, toward the momentous scene unfolding before him. This is in part a demonstrative gesture directing viewers' gazes toward the hero, but it may also indicate the Romans' reception and welcoming of the returning hero – a kind of *adventus* scene, familiar from depictions of the emperor's arrival in contemporary art.³¹ This gesture makes clear that viewers of this scene are not merely seeing Horatius in action before an audience of eyewitnesses, but are seeing the very moment at which that primary audience (or at least its Roman component) marks his action as noteworthy and, by welcoming him, judges the performance beneficial to the community. With this gesture, the primary audience constitutes the action as a "deed."³² Thus the medallion, monument that it is, commemorates both the action itself

³⁰ Antoninus' third consulship (indicated by the obverse legend COS III) provides the date range. For the series of medallions featuring early Roman themes, see Rowan 2014: 111–16 with further references. For suggestions regarding their occasion see Rowan 2014: 115–20, Krumme 1995: 203–20, Strack 1937: 86–7. Discussion of the Cocles medallion in particular by Krumme 1995: 134–6; also his cat. no. 69/1 and fig. 137; Gnechi 1912: 2.9 and pl. 43.4. Excellent large image in Griffith 2009: fig. 2. The legend COCLES also appears on the obverse of a restoration denarius of Trajan (after 107 CE), accompanying a head of Roma (Krumme 1995: 138, 190–2, cat no. 48/1), but here there is no thematic connection between legend and type.

³¹ For a similar, somewhat earlier *adventus* scene, see the Dacians' reception and welcoming of Trajan, in scenes 89–90 of Trajan's column (Brilliant 1963: 126 and fig. 3.53). Krumme 1995: 136 seems to interpret this gesture as indicating a spoken address (*adlocutio*, cf. Brilliant 1963: 130–2), but I can see no rationale for this.

³² Observer figures in Roman art are largely unstudied. Michel 1982 provides the only detailed discussion I know, focusing on Pompeian painting. She considers, among other possibilities, that these figures provide internal audiences or surrogates for external, living viewers of the paintings, and/or that such figures function compositionally to direct attention to crucial actions. Along these lines, I would suggest that observer figures in paintings depicting exemplary deeds (e.g. Theseus and the Minotaur, or Micon and Pero) constitute, from a Roman perspective, judging audiences that confer significance and value on these actions by their witnessing.



Figure 1.1 Medallion of Antoninus Pius, 140–4 CE

and the eyewitnesses' evaluation of the action as significant and morally virtuous; it then places all this information before the eyes of the medallion's users, inviting them (as secondary witnesses) to accept this deed as normative.³³

Who are the intended (or actual) Roman users of this medallion? While medallions share certain commonalities with coins, they differ by being struck in limited numbers for narrow distribution. They tend not to be found in the same archaeological contexts as regular coinage, and seem often to have been used as jewelry or for other decorative purposes, or kept as heirlooms. They are perhaps best understood as instances of “gift money,” coinlike objects distributed as keepsakes on special occasions by the emperor to high-ranking officials and close associates and not intended to circulate as regular money. The intended viewers, then, are probably of elite status with corresponding education. Nevertheless, this image accords closely enough with the main features of the familiar Horatius narrative that almost any Roman could probably recognize it – especially when glossed by the legend *COCLES*, which would have assured correct identification by all who were even minimally literate.³⁴

³³ While the medallion, being a monument, makes those who examine it into secondary witnesses, its dramatic visual representation creates the conceit that its viewers are actually part of the *primary* audience, right along with the soldier-viewers represented in the scene, observing the action itself from a vantage point upstream as it unfolds before their very eyes.

³⁴ For the recipients and uses of medallions see Rowan 2014: 109–11, Mittag 2010: 21–2. Rowan 2014: 122 notes the “intertextual” (I would say “cross-referential”) relationship between standard narratives of early Rome and the images on these Antonine medallions; she also remarks (114–15) that some of these medallions show iconographic similarities to relief sculptures of the same subject (another kind of cross-reference). Cf. Krumme 1995: 140–6.

Yet one must note specifically what aspect of the deed this image illustrates. It is easy to read the whole story into the image – Horatius' solo fight against great odds, his plunge into the river, possibly a grievous wound to his leg or hip. What is actually depicted, however, is the hero swimming through rough water while burdened with a full complement of armor. In the narrative accounts too, his armor often conspicuously accompanies him in the water. Livy (2.10.11) describes him swimming in full armor, unwounded but amidst a shower of Etruscan javelins (perhaps implied also on the medallion, where an Etruscan poises his javelin), while in Plutarch (*Popl.* 16.8) he swims in armor not only while wounded, but with an Etruscan spear lodged in his buttock; meanwhile Seneca (*Ep.* 120.7) stresses that he *emerged* from the river with all his armor, "as safely as if he had come by way of the bridge." Many other accounts are similar.³⁵ Why this widespread insistence that his armor accompanied him in the river? The explanation may be found in the Graeco-Roman warrior ethic, which holds that flight from battle is disgraceful – indicating personal cowardice and endangering comrades exposed by the break in the formation. A soldier who returns without all of his arms may be suspected of having fled, for he would only drop his heavy equipment in order to run away expeditiously. In a proper "fighting retreat," where he withdraws maintaining formation and facing the enemy, he would need his full complement of weapons and armor. Moreover, the victorious enemy could be expected to gather up abandoned equipment as spoils, erecting a trophy on the battlefield and adorning the temples, public areas, and houses of their native city, as monuments to their victory and to the greater shame of the defeated.³⁶ Now, Horatius eventually flees the Etruscan onslaught, and

³⁵ Livy 2.10.11: *ita sic armatus in Tiberim desiluit multisque superincidentibus telis incolumis ad suos tranavit*. Plut. *Popl.* 16.8: οὕτω δὲ μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἀφείξεται εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν, ἀπενήξατο καὶ προσέμειξε τῇ πέραν ὄχθῃ, δόρατι Τυρρηνικῷ βεβλημένος τὸν γλουτόν. Sen. *Ep.* 120.7: *iecitque se in praeceps et non minus sollicitus in illo rapido alveo fluminis ut armatus quam ut salvus exiret, retento armorum victricium decore tam tutus rediit quam si ponte venisset*. Also Dion. *Rom.* 5.24.3, Val. Max. 3.2.1, Frontin. *Str.* 2.13.5, Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).3, Dio 45.31.1, *Pan. Lat.* 12.18.2, Ampelius 20.4, Serv. *in Aen.* 8.649, *Vir. Ill.* 11.1.

³⁶ For the disgrace of leaving arms on the battlefield, see (e.g.) Nisbet/Hubbard 1978: 113–14, with numerous references. In this case, Livy contrasts Horatius' retention of his arms (*ita sic armatus*, 2.10.11) with the other Roman soldiers' abandonment of theirs in flight (*arma ordinesque relinquere*, 2.10.3), and Seneca makes Horatius value his armor as much as his life (*non minus sollicitus ... ut armatus quam ut salvus exiret*, *Ep.* 120.7). Abandoned arms as booty: e.g. Schmuhl 2008: 61–72, Welch 2006, Rawson 1990: 158–61, Wiseman 1987b: 394–8, Hölscher 1978: 318–24. Abandoned arms could also be reused against the Romans; Livy says that the Carthaginian infantry at Cannae were mostly equipped with Roman spoils (22.46.4). Roman warrior ethics have been thoroughly investigated in recent decades: see e.g. Phang 2008, McDonnell 2006: 181–205, Alston 1998, Lendon 1997: 237–66, Goldsworthy 1996: 264–82, Harris 1979: 9–41.

in the water even turns his back to the enemy, as the medallion shows – actions that might be censured as indicating cowardice. Retaining all his armor, however, guarantees that the retreat was “proper,” and can be recuperated as a display of valor. The strenuous insistence in the texts and on the medallion that he returned with all his armor, then, betrays a problem in the production of Horatius as an exemplum of military valor. It acknowledges the awkward fact that he fled from the enemy, while striving to mitigate the adverse consequences of that acknowledgment.

Finally, the feat of swimming in full armor itself enhances the glory of the deed. Swimming appears in literary texts as a manly pursuit, and is associated with other athletic activities – riding, footraces, javelin-throwing – that were part of a soldier’s training.³⁷ In battle narratives feats of swimming may contribute to performances that are striking on other grounds as well. In Vergil’s *Aeneid* the Rutulian champion Turnus, fighting alone and pressed hard by Aeneas’ Trojans, leaps into the Tiber in full armor and is carried to safety (*Aen.* 9.815–19). To Vergil’s readers in the Augustan age and beyond, this vignette likely recalled the exemplum of Horatius, even while it purports to give Turnus chronological precedence.³⁸ In a more historical vein Quintus Sertorius, a young cavalryman at the battle of Arausio in 105, was wounded and unhorsed in the defeat and reportedly saved himself by swimming across the Rhone river in full armor.³⁹ Suetonius says that Iulius Caesar, cast overboard during the battle of Alexandria in 47, swam a considerable distance holding up his record-books with one hand to keep them dry and “holding his cloak in his teeth, lest the enemy take it as a spoil.”⁴⁰ Though not in full armor, Caesar here betrays a virtuous aversion to leaving equipment behind for the enemy to collect as booty, and scrupulous regard for the potential need to defend his accounts before the senate. And in the reign of Hadrian – almost contemporary with the period of the medallion – swimming in armor continues to indicate notable military valor or soldierly capability.⁴¹ Hence the feat of swimming ascribed to Horatius must have contributed to readers’ or viewers’ impression that his performance was valorous overall. Indeed the model Horatius sets likely informed these later stories (ch. 1.3). If one

³⁷ Swimming as military training: e.g. Hor. *Carm.* 1.8 (with Leach 1994: 335–8), 3.7.22–7, 3.12; Plut. *Cato Maior* 20.6; Veg. *Mil.* 1.10. Horsmann 1991: 127–33 provides general discussion and full sources.

³⁸ Goldschmidt 2013: 180–7 discusses the Turnus-Horatius parallel.

³⁹ Plut. *Sert.* 3.1, with Konrad 1994: 43–4.

⁴⁰ Suet. *Iul.* 64; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 49.7–8, [Caes.] *BAlex.* 21.2–3.

⁴¹ Batavian troops under Hadrian swim the Danube in armor, to demonstrate superb training and valor: see Dio 69.9.6, *ILS* 2558 = *CIL* 3.3676 vv. 3–4, and Horsmann 1991: 131 and n. 89.

wonders why Horatius should be said to survive his plunge into the river, the valor associated with swimming in armor, in a turbulent river, and perhaps while wounded, all with the result of bringing his armor home, may provide the answer.⁴² Under such circumstances he might have been expected to drown, as Polybius has him do. This is no disgrace, but is perhaps less glorious than the alternative.⁴³

1.2.6 Statue

The final monument to be discussed here is yet another object known only through cross-references in surviving literary texts. Several texts say that Horatius' deed was commemorated with an honorific statue.⁴⁴ While details vary, much of the information these texts convey is reasonably consistent. First, the statue was erected by public authority to monumentalize the deed and the positive evaluation it initially received, and/or to recompense Horatius for the injuries he suffered.⁴⁵ Second, the statue was bronze, and represented Horatius in armor.⁴⁶ Third, it was said to stand in the most public of places: either in the *comitium*, which is the assembly place in front of the senate house (*curia*); or in the sanctuary of Vulcan (*Volcanal*) adjacent to the *comitium*. Now, the *curia*, *comitium*, and speaker's platform (*rostra*) stood together in the northernmost corner of the republican forum (map locations A–D), and constituted the political heart of the state. This

⁴² Turbulence: large waves are depicted on the medallion; also Dion. *Rom.* 5.24.3, *περὶ γὰρ τοῖς ὑπερείσασσι τῶν στανίδων σχιζόμενος ὁ ῥοῦς ὁξὺς ἦν καὶ δίνας ἐποίει μεγάλας* (i.e. he is caught up in rapids and whirlpools), and Val. Max. 3.2.1, *nec ullo verticis circuitu actus* (i.e. he manages to avoid the whirlpools). At Sen. *Ep.* 120.7, the water flows fast (*in illo rapido alveo fluminis*). In contrast, Constantine's panegyrist (*Pan. Lat.* 12.18.2) makes the river calm for Horatius (*tu quietus armatum Coclitem revexisti*) but rough for Maxentius.

⁴³ For exhausted, heavily laden soldiers drowning in lakes or rivers, see Polyb. 3.84.9, Livy 5.38.7–9, 22.6.6–7; Horsmann 1991: 131–2. Polybius may have local, programmatic reasons for making Horatius die, and his version need not be thought to attest an alternative tradition (*contra* Briquel 2007: 69–70, Voisin 1992: 261–6). For Polybius has just described the moral inspiration young Romans receive from attending funerals and learning of past Romans' great deeds (6.53–4). Horatius' death, at the end of Polybius' narrative, closes the loop: having received his own inspiration in this way, Horatius' imminent funeral will yield a narrative of his deed to inspire other young Romans in turn (see also Stemmler 2001: 235–6).

⁴⁴ Cic. *Off.* 1.61 (probably), Livy 2.10.12, Dion. *Rom.* 5.25.2, Plin. *Nat.* 34.22, Plut. *Popl.* 16.9, Gell. 4.5, *Vir. Ill.* 11.2.

⁴⁵ Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch (previous n.) name the community at large as dedicator. Livy and Plutarch also mention gifts of food and land, making the statue just one component in a broader gesture of public gratitude. See also *Vir. Ill.* 11.2, Plut. *Mor.* 820E, with Sehlmeier 1999: 92–3, Münzer, *RE* 8 (1913): 2333–4. Tanner 2000: 25–30 plausibly argues that honorific statues participate in a gift-exchange dynamic between individual and collective, objectifying a relationship of mutual obligation.

⁴⁶ Bronze: Dionysius, Plutarch (per n. 44). Armor: Dionysius, perhaps Cicero (discussion below).

area is therefore described as the most visible, most frequented, or most important place. The statue's high visibility in this location significantly enhances its value as a gift. For since the statue's job *qua* monument is to construct secondary audiences for the great deed, it could collect the most eyes, from the widest range of Romans (and others) of every age, sex, and status, in precisely this location.⁴⁷ Moreover, Pliny asserts that it still stood in his day (*quae durat hodieque*, *Nat.* 34.22). This assertion makes it likely that three earlier authors who refer to the statue – Livy, Dionysius, and Cicero – also knew it as a part of the monumental landscape of the forum.

This statue has received considerable attention from archaeologists, since its attested features pose iconographic and typological difficulties. It is doubtful whether traditions about honorific statues erected in the sixth century BCE can be trusted (see also ch. 2.3 on Cloelia's statue), since the earliest honorific statues that are historically secure – and indeed the earliest securely attested commemorative monuments of any sort at Rome – date to the late fourth century. Thus it is argued that Horatius' statue, if properly honorific, must have been erected at least two centuries after the traditional date of his deed, and was subsequently misremembered as being contemporary with the deed. Alternatively, if the statue in fact dated earlier than the late fourth century, it was originally a cult or votive statue that came to be (mis)understood as honorific and (mis)ascribed to Horatius – another instance of a mysterious object being “monumentalized,” written into the logic of exemplarity, by being attached to a narrative to which it does not “properly” belong.⁴⁸ But while the question of the statue's “real” historical origins is assuredly interesting, all writers who mention it *believed* that it was honorific, and was erected to commemorate Horatius' great deed shortly after his performance. My aim here is to consider what these writers and other Roman viewers of the statue – the secondary audiences to Horatius' deed, constituted as such by encountering this statue – made of it, given their belief in its monumental character.

⁴⁷ Placement in *comitium*: Livy, Pliny (apparently) (per n. 44). In Volcanal: Plutarch, *Vir. Ill.* Dionysius locates it “in the most important place in the forum.” Visibility of *comitium*: Dion. *Rom.* 1.87.2, 2.29.1; Plin. *Nat.* 34.24. Gell. 4.5.1–4 reports that Horatius' statue was relocated from the *comitium* to the Volcanal, apparently a very short move. Scholarly discussion of the location(s) of Horatius' statue in Sehlmeier 1999: 94–5, Coarelli 1983: 1.168, 174–5, Lahusen 1983: 12–13, 33–4, Vessberg 1941: 87–8. On the placement of honorific statues generally in “much-eyed” locations, see Stewart 2003: 136–40.

⁴⁸ For such (mis)identification and (mis)attribution, see ch. 1.2.4 and n. 28. Coarelli 1983: 1.168, 174, for example, conjectures that an early cult image of Vulcan was later misunderstood as honoring Horatius. But there are as many suggested solutions as there are scholars. On the emergence of honorific statuary in Rome around 300, and on statues commemorating earlier figures, see Sehlmeier 1999: 41–109 (esp. 109), Hölscher 1978: 324–44 (332–5 on Horatius).

Two authors, Cicero and Dionysius, provide what may be regarded as interpretations of the statue's iconography. While sharing a belief in the statue's antiquity and commemorative function, these authors diverge in their view of *how* it commemorates the deed: that it represents Horatius as a typical instance of military valor, or that it represents him in the uniqueness of his individual performance.

First Cicero. In his dialogue "On moral duties" (*De Officiis*) 1.61, Cicero launches what will turn out to be a lengthy discussion of "greatness of soul" (*magnitudo animi*), one of the four virtues comprising overall "moral rightness" (*honestum*). By way of introduction, he declares that *magnitudo animi* "seems the most radiant" (*splendidissimum videri*) of these four virtues. As proof of its privileged status, he adduces the fact that we praise and blame people depending whether they display it. The examples he offers of such praise and blame all turn out to involve courage displayed in combat: so while Cicero does not expressly assert here that military courage is the principal constituent of *magnitudo animi*, this view is implied by his examples. Accordingly, he provides two examples of reproaches hurled against people for cowardice, and then, as examples of praise, continues as follows (Cic. *Off.* 1.61):

and conversely in praising, we praise with a kind of "fuller voice," as it were, deeds done bravely and outstandingly, with great spirit (*magno animo*). Hence the battles of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra are an exercise ground for the rhetoricians; hence our own Cocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and innumerable others, and most of all the Roman people itself, are outstanding in the greatness of their spirit. That we see statues, too, usually in military garb additionally testifies to a zeal for military glory.⁴⁹

The statues mentioned last, it seems, provide further evidence of the radiance (*splendor*) of the martial virtue *magnitudo animi*, to accompany the grand reputations of the Greek battles and Roman heroes mentioned previously. Whether Cicero is thinking of *particular* statues that commemorate these specific heroes – hence is attesting statues of Horatius, the Decii, the Scipios, etc. – is not entirely clear.⁵⁰ Assuredly, however, Cicero is

⁴⁹ Cic. *Off.* 1.61: ... *contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescioquo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, <hinc no>ster Cocles, hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M. Marcellus, innumerabiles alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari.* For Cicero's discussion of blame, immediately preceding this passage, see ch. 2.2 nn. 18–19.

⁵⁰ In this case one would translate "that we see *their* statues in military garb attests *their* zeal," as indeed some translators render it.

referring to what he deems a *typological class* of statues, namely statues in military costume. So assuming that the statue identified elsewhere as commemorating Horatius was in armor, as Dionysius and others say, then it seems very likely that Cicero, having just mentioned Horatius, has this statue in mind as a member of the class of statues in military costume. Whatever doubts or exceptions may lurk in the word *fere* (“usually,” “more or less”), Cicero seems confident of the costume’s meaning: all persons so commemorated share a zeal for military glory; one can read off from the costume the values the commemorands embraced and put into action. To look at Horatius’ statue through Cicero’s eyes, then, is to see how its military costume makes it *typical*, aligning it with other, iconographically similar statues. This iconography, along with the tropes of praise and blame mentioned immediately before, causes all who are caught up in these representations to fall into the category of “having demonstrated (martial) *magnitudo animi*,” and provides evidence that this virtue is indeed the “most radiant” of the four virtues comprising moral rightness.

Now for Dionysius. In his account of Horatius’ deed (*Rom.* 5.24.1–25.3) he expressly remarks on the role of the armor in battle, and stresses that the hero went into and came out of the river without losing it. Dionysius also lists the honors and rewards Horatius received publicly and privately, including a “bronze statue in armor” in the most visible part of the forum. Finally, Dionysius adds his own praise to these earlier acclamations (hence, as a secondary witness, affirming the correctness of the primary audience’s judgment), declaring in his own voice that Horatius had achieved something singular: he won “deathless renown,” and was “the most enviable of any Roman at that time.” Since Dionysius gives Horatius’ armor such prominence both in battle and in the Tiber, he seems likely to mean that the armor on the statue is Horatius’ own, the very armor that by (still) being on his body constitutes a monument to his valor.⁵¹ This interpretation is corroborated by Dionysius’ view that Horatius surpassed all other contemporary actors, and was therefore rewarded with a highly distinctive (not typical) set of honors. The statue of Horatius in *his* armor is therefore a distinctive honor marking his distinctive and surpassing achievement. To

⁵¹ Horatius’ armor in battle: τῶν ὁμόσε χωρούντων οὓς μὲν τῷ ξίφει παίων, οὓς δὲ τῷ θυρεῷ περιτρέπων (5.23.2). Into and out of the water in armor: καθάλλεται σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν ... ἐξεκολύμβησεν εἰς τὴν γῆν οὐδὲν τῶν ὅπλων ἐν τῷ νείν ἀποβαλὼν (5.24.3). Statue in armor: εἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἐνοπλὸν ὃ δῆμος ἔστησεν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐν τῷ κρατίστῳ (5.25.2). Author’s own added praise: Τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἀθάνατον αὐτῷ δόξαν εἰργάσατο. ... Ὁράτιος μὲν δὴ τοιαύτην ἀποδειξάμενος ἀρετὴν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζηλωτὸς μὲν εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος Ῥωμαῖον ἐγένετο (5.25.1, 3). Similarly Dio 45.31.1 (ch. 2.2 nn. 16–17).

look at Horatius' statue through Dionysius' eyes, then, is to see the hero in his specificity and uniqueness – in his *dissimilarity* from all other Romans, which is precisely what Dionysius wants to underscore here.

If these analyses are on the mark, then Dionysius and Cicero, in their contrasting readings of the meaning of the armor on Horatius' statue, trace out the dual ontology that underpins every exemplum, as discussed in the introduction (ch. 0.5.2). Dionysius sees the uniqueness and contingency of the particular performance, of the passage of the armor on this hero's body from the bridge into the river and back to land. This armor has a unique life course; no other warrior (or armor) has done this. Cicero, meanwhile, sees the performance's typicality: Horatius, the Decii, the Scipios, and so on all displayed military valor, and these kinds of performances are commemorated (*inter alia*) with armored statues. There is no hint that the armor is "specific" to Horatius, connected particularly to his story or specially revelatory of his own valor: rather, it is "generic," communicating the same virtue about all performers whose statues are so clothed. For Cicero, then, the armor on Horatius' statue simply places him in the category of "warriors who displayed valor" along with other figures similarly commemorated and categorized, all of whom are thereby rendered commensurable within that category. Yet for Dionysius, this armor places Horatius *hors de categorie*, rendering him uniquely outstanding and therefore incommensurable with any other figure ("the most enviable of any Roman").⁵²

This discussion of monuments commemorating Horatius' deed raises several points about the functioning of monuments in general. First, the Romans well understood that the chances of the memory of a deed surviving, and reaching the maximal number of secondary witnesses, was enhanced by entrusting that memory to as many different monumental forms and media as possible, and furthermore by making these monuments refer to one another. Thus, even in antiquity, people who read a textual account of Horatius' deed could learn that the bridge and the statue also served as monuments to his deed, even if they could never visit the city and observe the bridge and statue directly. We too, in modernity, learn of the range and characteristics of commemorative devices through the cross-references they receive in the texts that survive for us to read.

⁵² The modern debate among archaeologists regarding the form of Horatius' statue reproduces this ontological split. Namely: is this a *statua loricata* – the "normal" type of statue in armor familiar from the late Republic and imperial age, pointing generically to the commemorand's military valor or office-holding – or does the statue have a distinctive iconography related to his specific deed? See Stemmer 1978: 142, 145 on Horatius' statue and the *statua loricata* type; also Schlmeier 1999: 93–4 and n. 292; Lahusen 1983: 51–2 and n. 51.

Second, monuments can be “created” when otherwise mysterious objects are attached to existing or newly invented exemplary narratives. The cognomen *Cocles* (probably) spurs the invention of the story that Horatius had previously lost an eye; the *pons sublicius*’ distinctive construction is explained with reference to Horatius’ defense; and a mysterious ancient statue of a warrior is said to have been erected by Horatius’ contemporaries to honor his deed, even though the statue cannot, as a matter of historical fact, have been both honorific and contemporary with Horatius. In such cases, the logic of exemplarity has “captured” otherwise unexplained objects and rendered them meaningful by connecting them to a familiar narrative of an exemplary performance, causing them to stand as monuments to that performance. Third, monuments may be interpreted differently to meet different local needs. Cicero implies that Horatius’ statue indicates the hero’s typicality, in a context where he needs to adduce as many examples as possible of “greatness of soul.” Meanwhile Dionysius interprets the statue as indicating Horatius’ uniqueness, in a context where he requires one supremely valorous figure to save Rome from a supremely dire threat. Fourth and finally, my survey of monuments to Horatius has revealed their inherent openness and essential contestability. Did the bridge have iron nails or not when Horatius defended it? Does his cognomen imply that he had performed valorously in a previous battle, or simply that his facial physiognomy was unusual? Did his leg wound render him venerable or contemptible, and did it qualify him or disqualify him for high office? Did his statue mark his typicality, or his uniqueness? It is this essential openness and capacity to be contested that makes even this hoariest of exempla, and indeed all exempla, so useful for Romans of all periods to “think with” as they confronted decisions in their own lives about how to proceed in any given situation. Therefore I turn next to the question of how the Horatius exemplum sets norms that impact social actors who are distant in time and/or space from his deed.

1.3 Normative Horatius: Standard-Setting and Imitation

As discussed in the introduction (ch. 0.3.4), operation 4 of exemplarity involves audiences – primary or, more commonly, secondary – accepting that a deed they have observed, or learned of through a monument, is normative, i.e. has a morally prescriptive or obligatory character. The norm presents itself either as moral standard by which these audience members should evaluate subsequent performances they witness, or as a model that they themselves should follow or avoid when performing their

own actions in the public eye. Consequently, any action in the public eye may be viewed, within the logic of exemplarity, either retrospectively or prospectively: retrospectively for its relationship to earlier performances that may have supplied it with relevant models; and prospectively for the norms it may supply for future actors and judging audiences (ch. 0.4). These are the dimensions of exemplarity that I pursue here, in the case of Horatius. In defending the bridge as he does, what prior models does he instantiate? And for what subsequent performances does his famous deed provide a norm?

First for the retrospective view. Although Horatius is one of the first named military heroes found among the legends of early Rome, nevertheless the logic of exemplarity permits – even prefers – that his deed not be entirely unexampled. Several accounts point to preexisting models he could be regarded as imitating. Polybius, as noted earlier, presents Horatius as being inspired by the glorious deeds narrated during aristocratic funerals, and as seeking to perform such a deed himself in order to win the concomitant glory. Polybius does not seem to imply that any one specific model is important: the audience to the funeral eulogy, after all, is confronted not only with the newly deceased and his deeds, but with all the deceased's ancestors and their deeds, as potential models. In the face of such a juxtaposition or amalgamation of particular performances, witnesses to a funeral eulogy may absorb a rather general norm such as “one should strive to perform brave deeds or dutiful deeds” (i.e. manifest the moral values of *fortitudo* or *pietas*), rather than a more specific norm set by a particular admirable deed. Thus the amalgamative structure of the funeral eulogy seems to underscore the “generic” or “typical” dimension of the exempla it presents, rather than spotlighting individual performances in their uniqueness or contingency.

Some accounts of Horatius' deed do, however, imply a specific model for imitation. Dionysius supplies one such model, perhaps two, by providing Horatius with a genealogy (*Rom.* 5.25.3). Dionysius writes that Horatius was the nephew of Horatius Pulvillus, suffect consul in year one of the Republic and ordinary consul in year three, the year in which Dionysius also places Cocles' deed (see n. 1). Furthermore, he says that Cocles was descended from the surviving Horatius who, along with his two brothers, defeated the triplet Curiatii in a duel to secure Roman ascendancy over Alba Longa in the reign of king Tullus Hostilius. Within the logic of Roman exemplarity, compelling models for imitation often come from within the actor's own family: the idea that certain patterns of behavior

or achievement do or should run in families is widespread in Roman culture.⁵³ In Cocles' case, the surviving member of the triplet Horatii provides not only suitable moral categories like "military valor" and "endurance" in which his putative descendant may aspire to perform praiseworthy deeds, but also a more specific parallel at the level of the performance's structure. For Cocles and his putative ancestor both fought initially in a threesome, of whom two fell away leaving the one to face down a more numerous enemy alone; also, in both stories the fate of the entire city hangs on the one hero's performance.⁵⁴ Horatius Pulvillus may also be thought to provide a suitable moral category from within the family. As consul he persisted in dedicating the temple of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol (map location 158) despite being apprised, in the middle of the ritual, of his son's death – an action that can be judged positively in the category of *fortitudo*, among others. But since this performance lacks any martial element, it manifests a somewhat different dimension of this virtue from Cocles' performance.⁵⁵

In some texts, Horatius is presented as an exemplary model for himself. Earlier we saw (ch. 1.2.4) that those texts that explain the cognomen Cocles as meaning "one-eyed," and allege that Horatius lost an eye in a prior battle, thereby make the cognomen and the associated injury into monuments that commemorate Horatius' display of military valor (*virtus* or

⁵³ I know no comprehensive treatment of familial exemplarity, though an abundance of recent scholarship attests the topic's attraction. Overviews include Richardson 2012: 17–55, Baroin 2010, Lentano 2007: 113–44, and Walter 2004b; treatments of particular aspects include Haimson Lushkov 2015: 46–53 (exemplary replication among the Manlii), Richardson 2012: 57–113 (similiarieties among the Fabii), Scholz 2011: 89–129 (father as educator and exemplary model for son), van der Blom 2011: 51–63, 2010: 87–103, 316–21 (Cicero's practice of adducing ancestors), Molinier Arbo 2009 (valuable but overstated views on wax *imagines*), Treggiari 2003 (also on Cicero's deployment of ancestors), Bernard 2000: 167–96 (familial patterns in Livy), Doonan 1999 (ancestral images in houses), all with further bibliography. I offer a case study in ch. 3.4. Scholars have noted that both Livy and Augustus strive to generalize or "nationalize" these familial traditions: Feldherr 1998: 97–102, Jaeger 1997: 107–24.

⁵⁴ On the three Horatii see Solodow 1979, esp. 262–4 for a stimulating argument that the entire narrative is a back-formation from a collection of (apparently) monumental objects – an exemplary dynamic discussed earlier (ch. 1.2.4) and which will appear again.

⁵⁵ Pulvillus' deed is classified by Val. Max. (5.10.1) under the category *de parentibus qui obitum liberorum forti animo tulerunt*. Cocles' deed, meanwhile, is classified under *de fortitudine* (3.2.1), whose contents are predominantly military. Thus Valerius seems to recognize two distinct dimensions or subcategories of *fortitudo*: endurance of personal loss, and bravery in battle. Similarly, Livy 2.8.8 makes Pulvillus exemplary for his *robur animi*, which resembles the *fortis animus* with which Valerius credits him. Regarding the familial connection, Dionysius is the only source presenting Pulvillus as Cocles' uncle. Yet Dionysius does not mention the death-of-the-son incident when narrating Pulvillus' dedication of the temple, hence does not highlight Pulvillus' fortitude in that context. So Dionysius, at any rate, does not overtly suggest a familial transmission of *fortitudo* from Pulvillus to Cocles.

fortitudo) on that earlier occasion. In defending the bridge, then, Horatius displays this same virtue again, for this latter performance is assigned to the same moral category. Yet there is also a closer, structural parallel. The hip wound he incurs in the latter feat seems to echo the loss of the eye, as both injuries are debilitating, publicly visible, and therefore monumental. Taken together, these wounds present Horatius as someone who habitually acquires debilitating injuries as monuments to his valor, yielding one body part after another to the ever greater glory of the parts that remain.⁵⁶ Thus he establishes a model in an earlier performance that he imitates in a later one.⁵⁷

In contrast, one account of Horatius' deed – in the younger Seneca's *Epistula* 120 – has a stake in denying that Horatius sets such a model for himself. Here I briefly describe Seneca's position, saving more extensive discussion for this book's conclusion. Seneca contends, in a Stoic vein, that no external observer can assess an agent's moral state without observing many actions done over time and in various circumstances. Only long-term patterns of action, exposing the agent's overall consistency or inconsistency in making moral choices, reveal the virtuousness or viciousness of his disposition. As an example, Seneca offers a brief, admiring narration of Horatius' defense of the bridge (*Ep.* 120.7): a brilliant deed, he admits, but insufficient to ground any judgment about Horatius' moral status overall. Given that only *one performance* by Horatius is known, Seneca implies, any properly moral judgments about him are premature.⁵⁸ If Seneca accepted that the cognomen "Cocles" attested a prior valorous deed, he would put the cogency of his argument at risk. For two such deeds might seem, to some readers, to constitute something like a consistent pattern of behavior over time, and so to offer grounds for ascribing virtue overall to Horatius. Though admittedly arguing from silence, I speculate that Seneca omits the explanation of the cognomen found in certain other texts because his immediate argument is best served by presenting Horatius as a one-deed

⁵⁶ Compare Sallust on Sertorius, *Hist.* 1.88M (Reynolds' text): *quin ille dehonestamento corporis* [i.e. his scars and missing eye] *maxime laetabatur neque illis anxius, quia relicua gloriosius retinebat*. Dem. Cor. 67 speaks similarly regarding king Philip II of Macedon – indeed Gellius (2.27) says Sallust's text imitates Demosthenes. On the "public" quality of war wounds, Flaig 2003: 130–3.

⁵⁷ For exemplary performers following their own example, see Lowrie 2007: 101–2 (on Cicero). For the quasi-philosophical idea that properly constituted aristocrats exhibit *aequabilitas* or *constantia*, i.e. act in consistent ways over time in multifarious situations (whereby one can appear to "imitate oneself"), see ch. 8.3, with Langlands 2011: 107–11.

⁵⁸ With this argument, Seneca calls into question a key aspect of the logic of exemplarity, namely its focus on the moral quality of the individual performance. His contention that one performance provides insufficient evidence from which to form a moral judgment about the actor is part of his broader, systematic Stoic critique of conventional Roman exemplarity: see ch. 8.3.

marvel. Seneca tailors his presentation of this exemplum to optimize its “fit,” its capacity persuasively to support his immediate argument.

These potential models for Horatius’ defense of the bridge reveal that one performance can resemble another along a spectrum of similarity. Toward one end of this spectrum, a later performance may be judged merely to fall into the same moral category as an earlier one. Many moral categories are capacious enough to accommodate quite diverse types of action – such as the category *fortitudo*, which can encompass the rather dissimilar actions of Pulvillus at the temple and Cocles at the bridge. At this end of the spectrum, similarity consists in the “typicality” of the performances, their shared belonging to a single moral category (as discussed in the introduction, ch. 0.5.2). Toward the other end of the spectrum, a performance not only shares the categorical assignment, but also reproduces particular aspects, of its model. Thus Cocles fights originally in a threesome, like his triplet “ancestor;” also, according to the “one-eyed” explanation of his cognomen, his defense of the bridge debilitates a body part, creating a monument to his valor just as the (unspecified) earlier performance did. In these cases, the later performance takes on a mimetic quality. The closer the mimesis, the better the imitation is typically judged to be.

So much for the retrospective view, the models Horatius could be thought to follow. I now turn to the prospective view, and examine subsequent performances that take Horatius’ performance as setting a norm or providing a model for imitation. Valerius Maximus tells a striking tale about the radical Tribune of the Plebs Gaius Gracchus, who was killed by his political opponents in 121. In Gracchus’ last hours, as a mob intent on murder pursued him through the city, a steadfast friend named Laetorius barricaded the *pons sublicius* and held up the pursuit until Gracchus had crossed the bridge safely. Then, says Valerius, “overwhelmed by force of numbers, [Laetorius] turned his sword against himself and with a quick leap headed for the depths of the Tiber. The fondness for his entire country which Horatius Cocles had once demonstrated on that bridge, Laetorius bestowed upon a single friendship, with his death willingly added.”⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Val. Max. 4.7.2 (“de amicitia”): *Laetorius autem in ponte sublicio constitit et eum, donec Gracchus transiret, ardore spiritus sui saepsit, ac vi iam multitudinis obrutus converso in se gladio celeri saltu profundum Tiberis petiit, quamque in eo ponte caritatem toti patriae Horatius Cocles exhibuerat, unius amicitiae adiecta voluntaria morte praestitit*. The preceding sentence reports that another friend, Pomponius, died blocking the *Porta Trigemina* so that Gracchus could escape. This gate, whose precise location is unknown, was part of the city’s republican-era fortification wall along the left bank of the Tiber. Thus Gracchus fled through this gate out of the city, and then crossed over the bridge into Trastevere, going in the opposite direction from Horatius; he died on the Janiculum, in the *lucus Furi(inum)*. On Gracchus’ route see Coarelli 1988: 31–4; for the relationship of the *Porta*

Valerius here explicitly notes the mimetic aspect of Laetorius' performance: he imitates Horatius in his one-against-many fight on the pons publicius, concluding with a leap into the river. But in saying that Laetorius "added" something, namely his voluntary death, he presents Laetorius as diverging from, and indeed surpassing, his model in this one respect. Thus Valerius is presupposing a version of the Horatius story in which the hero survives, and may be suggesting that the defender's death while performing his deed morally surpasses whatever else he might have achieved had he lived (such as an heroic swim).⁶⁰

Yet a focus on the mimetic qualities of the performance misses the larger moral point. Valerius, rather than placing Laetorius' performance under the rubric of "military valor" as he does Horatius' deed (the latter is categorized as an instance of *fortitudo*: 3.2.1), assigns it instead to the moral category "friendship" (*de amicitia*, 4.7). Indeed, Valerius goes on to declare that Laetorius, like other Gracchan supporters, misapplied his military courage, however great it was: "What fine soldiers the Gracchi could have had, had they been willing to follow their father's or maternal grandfather's way of life! With what force and perseverance of spirit would Blossius, Pomponius, and Laetorius have augmented the Gracchi's trophies and triumphs, being such energetic accomplices of a lunatic enterprise!"⁶¹ The difference between Horatius' and Laetorius' defense of the bridge is that the former is judged to benefit the Roman community while the latter is not – neither by Valerius himself, who regrets the "trophies and triumphs" that the Gracchi never won because they chose the wrong path of life, nor by the primary audience Valerius describes, which consists of Romans chasing Gracchus *out* of the city rather than, say, watching Horatius prevent the enemy from storming into the city. So however closely Laetorius may mimic Horatius' deed, he perversely acts against, rather than for, the common good, and so is assigned to a different moral category. Valerius

Trigemina to the bridge (a difficult issue) and possible new evidence for the bridge's precise location (downstream from Tiber Island, as indicated on the map), see Tucci 2011/12. Cf. Vell. 2.6.6 (ascribing the bridge-blocking feat to Pomponius, but also noting the imitation of Horatius), Plut. *Gracch.* 38.1, *Vir. Ill.* 65.

⁶⁰ Valerius makes much of Horatius' heroic swim at 3.2.1, which Laetorius' death precludes him from rivaling. Polybius too, the only surviving source to make Horatius die, presumably ascribes higher moral value to the death than to any possible alternative.

⁶¹ Val. Max. 4.7.2 (continuing the passage from n. 59): *quam bonos Gracchi, si aut patris aut materni avi sectam vitae ingredi voluissent, habere milites potuerant! quo enim impetu, qua perseverantia animi Blossius et Pomponius et Laetorius tropaea ac triumphos eorum adiuvissent, furiosi conatus tam strenui comites*. Vell. 2.6.2 calls the defense of the bridge by Pomponius (n. 59 above) a striking instance of *fides*.

duly declares the imitation unsuccessful and deprives Laetorius of positive evaluation.

A contested deployment of the Horatius exemplum appears in a pair of speeches composed by the historiographer Dio Cassius. These speeches are placed in the mouths of two historical figures, Cicero (book 45) and an opponent of Cicero's named Fufius Calenus (book 46). Cicero's speech is a "Philippic" against Marc Antony, ostensibly delivered in the senate early in 43 B.C.E. Speaking of the famous incident of the previous year in which Antony offered Caesar a crown, Dio's Cicero demands (45.32.3),

Have we, who expelled the Tarquins and rejoiced in Brutus' deed, who threw Capitolinus from the rock and killed Spurius – have we commanded you [Antony] to install someone as king over us ... ? No, by the rods of Valerius and the law of Porcius, no by the leg of Horatius and the hand of Mucius, no by the spear of Decius and the sword of Brutus! ⁶²

Here, each object by which "Cicero" swears his oath participated in a great deed that helped preserve Roman political freedom in the Republic, and so serves to commemorate that deed. Horatius' leg is presumably mentioned due to the wound it suffered, which should remind Dio's readers how Horatius kept Porsenna from storming into the city. It is this freedom-preserving deed, along with the others called to mind by the remaining monuments mentioned here, that Antony's attempt to crown Caesar threatens to undo. Antony's performance thus stands as a negative exemplum in the category of "freedom-preserving deeds" – a travesty or negation of the positive exempla set by the heroes, including Horatius, whom Cicero names subsequently.

In the next book of his history, Dio makes Fufius, who is Antony's ally, rebut Cicero. Fufius says that Antony, in fact, made certain that Caesar would reject the crown, because he offered it in a place and manner that made it impossible to accept. Thus Antony actually preserved Rome's freedom from this would-be tyrant: "Antony did not break his leg for nothing so that he himself might escape, nor burn off his hand to scare Porsenna, but ended Caesar's tyranny by wisdom and cunning, surpassing the spear of Decius and the sword of Brutus."⁶³ In presenting Antony's action as the

⁶² Dio 45.32.3: ... οὐ μὰ τὰς ῥάβδους τὰς Οὐαλερίου καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν Πορκίου, οὐ μὰ τὸ σκέλος τοῦ Ὁρατίου καὶ τὴν χεῖρα τὴν Μουκίου, οὐ μὰ τὸ δόρυ τὸ Δεκίου καὶ τὸ ξίφος τοῦ Βρούτου (cf. 45.31.2). Also Verg. *Aen.* 8.646–51, where Horatius and Cloelia, shown together on Aeneas' shield, jointly defend *libertas* against Porsenna/Tarquinius; Livy 2.10.8, Jun. 8.261–5.

⁶³ Dio 46.19.8: ... οὐ σκέλος ἄλλως κατάξαντος ἵνα αὐτὸς φύγῃ, οὐδὲ χεῖρα κατακαύσαντος ἵνα Πορσένναν φοβήσῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν τυραννίδα τὴν τοῦ Καίσαρος σοφίᾳ καὶ περιτεχνήσει, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δόρυ τὸ Δεκίου καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ξίφος τοῦ Βρούτου, παύσαντος.

true exemplar of the liberty-preserving deed, Fufius dismisses the exemplary performances that Cicero had held up as normative – thereby turning Cicero’s argument, along with his exempla, precisely on their heads. By emphasizing Horatius’ escape, leg wound notwithstanding, Fufius seems to expose the latent anxiety that Horatius did in fact flee and turn his back on the enemy, an anxiety that is generally papered over by emphasizing that he brought his arms home (ch. 1.2.5). Horatius’ performance, according to Fufius, is a morally contemptible quest for personal safety, rather than a morally virtuous defense of the community as a whole. In these paired speeches, then, the fictionalized speakers contest the exemplum of Horatius by propounding morally opposed readings of his performance. The inherent moral ambiguity of the leg wound creates the opportunity for opposed readings, as discussed earlier (ch. 1.2.3): this injury does not by itself indicate what moral judgment is suitable, so different secondary judges can stake out opposing positions.

Even when not named explicitly, Horatius may provide an implicit model for others’ heroic deeds. Plutarch, in his biography of the Roman general (and later rebel) Quintus Sertorius, stresses his subject’s courage in battle. During the catastrophic Roman defeat in the battle of Arausio, as noted above, Sertorius swam across the Rhone river, wounded but retaining his breastplate and shield. Later in life, after attaining high command, he continued putting his body at risk like a common soldier: for instance, he lost an eye, and was proud that the wound offered visible proof of his courage.⁶⁴ Plutarch, then, presents it as Sertorius’ own view that his feat of swimming and lost eye monumentalize his martial valor. The exemplum of Horatius is never expressly mentioned here, but one can readily infer that it supplies the template for Plutarch’s, and perhaps Sertorius’ own, conceptualization of Sertorius’ valor.⁶⁵

Equally suggestive are the deeds of Cassius Scaeva, one of Iulius Caesar’s centurions, during the civil war of 49–48. Caesar himself, narrating the battle

⁶⁴ Plut. *Sert.* 3.1 (at Arausio): κατατετρωμένος τὸ σῶμα τὸν Ῥοδανὸν διεπέρασεν, αὐτῷ τε τῷ θώρακι καὶ θυρεῷ πρὸς ἐναντίον ῥεύμα πολὺ νηχόμενος. Later in life (§4.3–4): οὐ μὴν ὑφῆκατο τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τόλμης εἰς ἄξιωμα προεληλυθὼς ἡγεμόνος ... τῶν ὤψεων ἀπέβαλε τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκοπέσαν. ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ δὲ καὶ καλλωπιζόμενος αἰεὶ διετελεῖ ... αὐτῷ δὲ τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας παραμένειν τὰ γνωρίσματα, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἅμα καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς θεατάς. Similarly, Sal. *Hist.* 1.88M (n. 56 above).

⁶⁵ Sertorius and Horatius are never explicitly linked in any surviving ancient text. However, Gell. 2.27 compares Sertorius with Philip II of Macedon, while Plut. *Mor.* 307D–E compares Philip with Horatius (see nn. 27, 56 above). Ancient writers were thus attuned to the resemblances among these three figures. For modern discussions of Sertorius and Horatius, see Konrad 1994: 43–4, Africa 1970: 532–5, Gagé 1969: 197–8.

of Dyrrachium in 48, credits Scaeva with warding off, alone, a Pompeian attack on a Caesarian fortification, and says that Scaeva's shield suffered 120 perforations. Scaeva's feat became famous: later accounts, which are more elaborate, credit him additionally with wounds to the shoulder and leg and the loss of an eye, details that further smack of Horatius.⁶⁶ The epic poet Lucan tricks out Scaeva's deed in full exemplary guise. Lucan's Scaeva wishes for both commanders, Caesar and Pompey, to witness his deed, and a group of Caesarian soldiers also gather around to observe and judge. In the end, these primary witnesses judge the performance positively: they lift up their wounded champion and proclaim him "the living image of great *virtus*." Lucan's narrative voice, however, as a secondary witness at a spatial and temporal remove, rejects these eyewitnesses' positive evaluation and imposes a negative one, in accordance with his own conflicted view of the ethics of civil war. He thereby furnishes a reminder that those who learn of a deed via a monument need not slavishly reproduce the moral evaluation they find sedimented in that monument.⁶⁷

Several accounts also credit Scaeva with a more overtly Horatian deed performed several years earlier, during Caesar's campaign in Britain. Valerius Maximus describes this deed under the rubric "on military valor" (*de fortitudine*), the same category under which he had previously narrated Horatius' deed. Valerius says that Scaeva and four other Roman soldiers were conveyed by raft to a rock sitting offshore in the ocean. At low tide, a narrow spit of land was exposed, connecting the rock to an island occupied by enemy warriors. The latter attempted to cross the narrow spit to attack the Romans on the rock, but Scaeva took a stand blocking the passage, allowing his fellow soldiers to escape by raft behind him. His own retreat cut off, he remained where he was, fending off the enemy amidst a hail of spears, providing an astonishing spectacle to the both Romans (watching from the mainland) and Britanni (watching from the island). Finally, his thigh transfixd by a javelin, his helmet dislodged by stones, and his shield "consumed by numerous holes," he threw himself into the sea wearing two breastplates and swam to safety. He then begged Caesar's pardon for armor

⁶⁶ Caes. *BCiv.* 3.53.3–5, Val. Max. 3.2.23, Lucan 6.140–262, Plut. *Caes.* 16.3–4, Suet. *Iul.* 68, App. *BCiv.* 2.60 (where the perforated shield and lost eye are attributed to a Minucius). Capdeville 1972: 602–11 discusses Scaeva's relationship to Horatius.

⁶⁷ Witnesses: Lucan 6.159–69. Evaluations: 6.251–62 (253: *et vivam magnae speciem Virtutis adorant*). On this episode see Leigh 1997: 158–90. Leigh's account of the spectatorship and judging here is broadly compatible with my own exemplary framework; see Leigh 1997: 174–5 for Scaeva and Horatius. The Scaeva episode is an epic *aristeia*, and displays many generic features of that form. But the dynamics of military performance, witnessing, and commemoration that characterize *aristeiai* are compatible with the logic of Roman exemplarity, and analyzable in those terms.

that, Valerius says, was “not abandoned, but properly expended.”⁶⁸ This narrative obviously recalls many elements of the Horatius exemplum: the spit of land functioning as a bridge, the single-handed defense against a more numerous enemy, the escape of the comrades, the leg wound, the leap into the water, the swim to safety wearing armor, and the anxiety about whether the proper armor comes home in the proper way. The particularities of the Horatius and Scaeva narratives thus associate them especially closely together, creating a subgrouping within Valerius’ larger category of exemplary narratives of *fortitudo* in book 3.2. While the narratives grouped under this moral category display wide structural divergences overall, the close structural parallels between these two narratives nearly “bookending” the chapter – Scaeva standing as the penultimate Roman example (3.2.23) and Horatius as the first (3.2.1) apart from the invocation of Romulus in the preface – makes it hard to imagine that Valerius did not intend his readers to compare them.⁶⁹ For Scaeva, as Valerius presents him, is patently an imitator of Horatius, and his performance mimes aspects of that earlier performance in the category of *fortitudo*. The success of this imitation is indicated not only by the positive evaluation Scaeva receives from both primary and secondary audiences, but also for his “capping” or surpassing of Horatius in one respect: the apology he offers his commander for the armor left behind. Thus, says Valerius, he was “great in battle, but greater in his recollection of military discipline,” and was rewarded “not only for his deeds, but especially for his words” – thus achieving something beyond Horatius’ mere valor. Valerius’ engagement with the Horatian model in his Scaeva narrative is beyond question, though he never draws the parallel explicitly.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Val. Max. 3.2.23: *scuto crebris foraminibus absumpto ... armis non amissis sed bene impensis*. Valerius seems to imply that Scaeva abandoned his ruined shield, leaving spoils for the enemy (so understood by Valerius’ epitomator Iulius Paris, whose paraphrase here is *quod sine scuto redisset*) – hence his apology to Caesar. But if so, bringing back *two* breastplates (*duabus loriceis onustus*) perhaps compensates, as the second can only have been despoiled from a dead enemy. Other accounts of this performance: Plut. *Caes.* 16.5–7, Dio 37.53.2–3 (deed performed in Lusitania). Discussion by Capdeville 1972: 611–15.

⁶⁹ While the parallels between 3.2.1 (Horatius) and 3.2.23 (Scaeva) are substantial, at 3.2.1 Valerius does not mention the escape of Horatius’ comrades, the anxiety about the armor, or the leg wound – indeed, Valerius’ Horatius is completely uninjured. It appears that Valerius’ Scaeva narrative was built (by Valerius or his source) upon a more detailed template of the Horatius legend than Valerius’ own Horatius narrative employs. See ch. 0.5.2 on how the particularities of specific exempla marshaled in a list may create subgroupings within the overarching category that governs the list.

⁷⁰ Val. Max. 3.2.23: *magnus proelio sed maior disciplinae militaris memoria ... cum facta tum etiam verba tua centurionatus honore donata sunt*. See also Suet. *Iul.* 68, Plut. *Caes.* 16.2; cf. Lucan 3.609–26. Scaeva also recalls Vergil’s Turnus (*Aen.* 9.806–18), himself an imitator of Horatius as noted above (ch. 1.2.5); see Goldschmidt 2013: 186–7.

That Scaeva, a centurion, is non-elite alerts readers to a further dynamic of Valerius' list of exempla of *fortitudo*. Immediately preceding his Scaeva narrative, Valerius tells of another Caesarian soldier (*miles*) named Acilius, who during the civil war spectacularly lost his right arm in the naval battle at Massilia (3.2.22). These two non-elite figures appear to reproduce, in the era of Caesar, the exemplary performances of Horatius and Mucius Scaevola from the war with Porsenna – “real” analogues to the legendary figures from the foundation of the Republic. Valerius further adverts to the courage of centurions and ordinary soldiers elsewhere in the chapter on *fortitudo*, and indeed caps and concludes his survey of *fortitudo* among Romans with the famous soldier Siccus Dentatus (3.2.24). Valerius lists the important military awards and decorations Siccus received, and the number of times he received each kind of decoration. Valerius' selection of Roman exempla of *fortitudo* thus insinuates, unmistakably, that non-elites can and do rival aristocrats, at least in the arena of military valor where they can compete directly.⁷¹

1.4 Rhetorical and Moral Dynamics of the Horatius Exemplum

This discussion of norm setting in the case of Horatius Cocles has exposed several dynamics that are characteristic of exemplarity, particularly in its rhetorical and moral dimensions. Regarding rhetoric, we have seen that the needs of the immediate rhetorical situation may account for the creation of specially “fitted” variants. Polybius, having described how aristocratic funerals include reports of the glorious deeds of the deceased, and having depicted Horatius as inspired by such reports, possibly makes him die so that the reader will ponder the upcoming funeral, the awe-inspiring tale of valor that will be narrated there, and the effect it will have on still other young Romans. Plutarch, in one of several versions he offers of the Horatius legend, has Horatius lose his eye *following* the battle on the bridge, rather than in an earlier battle as other sources have it. The point of this variant is probably to bring Horatius closer to the pattern of Philip II, who Plutarch here sets up as Horatius' “parallel.” And Seneca may omit the “previous battle” explanation of the cognomen Cocles in order to make Horatius appear to have performed only one noteworthy

⁷¹ For Scaeva and Acilius as “real” analogues to Horatius and Scaevola, see Capdeville 1972: 615–18. Weiler 1998: 234–5 discusses the exemplification of non-elites, particularly for military valor, in Valerius Maximus; see also ch. 0.4 and n. 12.

deed, which better supports his argument about sufficient bases for moral judgment. Exempla can always be made new, adapted, and “fit” to the needs of the argument currently being expounded. No matter how hoary an exemplum may be – and none is hoarier than Horatius – it is always “alive” in its capacity for creative, adaptive reuse.

Now for moral conclusions. First, imitative performances are deemed particularly likely to occur within a family, or even over a single individual’s life course. Horatius himself can be imagined to behave consistently over time, producing two similar but chronologically separated performances; and different members of the *gens Horatia* (among many other *gentes*) can be thought to produce similar performances across generations. Second, whether imitation is perceived seems to depend on two independent variables. One variable is the degree to which a later action mimics an earlier action, i.e. how closely it reproduces the particular features of a potential model action. The other variable is the moral category under which the later action is classified, i.e. whether it is judged to manifest the same value as the earlier one. Thus the performances of Scaeva and Sertorius closely mimic Horatius’ deed, and fall under the same category of military valor; Laetorius’ defense of the bridge also closely mimics Horatius’ deed, but is judged negatively and therefore categorized as an instance not of valor, but of misapplied friendship; and in Dio Cassius’ paired speeches, the category of “defending Roman liberty” accommodates not only Horatius’ deed among others (in Cicero’s speech), but also Antony’s non-crowning of Caesar (in Fufius’ speech), though the latter deed does not mimic any of the former. These paired speeches lead to the third general point: secondary audiences may accept or reject the judgments they find sedimented in monuments commemorating a past deed. Dio’s Cicero accepts Horatius’ leg wound as proof of his service to the commonwealth, while Dio’s Fufius expressly denies this interpretation. Thus there can be disputes over the value and significance of a monumentalized deed, and disagreements regarding the norms (if any) that deed supplies.⁷² Finally, imitation may take place without the model being identified explicitly. Sertorius and Scaeva mimic Horatius so closely that the model is patent, and the fact that Horatius is not mentioned by name relative to either (in surviving texts, at least) in no way hinders recognition of the exemplary dynamic.

Omitted from the discussion so far, however, is Horatius’ most widely attested imitator: a girl named Cloelia, who performs a deed that is

⁷² For a ferocious, high-stakes dispute about the moral content of monuments, see ch. 7.4–5.

expressly said to mimic Horatius' deed, as well as to fall into the same moral category of *virtus*. Because her gender introduces special complexities into the receiving and setting of norms, and because she too is represented as a major hero of the newborn Roman Republic, she warrants full treatment in her own chapter. To Cloelia, then, I turn next.

Cloelia *Timelessness and Gender*

2.1 Introduction: Cloelia as Imitator of Horatius

Cloelia's resemblance to Horatius is so strong, says Valerius Maximus, that she causes him to lose track of the chronological order of his examples. In the preface to his chapter on *fortitudo* (3.2.pr.) Valerius acknowledges that it is appropriate to begin with Romulus, who as founder of the city should take ideological and temporal priority over all other military heroes. But in an apostrophe he begs Romulus to allow himself to be preceded by *just one* example, namely Horatius, presented out of chronological order.¹ Evidently confident of the founder's indulgence, Valerius does, indeed, lead off the section with Horatius (3.2.1). But does he keep his word, and turn to Romulus next? No. For Cloelia's imitation of Horatius is so close – “daring her famous deed at nearly the same time, and definitely against the same enemy and in the same Tiber” – that she causes Valerius to forget his intention altogether, as he puckishly declares.² He duly provides a brief narration of her deed (3.2.2), and only then does he return to Romulus (*redeo nunc ad Romulum*, 3.2.3), not quite as originally promised, to narrate his victory over King Acro of Caenina in single combat.

The rhetoric of priority and displacement that structures the opening sections of this chapter enables Valerius to achieve two aims at once. He acknowledges, or at least piously asserts, Romulus' priority in the category of *fortitudo*, while in fact permitting himself to group his opening exempla thematically rather than chronologically. Thus Horatius and his close imitator Cloelia are presented together (3.2.1–2), followed by the three winners

¹ Val. Max. 3.2.pr.: *nec me praeterit, conditor urbis nostrae Romule, principatum hoc tibi in genere laudis adsignari oportere. sed patere, obsecro, uno te praecurri exemplo.*

² Val. Max. 3.2.2: *immemorem me propositi mei Cloelia facit: paene eadem enim tempestate, certe adversus eundem hostem et in eodem Tiberi inclutum ausa facinus.* The hedges Valerius uses here – “nearly,” “definitely,” “the same” – show that Horatius' performance is the reference point for Cloelia's, and underscore their close connection.

of the *spolia opima*, gained by defeating an enemy king in single combat: Romulus, Aulus Cornelius Cossus, and Marcus Claudius Marcellus (3.2.3–5). Furthermore, the elaborate apologetics for the displacement(s) of Romulus – first from the first position, and then from the second, with his actual appearance coming only in the third position – provides a dramatic frame binding Horatius and Cloelia together. This frame powerfully underscores the similarity that Valerius ascribes to them: that their performances share the same mythistorical context, and involve striking structural parallels. Also, by giving them *de facto* precedence in the list of examples of fortitude, this framing properly underscores the great rhetorical and moral importance of these two exempla in Roman culture, both of which are far more frequently narrated or mentioned in surviving texts – sometimes separately, but often together – than Romulus' victory over Acro.

Cloelia's story goes as follows. It is somewhat later in the year of Horatius' deed – the second or third year of the Republic, depending on the chronology.³ Porsenna, his initial assault stymied by Horatius, is now encamped on the Janiculum hill laying siege to the city. Mucius Scaevola's failed attempt to assassinate Porsenna, followed by his exemplary incineration of his right hand, has meanwhile led to a truce, which the Romans guarantee by giving the young sons and daughters of leading families to Porsenna as hostages. Among these children is a girl – a *virgo* – named Cloelia.⁴ Livy narrates the sequel (2.13.4–11):

(2.13.4) With a truce arranged on these terms, Porsenna led his army down from the Janiculum and withdrew from Roman territory. (5) The senate gave Gaius Mucius [sc. Scaevola] land on the other side of the Tiber because of his *virtus*, land which afterward was called the "Mucian meadows." (6) Consequently, with *virtus* held in such esteem, women too were incited to public honors. A maiden named Cloelia, one of the hostages, eluded her guards – since the Etruscan camp by chance was located not far from the Tiber's bank – and leading a band of maidens swam across the Tiber amidst the enemy's javelins, and restored them all safely to their kinsmen in Rome.

³ Livy 2.13.6–11 and Plut. *Popl.* 16.3 place both deeds in year two, the consulship of Publius Valerius Publicola (II) and Titus Lucretius; Dion. *Rom.* 5.33 places them in the subsequent year (according to his chronology), the consulship of Valerius Publicola (III) and Horatius Pulvillus (II). See ch. 1 n. 1.

⁴ The *gens Cloelia* is included by Livy 1.30.2 and Dion. *Rom.* 3.29.7 among the Alban families enrolled in the Roman patriciate after the cities unified. A Cluilius is among the last Alban kings/leaders (Livy 1.23.4, Dion. *Rom.* 3.2.1), and a Cloelius is consul at Rome several years after Cloelia's deed. Festus ascribes Trojan origins to the family (Paul. Fest. 48L). See Fugmann 1997: 62, Briquel 1997: 133, Forsythe 1994: 254–5, Arcella 1985: 35–40. Also Münzer, *RE* 4 (1901): 109–10, s.v. Cloelius, nos. 6, 8, 10–12 – all early republican figures.

(7) When this was announced to the king, he was at first infuriated, and sent ambassadors to Rome to demand Cloelia back as hostage: about the others he cared little. (8) Then, his anger turning to wonder, he said that it was a deed surpassing the likes of Cocles and Mucius, and let it be known that if the surety were not returned, he would deem the truce broken, but that if she were given over, he would return her unharmed and inviolate to her people. (9) *Fides* was maintained on both sides: the Romans restored the guarantee of the truce as the agreement required, while the Etruscan king not only kept her *virtus* safe but even held it in esteem: after praising the maiden he declared that he was bestowing a portion of the hostages as a gift; she herself should choose which ones she wanted. (10) It is said that, when all had been brought forth, she chose those who had not reached puberty; it befitted her status as *virgo*, and in the hostages' own collective view was commendable, that the age that was most at risk of violation be freed from the enemy first and foremost. (11) The truce reestablished, the Romans rewarded this novel *virtus* in a woman with a novel form of honor, an equestrian statue; at the top of the Sacred Way was placed a *virgo* sitting upon a horse.⁵

Here Livy, like Valerius Maximus, introduces Cloelia as an imitator: she was incited to pursue public honors by observing those that Mucius and Horatius received for their own displays of *virtus*, even though as a female she would normally have been excluded from the battlefield and from other traditional realms of masculine achievement. Indeed, Livy presents Horatius, Mucius, and Cloelia as a triptych of actors who perform sequential and categorically identical deeds, inaugurating the infant Republic in a striking manner. According to him, each performer's deed is judged positively by a primary audience (Roman and Etruscan) in the moral category *virtus*, and the Roman community creates one or more monuments for each to commemorate and reciprocate their spectacular service. Even

⁵ Livy 2.13.4–11: *his condicionibus composita pace exercitum ab Ianiculo deduxit Porsenna et agro Romano excessit. (5) patres C. Mucio virtutis causa trans Tiberim agrum dono dedere, quae postea sunt Mucia prata appellata. (6) ergo ita honorata virtute, feminae quoque ad publica decora excitatae, et Cloelia virgo una ex obsidibus, cum castra Etruscorum forte haud procul ripa Tiberis locata essent, frustrata custodes, dux agminis virginum inter tela hostium Tiberim tranavit, sospitesque omnes Romam ad propinquos restituit. (7) quod ubi regi nuntiatum est, primo incensus ira oratores Romam misit ad Cloeliam obsidem deposcendam: alias haud magni facere. (8) deinde in admirationem versus, supra Coclites Muciosque dicere id facinus esse, et prae se ferre quemadmodum si non dedatur obses, pro rupto foedus se habiturum, sic deditam <intactam> inviolatamque ad suos remissurum. (9) utrimque constitit fides; et Romani pignus pacis ex foedere restituerunt, et apud regem Etruscum non tuta solum sed honorata etiam virtus fuit, laudatamque virginem parte obsidum se donare dixit; ipsa quos vellet legeret. (10) productis omnibus elegisse impubes dicitur; quod et virginitati decorum et consensu obsidum ipsorum probabile erat eam aetatem potissimum liberari ab hoste quae maxime opportuna iniuriae esset. (11) pace redintegrata Romani novam in femina virtutem novo genere honoris, statua equestri, donavere; in summa Sacra via fuit posita virgo insidens equo.*

Porsenna, an enemy but perforce a close observer of Roman valor, is a judge: he declares Cloelia the best of the lot, her deed outstripping those of Coclès and Mucius.⁶ But this “categorical” resemblance among the three performances is not the whole story, for Cloelia’s performance also mimics that of Horatius in crucial respects. According to Livy, she too swims the Tiber (there being no bridge) from the Etruscan to the Roman side, under a shower of enemy javelins; and she too receives an honorific statue in the forum to monumentalize this performance (2.13.6, 11). We have already seen how this mimetic quality – “same time, same enemy, same river” – spurred Valerius Maximus to narrate Cloelia’s deed immediately following Horatius’ in the moral category of *fortitudo*, preempting Romulus. This mimetic aspect allows Horatius and Cloelia to be presented as a diptych, an “inner core” of early republican heroes. Mucius, whose deed does not mimic Horatius’, is excluded from this inner core, and he (re)joins Horatius and Cloelia as a third only when a purely categorical similarity is at issue.⁷

The figure of Cloelia is only slightly less resonant than that of Horatius, to judge by her monumental trace. About a half-dozen extended narratives of her deed survive, along with another dozen or so sparer narratives or mere references. The earliest is a fragment of the historian Calpurnius Piso (transmitted by the elder Pliny), dating probably to the late second century BCE; next comes a probable hidden reference in Cicero, followed by a profusion of references and fuller accounts from the Augustan age onward. Several of these texts refer to another monument, the honorific statue, which does not survive but whose interpretation crucially impacts the kind of norm she is thought to set (as we shall see). The surviving accounts present numerous variations: she seized a fortuitous opportunity to escape, or actively tricked her guards; she escaped alone, or with other hostages; she crossed the Tiber by day with many observers watching, or invisibly by night; in a few accounts she does not swim but crosses on horseback.

⁶ Horatius: the *civitas* honors his *virtus*, granting him a statue and land (2.10.12). Mucius: first Porsenna (2.12.14–15) and then the Roman senate (2.13.5) honor his *virtus*; Porsenna releases him and the senate grants him land. Cloelia expressly imitates prior deeds of *virtus* (2.13.6), and is duly credited with *virtus* in turn by both Porsenna and the Roman community (2.13.9, 11); Porsenna releases her and the community grants her a statue (*ibid.*). Horatius, Mucius, and Cloelia as a “triptych”: Man. 1.779–81, Juv. 8.264–5, Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).3. Extensive narration of all three deeds (as in Livy) at Dion. *Rom.* 5.23–35, Plut. *Popl.* 16–19, *Vir. Ill.* 11–13. On enemies, especially enemy leaders, as interpreters of Roman exempla, see Bleckmann 2002: 122–3, Vigourt 2001a: 124, and Chaplin 2000: 73–82.

⁷ Valerius presents Mucius not under the category of *fortitudo*, with Horatius and Cloelia, but under *patientia*, which he treats in the very next chapter (3.3.1). Other “diptych”-like pairings of Horatius and Cloelia: Verg. *Aen.* 8.650–1; *Pan. Lat.* 12.18.2 (possibly derivative of Vergil), Serv. *in Aen.* 8.646, Dio 45.31.1–2.

Finally, some accounts say that as she and the other hostages returned to Porsenna, they were ambushed by Tarquin's forces; here another hostage, the daughter of the consul Valerius Publicola, is said to escape, while Porsenna's troops come to the rescue.⁸

As in the case of Horatius (ch. 1.1), source critics have attempted to sort these many variants into family groups, and to characterize earlier versions from which the accounts that survive putatively descend.⁹ Again, these stories have sometimes been seen as transfigured or misremembered representations of archaic cult and ritual practice, or analyzed from the viewpoint of Dumézilian structural anthropology and comparative religion to identify their alleged affinities with other Indo-European gods and heroes.¹⁰ My own approach, again, is different. Rather than seeking lost origins and hidden meanings, I seek to elucidate how Cloelia functions as an exemplum in Roman culture, and how the texts and other monumental forms by which she is commemorated participate in the dynamics of exemplarity. As we have seen, exempla by their nature entail alternative and competing versions, and a profusion of meanings and functions, different combinations of which are foregrounded and emphasized in any given context. Here I embrace this complexity and multivocality as constituent elements of the phenomenon I seek to explicate.

In contrast to the preceding chapter, I proceed not by illustrating specific exemplary operations, but by focusing on two particular uses to which the Cloelia exemplum is put in surviving sources – uses for which this figure seems to have been deemed particularly apt. The first is the tendency to treat her as being vividly present, via her monuments, to secondary audiences in their own time and place. This tendency toward “timelessness” is especially, though not exclusively, associated with a statue of a woman

⁸ Earliest reference: Piso fr. 20 Peter = fr. 27 Forsythe = fr. 22 Chassignet / Beck-Walter / Cornell, *apud* Plin. *Nat.* 34.29; discussion at Forsythe 1994: 252–7. Differences from the Livian account: she tricks the guards at Dion. *Rom.* 5.33.1, *Vir. Ill.* 13.1, *Schol. in Iuv.* 8.264; she crosses alone at Flor. *Epit.* 1.4.(=1.10).7, Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646; by night at Val. Max. 3.2.2 and *Vir. Ill.* 13.1; on horseback at Val. Max. 3.2.2, Flor. *Epit.* 1.4.(=1.10).7, *Vir. Ill.* 13.1 (alternative versions – swimming or crossing on horseback – given at Plut. *Popl.* 19.2, 8, *Mor.* 250C–F). Tarquins attack returning hostages: Plut. *Popl.* 19.4–6, *Mor.* 250D–F; Fetalis *apud* Plin. *Nat.* 34.29 (all naming Valeria as the escapee); Dion. *Rom.* 5.33.3–4.

⁹ Source criticism: Fugmann 1997: 60–7, Münzer, *RE* 4 (1901): 110–11. Wiseman 1998: 84 reasserts the older idea that the historian Valerius Antias invented the ambush episode, to give an heroic role to a member of the *gens Valeria*.

¹⁰ Misremembered rituals: Briquel 2007: 135–7, Capdeville 1995: 399–405, Gagé 1963: 60–2, 271–2; 1988: 241. Wiseman 1999: 198–99 suggests that certain elements of the legend originated in stage performances at the annual Festival of Flora (*Floralia*). Indo-Europeanist/Dumézilian approach: Briquel 2007: 135–67, Arcella 1985: 27–40, Dumézil 1973: 286–91.

on horseback in the Roman Forum that was identified as representing Cloelia. The second is the use of the Cloelia exemplum to articulate and explore a specific moral conundrum, the paradox of the “manly maiden.” More than any other exemplary female figure, Cloelia is celebrated for performing a deed gendered as masculine. For the Romans, this gendering problematizes either the category of the “man” (*vir*) by allowing women performatively to “be” men; or the category of the “manly” (*virtus*) by creating flavors of “manliness” that are not applicable to “real” men but serve to dignify activities suitable to women. Among Cloelia’s monuments, the statue in particular participates in this gender-bending dynamic, and spotlights the question of her “typicality” or “uniqueness” as a “manly maiden.” I take these topics in turn.

2.2 On Timelessness: Monumental Encounters between Past and Present

The example of Cloelia affords the opportunity to explore in greater depth the “timelessness” of exempla – a phenomenon discussed in general terms in the introduction (0.5.3). As indicated there, “timelessness” refers to the idea that a deed performed and evaluated in the past, along with the values animating that performance and its evaluation, is comprehensible and morally compelling to potential actors and judges in the present. “The present,” in this case, means the contemporary world of any given secondary witness who, subsequent to the original deed, acts and judges in light of her or his understanding of the past deed as transmitted in monumental form. A rhetoric of contemporaneity may enhance the “timelessness” effect: either present-day secondary witnesses are assimilated to and conflated with the original primary witnesses, so that “we are there” at the original performance; or the original actor is portrayed as being present and performing before us here and now, projected forward into the present by a monument functioning as a “time island.” In Cloelia’s case, two different monumental forms display these two faces of “timelessness.” Certain literary texts invite contemporary readers to join in the judging activities of the primary audience; and conversely her statue, by its mimesis of physical presence, facilitates the illusion that she is present to the eyes of her secondary audiences of judges, in their own times.

I begin with texts, and with Livy’s account of Cloelia’s deed. Livy says that the deed was reported to Porsenna (*quod ubi regi nuntiatum est*, 2.13.7), meaning that, as Livy imagines it, Porsenna was not an eyewitness but a secondary witness, albeit contemporary with the deed. In light of

the report he receives, he measures her performance against “people with the characteristics of Cocles and Mucius” and judges it superior (*supra Coclites Muciosque ... id facinus esse*, 2.13.8). With these “typological” plurals Livy’s Porsenna is already regarding Cocles and Mucius as exemplary actors who will spur imitators, and he evaluates Cloelia’s performance favorably against these “originals” and their putative copies.¹¹ Now consider the late Augustan poet Manilius. In the first book of his astronomical poem, Manilius lists Roman heroes who he says reside in the Milky Way. The list opens with the kings of early Rome apart from Tarquinius Superbus, then names the three Horatii, followed by Mucius Scaevola, Cloelia, and Horatius Cocles. The latter three each receive brief, admiring epithets or descriptions their deeds. Cloelia’s epithet is “a maiden greater than the men,” which logically makes her the greatest of all these heroes (being the only female on the list).¹² This is precisely the judgment Livy’s Porsenna makes, so that Manilius, at more than five centuries’ remove from Cloelia, endorses and replicates an evaluation notionally made by her contemporary. In contrast, the elder Pliny, writing half a century after Manilius, handles such ranking debates quite differently. Remarking on Cloelia’s equestrian statue, which he notes is a rare honor for a woman (ch. 2.3 below), he dysseptically exclaims, “as if it were not enough that she be clothed in a toga [i.e. be honored more modestly with a pedestrian, togate statue], when equestrian statues were not granted to those who expelled the kings, Lucretia and Brutus, thanks to whom Cloelia had been included among the hostages.”¹³ Pliny interprets Cloelia’s equestrian statue as meaning that her contemporaries ranked her deed above Lucretia’s and Brutus’, since the latter did not receive such a prestigious honor.¹⁴ Pliny rejects that original ranking, declaring Lucretia’s and Brutus’ deeds more significant for the community. In these passages, then, Manilius and Pliny both assume that Cloelia’s deed lies transparently open to their own scrutiny and

¹¹ “Typological” plurals: Kühner/Stegmann 1912: 2.1.72; cf. ch. 6 n. 11.

¹² Man. 1.779–81: *nec non et Scaevola trunco / nobilior, maiorque viris et Cloelia virgo, / et Romana ferens quae texit moenia Cocles*. But if Cloelia has logical priority by being “greater than the men,” Horatius seems to take rhetorical priority by being mentioned last, strikingly out of chronological order.

¹³ Plin. *Nat.* 34.28: *ceu parum esset toga eam cingi, cum Lucretiae ac Bruto, qui expulerant reges, propter quos Cloelia inter obsides fuerat, non decernerentur*.

¹⁴ In the late Republic a statue of Brutus stood on the Capitol, along with seven kings, and at one point bore anti-Caesarian squibs. Its posture and dress are not reported. However, as the kings were almost certainly pedestrian and togate, Brutus’ inclusion in this group may suggest that his statue was similar. See Sehlmeier 1999: 68–74, Hölscher 1978: 328–31. No statue of Lucretia is attested, nor is Pliny implying that she received one: he is merely asserting that she did not receive the same honor Cloelia did. On the problem of statues for women prior to the first century B.C.E., see ch. 2.4 and n. 64.

evaluation, just as it did to her contemporaries – such judges as Porsenna and the Romans who erected the equestrian statue. The performance and the opportunity to judge it are “timeless” in the sense that secondary witnesses, even at a great temporal remove, assume that they have access to all relevant information about the deed, and that their own judging involves the same moral values and categories that governed the actions of the original performer and judgments of the primary audience. Thus Manilius can affirm what he knows to be the original evaluations of the deeds he invokes, while Pliny pungently rejects those evaluations – not because he thinks times have changed, but because he thinks the original evaluators got it wrong.

The effect of exemplary timelessness is not, however, felt only when later judges enter the past, as it were, to affirm or reject the evaluations made by earlier judges. More importantly, ancient deeds, bearing the evaluations they have previously received, can be summoned into the present to provide a model for imitation or standard by which to evaluate contemporary performances, and so help to shape actions taken in the present (ch. 0.3.4). The exemplum of Cloelia, again, provides striking instances of this forward projection. In the “Philippic” of Cicero composed by Dio Cassius, discussed earlier (ch. 1.3) for its invocation of Horatius, Cloelia is also adduced as providing a standard of performance in comparison to which Antony falls short. Antony belonged to the priestly college of Luperci, who discharged their religious functions during the annual festival of the Lupercalia while wearing a loincloth or girdle (*perizoma*). In 44 he also held a consulship. During the Lupercalia that year he delivered a speech from the rostra in his consular role, but wearing his priestly garb rather than the consular *toga praetexta*. Dio’s Cicero takes Antony to task for demeaning the dignity of the consulship by speaking from the rostra “naked” – for so Cicero characterizes the Lupercus in his *perizoma*.¹⁵ What precedents might Antony have had for this behavior? In Dio, Cicero considers the following options (45.31.1):

Perhaps he imitated the famous Horatius of old, or indeed Cloelia of old, of whom the latter swam across the river in a fully clothed state, while the former threw himself into the stream with his armor on as well. It would be fitting indeed (how could it not be?) for a statue to be erected of Antony

¹⁵ Dio 45.30.2, 5; for Antony as consul appearing on the rostra dressed as a Lupercus, see Cic. *Phil.* 2.85–6, 13.31, and Plut. *Ant.* 12. Dio presumably knew these texts and drew on them for the background to his composed “Philippic.”

too, so that the one might be seen in armor even in the Tiber, and the other might be seen naked even in the forum.¹⁶

The statement “perhaps he imitated ...” is of course ironic, for Cicero is contending that Antony’s actions actually bear no moral resemblance to, and indeed contrast sharply with, Horatius’ and Cloelia’s deeds. Specifically, “Cicero’s” invocation of these exempla turns on the moral implications of their sartorial states. He invokes a hierarchy in which being clothed in the Tiber (like Horatius and Cloelia) evinces high virtue, and being “naked” in the forum (like Antony) indicates low vice. The other two combinations – naked in the Tiber, clothed in the forum – are presumably unmarked and morally neutral, since they would represent the “normal” sartorial states of persons swimming or engaging in civic life, respectively. At any rate, the performances of the two archaic heroes provide the moral standards relative to which Antony’s recent performance falls short. Dio’s Cicero even imagines an “honorific” statue of Antony in his “naked” state, which bears comparison to the existing statue of Horatius commemorating the hero’s swim in armor – but the irony, of course, is that Antony’s putative statue, in its vicious nakedness, does not demonstrate how closely Antony rivals Horatius, but how distantly he trails him.¹⁷ While Cloelia’s statue is not invoked here (though it could have been, to the same moral effect), Cicero’s reference to her deed brings it, like Horatius’, into the present for comparison with Antony’s performance.

Cicero himself never makes such an argument in the extant *Philippics*. But in his dialogue *De Officiis* (“On moral duties”), he does confirm that Cloelia can be invoked as if present here and now, to provide a standard for evaluating contemporary action. At §1.61, he discusses techniques for praising and blaming the presence or absence of the virtue *magnitudo animi*, “greatness of soul.” Regarding blame he writes, “And so, one is best

¹⁶ Dio 45.31.1: τάχα γ’ ἂν οὗτος ἢ τὸν Ὀράτιον τὸν παλαιὸν ἐκείνῳ ἢ καὶ τὴν Κλοίλιαν τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἐμιμήσατο, ὧν ἡ μὲν τὴν ἐσθῆτα πᾶσαν ἐνδεδουκίᾳ τὸν ποταμὸν διενήξατο, ὁ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐς τὸ ῥέυμα ἑαυτὸν ἐνέβαλεν. ἄξιόν γε (οὐ γάρ) καὶ τούτου τινὰ εἰκόνα στήσαι, ἵν’ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιβέριδι ὠπλισμένος, ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ γυμνὸς ὁρῶτο.

¹⁷ Note that Dio’s Cicero here understands Horatius’ statue as representing him in *his own* distinctive armor, that in which he swam the Tiber (ch. 1.2.6). But what might this “nude” statue of Antony have looked like, as Dio imagines it? Both fully nude portraits and (semi-)nude ones in hip-mantles were common in the imperial age, for emperors and private individuals alike. But the context suggests that Dio may be imagining a statue dressed specifically in the loincloth (*perizonia*) of the Lupercus. Pliny (*Nat.* 34.8) mentions statues “in the garb of Luperci” as a recent innovation in honorific statuary, and several such statues from the first to third centuries CE have been identified (Wrede 1983). Even if familiar to Dio and his contemporary audience, however, such iconography was probably anachronistic for the 40s BCE. On nakedness, nudity, and Antony as Lupercus, see also Hallett 2005: 61–3, 76–8, 100.

equipped to make reproaches if one can say something like this: ‘for you young men have a womanly spirit, but that maiden has a man’s.’”¹⁸ The reproach quoted here is a verse of poetry, perhaps a trochaic septenarius and perhaps from the tragedy *Meleager* of Accius, in which case the maiden in question is the Greek heroine Atalanta.¹⁹ A hunter, wrestler, and all-around athlete, Atalanta is the physical and psychological match for the male heroes whose company she keeps. Cicero goes on to discuss how we praise *magnitudo animi*, for which for which one may invoke Horatius, the Decii, and so on: this passage was discussed earlier (ch. 1.2.6). But because Cicero contrasts this praise with the “reproach” expressed in the verse referring to the unnamed *virgo*, I suspect he imagines that his audience will understand this “manly maiden” as being Cloelia – the figure who naturally keeps company with Horatius and so on, figures whose exemplary performances the orator can invoke as standards of which certain people here and now fall short.

A striking instance of Cloelia doing exactly the job this verse describes – being summoned into the present to provide a standard of manly achievement surpassing anything today’s men can muster – is found in a consolatory text of the mid-first century CE: Seneca the Younger’s *Ad Marciam De Consolatione*, addressed to a female friend named Marcia whose son has recently died. About midway through this work, Seneca adduces various exempla of men who courageously endured the deaths of family members, refusing to be bowed by grief (§§12.4–15.4). He then imagines Marcia objecting as follows (§16.1–2):

(1) I know what you are saying: “you have forgotten you are consoling a woman; you offer up exempla of men.” But who said that nature dealt parsimoniously with women’s spirits and constrained their virtues to a narrow domain? Believe me, they have the same energy, the same capacity for honorable deeds, if they please; they endure pain and toil on equal terms, once they have grown accustomed to it. (2) In what city, by the good gods, are we uttering this? One in which Lucretia and Brutus threw down a king from the Romans’ necks (we owe freedom to Brutus, and we owe Brutus to Lucretia); one in which we have all but enrolled Cloelia as a man because of her outstanding boldness, despising both the enemy and the river. Sitting upon her equestrian statue on the Sacred Way, in a heavily frequented place, Cloelia reproaches the young men of today as they climb up onto their

¹⁸ Cic. *Off.* 1.61: *itaque in probis maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest: ‘vos enim iuvenes animum geritis muliebrem, illa virgo viri.’*

¹⁹ So assigned (tentatively) by Ribbeck 1871: 266 (*inc. inc.* v. 210). However, other scholars have suggested other authors, plays, and meters: Schauer 2012: 248–9 (*fr. adesp.* 79).

litters, that they go about thus in a city where we have honored even women with a horse.²⁰

Seneca presents Marcia as objecting that male exempla do not sufficiently “fit” her situation as a woman in need of consolation. In reply, Seneca insists that no significant virtue gap exists between men and women (an orthodox Stoic philosophical position²¹). Therefore the objection based on gender difference is invalid, and the male exempla provide a perfectly satisfactory “fit.”²² To substantiate his assertion about the equality of virtue between men and women, Seneca adduces Cloelia as a female who equals or surpasses men in valor.²³ He finds proof of this equality in her statue, whose deportment he compares favorably, via a set of telling oppositions and parallels, with the young men of today. Cloelia is ancient, female, manly in her martial valor, and consequently honored by being elevated on a horse. Today’s youth are modern, male, effeminate, and proved as such by being elevated on sedan chairs. Indeed, Seneca says that Cloelia has all but been reclassified as man, *vir*. In the next section (ch. 2.3) I will further discuss Cloelia as a gender transgressor and the paradox of the “manly maiden.”

For now, however, I wish to focus on the statue’s rhetoric, as Seneca describes it. Seneca not only adduces Cloelia as a standard for evaluating his own contemporaries, but he imagines her as being present among, even *speaking* to, today’s (male) youth – her own agemates – reproaching them (*exprobrat iuuenibus nostris*) from her position on horseback. The content of the reproach, given in reported speech, is along the lines of “you youths must do as I, a girl, did, in order to get this masculine kind of mount” – that is, to be monumentalized by an equestrian statue they must perform

²⁰ Sen. Marc. 16.1–2: (1) *scio quid dicas: ‘oblitus es feminam te consolari, virorum refert exempla.’ quis autem dixit naturam maligne cum mulierum ingeniis egisse et virtutes illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat <modo>, facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si consuevere, patiuntur.* (2) *in qua istud urbe, di boni, loquimur? in qua regem Romanis capitibus Lucretia et Brutus deiecerunt: Bruto libertatem debemus, Lucretiae Brutum; in qua Cloeliam contempto et hoste et flumine ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus: equestri insidens statuae in sacra via, celeberrimo loco, Cloelia exprobrat iuuenibus nostris pulvinum escendentibus in ea illos urbe sic ingredi in qua etiam feminas equo donavimus.*

²¹ Discussion by Wray 2003: 1–2, 10.

²² On the rhetoric of “fit” see ch. 0.5.1–2.

²³ Note that Cloelia is *not* an example of a bereaved woman bravely enduring a familial death: she supports Seneca’s immediate point about the equality of virtue without reference to the specific virtue under discussion here, fortitude in the face of loss. Yet Seneca does, in fact, immediately proceed to offer exempla of such women (§16.3), thus acceding to Marcia’s demand despite rejecting its premise. On Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi in this context, see ch. 6.2 and 6.5.

deeds like hers.²⁴ The statue itself enables the fiction that Cloelia is present here and now, a “time island” projected forward from her own day. Standing in a “very crowded” spot on the Sacred Way, and so visible to all, Cloelia on her horse is imagined to be alive and sensible to all the activities currently surrounding her, hence to be capable of observing and judging everything that occurs in the forum here and now. The statue momentarily effaces itself as a monument, turns “transparent,” and *becomes* the exemplary actor it has hitherto merely represented. The past could hardly be brought into the present more vividly: the archaic hero sits in judgment on today’s social performers as a primary audience member and judge, sorting their performances into moral categories and deeming them worse than her own.²⁵ So while monuments of all kinds can produce the “timelessness” effect that characterizes exempla in general, Cloelia’s statue, by its mimesis of physical presence, seems to produce this effect even more powerfully than her literary monuments do.

2.3 The “Manly Maiden”

Cloelia’s monuments are illustrative of the “timelessness” effect that characterizes all monuments, but are hardly distinctive in this respect. In another respect, however, the exemplum of Cloelia is strikingly distinctive: she is an unmarried female who displays *virtus*. *Virtus*, as noted earlier, is etymologically “behavior appropriate to an adult male.” The texts ascribing this quality to Cloelia intend this etymological force to be fully felt, for they often formulate the paradox of the “manly maiden” or woman with tight

²⁴ The gender contrast produces an *a fortiori* argument: “back then, *even women* were honored with horses (*etiam feminas equo donavimus*). All the more should the young *men* of today be able to achieve that honor.” Similar example at Tac. *Ann.* 15.57. Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.10 discusses *a fortiori* arguments involving women who exceed men in valor; he says such arguments are drawn *ex minoribus ad maiora* (5.11.8). However, Langlands 2004: 124 and Wray 2003: 4–5 astutely note an inconsistency in Seneca’s argumentation: assuming the actual gender equality in virtue that Seneca asserts, men could not be reproved *a fortiori* by examples of women.

²⁵ For this statue’s rhetoric and addressees see also Caldwell 2015: 41–3, 59 (statue addresses young men and girls), Wilcox 2006: 80, Langlands 2004: 124 (addresses Marcia and today’s youth), Wray 2003: 4–5, Mauch 1997: 98–9. In other monumental forms too, exemplary heroes or ancestors may be revived to pass judgment on posterity: e.g. in epitaphs (*CIL* 1293 vv. 3–4 = *ILS* 6 = *ILLRP* 316), in the aristocratic funeral (Polyb. 6.53–4, with Habinek 1998: 53, Hölkeskamp 1996: 321–2, Flower 1996: 128–31), and in oratorical *prosopopoeia* (Cic. *Cael.* 33–4; ch. 3.4). Ancient heroes summoned into the present seem likely to judge today’s performances inferior to their own – and so they do, on the “decline” model of change over time. But under an “improvement” scenario, ancient heroes concede that they have been bettered: see Cordes 2014: 316–17 for perceptive discussion of this dynamic in imperial panegyric, a genre that posits improvement (i.e. the current emperor is the best ever). For more on “decline” and “improvement” see chs. 0.5.3, 4.5.

rhetorical point. Livy makes the Romans remark upon the novelty of *virtus* in a woman – *novam in femina virtutem* (2.13.11) – where the juxtaposition of the words *femina* and *virtus*, together with the adjective “novel” (*nova*), conveys the paradox. Valerius Maximus similarly juxtaposes *vir* with *puella*, “girl,” to convey the paradox, when he describes Cloelia as “carrying the torch of *virtus* for the men, though a girl” (*viris puella lumen virtutis praeferendo*, 3.2.2). Manilius, as noted above, calls Cloelia a “maiden greater than the men” (*maiorque viris et Cloelia virgo*, 1.780), contrasting *virgo*, “unmarried woman,” with *vir*. Florus goes further: he exclaims that, in the good old days, even *virgines* had *virtus* (*ecce et virginum virtus*, *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).7). This is an etymological figure, which presents *virtus* as if it were derived from *virgo*, rather than *vir*.²⁶ Such paradoxical juxtapositions and punning also occur in Greek sources. In Dionysius, for example, Porsenna praises the Romans for rearing “maidens equal to the men.” Polyaeus, the author of a Greek manual on military stratagems, dating to the 160s CE, says that Porsenna praised “the manliness of the maiden.” Plutarch, working in the same semantic space, declares that Porsenna honored Cloelia’s manliness, *andrôdes*, and that she received an honorific statue, *andrias*. Both of these words are etymologically related to *anêr*, “adult male,” hence paradoxical in their application to an unmarried girl.²⁷ In Seneca’s *Ad Marciam De Consolatione*, the logical paradox is emphasized (“we all but enrolled her as a man”) even though the rhetorical and semantic formulation is not as pointed here as in other texts.²⁸

What exactly does it mean to ascribe “manliness” (*virtus*, *andreia*) to a female? There are at least two broad ways to grapple with this paradox. The ascription may problematize the moral category of *virtus* by suggesting that there exists a specifically womanly sort of *virtus* – a category of socially valued actions that women can discharge and that bears the name *virtus*, but is not identical in content to the *virtus* ascribed to men. Alternatively, the contents of the category *virtus* may be thought invariable with respect to gender, necessitating that women’s performances be similar to men’s in order to be so categorized. In this case, the gender distinction between men and women is problematized, for the ascription of *virtus* to women contradicts the logic of gendered roles and actions that underpins

²⁶ So also Facchini Tosi 1998: 208.

²⁷ Dion. *Rom.* 5.34.3: παρθένους ἀνδρασιν ὁμοίας; Polyaeus. 8.31.1: τὸ ἀνδρεῖον τῆς κόρης; Plut. *Popl.* 19.8: οἱ δὲ ... φασιν τιμῆσαι τὸ ἀνδρῶδους αὐτῆς το Ὑπρηγνόν ... ἀνάκειται δὲ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν ... ἀνδριᾶς αὐτῆς ἔφιππος. In Plutarch the juxtaposition of the feminine singular personal pronoun αὐτῆς with nouns derived from the word for “male” (ἀνδρῶδους, ἀνδριᾶς) enhances the paradox.

²⁸ Logical paradox also at Sil. 13.829–30.

the notion of “manliness” (or “womanliness”) in the first place. The first alternative is conservative in respect to gender categories – keeping men’s and women’s deeds, hence social roles, distinct – but radical in altering the content of the moral category “manly.” The second alternative is radical in respect to gender categories – allowing a female to be gendered as a man – but conservative in regard to the moral category “manly,” making its contents invariant regardless of the actor’s sex.²⁹ As we shall see, the texts that present Cloelia as a “manly maiden” manifest both alternatives, as well as a range of intermediate positions. In fact, diverse conceptions of how a maiden can be manly emerge even within individual texts and particular representations of her deed.

As a first approach to Cloelia’s “manliness,” she may be compared to other exemplary Roman women. Roman discourse about the virtues of women tends to focus on women’s bodies and bodily behaviors – especially sexual conduct, and the question of which men should or do have sexual access to them. Among the exemplary women from early Rome, there are many – the Sabine women, Tarpeia, Horatia, Tullia, Lucretia, and Verginia, at least – whose sexualized bodies are objects of contestation among rival men, and whose exemplary performances (hence virtues) are framed by this contestation. Furthermore, these women function as surrogates for the larger Roman community. For the sexual threats against, or the possibility of sexual access to, their bodies symbolize or participate in the opening or closing of external military threats and internal social rifts. Women’s bodies bear this symbolic and practical burden because they are conduits for both lineal descent and marriage relations, which are often in tension (to the point of snapping violently) in the legends of early Rome. Looming especially large in these stories is the tension between the options of endogamy and exogamy, and the effects of the latter in particular on the Roman community.³⁰ I cannot pursue these matters here, but would stress that Cloelia functions differently from these exemplary women because

²⁹ Wray 2003 examines these alternatives, and their implications for early imperial politics and gender discourse, in Seneca and Valerius Maximus; I am grateful to David Wray for sharing this unpublished essay and granting permission to cite it. McNerney 2003 examines a similar dilemma in Plutarch’s *Mulierum Virtutes* (Mor. 242E–263C). Scholars gravitate either toward the view that *virtus* is largely the same for men and women (e.g. McDonnell 2006: 161–5, focusing on late republican evidence; Hemelrijk 2004, arguing that women may display a “manly” *virtus* under exceptional circumstances) or toward the view that it is largely different (e.g. Caldwell 2015: 40–1, suggesting that the Cloelia legend actually reinforces traditional gender roles; McAuley 2016: 191–3 and Wilcox 2006: 92–3, contending that Seneca’s female *virtutes* are different from male ones).

³⁰ Bodily virtues of women: McDonnell 2006: 161, McNerney 2003: 328–41, Wray 2003: 3–10. Exemplary women of early Rome and their functions: Miles 1995: 179–219, Joshel 1992: 121–8, Joplin 1990 (on surrogacy), Konstan 1986: 210–13.

she is not (yet) a woman. Being *ex hypothesi* too young for marriage, she does not embody the potential or actual cognate/agnate tension that crystallizes in other female figures.³¹ Indeed, being unmarried and sexually immature, Cloelia has key commonalities with properly constituted males. In particular, she shares with them the characteristic of never having been sexually penetrated. This fact perhaps helps to forge the conceptual link some authors see between the words *virgo* and *vir*.³²

Being “not penetrated” may be a necessary condition for “manliness,” but is hardly sufficient. In ancient Rome as in many other societies, “manliness” does not simply fall to one by dint of anatomy or coming of age, but is a quality ascribed by a judging audience (the second operation of exemplarity) that must be won and maintained on the basis of competitive social performance in the public eye.³³ *Virtus*, as noted earlier, has both a narrow and a broad semantic range. In its narrower range, where it substantially coincides with the Greek *andreia*, it is a military quality referring specifically to a soldier’s bravery in battle. In its broader range, commonly seen in philosophical contexts, it refers to moral “excellence(s)” more generally and renders into Latin the Greek term *aretê*.³⁴ Now, Cloelia’s deed is almost always evaluated positively, and is usually described in terms that foreground gender-crossing – whether she is compared favorably to men, or has her actions assigned to the categories *virtus* or *andreia*. In judging her deed “manly,” did the Romans mean that she acted exactly as a (real) man would have done, or that she performed some other kind of deed that the category *virtus* was extended to encompass, perhaps by leveraging its broader, philosophical semantic range? Or both? Answering these questions requires a close examination of her actions and the evaluations they receive. Livy, for instance, lists five distinct achievements: she deceives the guards, leads the other girls, avoids the javelins, swims the river, and

³¹ E.g. Arcella 1985: 36–8 contends that Cloelia’s flight across the Tiber confirms a principle of endogamy. But Cloelia’s unmarriageability seems to rule out that she could be a vehicle for introducing problematic cognate relations. Bernard 2000: 214–19, discussing Livy’s portrayals of women, notes Cloelia’s exceptionality.

³² D’Ambra 2008 demonstrates, via analysis of funerary imagery, that unmarried Roman girls are in the conceptual and symbolic realm of Diana. Like the unmarried and undomesticated huntress-goddess, such girls may aspire to masculine forms of heroism. Some ancient etymologies connect both *virgo* and *vir/virtus* with words like *vis* and *viridis*, efforts that attest the perception of links among these concepts (Barton 2001: 41–2, Maltby 1991: 647–9). In modern historical linguistics some scholars connect *vir* and *vis*, but the etymology of *virgo* is obscure: de Vaan 2008: 681–3.

³³ E.g. McDonnell 2006: 10, Barton 2001: 38–43, Gleason 1995.

³⁴ These two senses of *virtus* coexist from the earliest evidence (mid-republican texts) onward: McDonnell 2006: 59–71 (martial), 110–28 (ethical). On semantics and Roman warrior values, see also ch. 1 nn. 5, 6, 36.

restores the hostages safely to their families.³⁵ Somewhere here “manliness” resides, for on these grounds Porsenna ranks her above Horatius and Mucius (§8), and both he (§9) and the Romans (§11) expressly honor her *virtus*. Dionysius, meanwhile, lists three elements: she tricks the guards rather elaborately, leads all the other hostages, and swims across (*Rom.* 5.33.1). “Manliness” is here too, for in this account Porsenna praises her as “having a spirit surpassing her nature and age” (i.e. surpassing her female nature and childish age: the spirit, in short, of an adult male) and deems the city blessed “for rearing not only good men, but also maidens equal to the men.”³⁶ Still other texts mention only one or two elements.³⁷ Yet even in these sparer accounts Cloelia’s actions may be called “manly” in one of the ways described above. Passing this judgment are either Cloelia’s contemporaries, namely the Romans or Porsenna; or a later figure, perhaps even the author himself, reevaluating the performance as a secondary witness.

It may be fruitful to examine the three most common elements in the traditional tale – crossing the river, leading the girls, and deceiving the guards – for their potential “manliness,” whether individually or in combination. Since the river-crossing, with swimming sometimes replaced by a ride on horseback, is present in every account, it seems a particularly good candidate for an irreducibly “manly” aspect. Chapter 1 showed (1.2.5) that swimming is among the athletic exercises featuring in a soldier’s training, and that feats of swimming occasionally appear in battle narratives. Through these military associations, girls who swim might be deemed “manly” even without also being wounded, under fire, or wearing armor (like Horatius and some of his other imitators).³⁸ The variants in which she crosses by night or on horseback might seem to betray the assumption

³⁵ Livy 2.13.6: *frustrata custodes dux agminis virginum inter tela hostium Tiberim tranavit, sospitesque omnes Romam ad propinquos restituit*.

³⁶ Dion. *Rom.* 5.34.3: μίαν δὲ παρθένον ... ἐπαινέσας ὡς κρείττον ἔχουσιν φρόνημα τῆς τε φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν μακαρίσας ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ μόνον ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐκτρέφειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρθένους ἀνδράσιν ὅμοιας.

³⁷ Plut. *Popl.* 19.2, 8 mentions her leadership of the hostages and swim (though here she does not deceive the guards, but opportunistically flees when they are not watching), and has Porsenna deem the performance “manly”: τιμῆσαι τὸ ἀνδρῶδες αὐτῆς τὸν Τυρρηνόν. Similarly Plut. *Mor.* 250C–D, Polyæn. 8.31.1. Swimming (or riding) and deception of guards, with judgment of “manliness.” Val. Max. 3.2.2, Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).7–8, Vir. *Ill.* 13. Only river-crossing (swimming) noted: Dio 45.31.1, Juv. 8.264–5, Sil. 13.828–30 (with “manliness” judgement). Cf. Sil. 10.496–8 (manliness judgement implied). Briquel 2007: 123–5 provides summary discussion of all the sources.

³⁸ Some accounts, however, make Cloelia’s swim more impressive by introducing strong currents and eddies: Plut. *Popl.* 19.2, *Mor.* 250C–D, Polyæn. 8.31.1, though Pan. *Lat.* 12.18.2 makes the water smooth for her (likewise for Horatius: ch. 1 n. 42). For Briquel 2007: 150–2, Cloelia’s river crossing represents a passage from death to life, within an Indo-Europeanist perspective.

that her nature is weaker, since a girl might be thought more likely to succeed under cover of darkness, or by riding a horse than by swimming unassisted.³⁹ Yet, even regarding the horse, texts contemporary with those under discussion praise the bravery and enterprise of German cavalymen who cross rivers with or on their mounts. Such an action therefore should fall comfortably into the category of masculine military valor.⁴⁰ The river-crossing, then, whether by swimming or on horseback, appears to be at least one locus of Cloelia's "manliness." It is of a specifically masculine and gender-transgressive sort, as Cloelia has performed precisely the kind of deed male warriors do, in roughly equivalent circumstances, to be so categorized. This "manly" quality is even more pronounced in Livy's narrative, where she swims to safety under a shower of Etruscan javelins, as though in combat, just like Horatius before her.⁴¹

What of her leadership of other girls? Livy's account gives their escape a decidedly militaristic color even apart from the shower of missiles: Cloelia is a *dux agminis virginum*, i.e. a general (*dux*) whose troops are in marching formation (*agmen*) as she leads them from one point to another. Normally, a *dux* is an aristocratic male commanding troops in wartime and thereby engaging in activities central to the category *virtus*. Other accounts of her leadership are less militaristic, crediting her instead with compelling rhetorical skills by which she urged the other hostages along.⁴² Addressing the people in a public meeting (*contio*) is another arena of aristocratic male performance that provides a close analogy to Cloelia's actions here. Yet however much her leadership is presented as following a characteristically male, aristocratic pattern, she is in fact *not* doing what those males do: her "troops" are unarmed girls like herself, and such girls constitute no male magistrate's imagined audience when he addresses the people. Cloelia's actions as a leader are assuredly unusual for someone of her age and sex, but they are parallel to, rather than identical to, those of aristocratic males. One might say, in this case, that her "manliness" itself is parallel, but not identical, to that of men – it is the female *version* of the manly activity and performance. Still, the category *virtus* is easily extended to cover such parallel performance.

³⁹ Crosses by night: Val. Max. 3.2.2, *Vir. Ill.* 13.1. On horseback: Val. Max. 3.2.2, Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).7, *Vir. Ill.* 13.1, Plut. *Popl.* 19.2, 8, *Mor.* 250C–F.

⁴⁰ German cavalry: Tac. *Agr.* 18.4, *Hist.* 4.12.3, Dio 69.9.6. Briquel 2007: 157–67 suggests that Cloelia's horse attaches her to the second, "warrior" function in his trifunctionalist interpretation of the Republic's foundation legend; similarly Dumézil 1973: 287.

⁴¹ Livy 2.13.6: *inter tela hostium* (Cloelia); cf. 2.10.11: *multisque superincidentibus telis* (Horatius).

⁴² For Cloelia's rhetorical skills, note the verbs πείθω (Dion. *Rom.* 5.34.3), ἐγκελεύομαι and παραθαρρύνω (Plut. *Popl.* 19.2, *Mor.* 250D), and προτρέπω (Plut. *Mor.* 250C, Polyæn. 8.31.1).

Now consider the third common element, the deception of the guards. In Dionysius the female hostages ask the guards to withdraw so that they can modestly undress to bathe in the river. The guards do as requested, whereupon Cloelia exhorts the girls to flee and leads them in swimming across the river. A scholion to Juvenal reports a different stratagem: Cloelia declares that she and the other female hostages must go to the river to perform a ritual; the guards depart, and she swims away (whether with the other girls is unclear). In *De Viris Illustribus*, she is merely said to have deceived the guards.⁴³ Now, Roman attitudes toward military trickery and deceit vary according to context. Stratagems are typically presented as *alternatives* to direct, open confrontation on the battlefield, traditionally the primary locus of masculine *virtus*; stratagem and *virtus* represent contrasting approaches to solving a military problem. Stratagem is sometimes deemed superior to *virtus*, especially when it secures a Roman victory; but in other cases, for instance when used by an enemy, it is deprecated as unworthy of Roman values. Regarding Cloelia, in none of these passages is her stratagem condemned as such (though discomfort attends her violation of the truce as we will see). A Roman could perhaps hold that a woman is more likely to deploy a stratagem to achieve a military end (when in a position to do so) because she cannot fight hand to hand. Thus stratagem might be deemed a "woman's form of *virtus*" – the functional equivalent by which she can achieve what men stereotypically achieve via traditional *virtus*, though neither identical to what a man does, nor even closely parallel. If so, then Cloelia's deception of the guards might be regarded as "manliness by courtesy." Thus the narrower, military sense of *virtus* is stretched to encompass an activity more typically deemed to contrast with it, while the female actor remains more or less within the bounds of the kinds of actions traditionally allowed to women.⁴⁴

One further, occasional element of the story warrants discussion here – one in which the "manliness" paradox also resides, but depends on age rather than gender. Some accounts say that Cloelia, upon her return to Porsenna's camp, was permitted to select any of the other Roman hostages she wished to take back to Rome. She chose those who had not yet reached puberty, whether girls and boys or just girls, as being those most at risk of

⁴³ Dion. *Rom.* 5.33.1, *Schol. in Iuv.* 8.264, *Vir. Ill.* 13.1.

⁴⁴ For the ambiguous moral values associated with stratagem in Roman warfare, see Lendon 1999: 306–9 and Wheeler 1988, esp. 50–92. For women and stratagem, see Harder 2007: 190–1 (on Polyaeus' *Strategemata*) and McNerney 2003: 333–5 (on Plutarch's *Mulierum Virtutes*), both contending that woman's stratagems typically depend on "womanly" techniques, and not usually on military valor. Arcella 1985: 27–9, in an Indo-Europeanist vein, interprets Cloelia as a "trickster" figure.

sexual exploitation. This story element spotlights the widespread concern for the bodily integrity of freeborn children (and more so for aristocratic children) in Roman society. Livy pointedly says that Cloelia's action "befit her status as *virgo*," implying that it is particularly appropriate for a prepubescent freeborn child to protect others of her kind from what most threatens their status. The "choosing of hostages" detail appears also in Servius Auctus and *De Viris Illustribus*, though with no indication of the action's special appropriateness.⁴⁵ At any rate, if her *virtus* resides partly in this action, Livy suggests it assumes a *childish* form, befitting the performer's age perhaps more than her sex. No adult male would ever perform such an action, or be in such a position. Such implications are far indeed from the narrow sense of *virtus* as valor in battle, and much closer to philosophical sense of *virtus* as *aretê*, "(moral) excellence," which can be ascribed to almost anything – animate or inanimate – that properly discharges whatever functions it has.⁴⁶

Cloelia's "manliness," then, can be articulated across a range of possible relationships among gender, age, and action. At one extreme, swimming the river, she is said to do exactly what adult male warriors do to display their valor (*virtus* in its narrower, military sense). In this case she is a gender deviant – a woman who acts as a man does. At the other extreme, protecting the other youths, her action bears no resemblance to any that an adult male warrior might perform. If *virtus* is thought to reside here, it can only be in its broader philosophical sense, underscoring the appropriateness of her actions to her age and perhaps sex. Between these extremes fall other actions – her leadership of the girls, her deception of the guards – that manifest greater or lesser degrees of transgressiveness relative to norms of action for a *virgo*, and varying degrees of alignment with the traditional military contents of the category *virtus*.

Indeed, diverse articulations of Cloelia's "manliness" may coexist within a single account. Livy, for instance, reports that, when Cloelia was returned to Porsenna, "her *virtus* was not only kept safe, but even held in esteem" (2.13.9). The *virtus* Porsenna keeps safe must be her bodily integrity, the sexual inviolability he had promised earlier (§8). But the *virtus* he holds in

⁴⁵ Livy 2.13.9–10 (n. 5 above); Serv. in Aen. 8.646: *qui admiratus virtutem puellae dedit ei optionem ut cum quibus vellet rediret. illa elegit virgines*, <Serv. Auct.: *quae iniuriae poterant esse obnoxiae*,> unde Porsenna hoc quoque miratus concessit et rogavit ... ut ei aliquid virile decerneretur. Vir. Ill. 13.3–4: *cuius ille virtutem admiratus cum quibus optasset in patriam redire permisit. illa virgines puerosque elegit, quorum aetatem iniuriae obnoxiam sciebat*.

⁴⁶ Caldwell 2015: 40–1 points out that, in protecting the hostages' virginity, Cloelia adheres to conventional social values, however dramatically her deed may be packaged in the language of "manliness" and transgression.

esteem must be that which Cloelia displayed in leading the girls across the river, the military performance that brings Cloelia closest to the traditional, military category of *virtus* and for which Livy's Porsenna ranks her above Horatius and Mucius (§8). Thus Livy, by a kind of zeugma, asserts both the "childish *virtus*" and "masculine *virtus*" aspects of her deed simultaneously, though these two flavors of *virtus* are neither the same nor easy to reconcile. Meanwhile, in Silius Italicus, a Roman called Cinna expounds Cloelia's deeds to Hannibal, as they survey the battlefield after the battle of Cannae. Cinna is describing some of the Roman dead, including a cavalryman named Cloelius who he says is related to the heroine of old. Of her, he says, "I pass over the deeds of men," and describes how she swam the Tiber "disregarding the king, the truce, her age, and the river." This representation paints her as transgressive both in gender and age, as she eclipses the adult males (Horatius and Mucius?) whom Cinna indicates he might otherwise have mentioned. Then he proceeds: "had nature changed her sex, perhaps Porsenna would not have returned to his own territory" – apparently implying that, were she a man, she would have killed Porsenna rather than merely escaping from him. So now her deed, however admirable for a girl, is presented as inferior to what its manly instantiation would have been.⁴⁷ In successive sentences of the same utterance, then, her performance is said to outstrip, and then to fall short of, a male standard; her "manliness" can be understood in contrasting and even contradictory ways simultaneously. Examples can be multiplied from other texts.

A further moral complexity, involving trust and credibility, attends the question of Cloelia's "manliness." The surviving accounts agree that the youthful Roman hostages were pledged to Porsenna as security for a truce. Their flight, whatever *virtus* it displays, abrogates the terms of the truce and breaks the consul Publicola's promise to Porsenna. Plutarch says that Publicola "neither marveled nor rejoiced" at the hostages' safe arrival in Rome, "but was vexed that he might appear worse than Porsenna in his trustworthiness, and that the daring of the maidens might give cause for accusing the Romans of trickery."⁴⁸ In Dionysius, the deposed king Tarquinius, who has accompanied Porsenna on this campaign, casts precisely this accusation of untrustworthiness and oath-breaking against the

⁴⁷ Sil. 10.496–501: *facta virum sileo. rege haec et foedere et annis / et fluvio spretis mirantem interrita Thybrim / tranavit... / cui si mutasset sexum natura, reverti / forsan Tyrrhenas tibi non licuisset in oras, / Porsena.*

⁴⁸ Plut. *Popl.* 19.3: οὐκ ἐθαύμασεν οὐδ' ἠγάπησεν, ἀλλ' ἠνιάθη, ὅτι Πορσίννα κακίων ἐν πίστει φανεῖται, καὶ τὸ τόλμημα τῶν παρθένων αἰτίαν ἔξει κακούργημα Ῥωμαίων γεγονέναι.

new Roman regime.⁴⁹ Plutarch's Publicola and Dionysius' Tarquinius, then, hold that the hostages' action has bad consequences for the Roman community, and judge it negatively in the category of "trustworthiness," *pistis* (*fides* in Latin). In other accounts it is the Romans collectively, or Porsenna, who object that Roman trustworthiness has been tainted, even while they praise the *virtus* (or *andreia*) of the escape itself – thus judging Cloelia's deed negatively in one category but positively in another.⁵⁰ To repair the breach of trust, a somewhat cumbersome interchange ensues: the Romans return the hostages to Porsenna as the truce requires, and Porsenna immediately releases them in acknowledgment of their valor. In this way the Romans reclaim a positive evaluation in the category of "trustworthiness" (*fides/pistis*) in Porsenna's judgment and their own; Cloelia is celebrated and monumentalized for her now untarnished "manly" deed (however conceived), in which she imitates Horatius and is herself installed as a moral standard or model for future judges and actors; and the Romans can conclude a final peace with Porsenna to which Cloelia's deed has opened the door.⁵¹

Yet the effort to corral the negative implications of Cloelia's deed – to stamp out the breach of Roman *fides* that it represents – is all too patent, and it is characteristic of the flexibility and slipperiness of exemplarity that Rome's subsequent enemies, no less than those contemporary with the deed, seize upon the negative exemplum it affords. Following the Roman army's surrender at the Caudine Forks in 321 BCE, according to Livy, the Samnite general Gavius Pontius complains that the Romans are violating the terms of the agreement. Perfidy, he says, is the Romans' habitual practice. "Will you never lack a reason for not abiding, in defeat, by your agreements? You gave hostages to Porsenna, and smuggled them out through

⁴⁹ Dion. *Rom.* 5.33.2: ἐνθα δὴ πολὺς ὁ Ταρκύνιος ἦν ἐπιορκίαν τε καὶ ἀπιστίαν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐγκαλῶν.

⁵⁰ Mixed judgments by Romans: Plut. *Mor.* 250D, Polyæn. 8.31.1. By Porsenna: Livy 2.13.8–9, Dion. *Rom.* 5.34.3. In general, individual performers or performances may receive conflicting moral evaluations when the performers or judging audiences inhabit multiple social roles at once, roles that involve divergent behavioral norms: see Haimson Lushkov 2015: 30–60 (on conflicting familial and civic roles), Solodow 1979: 252–60.

⁵¹ Breach repaired: Livy 2.13.9, Dion. *Rom.* 5.34.3; implicitly at Plut. *Mor.* 250D, *Vir. Ill.* 13.2–3, Serv. *in Aen.* 8.646. It is not, therefore, the whole of Cloelia's deed that is undone or nullified by her return to Porsenna (McInerney 2003: 334), but only its negative *fides*-repercussions. Arcella 1985: 29–31, 36, 39–41 explores further dimensions of *fides*. Imitators: Seneca may imagine that some of today's soft youth will take up the "match me if you can" challenge that Cloelia's statue, in his view, issues to them: *Marc.* 16.2. Also, Silius Italicus' fabrication of a valorous relative named Cloelius who dies in battle at Cannae (10.472–502) is a reminder that Romans readily assumed that exemplary dynamics occur within families.

trickery.” Here, Livy’s Pontius is striving to make the exemplum of Cloelia “fit” the argumentative context. By ignoring the subsequent return of the hostages to Porsenna, and omitting to acknowledge Cloelia’s courage, he causes her to exemplify not Roman *virtus*, but the very perfidy of which he now accuses them.⁵²

This consideration of the various ways Cloelia’s “manliness” can be understood and articulated, along with the additional exemplary possibilities opened up by the truce-breaking, illuminates the vibrancy and complexity of the discourse surrounding even this hoariest of exemplary figures. Above all, the paradox of the “manly maiden” stimulates judging audiences to refine their capacity for making moral evaluations and distinguishing between moral concepts. What counts as *virtus*? How can a woman or girl display it? What kind of woman is she, then? How is this value to be weighed against other values, like *fides*, with which it might conflict? Different individuals and groups propound different answers to these questions, as their immediate argumentative situations require – or perhaps they accept multiple answers at once. The stage is then set for diverse evocations of this figure in varied argumentative contexts, leading to vigorous rhetorical contestation. Thus the Cloelia exemplum can play a vital role in the social and political debates of any given moment.

2.4 Cloelia's Statue

Among the indicators of Cloelia’s “manliness” is a statue that was thought to monumentalize her great deed. In chapter 2.2 I examined how Seneca portrays this monument, and how he makes it function as a “time island.” Here I will examine a wider range of representations, focusing on how various audiences interpret it and how it shapes their understanding of the paradox of the “manly maiden.” The texts that mention this statue say that it stood on the summit of the Sacred Way, or where the Sacred Way enters the forum, or opposite the temple of Iuppiter Stator in the vestibule of Tarquinius Superbus’ house. These descriptions can charitably be interpreted as consistent and referring to the same location (map location 226). Second, the statue represented a female figure on horseback, and according

⁵² Livy 9.11.6: *numquamne causa defiet cur victi pacto non stetis? obsides Porsinnae dedistis, furto eos subduxistis*. On Roman *fides* as Pontius presents it, see Barchiesi 2009: 61–2, Chaplin 2000: 40; also Briquel 2007: 125, 142 on how Caudium raises the same hostage-taking and *fides* issues as the Porsenna war.

to one source was made of bronze.⁵³ These accounts also diverge on certain points. Several report a variant in which the honorand is not Cloelia but Valeria, Publicola's daughter who escaped the ambush that (on some accounts) the Tarquins laid for the hostages. However, the surviving texts always report this alternative *as* a variant, suggesting that these authors – or the tradition they inherited – had already constructed a hierarchy of versions in which the Cloelia identification was preferred.⁵⁴ Also, the dedicator of the statue is variously reported as the senate, the Roman people, the hostages whom Cloelia led to freedom, or the hostages' fathers.⁵⁵ From the point of view of exemplarity, this variation is insignificant. For in any case the dedicators are judging audiences – either eyewitnesses to Cloelia's action, or secondary witnesses contemporary with it – whose interests and values are those of the community at large, and who therefore are entitled to judge the action's significance for the community.

This statue, like Horatius' (ch. 1.2.6), poses formidable typological and iconographical difficulties. Archaeologists question whether an honorific bronze equestrian statue could have been erected in the sixth century BCE. The earliest honorific equestrian statues that are undoubtedly historical date to the late fourth century. Therefore, if this statue was indeed honorific, it must postdate Cloelia's deed by at least two centuries. By the time the texts that speak of the statue were written, the actual conditions of its erection had long been forgotten, and the statue was mistakenly assumed to be contemporary with her deed. Alternatively, if the statue really dated to the sixth century, it must originally have had some other identity and served some other civic or religious purpose. Some scholars, for example, have tentatively identified it as a very early cult statue of a goddess on horseback, which came to be attached to the legend of Cloelia after its original subject and purpose was forgotten. In this scenario, the statue becomes an(other) instance of a mysterious object that is rendered

⁵³ Form and location of statue: Livy 2.13.11 (n. 5 above), Dion. *Rom.* 5.35.2: Κλοιλία δὲ τῇ παρθένῳ στάσιν εἰκόνας χαλκῆς ἔδοσαν, ἣν ἀνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς ὁδοῦ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν φερούσης; Plin. *Nat.* 34.29: [statuam] equestrem contra Iovis Statoris aedem in vestibulo Superbi domus; Sen. *Marc.* 16.2; Plut. *Popl.* 19.8: ἀνάκειται δὲ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν πορευομένοις εἰς Παλάτιον ἀνδριᾶς αὐτῆς ἔφιππος (cf. *Mor.* 250F); *Vir. Ill.* 13.4: huic statua equestris in foro posita; Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: statua equestris quam in sacra via hodieque conspicimus.

⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the Valeria version is carefully preserved and transmitted, if only as a variant: see Plin. *Nat.* 34.29, Plut. *Popl.* 19.8, *Mor.* 250F. For the origins of the variant, and the conjectured involvement of the historian Valerius Antias, see Briquel 2007: 132–3, 1998: 84, and Forsythe 1994: 255–6.

⁵⁵ Dedicator: *Romani*, Livy 2.13.11; *publice dicatam*, Plin. *Nat.* 34.29; *populus Romanus* (at Porsenna's request), Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646. Dion. *Rom.* 5.35.1–2 says that the senate decreed it, but the hostages' fathers erected it (i.e. bore the cost?), while Piso *apud* Plin. *Nat.* 34.29 (see n. 8 above) says the other hostages dedicated it (perhaps implying a private dedication). See Forsythe 1994: 256.

monumental, and thereby given meaning, by being attached, via the logic of exemplarity, to the narrative of a famous deed.⁵⁶ To complicate matters further, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing early in the Augustan period, reports that the statue had been destroyed by fire prior to his own day and no longer stood. Yet Seneca and Pliny, writing in the 40s–70s CE, as well as Plutarch and Servius later, speak of the statue as being visible to their eyes. Scholars reconcile these accounts by conjecturing that the statue was re-erected, probably by Augustus or Tiberius, both of whom were inveterate restorers and recreators of ancient monuments.⁵⁷ If so, then the re-erected statue represented what the original statue had come to be believed to represent: that is, the statue visible to imperial writers *really was* an honorific equestrian statue commemorating the Cloelia of legend.⁵⁸ Further, it might have been graced with an inscription giving her name and a brief account of her deed, such as Augustus supplied for the statues of past heroes that he erected in the Forum Augustum (ch. 3.3.3). But regardless of the statue's actual origins and history, the writers who discuss it unanimously accepted that it was a monument commemorating the famous deed performed by Cloelia (or alternatively by Valeria, Publicola's daughter) during the war with Porsenna in the first years of the Republic. It is this belief, and its exemplary consequences, that I investigate here.

Several texts insist that the statue was a “manly” honor. Servius is most explicit: he says that Porsenna admired Cloelia's *virtus* and asked the Roman people to decree “something manly,” yielding the equestrian statue.⁵⁹ Plutarch reports that Porsenna gave her a (live) horse as a gift, and that some people explained this gift as meaning that he “admired her strength and daring as superior to that of a woman, and deemed her worthy of a gift befitting an adult male warrior.” Plutarch then continues,

⁵⁶ On the construal of mysterious objects as monuments, see e.g. ch. 1.2.2 (no iron nails in the pons sublicius), 1.2.4, 1.2.6 (Horatius' cognomen, his statue). On the dating and original identity of Cloelia's statue see Valentini 2011: 208–13, Briquel 2007: 130–7, Sehlmeier 1999: 98–101, Fugmann 1997: 64–5, Papi, *LTUR* 2 (1995): 226, Forsythe 1994: 254–6, Flory 1993: 289, Bergemann 1990: 32–3, 157, Verzář 1980: 58–61, Hölscher 1978: 332, 334–5, Vessberg 1941: 88. Only *Suda* α 4653 hints at a statuary type representing a goddess (Aphrodite/Venus) on horseback. Hemelrijk 2005: 311–15 and Hölscher 2001: 197 n. 39 stress the implausibility of this explanation of the Cloelia statue given the paucity of evidence.

⁵⁷ Statue destroyed: ταύτην ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐκέτι κειμένην εὔρομεν, ἐλέγετο δ' ἐμπρήσεως περὶ τὰς πλῆθιον οἰκίας γενομένης ἠφανίσθαι (Dion. *Rom.* 5.35.2). Extant later: Sen. *Marc.* 16.2, Plin. *Nat.* 34.28, Plut. *Popl.* 19.8, Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: *cui data est statua equestris ... quae hodieque conspicimus* (Servius supposes that the statue he sees in the early fifth century CE is some 900 years old).

⁵⁸ So Sehlmeier 1999: 100–1.

⁵⁹ Serv. in *Aen.* 8.646: *qui admiratus virtutem puellae ... rogavit per litteras populum Romanum ut ei aliquid virile decerneretur: cui data est statua equestris.*

speaking for himself, “at any rate, an equestrian statue of a woman stood on the Sacred Way.” The implication is that the gift-horse honored her as being like a male warrior, and that the equestrian statue depicts Cloelia mounted upon that very horse.⁶⁰ This monument’s “manly” implications are stressed in earlier texts as well. Livy says that the equestrian statue was “a novel honor for novel *virtus* in a woman;” Seneca sees the horse on which her image is mounted as proof of her all-but-male status; and both Seneca and Pliny suggest that this monument shows that *even* women could receive an equestrian statue – implying that, in their view, equestrian statues were usually associated with men.⁶¹

This gendering of equestrian statues is not surprising. A great many such statues are mentioned in literary texts, represented on coins, or attested via inscriptions or plastic remains; yet there is no evidence for any other equestrian statue honoring a woman, from any period of Roman history, in Rome itself or anywhere else in the Roman world. Already in Livy’s day – the earliest surviving author to deem Cloelia’s statue “manly” – many equestrian statues honoring male aristocrats stood in the city’s public places. The occasions for their dedication, when known, are the honorands’ success as military leaders or in discharging high magistracies, activities falling within the normal ambit of *virtus* for male aristocrats.⁶² In the imperial period this gendered pattern was reinforced, as the equestrian statue became a regular means of honoring male members of the imperial family and their close associates.⁶³ Such statues were also erected elsewhere in the empire, along with similar statues honoring local magistrates. Imperial authors therefore had even better cause than Livy to associate this statue type with aristocratic males and their characteristic public activities, hence to regard an equestrian statue representing a female as anomalous. The paradox of the “manly maiden” that Cloelia’s story poses is thus merely sharpened by the unique iconography of her statue.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 250F (n. 68 below); for a trifunctionalist reading of this passage, Briquel 2007: 163.

⁶¹ Livy 2.13.11 (n. 5 above); Sen. *Marc.* 16.2: *in qua* [sc. *urbe*] *Cloeliam contempto et hoste et flumine ob insignem audaciam tantum non in viros transcripsimus: equestri insidens statuae (equestri is in emphatic position, providing the key evidence for her masculinity), ... in qua* [sc. *urbe*] *etiam feminas equo donavimus*. Plin. *Nat.* 34.28: *cum feminis etiam honore communicato*. In these passages *etiam* implies the abnormality of so honoring a woman.

⁶² Bergemann 1990: 14–20 discusses the locations of equestrian statues, the status of the honorands, and the occasions for erection. Republican equestrian statues in the city of Rome are securely known only via literary attestations and images on coins (Bergemann 1990: 156–63, 170–1), though the bronze horse with missing rider in the Palazzo dei Conservatori is of this period (Bergemann 1990: 103–5).

⁶³ For imperial equestrian statues in the city of Rome, see Bergemann 1990: 79–80, 105–8, 120–1, 163–8.

⁶⁴ In the context of other types of honorific statuary, Cloelia’s appears only slightly less exceptional. Valentini 2011: 201–22 and Flory 1993: 287–92 show that prior to 35 only five (at best) honorific

How, then, did Romans of the late Republic and Empire understand this anomalous monument in their midst? It clearly predisposed some viewers to comprehend it as a “normal” equestrian statue such as men otherwise had, implying that her deed was of the same sort that men perform. Pliny interprets it thus, when he identifies equestrian statuary as a type and Cloelia's statue the earliest of the type. His further assertion that the honor is excessive because neither Lucretia nor Brutus received such an honor, and that Cloelia deserved only a togate statue (presumably standing), shows that he regards both the equestrian and the togate statuary types as marking broad, generic levels of achievement into which men too can be slotted, with the equestrian type ranking higher than the togate.⁶⁵ Seneca interprets the statue similarly, and deploys it in support of a philosophical polemic. In his *Ad Marciam De Consolatione*, quoted above (ch. 2.2), he develops the Stoic argument that women and men are equal in their capacity for virtuous action. To corroborate this assertion he invokes Lucretia, then Cloelia: he declares regarding the latter that “we have all but enrolled her as a man” on account of her “outstanding boldness,” which he describes in so generalized a way that it could indeed apply equally to Horatius: “despising the enemy and the river.” To put the fully masculine quality of her performance beyond doubt, and thus prove the

statues of women are attested as existing at Rome (on Cornelia's statue see ch. 6.3). It is historically doubtful that any such statues were ever erected in the Republic, notwithstanding the identifications of certain old female statues offered by later authors. Beyond Rome, late republican fragments of apparently honorific statues of women survive from Cartoceto in central Italy (Bergemann 1990: 51–2), and Pliny (*Nat.* 34.31) says that Cato the Elder, as censor in 184, objected to the erection of statues of Roman women in the provinces (Forsythe 1994: 256–7; discussion in ch. 6.3). Geiger 2008: 115 speculates, on the basis of *Sil.* 13.806–30, that the Forum of Augustus contained statues of seven women, including Cloelia. But this is sheer conjecture. From the Augustan age onward, princesses and empresses are profusely commemorated in honorific statuary throughout the empire (e.g. Alexandridis 2004), as are private women (e.g. Davies 2008), though never in equestrian form. Livy and Dionysius, then, must have deemed any honorific statue of a woman remarkable. Later authors, being accustomed to seeing honorific statues of women, were likely more struck by Cloelia's statue being *equestrian*.

⁶⁵ Plin. *Nat.* 34.28: *et equestrium tamen origo perquam vetus est, cum feminis etiam honore communicata Cloeliae statua equestri, ceu parum esset toga eam cingi, cum Lucretiae ac Bruto ... non decernerentur*. Some scholars (e.g. Valentini 2011: 212, Hemelrijk 2005: 312, Bergemann 1990: 157) interpret Pliny's phrase *ceu parum esset toga eam cingi* as meaning that the monument represented Cloelia both mounted and togate. But Pliny contrasts *toga* (note its emphatic position) with *statua equestri*, a contrast that is only meaningful in the context of alternative *types* of honorific statue. Thus he means, “she has a *statua equestris*, as though it were not enough to have a (standing) *statua togata*,” i.e. the lesser honor, which implies nothing about her costume on the equestrian statue. Citizen girls of every status did, however, wear the *toga praetexta* at least on ceremonial occasions, just as boys did: Caldwell 2015: 57–8, Goette 1990: 80–3, Gabelmann 1985: 517–25. Thus it is not impossible that the equestrian statue Pliny saw (in its reerected, not original, form) represented this *virgo* in her citizen's costume. But Pliny's phrasing does not require it.

point about the ethical equality of the sexes, he declares outright that “we have given equestrian statues even to women” (sc. right along with the men whom equestrian statues normally honor). Thus the statue indicates a performance not essentially different from the performance of men so honored.⁶⁶ In these authors’ view, then, Cloelia’s monument signifies the same type and level of masculine achievement as every other equestrian statue signifies. The horse is symbolic, indicating merely that she is deemed (like others) to have performed at a certain level.⁶⁷

Other viewers, however, interpret the anomalous statue in a different way. Consider the two interpretations offered by Plutarch (*Mor.* 250E–F):

In admiration, Porsenna ordered a horse to be brought, fittingly adorned, and presenting it to Cloelia sent all the maidens away in a kindly, well-disposed manner. Most people take this as an indication that Cloelia crossed the river on horseback. Others deny this, saying that he marveled at her strength and daring as being greater than a woman’s, and judged her worthy of a gift befitting an adult male warrior. At any rate (*goun*), an equestrian statue of a woman stood on the so-called Sacred Way, which some say was of Cloelia and others say was of Valeria.⁶⁸

According to Plutarch, “most people” hold that Porsenna gave Cloelia a horse because she had previously escaped by crossing the river on horseback, while “others” hold that he bestowed it as an indication that she had, in his view, displayed the personal valor of an adult male warrior. “At any rate” (*goun*), she was commemorated with an equestrian statue. The particle *goun* appears here in its “part proof” function: the existence of the equestrian statue constitutes evidence for, or partial proof of, the prior claim that a horse plays a role in Cloelia’s story, whether as an escape vehicle or as a gift from Porsenna acknowledging her valor.⁶⁹ The horse

⁶⁶ Sen. *Marc.* 16.2 (n. 61 above). Wray 2003: 1–10 discusses Seneca’s articulation of the Stoic doctrine of the ethical equality of the sexes, including this passage.

⁶⁷ Among modern scholars, Sehlmeier 1999: 101 and Flory 1993: 288 concur with this Senecan/Plinian view that the horse is symbolic and attests a “typical” (male) performance that rises to a certain level; contrasting scholarly opinion in n. 70 below.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 250E–F: ἀγασθεὶς ὁ Πορσέννας ἐκέλευσεν ἵππον ἀχθῆναι κεκοσμημένον εὐπρεπῶς, καὶ τῇ Κλοιλίᾳ δωρησάμενος ἀπέπεμψεν εὐμενῶς καὶ φιλανθρωπῶς πάσας. τοῦτο ποιοῦνται σημείον οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ τὴν Κλοιλίαν ἵππῳ διεξελάσαι τὸν ποταμόν. οἱ δ’ οὐ φασιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ῥώμην θαυμάσαντα καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτῆς ὡς κρείττονα γυναικὸς ἀξιώσαι δωρεᾶς ἀνδρὶ πολεμιστῇ πρεπούσης. ἀνέκειτο γοῦν ἔφιππος εἰκὼν γυναικὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἱερᾶς λεγομένης, ἣν οἱ μὲν τῆς Κλοιλίας οἱ δὲ τῆς Οὐαλερίας λέγουσιν εἶναι.

⁶⁹ On γοῦν as “part proof,” Denniston/Dover 1950: 451–3, Radt 2015: 127. Cloelia crosses the river on horseback also at Val. Max. 3.2.2, Flor. *Epit.* 1.4(=1.10).7, Vir. Ill. 13.1; she receives a gift-horse at Dion. *Rom.* 5.34.3, Polyæn. 8.31.1, Dio fr. 14.4. Both alternatives are suggested again at Plut. *Popl.* 19.7–8. However, only the passage quoted (Plut. *Mor.* 250E–F) expressly connects the horse in her story to the horse in the monument.

is part of the monument because it is part of her unique story. It is not symbolic, but “literal” in depicting a concrete element of her specific performance. Plutarch may even imply, with this *goun*, that the narratives of Cloelia’s deed that involve a horse are retrojected from the statue. If this is correct, then the logic of exemplarity has stimulated Roman viewers of this statue to create narratives of an exemplary deed that includes a horse in the action, rendering the equestrian statue a monument commemorating that deed in its particularity.⁷⁰

2.5 Judging Morals, Typicality, and Uniqueness across Time

The iconography of Cloelia’s statue can thus be interpreted in either a generalizing or a particularizing way, manifesting the dual ontology of “typicality” and “uniqueness” that characterizes all exempla. Here the two options reflect alternative conceptions of the manliness of this maiden. Pliny and Seneca, among others, see the typicality of her performance, its membership in an exalted category of male military valor defined by the conferral of an honorific equestrian statue – a statue type serving this purpose since the late fourth century B.C.E. Here the horse is generic and symbolic, simply marking a broad level of achievement reached by all heroes so monumentalized. This interpretation makes Cloelia a one-of-many, hence a “real man” – a gender deviant of the sort discussed in the analysis of her actions in chapter 2.3 above. Plutarch, meanwhile, reports how some people see in this monument the uniqueness and contingency of her specific performance. They regard the horse as depicting the one that appears in (some versions of) her story – the horse by which she crossed the Tiber, or that she received as a gift from Porsenna. The monument is thus not an “equestrian statue” of Cloelia, which is a typological category, but “a statue of Cloelia *on her horse*,” a unique monument, reflecting the distinctiveness of this performance. Gender deviance is not required under this interpretation, as the “backstories” to the horse include versions in which Cloelia does not perform the very same actions that adult males do. As noted in chapter 2.3, some of the actions attributed to her in various versions of her story are likewise relatively gender- and age-appropriate,

⁷⁰ Some modern scholars hold that the horse depicted in the statue was involved in her deed (Bergemann 1990: 32–3, calling the statue a “Handlungsbildnis;” cf. Fugmann 1997: 66), while others hold that versions of her story involving a horse are simply retrojected from the statue (e.g. Facchini Tosi 1998: 208, Forsythe 1994: 254, Gagé 1988: 238, Arcella 1985: 30). In either case, the horse is connected to the particulars of Cloelia’s story, in contrast to interpretations that see the horse as symbolic and the statue as a type (n. 67 above).

reflecting a less absolute conception of her “manliness.” Thus the conundrum of gender and ethics posed by the figure of the “manly maiden” is articulated and worked out in similar ways both in the interpretation of her actions as described in the narratives, and in the interpretation of her statue’s iconography.⁷¹

That statue, meanwhile – as noted in chapter 2.2 – brings Cloelia vividly into the present, to address Roman audiences in their own time and place. Those audiences, for their part, are placed in the position of judging an actor from the remote past according to the moral standards of their own day, as if these same standards held good centuries ago. They may agree or disagree with the original primary audience’s judgment, but they in any event assume – regardless whether they think consciously about the question, or even recognize it *as* a question – that they are employing the same moral categories, and assigning actions to those categories in the same ways, as the original judging audiences did, and as the actor herself would have expected. Thus the exemplum of Cloelia, like most other exempla, has a “timeless” quality in that it purports to present standards of evaluation and models for action that are eternally valid and compelling. In particular, the conundrum of gender propounded by her deed resonates down the ages, impacting later actors’ and judges’ senses of the appropriateness and relative value of the deeds they themselves perform or evaluate.

⁷¹ Horatius’ statue too, as noted in ch. 1.2.6, admits both generalizing and particularizing interpretations. In his case, the selection of one or the other interpretation responds to specific local needs: the need in some contexts to present him as a “typical,” relatively ordinary hero among others; or in other contexts to make him “unique,” a hero beyond compare. In Cloelia’s case, the generalizing and particularizing interpretations of her statue point toward different ways of resolving the structural paradox of the “manly maiden,” a different sort of need.

Appius Claudius Caecus
Positive and Negative Exemplarity

3.1 Introduction: Appius “Live”

Virtually every modern scholarly discussion of Appius Claudius Caecus cites or paraphrases a *dictum*, pronounced in 1907 by the ancient historian Gaetano De Sanctis, that Appius was the first “vivid personality” of Roman history. By “vivid” De Sanctis apparently meant that Appius – in contrast not only to remote figures like Horatius Cocles and Cloelia, behind whom no one would look for a “real” historical personage, but even to Romans of the generation or two preceding him – takes on the outlines, and leaves behind monumental traces, of the kind of flamboyant, self-aggrandizing republican noble familiar from later periods.¹ His name was attached to two great public works, an aqueduct and a road, inaugurating the practice of sponsoring and giving one’s name to urban amenities and infrastructure that many a noble followed in subsequent years. He initiated these projects as censor, an office he held beginning in 312 BCE. Also during his censorship, which much of the tradition presents (perhaps inaccurately) as highly contentious, he is said to have carried out the first, highly controversial, culling of the senate (*lectio senatus*), a practice that became regular for subsequent censors. He also supposedly enrolled sons of freedmen in the senate and somehow reformed the structure and voting procedures of the tribes, allegedly causing scandal. Finally, some accounts say that he altered the ritual practice of certain state cults, causing a disruption of the *pax deorum* so severe that the gods punished him with the blindness commemorated in his cognomen Caecus. In later years he appears to have sponsored the publication of the Roman civic calendar, which supposedly had been a closely guarded secret thitherto; he is also credited with writing

¹ De Sanctis 1907: 2.229: “L’autore d’innovazioni così geniali e ardite ...spicca come la prima personalità viva in cui ci incontriamo nella storia romana, mentre prima di lui, sfrondate le leggende, non rimangono che meri nomi.” Echoing this are (e.g.) Beck 2005: 159, Humm 2005: 5, 2001: 65; Raaflaub et al. 1992: 34–5, Ferenczy 1976: 120, all with further references.

the first known interpretive legal treatise (entitled *De Usurpationibus*, dealing with aspects of the Roman law of ownership and possession), and with producing a set of sayings, perhaps in the form of a poem. In a pair of consulships, held in 307 and 296, he is said to have gained mixed results (at best) as a military commander, but in battle he vowed a major temple to the goddess Bellona Victrix that was erected and stood for centuries in the Circus Flaminius. Late in life, supposedly blind and decrepit, he was carried into the senate to denounce a treaty proposed by King Pyrrhus of Epirus, who had invaded southern Italy, had defeated the Romans in a close-fought battle, and was now seeking a settlement. The speech Appius delivered on this occasion had a long literary afterlife: a text (or purported text) could be read in Cicero's day and beyond, which was deemed the earliest Latin oration preserved in written form.

Scholars of Roman history have long sought to understand this multifarious activity in the context of the huge transformations that Roman politics and society underwent in the late fourth and early third centuries B.C.E. In this era the new patricio-plebeian nobility was being consolidated and the city-state was beginning to project its political and military power beyond its own Latian and Etruscan hinterland via its ventures in the Bay of Naples and its conflict with the Samnite federation of the southern Apennines. Appius' initiatives, especially during his censorship, can reasonably be interpreted as first steps in creating the physical and institutional infrastructure that would underpin Roman imperial expansion in Italy and beyond over the next three centuries. Indeed, modern scholars – despite sometimes large differences among the models they adopt in trying to make sense of Appius and his initiatives – are nearly unanimous in deeming him a great innovator. Current opinion plausibly holds, however, that he cannot have acted alone in these matters and must have had (contrary to tradition) considerable support within the nobility.²

In this chapter I attempt no new historical analysis of Appius' initiatives, nor do I provide further systematic discussion of previous scholars' views. Rather, I examine the exemplary uses to which Appius is put by later generations of Romans. In striking contrast to the modern scholarly consensus, exemplary invocations of Appius generally do not present him as an innovator. These invocations are, however, remarkably varied and in

² Humm 2005: 12–26 offers a fascinating survey of major scholarly positions since the nineteenth century. On the logic of Appius' reforms in the social and political context of Rome ca. 300 see Beck 2005: 174–6, Humm 2005: 30–1, 639–41. Substantial support necessary for Appius' main undertakings: Beck 2005: 177–8, 183; Humm 2005: 641; Raaflaub et al. 1992: 45–7.

some respects contradictory. There are strongly negative representations of his alleged religious transgressions and disturbances of established constitutional practice, but also strongly positive representations of him as a canon of old Roman moral virtue, which may entail ameliorative presentations of actions elsewhere criticized (the exemplary tradition is particularly conflicted regarding Appius' military achievements).³ He is also adduced in a range of contexts as a familial exemplum – a model for the comportment of living Claudii in any given present. In their very breadth and variety, these exemplary invocations reflect and help to construct the multifaceted figure, with its wide array of activities and engagements, that modern historians have identified in Appius.

In the pages to follow I investigate three specific dimensions of Appius' exemplarity. I begin by analyzing Livy's narrative of the core years of Appius' activity. This account, itself shot through with exemplary dynamics, seems to be striving to provide a "genealogy" or backstory for the varied and contradictory exemplary figurations that Appius had assumed by Livy's own day. I turn next to a discussion of the monuments – built, bodily, onomastic, and performed – by which Appius and his deeds are commemorated, both positively and negatively. Finally I discuss some texts that adduce Appius as a familial exemplum, one who models proper comportment for his descendants. Collectively, these analyses will reveal the diverse and often contradictory political and ideological work the figure of Appius was made to perform at different times and in various contexts.

3.2 Livy's Appius: Exemplary Performance in *artes urbanae*

Livy's connected account of the core years of Appius' magisterial activity (312–295) in books 9–10 of the *Ab Urbe Condita* presents Appius as a "vivid personality" in a sense somewhat different from what De Sanctis meant (n. 1 above). Livy's Appius is a strikingly abrasive figure, frequently in conflict with his peers and arousing widespread opposition as he pursues novel initiatives. His opportunities to command armies are limited, even when he holds suitable magistracies, and he makes a bad job of it when he does hold commands and operates on his own. Yet Livy also portrays Appius as setting a standard, to which his peers feel compelled to measure up, for his prowess in what Livy calls "urban arts" or "civil arts." This domain of competitive excellence is represented as novel – an arena Appius himself created due to falling short in the competition for military

³ Humm 2005: 11–12, 652–3, and Beck 2005: 161–4 remark upon this bifurcation.

glory, the premier prestige-bearing arena of aristocratic endeavor. A broad scholarly consensus holds that Livy's narrative of this period is bedeviled by misunderstandings of the political environment, resulting in distorted representations of historical actors' deeds and motivations (see below). Yet my concern is not with historical actualities (for the most part), but with the exemplary figuration Appius assumes in the texts and monuments that transmit information about him to later eras. Livy himself presents Appius as an exemplary model, both positive and negative, for his peers and for posterity; and Livy's representations in many respects are consistent with, and could be thought to provide an ideological basis for, Appius' exemplary figuration as it existed in Livy's own day – key aspects of which would also persist into the imperial age.⁴

Livy first introduces Appius in his account of the censorship of 312. Livy's Appius is a rebarbative figure who opposes his magisterial colleagues, the senate in general, and even the gods.⁵ First, Livy notes that Appius became more famous than his censorial colleague Gaius Plautius because the road and aqueduct built in this censorship bore only Appius' name. Plautius had abdicated as censor in mortification over another of Appius' censorial initiatives, a revision of the senate roll (*lectio senatus*) that Plautius deemed "disgraceful and odious."⁶ Nor was Plautius alone in this assessment: the consuls of the next year, complaining that Appius' revision of the senate was "crooked" (*prava*), rejected it and convened the body according to the pre-censorial roll.⁷ Livy seems to imply that Appius should have abdicated along with Plautius, presumably on the principle of pairwise collegiality and in deference to the broad opposition his revision of the senate roll aroused. But Appius did not allow his hand to be forced: being well-endowed with "the ancient ingrained stubbornness of his family," he

⁴ I know no previous analysis of Livy's Appius relative to Livy's larger concerns as an historiographer. Humm 2001 provides valuable insights, but his source-critical analysis, characteristically of this approach, pushes the question of Livy's representational choices and strategies back onto his putative sources. Source-critical approaches dominated Livian studies during the 1970s and 1980s: see e.g. Ferenczy 1976: 179–89 and Wiseman 1979: 85–90 for such treatments of Appius (though this approach ultimately goes back to Mommsen; discussion by Raaffaub et al. 1992: 44–5). Since the 1990s scholars have refocused their attention on Livy's own voice, agendas, and working methods – which involve intentional, conscious selection from among his sources, as well as his own invention and synthesis – as he promulgates a vision of the past that addresses his readers' contemporary needs and interests. Pathbreaking studies along these lines include Miles 1995, Jaeger 1997, Feldherr 1998, and, more recently, Levene 2010.

⁵ Discussion of Appius' censorship at Livy 9.29.5–30.2; also 9.33.4–34.26, 9.46.10–11.

⁶ Livy 9.29.5–7: *et censura clara eo anno Ap. Claudii et C. Plautii fuit; memoriae tamen felicioris ad posterum nomen Appii, quod viam munivit et aquam in urbem duxit; eaque unus perfecit quia ob infamem atque invidiosam senatus lectionem verecundia victus collega magistratu se abdicaverat.*

⁷ For general opposition to Appius' *lectio senatus* see also 9.30.1–2, 9.46.10–11.

carried on alone in the censorship.⁸ Indeed, as Livy later reports, he refused to resign even when the lawful eighteen months of the censorial term had elapsed, and in the face of great ill-will from every social class continued as sole censor for the full five-year interval (*lustrum*) until the next pair of censors was chosen for 307.⁹ The result of these unpopular, uncollegial, and possibly illegal machinations (as Livy presents them) was that he completed the two great public works projects alone, and hence his name alone was attached to them.

Nor is this all. Yet another of Appius' censorial reforms in 312 involved distributing low-status city-dwelling citizens (perhaps freedmen, or their sons) across all the voting tribes, a reform Livy seems to have understood as an attempt by Appius to gain influence (*opes*) by maximizing his own supporters' voting power. Livy mentions this reform only in his narrative of the year 304, when he reports that the censor Quintus Fabius Rullianus reversed the reform and enrolled these citizens in just four "urban" tribes, greatly diminishing their overall voting power – again hinting at widespread opposition to Appius' initiatives.¹⁰ Beyond this, Livy says that Appius as censor removed supervision of the cult rites of Hercules at the Ara Maxima from the Potitii, a priestly family that had traditionally conducted these rites. But disturbing long-settled ritual practices risks angering the gods: for the entire family of Potitii died out within a year, and Appius himself was eventually blinded due to divine anger.¹¹ Thus Livy introduces Appius as a figure who, as censor, maintains a confrontational and uncooperative relationship with peers, colleagues, and even the gods, and does not hesitate to disrupt settled arrangements in pursuit of personal advantage.¹²

Scholars generally agree that Livy's description of Appius' motives, of his antagonistic relations with his peers, and of decisions and events allegedly resulting from these relations cannot be historically correct. It is

⁸ 9.29.8: *Appius iam inde antiquitus insitam pertinaciam familiae gerendo solus censuram obtinuit.*

⁹ 9.34.26: *summaque invidia omnium ordinum solus censuram gessit.* At 9.33.4 Livy implies that Plautius fulfilled the entire eighteen-month term specified by law before abdicating (similarly Frontin. *Aq.* 5.3, quoted n. 41 below, following Livy or the same tradition), which seems inconsistent with his earlier implication that Plautius abdicated in protest in the middle of his term: but in either case Livy holds that Appius continued in the censorship alone, beyond his colleague's abdication, illustrating the go-it-alone quality, disregarding others' views and settled practice, that Livy generally attributes to Appius.

¹⁰ 9.46.11–15 for Appius' reform (dating to 312) and Fabius reversing it in 304.

¹¹ 9.29.9–11; further discussion in ch. 3.3.4.

¹² Personal qualities: the tribune Sempronius at 9.34.22–4 accuses him of *superbia*, *pervicacia*, *audacia*, and *contemptus deorum* for refusing to abdicate the censorship; the (authorial) narrator twice ascribes *pertinacia* to him (9.29.8, 10.26.6), and calls him *acer et ambitiosus* (10.15.8).

inconceivable that Appius carried through his vast public works, at enormous expense to the state, without significant senatorial and popular support. The extension of his censorship, if indeed it occurred, is likely to have been ratified by the senate precisely to allow him to see these projects to completion, as they almost certainly took longer than eighteen months. His tribal reforms, as well, must have had significant support. They can plausibly be connected to the organizing of the manipular army (a new tactical structure) and to the extension of the Roman civic framework into newly conquered territories. The reversal or modification of these reforms *two* censorships later – not by Appius' immediate successors in 307 (as one would expect if the reforms were so widely loathed), but by the censors of 304 – may be related to the ending of the second Samnite war in this year, and the consequent reduction of military pressure on the state (which may also explain why these censors were elected just three years after the prior censors, rather than the usual five). And so on: there can be little doubt that Appius as censor was “actually” addressing fundamental limitations in the physical, civic, and governmental infrastructure of the state, not simply (or not only) pursuing personal competitive advantage or vendettas. Also, many Romans must have recognized the need for such undertakings and supported them.¹³ But the likelihood that Livy's representations are historically incorrect merely underscores the broader point I seek to make here: that Livy's account of Appius' censorship creates or perpetuates a characterization of Appius that will set the stage for his later successes and failures as Livy narrates them, and will also underpin the exemplary figuration Appius subsequently assumes in Livy's text and beyond. To what extent this image of Appius is Livy's own creation or was transmitted to him from his sources, where that image (or some aspects of it) may already have been found, is impossible to say.¹⁴

Livy's Appius is characterized not only by his propensity for antagonism and conflict, but also by distinctive interests and capabilities whose

¹³ Rationale for extending censorship: e.g. Beck 2005: 177–8, Oakley 1997: 3.376–9, Ferenczy 1976: 151. Rationale for tribal reforms, and reversal of them due to changing needs: Beck 2005: 174–6, Humm 2005: 399–439, Oakley 1997: 3.629–35, Raaflaub et al. 1992: 39–42. Meeting real needs: Beck 2005: 175–8, Humm 2005: 639–52. Broad support: Raaflaub et al. 1992: 42–3. Beck 2005: 183 notes that the mere fact that Appius was elected to magistracies (including very powerful ones) in thirteen or fourteen years out of twenty in the interval 316–296 guarantees that he had broad-based and durable support, even if particular reforms were controversial.

¹⁴ While “Claudian stereotypes” are assuredly visible in the Roman historical tradition, their origins cannot be attributed with any assurance to this or that historian that Livy employed as sources, nor confidently connected with any particular historical events. For discussion see Humm 2005: 73–94 and Oakley 1997: 3.357–61, 665–9, *pace* Wiseman 1979: 104–39.

contours become clearer as the narrative progresses. When Appius enters upon his first consulship in 307, Livy says that Quintus Fabius Rullianus, consul the previous year with Publius Decius Mus, is prorogued in his command against the Samnites over Appius' strong objections (*maxime Appio adversante*, 9.42.2); meanwhile, a new war against the Sallentini is allotted to the other incoming consul, Lucius Volumnius. Consequently, Livy says, Appius "remained at Rome in order to grow his resources through urban arts, since the glory of war was in the hands of others" (*Romae mansit ut urbanis artibus opes augetet quando belli decus penes alios esset*, 9.42.4). This passage seems to imply the reason Appius opposed Fabius' prorogation. Livy presents to his readers a society in which war-fighting is by far the most prestigious arena of aristocratic achievement – where celebrating triumphs, dedicating temples and other monuments from spoils, distributing booty to soldiers, and so on, are the chief means of gaining prestige.¹⁵ In such a society, an aristocrat cannot lightly pass over the chance to gain military glory during his consulship, when he holds *imperium* – the power to command. Livy's narrative leaves the impression that Appius simply suffered bad luck and that, despite his best efforts, circumstances conspired against his holding a command. Thus, he is portrayed as being reduced to pursuing a second-best strategy – indeed a counsel of desperation – whereby he does his best to "grow his resources" or enhance his prestige through non-military means, here called *artes urbanae*. What might these be? Neither Livy nor any other surviving text describes Appius' activities as consul this year. Nevertheless, Livy's reader, recalling the narrative of Appius' censorship, might conjecture that "urban arts" encompasses activities like the public works and the various civic, governmental, and cultic reforms that Appius had then carried out. This reader is also likely meant to recall other Appii Claudii earlier in Livy's history, who are most visible as constitutional reformers and antagonists of the plebs. As we have seen (and will see further in ch. 3.4), the logic of exemplarity turns one's ancestors into especially compelling exemplary models; hence these earlier figures could readily be thought to provide a template for Appius' role.¹⁶

¹⁵ Livy's depiction of the surpassing prestige of war-fighting in the period of the emergence of the patricio-plebeian nobility is probably historically accurate: Hölkeskamp 1993: 22, 26; Harris 1979: 18–29. Oakley 1997: 3.548–50 discusses Appius' actions in this passage. Chapters 4–5 address further dimensions of the primacy of military achievement in the aristocratic competition of the middle Republic.

¹⁶ Livy himself alerts his reader to how Appius resembles his ancestors at 9.29.8 (n. 8 above). On Claudian patterns of behavior in Livy's first pentad, see Vasaly 2015: 59–73; on Claudian stereotypes in general, or as precedents for Appius in particular, see Richardson 2012: 26–30, Beck 2005: 162–3, Walter 2004a: 121–30, Oakley 1997: 3.357–66, Wiseman 1979: 77–103.

And the reader will assuredly be looking for some evidence of oratorical prowess, knowing (as everyone did) that Appius' story ends around 280 with his great senatorial speech against peace with Pyrrhus (ch. 3.3.5). To this point, however, Appius has appeared as an orator only when justifying his continuation in the censorship beyond eighteen months. In making this argument, Livy says, Appius employed sophisms and persuaded no one (*sine ullius adsensu cavillante Appio*, 9.34.1) – hardly an auspicious beginning for so great an end. At any rate, however accidental Appius' exclusion from military command may appear, it is narratively and programmatically overdetermined.¹⁷ Appius resumes a longstanding familial pattern in good exemplary fashion, and indeed continues a pattern of civic activity he himself previously established, hence follows his own example. This exclusion also sets the scene for the more detailed, specific portrait of the exemplary specialist in "urban arts" that Livy subsequently unfurls for his reader.

This portrait is developed in book 10 over a series of episodes in which Livy engineers face-to-face encounters between Appius and some other leading political and military figures of the day: Quintus Fabius Rullianus, Publius Decius Mus, and Lucius Volumnius Flamma. Syncrisis – the close comparison of two or more figures across a variety of categories – is a familiar device in ancient historiography, and is a crucial means by which historical authors characterize the actors who populate their works. The technique is most famously used in Plutarch's *Lives*, where the formal pairing and systematic comparison of individual Greeks and Romans provides the overarching structure of the entire work; however, many further levels of comparison within and between lives have been detected.¹⁸ But syncrisis is visible in earlier writers as well, Livy included. Andreola Rossi (2004) shows that, in books 21–30, Scipio and Hannibal are assimilated and differentiated through an extended structure of comparison and contrast, making them into mutual "foils." In book 10, Livy constructs a multilateral syncrisis that serves to characterize Fabius, Decius, Volumnius, and Appius via bilateral interactions, each figure serving as a foil to the others. Such multi-character comparison is what philosophers who study the ethics of art call a "virtue wheel" – a narrative device that can be defined as "a studied array of characters who both correspond and contrast with each other

¹⁷ Astutely observed by Beck 2005: 159. Livy 4.24.3 presents a strikingly similar situation.

¹⁸ Xenophontos 2012 and Beck 2002, 2003a discuss syncrisis and the use of foils both within individual Plutarchean lives and between them.

along the dimension of a certain virtue or package of virtues.”¹⁹ Through this device, the distinctive character of Appius’ “urban arts” specialization emerges.

Appius’ first such “syncritic” interaction occurs in a debate over the proposed *lex Ogulnia* (300 BCE) that would admit plebeians to two important priesthoods, the augurate and pontificate (10.7.1). Appius opposes the measure while Decius supports it. Perhaps the most prominent plebeian noble of the day, and graced with solid war-fighting credentials, Decius delivers a substantial oration (10.7.3–8.12) in which he assumes the mantle of spokesman for his order in its continuing struggle for empowerment against patrician privilege. In Appius he has a patrician opponent conveniently connected to a *gens* renowned for its antagonism toward the plebs.²⁰ Livy implies that Appius gave a speech to counter Decius’ (10.7.1), but he places no words in Appius’ mouth, characterizes the counterargument only in the broadest terms, and even hints that Appius may not have been trying very hard due to the patricians’ long losing record in such debates.²¹ Decius’ argument sways the electoral assembly and the law is passed – no smashing success on the constitutional or oratorical front for his opponent, the would-be specialist in urban arts.

An encounter with Fabius follows later. Appius seeks to have himself elected consul along with Fabius for 296 (10.15.7–8) – two patricians, in order (says Livy) to shut plebeians out of their lawful share of this office.²² Yet Fabius, the incumbent consul presiding over the election, refuses to accept his own nomination, declaring that it would be illegal and set a bad example (10.15.10–11); Appius is then returned as consul along with the

¹⁹ Virtue wheel: Carroll 2002: 12–19 (esp. 12), with further bibliography; Williams 2003 neatly analyzes an example from Jane Austen. Syncrises in Livy: besides Rossi 2004, Briquel 2009: 336–48 discusses a bilateral syncrasis of Fabius Rullianus and Papirius Cursor in Livy 9, and Richardson 2012: 101–3 notes how the four figures I discuss here serve as mutual foils in Livy 10. See also ch. 5.2 and n. 18.

²⁰ See the works cited in n. 16. The tribune Sempronius, who attacks Appius at 9.34 for refusing to step down as censor, also makes much of Appius’ anti-plebeian lineage (9.34.1–5). Appius’ alleged opposition to plebeian nobles taking up high office has been thought inconsistent with his other acts benefitting lower-ranking plebeians, stirring much scholarly debate: Beck 2005: 180–3, Linke 2000: 75–6; Raafaub et al. 1992: 44–5.

²¹ At 10.7.2 Livy says the two speeches’ content replicated the earlier debate over the *lex Licinia* admitting plebeians to the consulship. In his account of that debate at 6.40–1, Livy gives a long speech opposing the law to Appius Claudius Crassus, Caecus’ grandfather. By the logic of familial exemplarity, Livy’s reader could perhaps supply that ancestral speech, *mutatis mutandis*, for the current Appius. Smith 2010: 273–9 compares these parallel episodes from Livy 6 and 10. Not trying hard: 10.6.11.

²² Cic. *Brut.* 55 ascribes similar behavior to Appius as Interrex in an unknown year (perhaps 298). There his eloquence is pointedly noted (*disertus homo*), yet he is bested in debate by the tribune Manius Curius Dentatus. Cf. *Vir. Ill.* 34.3.

plebeian Volumnius, his consular colleague from eleven years earlier. Here Livy remarks, “the nobles criticized Fabius for avoiding Appius Claudius as his colleague, a man clearly superior in eloquence and civil arts.”²³ Despite this concession of Appius’ preeminence in these areas – I assume the “civil arts” (*civiles artes*) mentioned here are identical to the “urban arts” (*urbanarum artes*) he was previously said to be cultivating²⁴ – it is awkward that Livy has still not shown Appius winning any oratorical victories, nor gaining any constitutional triumphs subsequent to his censorship sixteen years earlier. Indeed, in this very situation Appius is portrayed as failing yet again to achieve his goal, allegedly of getting two patricians elected. Nevertheless, Livy suggests not only that Appius has outcompeted other nobles in these arenas (he is *haud dubie praestans*), but also implies that other nobles should be prepared to compete in these arenas themselves, embracing the exemplary challenge that Appius’ supposed preeminence casts before them. Fabius is regarded as intentionally avoiding having the master of these arts as his colleague, and is thought diminished for shirking the implicit challenge to compete, notwithstanding his own acknowledged preeminence in military glory and war-fighting.²⁵ Thus, it seems, the skills that Livy says Appius cultivated in his first consulship only because a military command was not open to him (9.42.4, discussed earlier), have now attained such visibility and prestige that even a revered military commander can seem lessened for not taking up the challenge to compete in these arenas himself. This reproach to Fabius for shirking a challenge in “civil arts” is all the more remarkable because he is hardly incompetent in domestic politics (as Livy presents him, at least): his honorific cognomen Maximus was supposedly bestowed for the tribal reforms he implemented as censor in 304 (9.46.14–15 – in fact, reversing Appius’ own tribal reforms from 312), and Livy further declares that, in securing the grain supply as aedile in 298, Fabius measured up to his own military achievements (10.11.9).

But if Appius overshadows Fabius in the “civil” or “urban” arts, how might he do – given the opportunity – in the military arena where Fabius has proven his mastery? Deprived of command during his first consulship,

²³ 10.15.12: *nobilitas obiectare Fabio fugisse eum Ap. Claudium collegam, eloquentia civilibusque artibus haud dubie praestantem*.

²⁴ Humm 2001: 68 n. 9 discusses the possible meaning(s) of *civiles* vs. *urbanarum artes*.

²⁵ On Fabius’ military preeminence, see e.g. Livy 10.3.7, 10.11.9, 10.21.15–16. This presentation of his military reputation likely has an historical basis, since his iterated magistracies and prorogued commands should reflect his perceived military competence: Hölkeskamp 1987: 133, 138 (130–4 in general on iteration).

in his second he again suffers delay: for the consuls of the previous year, again Fabius and Decius, are prorogued for six months in their command in Samnium, leaving the new consuls Appius and Volumnius without commands (10.16.1–2).²⁶ When news arrives of a rising in Etruria, it emerges that Volumnius has already departed for Samnium with two legions to join the proconsuls (10.18.3, 8–9), leaving only Appius available to lead an army north. At long last, he has his chance in the field.²⁷ It is nearly a disaster. Livy says Appius showed little aptitude as commander, doing almost nothing “shrewdly or with a prosperous outcome” (*satis scite aut fortunate*, 10.18.5).²⁸ He joined battle at disadvantageous times and places, causing the enemy to swell with confidence, and ultimately himself losing confidence in, as well as the confidence of, his soldiers (10.18.6). Livy then reports, but refuses to affirm, the claim in some of his sources that Appius wrote to Volumnius requesting aid: at any rate Volumnius breaks off an already successful campaign in Samnium and brings his army to Etruria, claiming that Appius summoned him (10.18.7–14).

Here begins the third “set-piece” confrontation that Livy has constructed between Appius and his key contemporaries. Appius angrily denies having written for help, and speaks curt words in *oratio recta* (as befits one deemed outstanding in *eloquentia*); he accuses his colleague of seeking glory in Etruria at his expense. Volumnius’ words, in *oratio obliqua*, are accommodating, and he prepares to return to Samnium.²⁹ At this point, the officers of Appius’ army gather around the consuls – the assembling of spectators, as always, emphasizing the civic, communal significance of the events

²⁶ After narrating the proconsuls’ subsequent successes in Samnium (10.16–17), Livy mentions disagreement among his sources about who won these victories (10.17.11–12): some credit one or the other proconsul, while others credit the consul Volumnius, and still others credit both consuls. For my purposes, what matters is that Livy adopts a version that keeps Appius in Rome and out of battle as long as possible, concordant with his overall presentation of Appius’ distinctive specialization and competence.

²⁷ In 10.18 Livy carefully accounts for why Fabius, Decius, and Volumnius are unavailable, and he stresses the urgency of the Etruscan situation; thus he makes clear that the situation must be addressed, and that Appius is the only available bearer of *imperium*. Livy’s phrasing at 10.18.3 implies that Volumnius would have been preferred (as, indeed, he clearly was for the Samnite command, for which he had already departed).

²⁸ Volumnius later implies that Appius speaks *scite* (10.19.8: see below), and Livy’s readers may have known the *dictum* that (pseudo-)Sallust gives as follows: *Appius ait fabrum esse suae quemque fortunae*, “Appius says that every person is the maker of his own fortune” (*Ep.* 1.1.2). So when Livy says that his actions as commander were carried out *nec satis scite nec fortunate*, he portrays him as failing to exhibit specific qualities that are associated with his performance in other arenas. On Livy’s representation of Appius as militarily incompetent, see Beck 2005: 184–5.

²⁹ 10.18.13–14 for this exchange. Livy comments that Appius’ anger at Volumnius’ arrival was justified, if he did not write for help; but that he displayed an “ungenerous and ungrateful spirit” if he did write and now pretended he hadn’t (10.18.10).

unfolding (ch. 0.3.1) – exhorting Appius not to spurn his colleague’s help and begging Volumnius to stay for the good of the *res publica* (10.19.1–4). Under such pressure the consuls are drawn into a highly ritualized performance situation: a full-scale assembly (*contio*) of Appius’ army, with each consul delivering a speech regarding what should be done. Competing now with words, Appius might be expected to dominate; yet Livy says Volumnius’ verbal performance stood up well against his colleague’s “outstanding eloquence,” since his cause was better.³⁰ Indeed, Livy shows Volumnius outperforming Appius contrary to expectation: when Appius, offering grudging praise for his colleague’s speech, jeers (*cavillans*) that Volumnius should thank him for his unexpected fluency, as he was now a popular orator when he had hardly dared speak during their previous consulship, Volumnius replies, “I would prefer that you had learned from me to act forcefully (*strenue*), than that I had learned from you to speak cleverly (*scite*)” – here with Appius’ words in *oratio obliqua* and Volumnius’ in *oratio recta*, as befits this inversion of the expected order.³¹

The dynamics of imitation and exemplarity in this exchange are complex. Livy portrays Appius, here as previously, as employing sophistic argumentation (*cavillans*), perhaps the very quality of “cleverness” in speaking (*scite loqui*) that Volumnius now decries in his own speech as well as Appius’.³² Indeed, in his pointed and clever “capping” of Appius’ mocking compliment, Volumnius displays precisely the type of eloquence that words like *cavillans* and *scite* connote. Unlike Fabius, who was criticized for avoiding a confrontation with the acknowledged master of eloquence (10.15.12), Volumnius here tangles with and bests that master, even as he concedes – and laments – that it was from this very master that he learned the skill he now wields so effectively. Yet Appius is not the only one setting himself up as an exemplary model. As Volumnius declares, Appius might have learned from him to act forcefully (*strenue facere*); and he concludes by remarking that the current situation requires determining not who is better at oratory,

³⁰ 10.19.6: *cum Volumnius, causa superior, ne infacundus quidem adversus eximiam eloquentiam collegae visus esset ...*

³¹ 10.19.6–8: *cum ... cavillans ... Appius sibi acceptum referre diceret debere quod ex muto atque elingui facundum etiam consulem haberent – priore consulatu, primis utique mensibus, hiscere eum nequisse, nunc iam populares orationes serere – ‘quam mallet’ inquit Volumnius ‘tu a me strenue facere quam ego abs te scite loqui didicissem’* (variant version at Dio 8.27). Oakley 1997: 4.219 observes that the expression *acceptum referre* is a metaphor derived from banking – another dimension, perhaps, of Appius’ characterization as a specialist in *artes urbanae*.

³² For Appius *cavillans* (using sophisms, or mocking his opponents) cf. 9.34.1. Acting *scite* is a positive quality in a commander: “shrewdly, skillfully.” But in this context, in reference to oratory, the adverb admits negative connotations: “over-cleverly, speaking fine words” as opposed to performing forceful deeds.

but at generalship.³³ Can Appius yet learn to “act forcefully” by following Volumnius’ example as a commander, just as Volumnius has learned to speak cleverly by following Appius’ example as an orator?

We soon find out, for the soldiers, with an outcry, persuade Volumnius and his army to remain. Volumnius orders his soldiers to advance into battle. Appius hesitates, surmising (says Livy) that whether he leads his own soldiers into battle or not the glory of victory will be Volumnius’. Eventually, however, he gives the signal for battle, fearing that his soldiers will simply follow Volumnius if he does not (10.19.13). Yet, once battle is joined, Appius devises a stratagem by which to recover his share of glory: Livy writes (10.19.17–18),

It is said that Appius, at precisely the critical point of the battle, as he was seen at the forefront with his hands raised toward heaven, prayed as follows: “Bellona, if you grant us victory this day, then I vow you a temple.” With this prayer, as though inspired by the goddess, he matched his colleague’s valor and his army matched its commander’s.³⁴

Significantly, Livy makes Appius stand in the forefront – the proper place for a courageous general rallying his troops – where his soldiers, here constituting a judging audience, see and hear him making the vow.³⁵ Given his deficits as a commander, he prudently invokes the help of a war-goddess; and having apparently obtained her favor (*velut instigante dea*), he finally “equals” (*aequavit*) his colleague’s valor in battle. Later, when the opposing battle line is routed and the Romans are besieging the enemy camp, Appius again manages to equal the valor and leadership of Volumnius: while the latter personally leads his troops’ assault on the gates of the camp, Appius incites his own soldiers to cross the stockade and trench by repeatedly proclaiming the name of Bellona.³⁶ Throughout this battle, then, as Livy narrates it, Appius rises to the exemplary challenge Volumnius issues to him in word and deed, and shows himself sufficiently capable after all in

³³ 10.19.8: *postremo condicionem ferre, quae decretura sit non orator – neque enim id desiderare rem publicam – sed imperator uter sit melior*. Numerous texts convey the stereotype that military men are (usually) brief in speaking, and not concerned with eloquence (Oakley 1997: 4.242 collects parallels). Conversely, the topos that aristocrats compete in words as well as deeds is as old as Homer, and finds Roman reflexes in passages (like this one) defining the proper time and place for orators vis-à-vis generals (see also e.g. Cic. *Mur.* 30; Harris 1979: 22–3).

³⁴ 10.19.17–18: *dicitur Appius in medio pugnae discrimine, ita ut inter prima signa manibus ad caelum sublati conspiceretur, ita precatus esse: ‘Bellona, si hodie nobis victoriam duis, ast ego tibi templum voveo.’ haec precatus velut instigante dea et ipse collegae et exercitus virtutem aequavit ducis*.

³⁵ Courageous general at the front: e.g., Livy 6.8.1–2, 10.41.7; Goldsworthy 1996: 154–63.

³⁶ 10.19.21: *et cum Volumnius ipse portae signa inferret, Appius Bellonam victricem identidem celebrans accenderet militum animos, per vallum per fossas inruperunt*.

his “off-field” of generalship – just as Volumnius had risen to Appius’ challenge in the *contio* and showed himself sufficiently capable in his own off-field of eloquence. Furthermore, the temple Appius vows is a great public work that will monumentalize him as a military victor, complementing the other great public works – the road and aqueduct – that monumentalize his prowess in *artes urbanae* (on which see ch. 3.3.1–2).

Despite the consuls’ strife, Livy makes Volumnius into a conciliator who understands and articulates what his prickly colleague is good for. Volumnius is recalled to Rome to conduct elections, with the threats in Etruria growing greater (emphasized by Appius’ dispatches, which Volumnius corroborates: 10.21.11–15). Coming forward again as a public speaker, Volumnius addresses the assembled voters. He describes the military situation, and eventually endorses a particular slate of candidates (10.22.6–7):

Decius and Fabius, who lived with one heart and one mind, were also men born for campaigning: great in their deeds, they were inexperienced in contests of words and tongue. Theirs were consular dispositions. But men who were clever and resourceful, practiced in law and eloquence, as Appius Claudius was, should be regarded as custodians of the city and forum, and should be elected praetors to administer justice.³⁷

Thus, in a highly ritualized and institutionalized setting – a formal assembly of the *populus* prior to the vote of the *comitia centuriata*, which elects magistrates bearing *imperium* – Volumnius articulates for the voters the arena he deems appropriate to Appius’ distinctive qualities of being *callidus*, *sollers*, and *iuris atque eloquentiae consultus*.³⁸ These are expressly contrasted with military capabilities, which he ascribes to Fabius and Decius and implicitly withholds from Appius; whether he is thereby insulting Appius or offering him a backhanded compliment (or both) is perhaps open to debate. At any rate, events as Livy portrays them have borne out the distinction articulated earlier between the *urbanae* or *civiles artes*, in which Appius was forced to specialize, and the military commands held by others, who have proven themselves more capable in that arena than

³⁷ 10.22.6–7: *Decium Fabiumque qui uno animo, una mente viverent esse praeterea viros natos militiae, factis magnos, ad verborum linguaeque certamina rudes. ea ingenia consularia esse: callidos sollertesque, iuris atque eloquentiae consultos, qualis Ap. Claudius esset, urbi ac foro praesides habendos praetoresque ad reddenda iura creandos esse* (Walters’ text).

³⁸ The idea that the praetor has distinctively “urban” functions relating to eloquence and law may be anachronistic here, importing the responsibilities of the “urban praetor” of the later Republic. See Oakley 1997: 4.243, Brennan 2000: 61–2.

Appius. Volumnius once again demonstrates his own passing competence as an orator (thanks, evidently, to Appius' own influence), and his words are persuasive: the voters duly return Fabius and Decius as consuls, along with Appius as praetor; Volumnius' own *imperium* in Samnium is pro-rogued (10.22.8–9).

Two further encounters between Appius and his peers underscore the characterization that has emerged so far. Appius, still consul but alone again in his Etruscan command after Volumnius' departure, had been sending alarmed dispatches to the senate (10.21.11–12), and in terror had surrounded his camp with a double stockade and trench. When Fabius arrived as consul to relieve him, he ordered the soldiers to tear up the stockade – removing their protection but nevertheless dispelling their fear, so great was their confidence in Fabius' generalship (10.25.5–10). Appius returned to Rome to assume his praetorship and (presumably) “preside over city and forum,” as Volumnius put it. Here Livy gives Appius his one and only clear rhetorical success: a speech or series of speeches to the people and senate that, like his earlier dispatches, lay out the perils of the military situation in Etruria and advocate a concerted military response. These speeches are persuasive, and in due course Fabius himself comes to Rome to confirm the threat and echo Appius' recommendations.³⁹ But if Appius, as praetor, has finally been shown (rather than simply said) to find his footing as an orator, after Decius' death at the battle of Sentinum he is pressed back into military service to command Decius' now leaderless army. Appius joins forces with Volumnius, now proconsul in Samnium, and the two win a battle together (10.31.3–7). These episodes seem to recapitulate aspects of Appius' earlier encounters with Volumnius and Fabius in Etruria: he struggles as sole commander, requiring rescue by a better general; but he does passably when campaigning in concert with Volumnius.

To summarize, Livy's Appius in books 9–10 is a “lively” figure insofar as he is given a stubborn and abrasive personality, combined with what Livy presents as unusual capability in “civil” or “urban arts” and embarrassing weaknesses as a military commander. This distinctive profile supports Appius' structural function in Livy's narrative, which is to register a crucial shift in the activities that the still-consolidating patricio-plebeian nobility will be called upon to undertake, and the skills it will need to

³⁹ The contents of Appius' speech(es) are given in *oratio obliqua* at 10.25.13–16. Decius and Fabius seem to suspect Appius of overstating the threat (10.25.17–26.1), but in the end Fabius largely concurs with Appius' assessment (10.26.1–4).

display, as the Roman imperial project ramps up. Appius' persistent lack of opportunity to command an army compels him to pursue a different course to gain prestige; his contemporaries in due course acknowledge his mastery in eloquence and "urban/civil arts" (though Livy hardly shows Appius in action as master of these domains). These capabilities also become exemplary in their own right, as his contemporaries must eventually try to measure up to Appius in these arenas, or be criticized for faint-heartedness if they shirk the challenge. The "virtue wheel" allows Livy's reader to see where and how Appius provides an exemplary model to his peers. Yet, once the opportunity to command troops arises, the virtue wheel also shows him mostly falling short of his peers' performances – and of performing credibly only when operating in tandem with a more competent general. As we will see, aspects of Livy's characterization also mark the exemplary figurations Appius takes on in other monumental forms.

3.3 Appius' Monuments: Deceptive, Contradictory, and Double-Edged

In previous chapters I discussed monuments created or identified as such by judging audiences who observe and evaluate an actor's performance. Such monuments may be objects created anew during or subsequent to that performance, like a wound or narrative or honorific statue; or they may be preexisting objects that are repurposed, renamed, or overlaid with additional information to endow them with monumental force, like the *pons sublicius* in the case of Horatius Cocles (ch. 1.2.2). Such monuments play a crucial role in establishing a performance as exemplary, and in transmitting the knowledge of that performance, along with the social value ascribed to it, to people who did not witness it directly. Livy's narrative of Appius is of course one such monument, transmitting knowledge of his deeds to future generations and itself being awash in the dynamics of exemplarity. Next I examine some additional monuments commemorating Appius, created either by himself or by primary and secondary audiences. These monuments tend to confirm Livy's picture of a figure who contrives to build his prestige through novel channels, but who also strives to appear successful in the established military arena. Overall these monuments, like Livy's narrative, function in opposed and even contradictory ways, promoting inconsistent images of Appius and competing evaluations of the exemplary standard or model his performances provide.

3.3.1 *Via Appia, Aqua Appia*

I begin with the great public works of Appius' censorship, the aqueduct and road that both bear his name. Their monumental quality is patent to ancient authors. Diodorus, a historiographer writing a couple decades before Livy, expressly calls them "a deathless monument to himself [sc. Appius], ambitious as he was in regard to public utility;" and Livy himself, as noted earlier, remarked that Appius' name was more fondly remembered than his censorial colleague's because he executed these two works. Livy explains that Appius' colleague Plautius abdicated as censor in protest over other censorial actions of Appius before these works were completed – implicitly accounting for why they bear only Appius' name.⁴⁰ Similarly the Trajanic author Frontinus, in his account of the aqueduct's origins, says that Appius tricked Plautius into abdicating, and by this expedient completed the aqueduct alone and gave his name to it. Other texts too mention these public works among Appius' noteworthy achievements, though sometimes with confusion about such details as the length or finish of the road, or precise name of the aqueduct.⁴¹ Indeed, these two constructions are responsible for the existence of a secondary monument that emerged only to serve them: namely, the adjective *Appia*. Attested exclusively in the feminine singular, this adjective occurs only as a modifier of the nouns *via* or *aqua* – hence naming Appius' constructions. The Augustan polymath Verrius Flaccus spotted this adjective's uniqueness, and duly noted it in his lexicon of rare or obscure Latin words.⁴²

There is every reason to agree with the ancient authors' assessments of the magnitude and significance of these projects: if anything, these assessments may understate the true scale of the effort these works represent toward watering the burgeoning city and extending its political and military reach

⁴⁰ Diod. 20.36.2 (speaking of the aqueduct and road): αὐτοῦ δὲ μνημεῖον ἀθάνατον κατέλιπεν, εἰς κοινὴν εὐχρηστίαν φιλοτιμηθεὶς. Livy: see n. 6 above.

⁴¹ Frontin. *Aq.* 5.1–3: *aqua Appia in urbem inducta est ab Appio Claudio Crasso censore, cui postea Caeco fuit cognomen. idem eo anno et viam Appiam ... muniendam curavit. collegam habuit C. Plautium ... sed quia is intra annum et sex menses, deceptus a collega tamquam idem facturo, abdicavit se censura, nomen aquae ad Appii tantum honorem pertinuit, qui multis tergiversationibus extraxisse censuram traditur donec et viam et huius aquae ductum consummaret.* For. Aug. *elogium* (ch. 3.3.3): *in censura viam Appiam stravit et aquam in urbem adduxit.* Dig. 1.2.2.36 (Pomponius): *Appius Claudius ... maximam scientiam habuit: ... Appiam viam stravit et aquam Claudiam induxit.* Vir. Ill. 34.6–7: *viam usque Brundisium lapide stravit, unde illa Appia dicitur. aquam Anienem in urbem induxit.* Also Eutr. 2.9.2.

⁴² Paul. Fest. 23L: *Appia via et aqua ab Appio Claudio est appellata.* On the adjective and its limited range of application see *TLL* and *OLD*, s.v. 4. Adjectives derived from Roman nomina are common enough, modifying not just the names of built structures but of laws, tribes, and the like; "Appia" is the only adjective derived from a praenomen.

toward Campania. The extraordinary scale of building, the mobilization of resources, and the feats of engineering involved can be compared in the city's prior history only to the construction of the republican ("Servian") city walls about seventy years earlier. The aqueduct, Rome's first, included many kilometers of subterranean tunnels. The road was apparently the first one purpose-built by the Roman state employing "rational" design and significant modification of the landscape – exemplified in the two initial segments, each almost perfectly linear, connecting Rome to Aricia and Aricia to Tarracina.⁴³ Earlier roads had developed organically, following the lay of the land; they also bore names that were descriptive of destination or geography – *via Latina*, *via Salaria* – rather than the name of their builders. Prior to Appius, only one censorial building project of any sort seems to have borne the censor's name: the *maeniana*, or balconies overlooking the forum, built under the censor Gaius Maenius' auspices in 318. But the scale of this project was tiny compared to Appius' huge works. After Appius, many censors and other magistrates oversaw road and other construction projects they named for themselves.

Yet these monuments present a complex commemorative dynamic, involving how they are connected to the performance they commemorate and what ethical valence they communicate. First, Appius himself is credited with creating and naming these monuments, rather than external judges creating them to commemorate and ascribe moral value to a performance by Appius that they themselves observed – the audience role set out in the general model of exemplarity (ch. 0.3). By creating his own monuments, one might say, he short-circuited actual evaluation by a judging audience, and simply imposed the external signs of a positive evaluation by those judges, manipulating the system in pursuit of personal advantage. In this he largely succeeded, establishing a reputation in posterity for having provided the city with valuable public services.⁴⁴ This outcome aligns neatly with Livy's depiction of Appius as someone striving for distinction in the novel realm of "urban" or "civic arts," for these monuments seem to confer precisely such distinction. A further peculiarity of these monuments – one allied with the bypassing of the community's judgment – is that they *are themselves* the very performances that they commemorate. That is, in contrast to honorific statues or names, triumphs, displays of spoils, and many other monumental types that merely *point to* a more

⁴³ On the political and technical achievement these works represent, see Humm 2005: 134–9, 489–96; Beck 2005: 171–3, Oakley 1997: 3.355–6, 373–6, with further bibliography.

⁴⁴ So Livy 9.29.5–7, Diod. 20.36.2, and Frontin. *Aq.* 5.1–3 seem to imply (nn. 6, 40, 41 above).

ephemeral performance (like a military victory) that would otherwise lack a means of remembrance, these huge public works self-monumentalize via the massive constructions that are integral to their being a road and aqueduct (hence “performances” in the arena of creating civic amenities) in the first place. Yet there is a countervailing, more conventional commemorative dynamic as well. For the road and aqueduct, as noted earlier, also lead some sources to recall the legend of Appius extending his censorship beyond Plautius’ by deceptive and possibly illegal means. In this respect the road and aqueduct *do* point to a performance beyond themselves – Appius’ allegedly shady dealings, manipulations, and antagonistic behavior as censor – and they convey the community’s negative moral judgment on this performance. Thus, to think of the *via Appia* and *aqua Appia* may lead one to think not (only) of Appius’ surpassing achievement in constructing these public works – his self-monumentalization and commemoration in a positive ethical mode for his success in *artes urbanae* – but rather (or also) of his allegedly provocative and transgressive behavior as censor.⁴⁵ The complexity of these monumental dynamics contrasts with the simpler, more typical dynamics of his colleague Plautius’ cognomen *Venox*: he was so called, certain sources say, to commemorate and celebrate his prowess in locating the underground streams (*venae*) that fed the new aqueduct.⁴⁶

3.3.2 Temple of Bellona

Earlier I discussed Livy’s account of how Appius, as consul, vowed a temple to Bellona in the heat of battle against the Etruscans in 296 – a rare moment in which Livy allows him to look like a competent commander. Two other texts also declare Appius responsible for this temple, though without indicating his precise role in its creation (as vower and/or

⁴⁵ On Appius’ conduct as censor, besides the passages of Livy discussed in ch. 3.2, see Diod. 20.36, Frontin. *Aq.* 5.1–3 (n. 41 above). Also, *Vir. Ill.*’s notice, *cenſuram ſolus omnium quinquennio obtinuit* (34.8), immediately follows the notice about building the aqueduct and road (34.6–7), as if the thought of Appius’ public works leads naturally to that of his conduct as censor. Yet this is not always the connotation that these public works bring with them: ch. 3.4.

⁴⁶ Frontin. *Aq.* 5.2: *Plautium ... cui ob inquisitas eius aquae venas Venocis cognomen datum est*. Also *Fasti consulares capitolini* s.a. 312: *cenſ(ores) Ap. Claudius ... C. Plautius ... qui in hoc honore Venox appellatus est* (not explaining exactly how the cognomen commemorates his censorship). The cognomen *Venox* or *Venno* is attributed to earlier Plautii, however (e.g. Livy 8.19.1, 9.20.1; *InscrIt* 13.1.110 discusses the evidence of various *Fasti*). If the name’s origin in the censorship of 312 is accepted, then it has been retrojected upon earlier family members. Alternatively, the censorship and aqueduct may have provided later Romans an affordance by which to fabricate, via exemplary logic, a “performance” for the otherwise unexplained name to “commemorate” (for this generative dynamic see ch. 0.5.3).

dedicator, for instance).⁴⁷ The Romans knew several earlier instances, actual or alleged, of generals vowing temples in battle, in hopes of obtaining divine assistance or causing others to believe that such assistance was at hand. There had been five such vows in the previous century, and many more would follow; but the tradition goes back to Romulus vowing a temple to Iuppiter Stator during the battle with the Sabines in the forum.⁴⁸ In making such a vow at this time, then, Appius did nothing that his contemporaries would have found surprising. Striking, rather, is the disjunction between the temple's martial ideology, which seems to bespeak its vower's military prowess and which was no doubt Appius' aim in vowing it; and Livy's portrait of Appius, which calls precisely this quality into question.

The temple, indeed, is awash in martial imagery and functions. Bellona Victrix, whose very name is comprised of terms for warfare and victory, was the most martial of goddesses. Like other temples and public works commemorating military victories, this temple may have been adorned with an inscription commemorating the victor, military spoils collected from the battlefield, and/or a painting of the battle, though no such decoration is attested for this temple.⁴⁹ Furthermore its ample size, along with its location at the east end of the Circus Flaminius just outside the city walls and near the *porta Carmentalis* (*/ Triumphalis*) (map locations 34, 198, 199), made it highly convenient for extrapomerial meetings of the senate. The senate convened outside the city walls when it had an audience with a general who had not yet laid down his *imperium*, hence could not cross the *pomerium* (the city's sacred boundary) and was making his case for being granted a triumph – the great victory procession that was arguably

⁴⁷ Livy 10.19.17–18, 21 (quoted nn. 34, 36 above); For. Aug. *elogium: aedem Bellonae fecit* (see n. 53 below). Ov. *Fast.* 6.201–4: *hac sacrata die* [sc. 3 June] *Tusco Bellona duello / dicitur... / Appius est auctor, Pyrrho qui pace negata / multum animo vidit, lumine captus erat.* The *Fasti Venusini* confirm the dedication date (*InscrIt* 13.2.58, 465), though the dedicatory year is unknown. Dedicators of temples, when known, tend to be the vowers themselves or their family members, though there are significant exceptions (Orlin 1997: 178–89). The terms *fecit* (elogium) and *auctor est* (Ovid) may imply more than just the vow: at Cic. *Rep.* 2.36, *eundem* [sc. Tarquinius Priscus] ... *accepimus aedem ... vovisse faciendam* suggests that the vow comes first and the “making” follows. No source reports how this temple was paid for: perhaps not with the booty from the victory, which Livy says was handed to the soldiers (10.19.22: *praeda ... militi concessa est*). For the options see Orlin 1997: 141–61.

⁴⁸ On temple vows in general, Orlin 1997: 199–202; on generals' vows in the fourth and third centuries, Ziolkowski 1992: 200, 235–58; for Romulus, Livy 1.12.3–8.

⁴⁹ Pliny *Nat.* 35.12 says that an Appius Claudius (probably Pulcher, consul 79) mounted shields bearing portraits of his ancestors (*imagines clipeatae*) in the temple of Bellona. Scholars have conjectured that these shields replaced “real” shields that were spoils of battle: Humm 2005: 43–9, 505–7, Massapairault 2001: 98–9. For the display of battle paintings in temples and other buildings – a practice first attested around this time – see Walter 2004a: 148–54.

the supreme military honor the *res publica* could bestow upon a successful general and his army. About twenty meetings of the senate are attested as taking place in the temple of Bellona from the third to first centuries BCE (presumably a small fraction of the actual total), of which about a dozen involved triumph debates. A smaller number of such meetings are also attested for the temple of Apollo Medicus (later Sosianus, map location 33) immediately adjacent to the west, another large temple that was about equally convenient for these purposes. In this location the temple of Bellona also occupied a key urban “node” through which triumphal processions typically (if not always) passed; hence the temple provided part of the commemorative martial backdrop to future processions.⁵⁰ Finally, the temple’s precinct hosted an additional monument of great significance for the opening of military hostilities: the so-called *columna bellica*, allegedly erected during the war with Pyrrhus, which was defined as “enemy territory” into which the Fetial priests could throw their spears to declare war with ritual propriety. The provision of this “boundary” just outside the city walls was increasingly convenient as Romans of the middle Republic undertook wars against ever more distant enemies, to whose actual boundaries the Fetials could not quickly travel and return to accomplish this ritual.⁵¹ It is thus striking that Appius, who never celebrated a triumph and whom Livy (and no doubt some of his sources) depicts as militarily incapable and oriented rather toward civil pursuits, came via his creation of this temple to preside over or at least bear witness to the ritually correct declaration of war, many decisions regarding the conferral of the *res publica*’s greatest military honor, and most of the triumphal processions that resulted, for centuries to come. In a sense, the temple of Bellona and its subsequent functions “redeem” the unwarlike Appius of Livy’s account, and permit him to be seen as no less successful in the traditional, military arena of aristocratic competition than he was in the arena of “urban arts” that he is otherwise said to have dominated.

⁵⁰ For sources and archaeological/urbanistic discussion of the Bellona temple see Albers 2013: 66–9, 232–3; Viscogliosi, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 190–2; Coarelli 1997: 391–5, 1968 *passim* (identifying the temple); Ziolkowski 1992: 18–19. For a list and discussion of extrapomerian meetings of the senate, including triumph debates, in all attested venues, see Marchetti Longhi 1943–4: 409–15. On the routes of triumphal processions, or rather the urban “nodes” through which the processions tended to pass, see Favro 2014: 87–92, with further bibliography.

⁵¹ *Columna bellica*: Paul. Fest. 30L (s.v. Bellona), Ov. *Fast.* 6.206–8, Dio 50.4.5, 71(72 Loeb).33.3, Serv. Auct. *In Aen.* 9.52; all sources but Servius connect the column (or Fetial ritual) with the temple of Bellona. Also La Rocca, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 300–1, Coarelli 1968: 54–7.

3.3.3 *Elogium from the Forum Augustum*

If the temple of Bellona “normalizes” Appius as a middle republican *nobilis*, making him look conventionally competent in the military sphere, the *elogium* from the Forum Augustum (map location 109) makes him look even more so. This forum, dedicated by Augustus in 2 BCE, enclosed a large temple dedicated to Mars Ultor (“the avenger,” map location 109a). The forum also contained marble statues representing leading men of previous centuries, slightly over life size, mounted in niches lining the forum’s enclosure walls. Modern reconstructions, combining a hint from Ovid with the findspots of fragmentary inscriptions, locate ancestors and other members of the Iulian *gens* in niches along the northwestern enclosure wall, and other prominent heroes unrelated to the Iulii in the answering gallery along southeastern wall. The second century CE historian Suetonius describes the honorands as “the commanders ... who turned the realm of the Roman people from a very small one into a very large one,” and the later *Historia Augusta* calls them the *summi viri* (“highest-ranking men”), which is the expression scholars usually use for convenience to describe this gallery.⁵² On each statue’s base was an inscription, the *titulus*, giving the honorand’s name and the magistracies he held. Mounted below each niche was the *elogium* proper, an inscribed marble plaque containing a brief résumé of the honorand’s main achievements. Appius was included in this gallery. While only small fragments of his *elogium* survive from the Forum Augustum itself, the text they contain coincides with portions of a complete *elogium* honoring him that was discovered in Arezzo – a municipal copy, presumably, derived from the master-texts in Rome. The Forum Augustum texts may be reconstructed from the Rome fragments and the full Arezzo text. The *titulus* on the statue’s base gave his name and offices as follows: “Appius Claudius Caecus, son of Gaius. Censor, consul twice, dictator, interrex three times, praetor twice, curule aedile twice, quaestor, military tribune three times.” The *elogium* on the plaque below the niche read, “He took several towns from the Samnites and routed an army of Sabines and Etruscans. He forbade that peace be made with king Pyrrhus. In his censorship he laid the Appian way and brought an aqueduct into the city. He made a temple to Bellona.”⁵³

⁵² Reconstruction: Ov. *Fast.* 5.563–6; Geiger 2008: 95, 117–62. Suet. *Aug.* 31.5: [sc. *duces*] *qui imperium populi Romani ex minimo maximum reddidissent*. SHA *Alex.* 28.6: [sc. Augustus] *qui summorum virorum statuas in foro suo e marmore collocavit additis gestis*.

⁵³ Inscriptions: Alföldy–Chioffi, *CIL* 6.40943 (Rome fragments), 11.1827 (Arezzo copy) = *InscrIt* 13.3.12, 79 = *ILS* 54; Geiger 2008: 142–3. Name and offices from Arezzo text: Appius Claudius C. f. Caecus

Augustus' intended audience, naturally alert to the semiotics of Roman monumentality, would instantly have recognized the exemplary dynamic in which this and the other monuments to *summi viri* in the Forum Augustum participate. According to Suetonius, Augustus himself issued an edict declaring his exemplary purpose in erecting these statues: Roman citizens were to judge Augustus himself, and leading men of future generations, by the exemplary standards that the Forum Augustum honorees set.⁵⁴ Indeed, as scholars have long recognized, Augustus represented himself as outstripping these figures in the particular areas that their *elogia* remark on, and did so particularly in his account of his own achievements (the *Res Gestae*).⁵⁵ Now, solid military credentials appear to be a *sine qua non* of inclusion in the gallery, and are part of every surviving *elogium*. Appius' *elogium* first and foremost mentions victories, which can be correlated (somewhat awkwardly) with battles described in Livy.⁵⁶ Also, the inscription on the statue base reports three years' service as a military tribune. This detail suggests that substantial experience as a junior officer underpinned Appius' successes in command as the *elogium* reports them, and reminds the reader that military training was the most important single subject of a Roman noble's secondary education at least until the late second century BCE.⁵⁷ This militaristic orientation has a clear rationale within the martial program of the Forum Augustum–Mars Ultor complex overall, which commemorates its dedicator's victory at Philippi in 42. Yet the overall image of Appius that results is difficult to reconcile with the inept commander Livy portrays, who seemingly takes the field for

censor, co(n)s(ul) bis, dict(ator), interrex III, pr(aetor) II, aed(ilis) cur(ulis) II, q(uaestor), tr(ibunus) mil(itum) III. Alföldy-Chioffi text of *elogium* with readings of the Rome fragments, supplemented by the Arezzo text: [*complu*]ra oppi[da de Samni]t[ib]us cepit]. / [Sabinoru]m et Tus[corum] exercit[um] [fudit]. / [p]lac[em] fie[ri] cu[m] Pyrrho rege prohibuit]. / in ce[nsura] viam Appiam stravit e[st] aq[uiam] / [in] u[r]bem adduxit. aedem Bellon[ae] fe[cit]. Bibliography on the Forum Augustum and its portrait galleries is vast; Geiger 2008 and Spannagel 1999 provide comprehensive recent discussion.

⁵⁴ Suet. Aug. 31.5: *professus et edicto commentum id se ut ad illorum velut exemplar et ipse dum viveret et insequentium aetatum principes exigerentur a civibus*. Similar sentiment in RG 8.5. Engels 2001: 141–3 discusses Augustus' relationship to exempla generally.

⁵⁵ Scholarly discussion by Walter 2004a: 420, Spannagel 1999: 336–44, Luce 1990: 125–9, Frisch 1980; also Geiger 2008: 86–9. Chs. 4.5 and 5.5 examine Augustus' relation to Gaius Duilius and Quintus Fabius Maximus, also included among the *summi viri* of the Forum Augustum.

⁵⁶ The clause *complura oppida de Samnitibus cepit* may be reconcilable with the campaigns Livy places in 296: Livy says Fabius and Decius took three *oppida* (10.16–17), but notes an alternative version in which the consuls Appius and Volumnius won these victories (10.17.11–12; cf. n. 26). Alternatively, this clause may refer to the campaign Livy places in 295 during Appius' praetorship, though Livy does not mention any *oppida* taken. Discussion by Massa-Pairault 2001: 99–104, Münzer, RE 3 (1899): 2684.

⁵⁷ For the significance of Appius' military tribunates, see Beck 2005: 168–9 and Ferenczy 1976: 129. Harris 1979: 10–15 discusses young nobles' training in warfare generally.

the first time only in his second consulship and flounders without expert guidance. Augustus seems, then, to have adopted or fashioned an Appius different from Livy's, to meet his own exemplary needs. Augustus' Appius is a conventionally successful commander, whose victories Augustus can nevertheless present his own as surpassing.⁵⁸

Beyond his military achievements, Appius' censorship and building activities are also exemplary for Augustus. In the listing of magistracies on Appius' statue, the censorship stands first; his offices are listed in descending order of prestige or importance, rather than chronologically. The *elogium* then specifies that the aqueduct and road were built during his censorship (*in censura*). That this office is mentioned twice in these very short texts, and that specific achievements are ascribed to it, likely signals its importance for Augustus. Indeed, in his *Res Gestae* Augustus makes much of his own activities as censor, and also of buildings and other structures he created or restored; among the latter are roads and aqueducts.⁵⁹ The *elogium* offers no hint, however, of the disruptive *lectio senatus* and controversial tribal reforms that Livy ascribes to Appius in his censorship, even though Livy's account of Appius would have been well known to Augustus and his advisors.⁶⁰ A censorship such as Livy describes would provide a poor exemplary model for Augustus' own *lectio senatus*, which he mentions at *RG* 8.2. Nor does the *elogium* hint at the controversially extended term of office associated with the large-scale public works – though this “off-message” thought might unavoidably occur to at least some viewers, as noted previously (ch. 3.3.1). Finally, Appius' temple to the war-goddess Bellona, mentioned at the end of the *elogium*, might remind viewers specifically of the temple of the war-god Mars Ultor, dedicated by

⁵⁸ Suteonius signals the prominence of the gallery's military theme when he states that the statues were “in triumphal garb” (*statuas ... triumphali effigie*, *Aug.* 31.5). Yet this cannot be universally true: while statue fragments reveal that some were togate (presumably painted to depict the triumphator's *toga picta*, hence “triumphal garb”), at least one was in armor (military, but not “triumphal”). Also Appius, who never celebrated a triumph, would have been misrepresented if depicted in “triumphal garb.” Discussion by Itgenshorst 2004: 452–5, Spannagel 1999: 326–7, Rinaldi Tufi 1981: 84.

⁵⁹ Augustus' censorship: *RG* 8. Building activities: *RG* 18–21, esp. 20.2, 5 for aqueducts and roads.

⁶⁰ Livy was already famous in his own lifetime (e.g. *Sen. Cont.* 10 *pr.* 2; *Plin. Nat. pr.* 16; *Plin. Ep.* 2.3.8) and was seemingly well-connected to Augustus and the imperial family (*Tac. Ann.* 4.34.3, *Suet. Cl.* 41.1; cf. *Livy* 4.20.5–11; *Luce* 1990: 124). Furthermore, estimating Livy's pace of composition at ca. three books per year starting around 30 (possibly he started two or three years earlier), and even supposing the early books were produced more slowly, books 9–10 could hardly have been completed later than the mid-20s, more than two decades before the Forum Augustum was dedicated. On Livy's starting date and pace, see *Burton* 2000: 438–45, *Oakley* 1997: 1.109–10; on the Forum Augustum *elogia*'s relationship to Livy and whatever historiographical tradition may lie behind him, see especially *Chaplin* 2000: 178–96; also *Humm* 2005: 60, *Luce* 1990: 136–8.

Augustus, that dominated the Forum Augustum and loomed over them as they examined this text. They might also recall more generally the numerous temples Augustus or Tiberius restored, among them the temple of Bellona itself.⁶¹ Thus Augustus honors his exemplary model for the reverence he shows toward the gods, while rivaling and indeed surpassing that model in his own displays of piety.

The attentive viewer, reading Appius' achievements as inscribed here, would thus have occasion to reflect not only on the exemplary hero of old, but also on Augustus' own achievements, and on the respects in which Augustus surpassed the exemplary standards that Appius is here portrayed as setting. In sum, Augustus' tailoring of the Appius exemplum emphasizes relatively conventional achievements that generally align with achievements Augustus himself wished to claim, while eliminating any trace of controversy, incompetence, or transgression. Augustus' purposes allowed no place for quibbles or reservations about the actions by which the heroes in his gallery "grew Roman dominion from very small to very large," and against whose military and civic achievements he explicitly or implicitly measured his own.⁶²

3.3.4 *Blindness and Cognomen*

In old age, virtually all accounts agree, Appius was blind. The cognomen Caecus – otherwise unattested in his family or elsewhere – is said to commemorate his blindness.⁶³ Yet this cognomen is associated with not one but two distinct performances with opposing moral valences. These alternative aetiologies charge the cognomen with the same conflicting, contradictory evaluations that the exemplum of Appius displays more generally. These alternative aetiologies bear closer investigation, to clarify this moral bifurcation.

Among his other censorial actions, reports Livy, Appius taught the rites of the state cult of Hercules at the Ara Maxima to public slaves, and

⁶¹ *RG* 20.4 claims he restored eighty-two temples. Augustan or Tiberian restoration of temple of Bellona: Albers 2013: 232, with bibliography. Augustus' handling of Duilius as an exemplary model is similar: ch. 4.4.

⁶² Spannagel 1999: 334–5 notes that the *elogia* commonly reference civic as well as military achievements. No room for quibbles: Humm 2005: 60, Beck 2005: 167. For the emperor Claudius using Appius' *lectio senatus* as a positive exemplum, see ch. 3.4.

⁶³ Frontin. *Aq.* 5.1 (n. 41 above), gives his name as Appius Claudius Crassus (a longstanding cognomen of the family), saying that he "later" assumed the cognomen Caecus. This report is consistent with the view that the cognomen monumentalized his eventual blindness. Similarly, the cognomen Cocles is said to commemorate Horatius' loss of an eye in battle: ch. 1.2.4.

removed the family of the Potitii, which had traditionally discharged these rites, from its ancestral role. Such tampering with established religious practice is ill-advised, as subsequent events showed: the entire family of the Potitii died out within a year, and Appius himself was blinded some years later by the unforgetting anger of the gods.⁶⁴ This negative judgment passed by the gods themselves – the most authoritative judging audience imaginable – is monumentalized both in the blindness that constitutes Appius' punishment and in the cognomen that cross-references that blindness. Mortal judging audiences, of course, can hardly disagree with the gods: as we have seen, Appius' censorial colleague and senatorial peers concur (at least in Livy) that he performed badly in his censorship, and they refuse to be associated with or accept many of his actions. Indeed, Livy underscores the (negative) exemplary quality of Appius' performance by remarking that the consequences were "amazing to tell of, which might inspire scruples about removing rites from their proper situation." Thus Appius' actions explicitly model for future actors how *not* to behave.⁶⁵ Valerius Maximus, probably drawing on Livy, tells the story similarly, and categorizes it under the rubric "on disregard for religious scruple." This categorization makes the negative judgment explicit and drives home the idea that Appius is a "god-hater."⁶⁶

Livy's account does, however, include temporal hedges, evidently to acknowledge that divine vengeance is slow: he speaks of "the *unforgetting* anger of the gods," and of blindness befalling Appius "some years later" (*memori deum ira, post aliquot annos*). Certainly Livy gives no hint of regarding Appius as blind during his military campaigns as consul and praetor, seventeen years after his censorship. Other authors, however, relate this same aetiology for Appius' blindness without temporal hedges, implying or at least leaving open the possibility that divine vengeance followed relatively promptly upon the transgression.⁶⁷ Some texts, indeed, seem to imagine – contrary to Livy – that Appius passed a fair portion of his adult

⁶⁴ Livy 9.29.9–11, esp. 11: *nec nomen tantum Potitiorum interisse sed censorem etiam memori deum ira post aliquot annos luminibus captum*.

⁶⁵ Livy 9.29.10: *dictu mirabile, et quod dimovendis statu suo sacris religionem facere possit*.

⁶⁶ Val. Max. 1.1.17 (*de neglecta religione*): *nomenque Potitium ... interit, Appius vero luminibus captus est*. "God-hating:" in Livy the tribune Sempronius later accuses Appius of *contemptus deorum hominumque* (9.34.22), a characteristic that aligns him with his ancestor the decemvir; discussion by Oakley 1997: 3.363. On the "divine anger" explanation of the cognomen, see Beck 2005: 164–5, Humm 2005: 84–5, Oakley 1997: 3.383–4, with further references.

⁶⁷ E.g. Dion. Hal. 16.3.1: Ἀππίος Κλαύδιος περὶ τὰς θυσίας παρανομήσας τι ἀπετυφλώθη καὶ Καῖκος προσηγορεύθη (cf. 1.40.5); Val. Max. 1.1.17 (previous n.); Serv. Auct. in *Aen.* 8.179, 8.269 (*mox caecatus factus*); Vir. Ill. 34.2 (*unde caecatus est*); Lact. Inst. 2.7.15 (*cum ... sacra ... transtulisset, luminibus orbatus est*).

life, including part of his public career, in blindness. This idea first appears in works of Cicero dating to the mid-40s, hence predating Livy's account by two decades. In book 5 of the *Tusculan Disputations*, the interlocutor "M." argues in support of the Stoic position that virtue alone suffices for a happy life. Toward the end of the book (5.110–15) "M." examines cases of persons suffering from various bodily infirmities, including a half-dozen examples of men who were blind but (he contends) were not thereby rendered unhappy. Appius is one of these: "M." says that Appius "was blind for many years, and from his magistracies and achievements we infer that, despite his well-known misfortune, he fell short neither in his public nor private duties." In his dialogue *De Senectute* Cicero offers a similar but even fuller account of Appius' vigorous and engaged (though blind) old age.⁶⁸ Valerius Maximus, probably drawing on these Ciceronian texts, adduces Appius along with four other Romans as examples of vigorous old age. He deems Appius especially impressive in this category because "he lived an infinite number of years in blindness" – a misfortune under which the other figures he adduces did not labor – yet raised a large family and successfully carried out public and private duties.⁶⁹ These texts thus present Appius "the blind" as a morally positive instantiation of personal and civic engagement, hence of happiness, his disability notwithstanding.⁷⁰

This set of texts reveals that Appius' blindness and associated cognomen may be understood as commemorating either of two distinct and morally opposed performances. They may be regarded as bodily and onomastic monuments to the reforms of the cult rites of the Ara Maxima that he implemented, and to the divine punishment he consequently suffered; this sacrilegious performance is of course morally vicious. Alternatively, the cognomen may be taken as pointing to a bodily condition *despite which* Appius maintained a vigorous and productive life into old age; this performance is morally virtuous. While these performances are logically compatible, no text directly connects them: the tale of divine punishment never looks ahead to a notionally more virtuous future life lived in blindness, and

⁶⁸ Cic. *Tusc.* 5.112: *Appium quidem veterem illum, qui caecus multos annos fuit, et ex magistratibus et ex rebus gestis intelligimus in illo suo casu nec privato nec publico muneri defuisse.* Cf. Cic. *Sen.* 37. Serv. in *Aen.* 8.269 implies that blindness followed not long after the religious reform (*propter quod dicitur et ipse mox caecus factus*), consistent with the idea that he lived long in that condition.

⁶⁹ Val. Max. 8.13.5 (under the rubric *de senectute*): *Appi vero aevum clade metirer, quia infinitum numerum annorum orbatus luminibus exegit, nisi quattuor filios, quinque filias, plurimas clientelas, rem denique publicam hoc casu gravatus fortissime rexisset.*

⁷⁰ As seen in ch. 1.2.3, ritual taboos would probably have prevented Appius, if already blind, from taking up the magistracies he held. Indeed, Ulpian makes Appius his exemplary case for the question whether a blind man can hold office (*Dig.* 3.1.1.5).

the tale of a fulfilled life lived in blindness seems to forget this condition's notionally vicious cause. The two scenarios are disjunct and unlinked. Yet both are available to later Romans in search of an exemplum: Appius can be made virtuously or viciously blind depending on the rhetorical and moral requirements of the situation in which he is invoked.⁷¹

3.3.5 *Speech Against Peace with Pyrrhus*

The "virtuously blind" scenario sketched above is consistent with, and may be retrojected from, the legend of the last great performance of Appius' life: his speech in the senate in 280 or 279 urging his colleagues to reject the terms for peace that king Pyrrhus of Epirus had offered. This performance makes any ancient author's short list of great deeds done by Appius, notably including the very short list in the Forum Augustum *elogium*;⁷² the speech is explicitly attested in about twenty further surviving ancient texts, and may be referred to implicitly in several more. The story goes something like this: following Pyrrhus' and his allies' victory over the Romans at the battle of Heraclea in 280, a battle arguably more costly for the victor than the vanquished (hence the first "Pyrrhic victory"), Pyrrhus dispatched an ambassador named Cineas to the Roman senate to offer terms of peace. Different texts provide different accounts of the terms, but their overall drift was that the Romans were to leave at least the Tarentines – Pyrrhus' southern Italian Greek allies – alone. Some accounts add that the Romans were to offer autonomy or reparations to other southern Italian groups, including the Bruttians, Lucanians, and Samnites, whom they had almost completely reduced after two generations of warfare. Stunned by defeat in battle, the senate inclined to accept these terms. At this point, the story goes, the aged and blind Appius, whose decrepitude had kept him away from senate meetings for some time, was carried in on a litter; he delivered a stirring and persuasive speech opposing the acceptance of these terms (more on its rhetoric momentarily). Consequently, the senate dispatched Cineas back to Pyrrhus with the reply that the king should withdraw entirely from Italy before treating for peace, and that until that time there would be only continuous warfare.⁷³

⁷¹ Valerius Maximus, at least, is aware of both scenarios: he offers the vicious version at 1.1.17 under the rubric *de neglecta religione*, and the virtuous one at 8.13.5 under *de senectute* (see nn. 66, 69 above). But he does not connect them. Chs. 4.6 and 5.3.1 discuss further monuments pointing to underlying performances that are judged in conflicting ways.

⁷² Ch. 3.3.3 and n. 53.

⁷³ Full accounts (with variations): Plut. *Pyrrh.* 18–19, App. *Samn.* 10.1–3, *Ined. Vat.* (FGrH 839 = *BNJ* 839) 2, Dio (Zon.) 8.4. Livy seems to have treated this material at length (*Per.* 13). On Pyrrhus'

A text, or alleged text, of the speech existed and was read in Cicero's day and beyond. Cicero himself, and several subsequent authors, regarded it as the earliest surviving Latin oration. Whether this text actually contained Appius' words from the early third century, or was a later composition – a *suasoria* – by an unknown author displaying what he imagined might have been the style and content of this famous old speech, cannot now be determined.⁷⁴ At any rate, no fragments of this speech are transmitted. Four surviving texts, however, do provide literarily elaborated reworkings. These texts' similarities reveal that the speech was remembered for a particular rhetorical move and a particular ideological orientation. According to three Greek-language sources dating (perhaps) from the first century BCE to the second century CE, Appius opened his speech by saying that, while he had long lamented his blindness, he was now glad for it and indeed wished he were also deaf, so that he would not have to hear, any more than see, so shameful a deliberation as the senate was then conducting. His senatorial peers, he declared, were falling short of the standards set by their ancestors – whether in fearing a Greek general who fell far short of Alexander the Great, whom senators of the previous two generations (the current generation's fathers and grandfathers) did not fear; or by contemplating giving up the conquests in southern Italy that these same forefathers had bequeathed them.⁷⁵ The fourth such text – from Ennius' *Annales*, an epic poem written in the 170s (about a century after Appius' speech was delivered) – provides this speech's earliest surviving attestation, for Cicero quotes the first two verses of this hexametric rendering: "Onto what path have your minds, which formerly used to stand upright, mindlessly wandered off?" These verses thus display another form of the "falling short of previous standards" argument. This Ennian speech may also have contained the "blind and deaf" motif in a subsequent verse.⁷⁶ As a group, these four renditions of the speech make clear that Appius was thought to

alleged terms, Humm 2005: 68–9, Beck 2005: 185–6. The claim that Appius' infirmity had kept him from the senate, and that he required assistance to appear there (Cic. *Phil.* 1.11; Livy, *Plut.*, *App.*, *Zon.* as above; *Plut. Mor.* 794D–E, *Vir. Ill.* 34.9), sits uncomfortably with the texts asserting that his old age was vigorous and engaged (nn. 68, 69 above).

⁷⁴ Earliest prose speech known to Cicero (or later Romans): Cic. *Brut.* 61 (cf. *Sen.* 16), *Sen. Ep.* 114.13, *Tac. Dial.* 18.4, *Isid. Etym.* 1.38.2; *Ap. Claudius Caecus ORF* no. 1 fr. 4–11. Discussion by Humm 2005: 61–73, Suerbaum 1995: 256–61.

⁷⁵ *Ined. Vat.* (FGH 839 = BNJ 839) 2 (possibly first century BCE); *Plut. Pyrrh.* 19.1–4 (cf. *Mor.* 794E), *App. Samn.* 10.2 (both second century CE).

⁷⁶ *Enn. Ann.* fr. 199–200 Sk.: *quo vobis mentes, rectae quae stare solebant, / antehac, dementes sese flexere via<i>?* (Cic. *Sen.* 16; discussion by Elliott 2013: 220–2, Powell 1988: 136–8, Skutsch 1985 *ad loc.*). Fr. 201 Sk., *sed ego hic animo lamentor*, "but here I sorrow in my heart ..." may be part of the "blind and deaf" motif; Humm 2005: 66–7, Suerbaum 1995: 256, Skutsch *ad loc.*

have deployed a rhetoric upholding the exemplary standards of his audience's forefathers as a model for their own conduct in the present (which risked falling short), and also to have thematized his own blindness in support of this argument.

This performance was evaluated positively: the primary audience of senators was persuaded to reject Cineas' terms; and secondary audiences – the authors of the texts surviving to today – universally praise Appius for recalling his wavering colleagues to the morally upright and courageous position, and for demonstrating the power of eloquence to promote the collective good.⁷⁷ In light of this story, one might expect some ancient authors to assert that the cognomen Caecus was conferred subsequent to Appius' momentous speech, to commemorate how he thematized his blindness in making his virtuous argument. In fact no surviving ancient text proposes this origin for the cognomen, though modern scholars have done so.⁷⁸ This story may, however, have generated the idea that Appius' blindness was recompensed by a particularly acute *moral* insight, manifested in the speech and perhaps other respects as well. Appius is thereby connected not only to the "vigorous old age" theme discussed earlier (ch. 3.3.4), but also to the "blind seer" tradition, which goes back to figures like Teiresias and Homer in Greek legend, and has a vibrant Roman strain as well.⁷⁹

The story of Appius' speech against peace with Pyrrhus contributes substantially to the flavor of Appian exemplarity that will be examined in the next section. In striking contrast to the abrasive, transgressive, opposition-galvanizing figure Livy depicts, some texts present Appius as the very embodiment of sound, conservative Roman values. This image of Appius as a "good old Roman" depends not only upon the tradition of the speech against Pyrrhus, and the arguments made there invoking the exemplary behavior of the current senators' less timid fathers and grandfathers, but

⁷⁷ Praise for Appius' morals and eloquence in the public interest: Cic. *Brut.* 55: *possumus Appium Claudium suspicari disertum, quia senatum iamiam inclinatum a pace Pyrrhi revocaverit*; Quint. *Inst.* 2.16.7: *deformem Pyrrhi pacem Caecus ille Appius dicendi viribus diremisit*; Vir. *Ill.* 34.9: *turpissimas condiciones magnifica oratione discussit*; Suet. *Tib.* 2.1 (speech listed under the rubric *egregia merita Claudiorum*); Ampel. 19 (under the rubric *Romani qui in toga fuerunt illustres*). For. *Aug. elogium: pacem fieri cum Pyrrho rege prohibuit*. This performance's inclusion in this very brief text indicates its noteworthy and admirable quality (in Augustus' view).

⁷⁸ Humm 2005: 7 n. 19 (crediting this idea to Amatucci and Lejay), cf. 43 n. 39; Beck 2005: 165 n. 31.

⁷⁹ Esp. *Ov. Fast.* 6.203–4: *Appius est auctor, Pyrrho qui pace negata / multum animo vidit, lumine captus erat* – suggesting that the speech particularly demonstrated his moral vision. Also Cic. *Sen.* 37, *Tusc.* 5.112–15 (adducing Roman and Greek examples of blindness combined with insight, Appius included). Humm 2005: 73 n. 140 discusses this theme.

it also turns on ameliorative understandings of Appius' public works and constitutional reforms.

3.4 Appius and His Descendants: Case Studies in Familial Exemplarity

Appius the "good old Roman" appears in familial contexts, providing either an exemplary standard against which his descendants can be measured or a model authorizing their own attempts at imitation. Cicero deploys this Appius with particular enthusiasm, as he pursues vendettas against Appius' descendants.⁸⁰ In his speech "On his house" (*De Domo Sua*), delivered in 57, Cicero contends to the *pontifices* that his bitter enemy Publius Clodius has improperly consecrated a shrine to the goddess Liberty on the site of his house (see ch. 7). Seeking to discredit Clodius as a legitimate performer of religious ritual, Cicero asks the *pontifices* to remember the infamous Bona Dea scandal of several years earlier, in which Clodius had been discovered, dressed as a woman, attending a rite open only to women. What a contrast (exclaims Cicero) with Clodius' forebear Appius Caecus, who never knowingly saw anything that was forbidden, yet was blinded; while Clodius, who intentionally saw what was forbidden, was punished by the gods with "mental blindness."⁸¹ Cicero seems to be imagining that Appius was invested with a priesthood, and was blinded as divine punishment for unwittingly catching sight of something that was restricted from him. No such story about Appius is elsewhere attested. However, this scenario does recall the story of the priest Quintus Caecilius Metellus who, after saving an ancient statue of Minerva (the Palladium) from the burning temple of Vesta in 241, was allegedly blinded despite his heroism for laying eyes on this object, which only the Vestal Virgins were allowed to behold. Whether Cicero projected the Metellus story onto Appius because it was convenient for his argument, or actually knew a story about Appius as a priest of which no other trace survives, is uncertain.⁸² What is certain, however, is that Cicero here presents Appius' blindness as a monument commemorating

⁸⁰ On Cicero's use of familial exempla in general, see van der Blom 2011, Treggiari 2003; for his use of Appius in particular, see van der Blom 2011: 55–6, Bücher 2006: 182–5, and the notes below.

⁸¹ Cic. *Dom.* 105: *quem umquam audisti maiorum tuorum ... cum sacrificium Bonae Deae fieret interfuisse? neminem, ne illum quidem qui caecus est factus. ... ille qui nihil viderat sciens quod nefas esset lumina amisit, istius ... poena omnis oculorum ad caecitatem mentis est conversa.*

⁸² Cic. *Scaur.* 48 refers to Metellus rescuing the Palladium; blindness enters the story at least by the Augustan age (Sen. *Cont.* 4.2, quoting Asinius Pollio). Cf. Plin. *Nat.* 7.141 and discussion by Beagon 2002: 116–17. Sen. *Prov.* 1.5.2, yoking Appius and Metellus as virtuous blind men, may suggest that Seneca knew (or inferred from Cicero) a story about Appius paralleling that of Metellus.

an inadvertent transgression that human judges, at least, could forgive (even as the gods' standard of judgment is stricter), and thereby provides a standard against which Clodius' recent performance – intentionally defiling the Bona Dea rites – falls glaringly short. That Appius is Clodius' ancestor makes the latter's shortcomings the more lurid, for the expectation that patterns of behavior run in families suggests Clodius should be striving to rival or outstrip Appius in the quality of his performance, the moral value it is deemed to carry, and in the monuments that commemorate it. Instead, Clodius has travestied his ancestor, committing at least two sacrilegious acts – the Bona Dea incident, and improperly consecrating the shrine of Liberty on Cicero's house site – and bearing “mental blindness” as a monument to his moral turpitude.⁸³

Appius provides such a canon for two of his descendants at once – Clodius and his sister Clodia – in Cicero's *De Haruspicum Responso*, delivered in 56. Here Cicero competes with Clodius to impose an advantageous interpretation upon the response the *haruspices* had given regarding the cause of an earthquake. They had replied, in part, that “ancient and hidden rites had been carried out incorrectly and were desecrated” (§37). Cicero contends that these words refer to Clodius' violation of the Bona Dea festival. Most people's view, he says, is that blindness should ensue. But no one can actually know what the divine punishment for this violation is, since it was never before committed. Would blindness of the eyes be worse for Clodius than blindness of lust? Does he not perceive that his ancestor's squinting eyes are preferable to the blazing eyes of his sister? Cicero is suggesting that Clodius' alleged incestuous relations with his sister Clodia – called here “blindness of lust,” and encouraged by her famously smoldering gaze – is precisely the form that divine punishment takes in this case.⁸⁴ The brief reference to Appius Caecus recalls, as in *De Domo Sua*, a less vicious form of blindness sustained by Clodius' ancestor. Appius' “squinting eyes,” apparently suggesting blindness and presumably monumentalizing

⁸³ Cicero frequently ascribes madness to Clodius; he frames it as “mental blindness” also at *Dom.* 129, *Sest.* 17, *Har.* 48. At *In Clod. et Cur.* fr. 20 Crawford = fr. 21 Schoell, Cicero seems to be saying that Clodius was “blind” (*caecus*) in overlooking an obvious riposte to a weak argument – so “blind” that he must previously have seen something forbidden. This is another, rather gratuitous reference to the Bona Dea scandal, and through that, possibly (not necessarily) to the figuration of Caecus just discussed. See Crawford 1994: 253–4; Wiseman 1979: 107–8, Geffcken 1973: 71–5, Lenaghan 1969: 154–6.

⁸⁴ *Har.* 37–8: *non ignovit* [sc. *dea*], *mibi crede, non: nisi forte tibi esse ignotum putas, ... quod oculos, ut opinio illius religionis est, non perdidisti. quis enim ante te sacra illa vir sciens viderat, ut quisquam poenam quae sequeretur id scelus scire posset? an tibi luminis obesset caecitas plus quam libidinis? ne id quidem sentis, coniventis illos oculos abavi tui magis optandos fuisse quam hos flagrantis sororis?* On Clodia's eyes see Lenaghan 1969 *ad loc.*

a virtuous performance that led to this condition (though without indicating what that performance may have been), also contrast with Clodia's "blazing eyes," which are here interpreted as monuments to her incestuous desire. Thus Clodia, no less than her brother, is compared disadvantageously to their forefather.

Cicero more spectacularly deploys Appius to Clodia's disadvantage in his speech *Pro Caelio*, also from 56. Cicero's client and protégé Marcus Caelius Rufus was being prosecuted for participating in the violence surrounding the Egyptian king Ptolemy Auletes' flight into exile at Rome, and his subsequent attempts to engineer his own restoration. The prosecution alleged, in part, that Caelius borrowed money from Clodia to help fund certain machinations involving Ptolemy, and that Caelius subsequently tried to poison Clodia to avoid having to repay. Cicero undertook to defend Caelius against these charges in his speech. His strategy was to deny any public significance to Caelius' alleged actions, but to portray him as a young man erotically pursued by a lustful older woman; and to suggest that, when Caelius spurned her advances, Clodia angrily leveled frivolous charges of attempted poisoning. It is in this context that Cicero creates a *prosopopoeia* (§§33–4), famous in antiquity and much discussed in modern scholarship, in which he summons Appius from the underworld to rebuke and chastise his descendant for her moral turpitude.⁸⁵

With tongue firmly in cheek, Cicero asks his audience to imagine a figure with a bristling beard "such as we see in ancient statues and masks," specifically Appius Caecus, who (he says) will suffer less in this role than other possible Claudian ancestors because he cannot see Clodia. Cicero's Appius then addresses Clodia: why, in consorting with an unrelated young man of no familial distinction, was she forgetful of all her distinguished consular forebears and of her deceased husband Quintus Metellus, himself a man of lofty achievements and virtue? Why was she so intimate as to lend him money, or so hostile as to fear being poisoned? "Rashness and lust" (*temeritas ac libido*) are the only possible explanations. Also – attending to the need for "fit," should she find male forebears unconvincing – Appius offers two virtuous Claudian women as exempla Clodia might have followed: Quinta Claudia who helped bring to shore the boat carrying the image of the Magna Mater; and a Vestal Virgin named Claudia who assisted her brother in conducting a triumph despite a tribunician veto. Why has Clodia chosen to spurn all these familial models of virtue going back generations, and embrace instead the vices of her brother Clodius

⁸⁵ Quintilian refers to this *prosopopoeia* at 3.8.54, 11.1.39, 12.10.61; see n. 88 below.

(*fraterna vitia*)? – and thus Appius links the current sibling pair together as matching aberrations in the morally distinguished lineage of the family. He ends his speech with three parallel sentences, each referring to one of his own monumentalized performances and suggesting that Clodia's sexual rapaciousness defiles each in turn (*Cael.* 34):

Did I stymie making peace with Pyrrhus, so that you could strike scandalous love-alliances every day? Did I bring water into the city so that you could make lewd use of it? Did I build the road so that you could go along it accompanied by throngs of men unrelated to you (/other women's husbands)?⁸⁶

Appius is made to claim that his virtuous prevention of a shameful treaty is travestied by the shameful “treaties” his descendant Clodia makes every day for illicit sexual liaisons; that the water he provided she uses in an “unchaste” manner; and that the road he built enables her to go about in company with men who are not members of her own or her husband's family – implicitly her lovers or potential lovers.⁸⁷

In this *protopopoeia* Cicero is assuredly being light-hearted: as Katherine Geffcken famously demonstrated, Appius is placed roughly in the role of the stern father of Roman comedy, in a narrative that Cicero has constructed to resemble a stock comic plot in which a feckless youth becomes involved with a prostitute – the template according to which he wishes Caelius' relationship to Clodia to be understood. On the other hand, Appius is also Cicero's *porte-parole* for delivering systematic assault on Clodia's character and thereby casting her in the prostitute role. With Appius doing the dirty work, Cicero's own persona can distance itself, with ironic piety, from the fray.⁸⁸ Appius can be made to play this role because of the expectation, characteristic of Roman exemplary thinking, that certain traits do or should run in families, and that one's ancestors provide particularly compelling models for one's own behavior. To purport that

⁸⁶ *Cael.* 34: *ideone ego pacem Pyrrhi diremi ut tu amorum turpissimorum cotidie foedera ferires, ideo aquam adduxi ut ea tu incestu uterere, ideo viam munivi ut eam tu alienis viris comitata celebrares?*

⁸⁷ Here the “unchaste” use of water may refer to the washing needs of prostitutes (see Dyck 2013 *ad loc.*), and the crowds of men connected to other *gentes* (or women) resumes Appius' earlier points about Caelius' social distance from her (*Cael.* 33–4): *mulier, quid tibi cum Caelio, ... quid cum alieno? ... cur tibi Caelius tam coniunctus fuit? cognatus, affinis, viri tui familiaris? nihil eorum.* Association with such a man (or men) is proof of her sexual voraciousness: *quid igitur fuit nisi quaedam temeritas ac libido?*

⁸⁸ On Cicero's rhetorical strategy and its execution in the Appius *protopopoeia* and in this section of the speech more generally, see Dufallo 2001, esp. 126–36, May 1988: 111–16, Wiseman 1985b: 81–7, Geffcken 1973: 17–22. Piously disavowing any insults against Clodia: e.g. *Cael.* 32, *de qua ego nihil dicam nisi repellendi criminis causa.*

the ancestors themselves return to life, or speak from beyond the grave, to serve as judges of the performances of their descendants, is merely a particularly vivid and striking instantiation of this widespread exemplary idea.⁸⁹

Appius' road is used in two further speeches to mark a standard of virtuous achievement that current Claudii utterly fail to meet. In the *Pro Milone* of 52, Cicero represents the prosecution as making an argument (whose precise details and logic he leaves hazy) to the effect that the murder of Clodius by Titus Annius Milo was all the more dreadful because it took place on the via Appia, a monument to the victim's ancestors.⁹⁰ Perhaps the implication is that scions of the family ought to have special privileges when traveling on the road their ancestor built, or should be able to expect special deference in gratitude for the public service provided by the builder. In any case, the argument is patently designed to rouse ill-will against Milo among the judges and spectators.⁹¹ Cicero replies, "As if the famous Appius Caecus built the road not for the public to use, but so that his descendants could engage in banditry there with impunity!" For Clodius, he goes on to explain, had himself previously committed murder on the via Appia, killing a distinguished equestrian named Marcus Papirius.⁹² Therefore, if Clodius' death on this ancestral monument was especially awful, then the murder he committed there was also especially awful; and if it is suggested that Clodius should have enjoyed special privileges on that road, Cicero counters that he bore special responsibilities there as well. As with Clodia in the *Pro Caelio*, here too Appius' descendant is pilloried for allegedly misusing the road and travestying the virtue displayed by the ancestor who created it.⁹³

Finally, in the *Pro Sestio*, delivered in 56, Cicero administers an exemplary beating to yet another of Appius' descendants – Appius Claudius Pulcher,

⁸⁹ On ancestors judging their descendants (also for exemplary figures in general addressing posterity), see ch. 2.2 and n. 25.

⁹⁰ *Mil.* 17: *nisi forte ... eo mors atrocior erit P. Clodi quod is in monumentis maiorum suorum sit interfec-tus – hoc enim ab istis saepe dicitur*. There may be a trace of this rhetoric in the speech of Metellus Scipio described by Asconius (35C ll. 3–6). The murder took place near Bovillae (Asc. 30C), 18km south of Rome: discussion by Russell 2016a: 34–40 (though *in monumentis* here means "on the road," not "among the tombs").

⁹¹ The published version of this speech is much reworked from the delivered speech, which failed to gain Milo's acquittal. Whether Cicero here presents arguments that the prosecution and defense actually made in the hearing of live judges and spectators is uncertain.

⁹² *Mil.* 17–18: *proinde quasi Appius ille Caecus viam munierit, non qua populus uteretur, sed ubi impune sui posterī latrocinaventur! itaque in eadem ista Appia cum ornatissimum equitem Romanum P. Clodius M. Papirium occidisset, non fuit illud facinus puniendum – homo enim nobilis in suis monumentis equitem Romanum occiderat*.

⁹³ The Bobbio scholiast perfectly understands this passage's monumental dynamics: Stangl 1912: 118–19, *ad loc.*; also Bettini 2011[2000]: 117.

brother to Clodius and Clodia. Late in this speech Cicero describes how the audience at a gladiatorial show, which took place in 57 while Cicero was in exile, expressed its support for Cicero's recall and its displeasure with those who opposed it. Among Cicero's supporters was Lucius Sestius, the defendant in this trial, who was serving that year as Tribune of the Plebs; his appearance at the show was warmly applauded by the spectators. Among his opponents was Appius Claudius, then praetor, who (Cicero says) dared not show his face in the arena for fear of a bad reception, yet yearned to see the show. So "when he came each day to watch the gladiators, he was never seen coming in: he popped up unexpectedly after creeping close in under the bleachers" as if he were a ghost emerging from the underworld; and "that secret way, by which he would come to watch, started to be called the 'Appian way.'"⁹⁴ Even so, Cicero continues, Appius did not escape demonstrations of public displeasure: whenever he was spotted, hissing rained down. The two different instances of the *via Appia* – one a critical artery monumentalizing the orientation toward the public good by Appius Caecus (in his "good old Roman" guise), and the other a route taken secretly by the current Appius as he seeks to avoid the public gaze that would condemn him for acting contrary to the public good (namely, opposing Cicero's recall from exile) – measures the moral distance between these homonymous men, ancestor and descendant.⁹⁵

While Cicero is a virtuoso at deploying Appius to the disadvantage of his descendants, one instance survives of a Claudius – the emperor Claudius, in fact – invoking Appius, his own ancestor, to authorize an action he himself is carrying out. Suetonius reports that Claudius granted the "broad stripe" (*latus clavus*), indicative of senatorial status, to the son of a freedman (*libertini filius*), having previously declared he would elevate to the senate only the great-great-grandsons of freedmen. In making such a grant of status Claudius was exercising the traditional censorial prerogative

⁹⁴ Sest. 126: *is, cum cotidie gladiatores spectaret, numquam est conspectus cum veniret. emergebat subito, cum sub tabulas subreperat ... itaque illa via latebrosior, qua spectatum ille veniebat, Appia iam vocabatur.*

⁹⁵ Wiseman 1979: 108–10 (cf. Humm 2005: 79 n. 160) contends that, since Cicero deploys Appius as a canon of high moral virtue, he did not know the "unfavorable version" of the Appius legend, which therefore cannot have been invented yet. Such source-critical speculation overlooks the essential malleability of exemplary figures – their capacity to be shaped, by selection and invention, so as to provide a moral framework supporting, or "fitting," the argument currently being made (on "fit" see ch. 0.5.1). To show the current Claudii as falling far short of ancestral moral standards is an efficient way to attack them, as the contemporary political situation keeps requiring Cicero to do. Therefore a virtuous Appius is presented – whose virtues are drawn from the speech against Pyrrhus, and the great public works – precisely so as to morally discredit his descendants. This in no way rules out the presentation of a vicious Appius in other contexts that might require a negative exemplary model.

of the *lectio senatus*, now held by emperors. Whatever the significance of Claudius' change of course, Suetonius says that he justified this decision by declaring that his own ancestor Appius Caecus, as censor, had enrolled the sons of freedmen in the senate.⁹⁶ Thus Claudius presented himself as following an ancient exemplary model, set by a progenitor who was a famous censor to boot, to authorize his own censorial action in the present. Claudius may well have taken his information about Appius' *lectio senatus* of 312, and his enrollment of sons of *libertini* in the senate, directly from Livy, who was widely read in the early Empire and indeed had encouraged the young Claudius to write history. If so, it is noteworthy that Claudius has reversed the moral valence of Livy's account. While Livy deems this innovation morally vicious and degrading to the senate's dignity, Claudius evidently believes, or at least hopes his own senatorial audience will believe, that a positive presentation of the model of Appius persuasively authorizes his own action in the present.⁹⁷ His rhetorical strategy in this case aligns with strategies he employed at other times when exercising his censorial power to select senators. In a speech to the senate justifying his decision to enroll certain Gallic nobles as senators, partially preserved on a bronze tablet found in Lyon, he dug deep into the regal period, as well as citing the more recent practice of Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, to show that leading positions in the state had always been open to newcomers. A version of this speech also appears in Tacitus; here too Claudius is depicted as deploying an array of exemplary arguments. Invoking historical exempla as precedents for his own efforts as censor to modify the composition of the senate seems to have been characteristic of this emperor's argumentation.⁹⁸

Yet Claudius' arguments are not beyond contestation. Suetonius himself objects to Claudius' deployment of the Appius exemplum as follows: "[Claudius] was unaware that, in Appius' day and for some time after, it was not the people who received manumission themselves who

⁹⁶ Suet. *Cl.* 24.1: *latum clavum, quamvis initio affirmasset non lecturum se senatorem nisi civis Romani abnepotem, etiam libertini filio tribuit ... ac sic quoque reprehensionem verens, et Appium Caecum censorem, generis sui proauctorem, libertinorum filios in senatum adlegisse docuit.*

⁹⁷ Livy 9.46.10: *Ap. Claudi ... qui senatum primus libertinorum filiis lectis inquinaverat*; for Livy's negative judgment on this action see (besides *inquinare* here) 9.29.7, 30.1–2, 46.11. Livy encouraging young Claudius: Suet. *Cl.* 41.1. Livy widely read: e.g. Suet. *Cal.* 34.2, *Dom.* 10.3; n. 60 above. Augustus, unlike Claudius, avoided adducing Appius' *lectio senatus* as a model for his own (ch. 3.3.3).

⁹⁸ Lyon tablet: *CIL* 13.1668 = *ILS* 212. Tacitean version: *Ann.* 11.24.1–25.1; discussion of parallels and divergences, with further bibliography, by Molloch 2013: 338–42. Claudius may also have used Appius' alleged introduction of the letter R into the Roman alphabet (*Dig.* 1.2.2.36) as an exemplary precedent for his own introduction of three new letters (*Tac. Ann.* 11.13.2, Suet. *Cl.* 41.3); see Ryan 1993: 611–13, and *passim* on Claudius' familial examples for other censorial activities.

were called *libertini*, but freeborn children begotten by them.”⁹⁹ That is, the exemplum of Appius does not actually provide a precedent for enrolling the sons of freedmen in the senate, but rather their grandsons. Hence Suetonius is claiming that this exemplum does not “fit” the situation in which Claudius adduced it. Change over time, in the form of a word changing its meaning, has rendered Appius’ actions less accessible and comprehensible than Claudius imagined when he adduced the exemplum (since he was ignorant of the change).¹⁰⁰ In chapter 4 I discuss further how the perception of change over time complicates the deployment of exempla and impacts their capacity to persuade. For now, however, I would observe only that, when exempla are adduced in support of an argument, those who reject the argument may contest those exempla on the grounds of poor “fit,” and that misunderstandings arising from change over time are one basis on which a misfit can be alleged.¹⁰¹

3.5 One Hundred Hands, for Better or Worse

The second chapter of the first book of Justinian’s *Digest* offers a potted history of the development of Roman law and jurisprudence, allegedly derived – via epitomization and other editing – from an account by the second-century CE jurist Pomponius. This history includes the following information about Appius Claudius Caecus: “he had the greatest knowledge, and was called ‘the hundred-hander’ (*Centummanus*); he built the via Appia and brought in the aqua Claudia (*sic*) and gave his opinion against allowing Pyrrhus into the city (*sic*); he is also reported to have been the first to write pleas regarding illegal seizures (*de usurpationibus*), a book that no longer exists.”¹⁰² While this account does not explicitly state why Appius was called “the hundred-hander,” the drift of the sentence seems to suggest it has to do with his wide range of engagements. This nickname (it would probably be too much to call it a cognomen) is otherwise unattested. Yet

⁹⁹ *Cl.* 24.1 (continued from n. 96): ... *ignarus temporibus Appi et deinceps aliquamdiu libertinos dictos non ipsos qui manu emitterentur sed ingenuos ex his procreatos.*

¹⁰⁰ Even on Suetonius’ view, Claudius’ Appius exemplum still furnishes a precedent for enrolling descendants of freedmen two generations earlier than Claudius’ original policy had stipulated. Suetonius’ objection therefore seems somewhat beside the point.

¹⁰¹ Thus Suetonius’ own “historicist” awareness of change over time is marshaled to undermine the “exemplary” view of a continuous, unchanging past that Claudius presupposes in invoking Appius; general discussion in ch. 0.5.3. However, there is no evidence to assess whether Suetonius’ claim about the meaning of *libertinus* in the fourth century BCE is correct (see Molloch 2013: 370–2, Humm 2005: 219–26).

¹⁰² *Dig.* 1.2.2.36.

centummanus is not a context-free or connotation-free designation: it looks to be a Latin calque of the Greek *hecatoncheir*, referring to the “hundred-handed” race of monsters of vast strength who warred either alongside the Olympian gods in their battle to overthrow the Titans, or alongside the Titans against the Olympians, depending on the version of the myth.¹⁰³ So is Appius thereby implied to be “vastly active and capable” or rather, a “monstrous creature who wars against the gods,” perhaps an allusion to his ill-received religious reforms? It seems fitting to leave both possibilities open as a final, morally bifurcated judgment on a figure whose overall exemplary trace in monuments of all sorts is equally bifurcated, and who admits of being deployed as either a positive or negative model for the performances of later generations – and for his own descendants above all.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ According to Plutarch (*Marc.* 17.1–3), Marcus Claudius Marcellus called Archimedes a *hecatoncheir* on account of the powerful siege engines and catapults he devised for the defense of Syracuse. Thus this mythic paradigm can imply vigorous activity and great power, not necessarily in a good cause. See Münzer, *RE* 3 (1899): 2681, Massa-Pairault 2001: 107 (suggesting that *Centummanus* implies the size of Appius’ clientele), Humm 2005: 141.

¹⁰⁴ Claudius Unimanus, a praetor defeated by Viriathus in Spain in ca. 146, may take his nickname/cognomen from having lost an arm in battle, as an honorific designation monumentalizing his valor – or perhaps it is derogatory, indicating his perceived incompetence relative to his forebear “Centummanus” (entailing that this name was widely known and deemed honorific). Sources and discussion by Brennan 2000: 176, 901 n. 136; Münzer, *RE* 3 (1899): 2885, s.v. Claudius no. 376.

CHAPTER 4

Gaius Duilius *Exemplarity and Innovation*

4.1 Introduction: Change in an Exemplary Framework

This chapter focuses on the question of novelty and innovation in an exemplary framework. The looping cycle of the four exemplary operations has an imitative logic that looks both backward and forward, as discussed in earlier chapters. In the backward-looking aspect, any given performance may itself imitate a prior performance that was previously evaluated and commemorated. The forward-looking aspect entails that an action that is observed, evaluated, commemorated, and deemed normative may find a future imitator – an actor who regards himself, or is regarded by others, as following the model set by this prior performance. The cycle of exemplary operations thus provides a tidy mechanism through which social values, and actions that accord with those values, are reproduced and mutually reinforce.¹ Yet this mechanism does not obviously allow for innovation. Can there be a beginning? If so, how and where does the mechanism accommodate it? Or is the idea of a novel or “first” performance, rather, inconsistent with an exemplary view of the relationship between past and present? Here I aim to investigate this problem of “firstness,” and to consider more generally how innovation and change over time are or are not understood and accommodated within an exemplary framework.

My exemplary innovator, for these purposes, is Gaius Duilius, consul in 260 B.C.E.² Duilius as consul is credited with defeating the Carthaginians,

¹ On the retrospective and prospective orientations of exemplarity see ch. 0.4 in general, and ch. 1.3 for the models Horatius Cocles may have been thought to follow and the model his own performance provides to posterity. The emperor Augustus well recognized this dual orientation: *m[ulta e]xempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro [saeculo] red[uxi et ipse] multarum rer[um exe]mpla imitanda post[eris tradidi]* (RG 8.5).

² The Augustan-era *Fasti triumphales* (next n.) and *Fasti consulares capitolini* give his full nomenclature as C. Duilius M. f. M. n. Literary sources spell his name Duil(l)ius or Duel(l)ius, and in one case Bellius (Cic. *Or.* 153); Greek transliterations also offer a range of spellings. Much of this variation is probably ancient, and not an artifact of the manuscript tradition; see Pariente 1970: 199–204. Besides the consulship of 260, the *Fasti consulares* attest Duilius as censor 258 and dictator 231.

early in the first Punic war, in a naval battle that took place off the town of Mylae (modern Milazzo), which lies on the northern coast of Sicily near the island's northeastern corner. This victory was commemorated in a rich range of monumental forms, which will be discussed in detail. Of the monuments that survive to the present and are known to us moderns directly – roughly twenty literary texts and a trio of important inscriptions³ – many display a distinctive rhetoric that points to a central feature of Duilius' performance: his "firstness." He is credited with winning a victory unlike any previous one, and receiving correspondingly unparalleled or unexampled honors. In this chapter I analyze the rhetoric of "firstness" as it is applied to Duilius, with outward glances toward other figures to whom "firstness" is attributed. I then examine a teleological historical schema, developed by the emperor Augustus in response to Duilius, that incorporates the idea of moral improvement, and I relate this schema to other schemata that posit improvement or decline over time. Finally, I consider to what extent such change-accepting schemata are compatible with either an exemplary or an historicist view of the relationship of past to present, as described in chapter 0.5.3.

4.2 Duilius as Naval Victor: Performance and Commemoration

A "synthetic" account of Duilius' story, one which assembles the basic elements in the tradition, goes something like this. Duilius, as consul, assumed command of a newly built Roman fleet after the Carthaginians captured its previous commander, Duilius' consular colleague Scipio Asina – or perhaps Asina never held this naval command, and it was allotted to Duilius at the start of the consular year.⁴ In either case, as commander he judged his ships clumsy and unmaneuverable compared with the Carthaginians', which were better built and manned by more experienced crews. He therefore fitted his ships with siege engines, alternatively described as "iron hands" (*manus ferreae*) by which enemy ships could be grappled, or as spiked boarding-bridges (called "ravens" by Polybius) that

³ The three inscriptions attesting the victory of 260 are (1) the Columna Duilia inscription, *CIL* 1².25 = 6.1300 = 6.31591 = 6.37040 = *InscrIt* 13.3.69 = *ILS* 65 = *ILLRP* 319; (2) the Forum Augustum *elogium*, *CIL* 6.40952 = *InscrIt* 13.3.13 = *ILS* 55; (3) *Fasti triumphales* s.a. 260, *CIL* 1.1² p. 47 = *InscrIt* 13.1.548. Hereafter I use briefer citations.

⁴ For the alternative strands, see Polyb. 1.22–3, Dio (Zon.) 8.10, Eutr. 2.20, Oros. 4.7.7–10. Discussion in Beck 2013: 132–6; 2005: 223–5.

could be dropped from the Roman vessels onto enemy ships to hold them fast.⁵ When battle was joined in the waters near Mylae these devices caught a number of Carthaginian ships. Roman infantry then crossed from the Roman to the enemy ships for hand-to-hand combat. The result was a decisive Roman victory, entailing the destruction or capture of about forty Carthaginian ships and a large haul of booty. Duilius went on to celebrate a “naval triumph.”

The surviving sources, being themselves monuments to this deed, reveal how thoroughly Duilius’ victory was enfolded within the logic of exemplarity. If one regards the events of the battle as representing the first in the sequence of exemplary operations – a spectacular action or set of actions performed before an audience of community members – then the primary judging audience, which discharges the second operation of moral categorization and evaluation, consists in large part of the performers themselves as they observe and judge one another. That is, the consul, his officers, and the soldiers/sailors under their command collectively comprise a cross-section of the Roman community, in which each member performs in battle before the eyes of every other as all seek commendation for *virtus*, martial valor.⁶ Several accounts also assert that the Carthaginians, long dominant in naval warfare, were chagrined by this display of Roman valor. The enemy too, then, could be regarded as a legitimate primary audience for judging the Romans’ performance, corroborating and validating the Romans’ own self-judgment.⁷

Among the monumental forms by which Duilius’ achievement was commemorated and made available to broader audiences of contemporaries and posterity – the third exemplary operation – are the texts of all eras that mention Duilius and his victory, along with other monuments that these texts in turn attest. Surviving texts include instances of epic poetry, oratory, theoretical and exegetical treatises, and historiography, as well as the three inscriptions mentioned earlier. All these texts, apart perhaps from one inscription, postdate Duilius’ deed by a century or more. These texts,

⁵ *Manus ferreae*: Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.24, Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).9, *Vir. Ill.* 38.1; also Dio (Zon.) 8.11. “Ravens” (κόρακες): Polyb. 1.22.3. The Latin term *corvi* (“ravens”) does not appear in any surviving text relating to Duilius, though it is used elsewhere to refer to siege engines of various sorts. Nevertheless modern scholarship conventionally refers to Duilius’ devices as *corvi* (e.g. de Souza 2007: 437–9). On the terms and their usage see Sordi 1967: 260–2, and discussion below.

⁶ *Virtus* is explicitly the category for evaluating the performance of Duilius’ forces in Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.24, and of Roman naval forces more generally in Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).4.

⁷ Col. Duil. ll. 9–11 pointedly makes the Carthaginian general witness to his own defeat. Meanwhile Polyb. 1.23, Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).9, and *Vir. Ill.* 38.2–3 purport to give the Carthaginians’ view of the battle. For the enemy as a valid witness and judge of Roman valor, see ch. 2.1 and n. 6 (Porsenna judging Cloelia, with scholarly discussion).

in turn, cross-reference other monuments that do not survive to the present day – monuments built or performed, hence durable or ephemeral, but which by their spectacularity and visibility reached different and in some respects broader audiences than the texts, and had different commemorative impact.⁸ These lost monuments were mostly created shortly after the victory and therefore communicate the judgments of near-contemporary audiences, whether primary or secondary. Among these monuments is a “naval triumph” – the great victory procession often celebrated by successful Roman commanders, but evidently in a special form reflecting the maritime character of the battle. It probably paraded maritime spoils, like the rams (*rostra*) and anchors of captured ships. This spectacular procession surely fixed Duilius’ victory in the minds of thousands of Roman spectators of every age, sex, and social class, and encouraged them, as secondary witnesses, to ascribe high value to it themselves.⁹ Another major monument is a temple to Ianus that Duilius dedicated as victor. This temple stood in the Forum Holitorium, a key urban “node” through which triumphal processions tended to pass (map location 168). It thereby served as a backdrop to future triumphal processions and reminded later spectators of Duilius’ own success. Moreover, the temple likely contained a painting and inscription commemorating his victory, thus identifying its dedicator clearly and summoning his deeds and their glory to the recollections of all who entered the temple throughout the centuries that it stood.¹⁰ A third monument is an honorific statue of Duilius erected in the west end of the Forum Romanum (map location D). The statue stood atop a *columna rostrata*, a column to which bronze rams taken from captured Carthaginian ships were affixed (perhaps after being paraded in his “naval triumph”). Scholars conventionally call this monument the Columna Duilia. Like the temple, this was a substantial, durable, highly visible monument, which would have kept Duilius and his victory before the eyes of many generations of Romans.¹¹ While its overall form is known only insofar as surviving

⁸ Hölscher 2001: 188–9 argues that built monuments in public spaces had greater commemorative impact, among a broad social range of viewers, than literary texts with their orientation toward smaller, highly literate audiences. See also ch. 0.3.3.

⁹ Testimonia for the triumph in n. 18 below. Ladewig 2014: 267–73 discusses naval spoils and their display.

¹⁰ Temple: Tac. *Ann.* 2.49 and For. Aug. *elogium* l. 7 as restored by Chioffi (nn. 45–6). Discussion by Beck 2005: 226–7, Bleckmann 2002: 122–4, Coarelli, *LTUR* 3 (1996): 90–1; also ch. 4.4 below. Favro 2014: 87–92 discusses the urban “nodes” through which triumphal processions tended to pass.

¹¹ Column: For. Aug. *elogium* ll. 5–6, Plin. *Nat.* 34.20, Sil. 6.663–4, Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.12, Serv. in *Georg.* 3.29 (specifying its location *in rostris*, which presumably means the Augustan/west rostra rather than the republican rostra); discussion by Schmuhl 2008: 84–7, Kondratieff 2004: 7–10, Schlmeier 1999: 117–19; Jordan–Ruwe 1995: 58–60; Chioffi, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 309; also ch. 4.4 below.

texts describe it (and through later imitations depicted on coins, imitations that incidentally reveal this monument's normative effect), one of the three inscriptions attesting Duilius comes from this monument's base. The inscribed stone that survives is now generally dated to the Augustan era, but it affects archaic expression and linguistic forms that strive to leave the impression that it was created in Duilius' own time; indeed the stone quite possibly represents aspects of an "original" that had degraded and required replacement after some 250 years (more in ch. 4.4). It may, then, transmit the views and expressions of Duilius' contemporaries, perhaps even of Duilius himself. This inscription narrates the victory, quantifies the booty taken, and refers to the triumph.¹² Fourth, surviving texts advert to a distinctive, unparalleled monumental form: for the rest of his life, whenever he dined out, Duilius was escorted home at night by a torchbearer and fluteplayer. As we shall see in chapter 4.6, the sources disagree on what exactly this ritualized procession commemorates, and how. A final possible monument to Duilius' victory is an issue of *aes signatum* – bronze bars serving as a kind of currency – stamped with naval designs. If these objects are connected to Duilius' victory, they are not only near-contemporary witnesses to his achievement, but also constitute the earliest known use of circulating currency as a commemorative device at Rome.¹³ All these monuments, both lost and surviving, create a kind of network via their interrelations and cross-references. Viewers or readers who encounter any particular monument can learn not only about Duilius' deed and how earlier judges evaluated it, but also about other monuments by which this hero and his performance are commemorated.

These monuments had their intended effect, spreading knowledge of Duilius' deed far and wide in space and time. Accordingly, the tradition holds that Duilius found a variety of imitators who, in various ways, measured themselves or were measured by others against the moral standard that Duilius' own deed established. Before discussing these imitators, however, it is helpful to consider the rhetoric of "firstness" that pervades the texts narrating Duilius' performance. This rhetoric may seem to create a difficulties for the very possibility of exemplary reproduction of positively valued performances.

¹² Starting points on this inscription: Kondratieff 2004: 10–26, Bleckmann 2002: 118–25, Alföldy and Ricci in *CIL* 6.8.3 (2000): 4675–6, with earlier bibliography. Quintilian refers to this inscription in a different context: he says it shows that, in early Latin, "d" frequently occurs as the final letter of a word (*Inst.* 1.7.12). His remark presupposes that the monument was visible and familiar to his own intended audience in the late first century CE.

¹³ Kondratieff 2004: 16–32 discusses this *aes signatum* and its possible relationship to Duilius' victory.

4.3 The Rhetoric of the *primus*

The surviving monuments that commemorate Duilius' deed pervasively present him as an achiever of "firsts," as the texts cited in the notes to follow make abundantly clear. The Columna Duilia inscription, the only surviving monument that may represent views of Duilius' contemporaries, already asserts that Duilius was the first Roman to fit out a naval force and fleet, and the first to win a naval victory.¹⁴ Later texts corroborate or add to these early assertions of "firstness." Florus claims that during Appius Claudius' consulship in 264 the Romans first embarked upon the sea, and that under Duilius they "even dared to join battle" – implying that this naval battle was a first. Eutropius, perhaps following the implication of Florus, expressly states that this was the first sea battle fought by Romans.¹⁵ Still other texts assert or suggest that grappling hooks or boarding bridges were first contrived or deployed in this battle.¹⁶ Consequently, a number of texts echo the Columna Duilia inscription in asserting that Duilius was the first Roman to win a victory in a sea battle,¹⁷ and as a result, that he was the first to celebrate a "naval triumph."¹⁸ While no text mentioning Duilius' deed asserts "firstness" for its every aspect, hardly a text exists that does not assert firstness for at least one element.

The rhetoric of "firstness" has swept up modern scholars as well, who attribute firsts to Duilius beyond those actually attested in surviving texts.

¹⁴ Col. Duil. ll. 5–7: *enque eodem mac[istrat]ud bene* / [*r*]em navebos marid consol *primos* c[eset copi- asque] / [*c*]lasesque navales *primos* ornavet pa[ravet]que].

¹⁵ Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).5, 7: Appio Claudio consule *primum* fretum ingrussus est [sc. *populus Romanus*] ... Duilio Cornelioque consulibus *etiam* mari congredi *ausus est*. Eutr. 2.20: *primum* Romani C. Duillio et Cn. Cornelio Asina consulibus in mari dimicaverunt.

¹⁶ Polybius claims that "someone suggested" the "raven" (1.22.3), and that the Carthaginians were surprised, amazed, or thunderstruck by this device or its effects (ξενιζόμενοι, ἐκπληττόμενοι, καταπλαγνύντες; 1.23.5–10) – all implying its novelty. Similarly Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.24: C. Duellius ... *excogitavit* manus ferreas. Also Vir. *Ill.* 38.1: Gnaeus Duellius ... *manus ferreas cum irrisu hostium primus instituit*.

¹⁷ Col. Duil. ll. 5–6 (n. 14 above). Sen. *Brev.* 13.3: *primus* navali proelio Duilius vicit. Sil. 6.665–6: *exuvias* ... Dui<l>-ius alto / *ante omnis* mersa Poenorum classe dicabat. Tac. *Ann.* 2.49: C. Duilius ... *qui primus* rem Romanam prospere mari gessit triumphumque navalem de Poenis meruit. Ined. Vat. (FGH 839 = BNJ 839) 3: [sc. οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι] εὐθύς τῇ πρώτῃ περιεγένοντο ναυμαχίαι, Δουιλίου στρατηγούντος.

¹⁸ Livy *Per.* 17: C. Duilius consul adversus classem Poenorum prospere pugnavit, *primusque* omnium Romanorum ducum navalis victoriae duxit triumphum. Fasti tr.: C. Duilius ... *primus* an(no) CDXCIII navalem de Sicul(is) et classe Poenica egit. For. Aug. *elogium* ll. 3–4: *primus* d[e] Poen[is] n[ava]l[em] trium[phum] / [*phum* egit]. Val. Max. 3.6.4: C. ... Duellius *qui primus* navalem triumphum ex Poenis rettulit. Sen. *Matrim.* fr. 42 Vottero: Duillius *qui primus* Romae navali certamine triumphavit. Plin. *Nat.* 34.20: C. Duillio *qui primus* navalem triumphum egit de Poenis. Tac. *Ann.* 2.49 (as in previous n.) Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).9: *victor* ... *primum* illum maritimum egit triumphum.

Theodor Mommsen, for instance, restored in the lacunose later sections of the Columna Duilia inscription (lines 16–18) two additional instances of the word *primos* beyond the two instances explicitly attested in the surviving portion (lines 6–7). These supplements, if accepted, would make Duilius the first to distribute naval booty to the people, and the first to parade freeborn Carthaginians in his triumph (neither claim of “firstness” is elsewhere attested).¹⁹ Also, Eric Kondratieff conjecturally restores a *primus* in the lacunose first line of the Forum Augustum *elogium* – an Augustan-era monument created to commemorate the hero of old (ch. 4.4) – as well as *corvo* in the second line; this reconstruction causes the *elogium* to assert that Duilius was the first to fit out a fleet with “ravens” (a claim elsewhere attested).²⁰ My aim here is not to defend or dispute these reconstructions, but merely to observe that they evince, by their very existence, the power that the pervasive rhetoric of “firstness” exerts over readers ancient and modern, and reveals the extent to which this quality is central to the legend of Duilius’ victory.

I have already noted that Duilius’ action is subjected to evaluation and commemoration, and the discussion to follow will show that subsequent naval commanders likewise fit out fleets, fight naval battles, use grappling hooks or boarding bridges, win naval victories, and celebrate naval triumphs, all acting explicitly or implicitly in relation to the standard Duilius sets. Duilius’ *bona fides* as an exemplary performer in the prospective view – as he accumulates imitators down the centuries – thus seems beyond question. As remarked earlier (ch. 4.1), however, the logic of exemplarity also allows any given action to be viewed retrospectively, for its relationship to norms set by previous performances. In this view, Duilius’ situation is different. A speaker or writer who claims that someone was the “first” to perform a given deed seems to imply that the deed was innovative, or marked a discontinuity or turning point – a shift from an earlier configuration of practices and values in which a certain kind of performance was lacking, to a later configuration in which that kind of performance is familiar. The “first” thus may seem to mark a point where the “historicist” outlook, which posits that societies and their values

¹⁹ Mommsen’s restorations at Col. Duil. ll. 16–19 are printed at *CIL* 6.1300 (= *ILS* 65). Degraffi’s alternative supplements are nowadays more commonly printed (*InscrIt* 13.3.69 = *ILLRP* 319). Recent discussion by Alföldy and Ricci at *CIL* 6.8.3 (2000) p. 4675 (endorsing Mommsen’s supplements); Kondratieff 2004: 14–26.

²⁰ Reconstruction at Kondratieff 2004: 11 n. 40, with parallels in n. 16 above; cf. Chioffi’s (2000) reconstruction at *CIL* 6.40952. Kondratieff’s restoration would produce the only known instance of the Latin word *corvus* appearing in connection with Duilius.

change over time, supervenes and overrides the assumptions of continuity, changelessness, and timelessness that characterize the exemplary outlook.²¹ And if “firstness” sits uneasily with an exemplary view of the relationship of present to past, i.e. in the retrospective view, a problem may arise for the prospective view as well. For to regard Duilius as furnishing a model or standard of judgment to future actors and judges may seem to entail, paradoxically, that he is imitable precisely in his non-imitation of prior actors, and normative in his disregard for established norms. How can this be?

To address this paradox, I examine more closely how the monuments that transmit information about Duilius’ deed represent its “firstness.” To begin with, several texts locate Duilius’ performance within a larger narrative concerning the origins of Roman naval warfare in (what moderns would call) the middle Republic. This narrative asserts that the Romans lacked all experience of and capability for naval warfare prior to the first Punic war. At its outbreak in 264, this war held out the prospect of fighting “overseas” in Sicily and North Africa, which spurred the Romans to build their first warships. The ensuing narrative accordingly presents a broader array of naval “firsts,” with Duilius playing a central but by no means exclusive role. The most detailed surviving version of this narrative of firsts is in Polybius; he opens this broader narrative by declaring that he will inform his readers “how and when and for what reasons the Romans first embarked upon the sea,” and “when they first undertook to build ships.” A dramatic tale follows of how a Carthaginian ship fell fortuitously into Roman hands at the start of the war, furnishing the model on which the Romans, who were otherwise completely ignorant of such matters, built their first warships.²² Seneca refers to this broader narrative as well, when he lists a series of antiquarian riddles that he deems morally unedifying. Some people, he says, wonder who first persuaded the Romans to board a ship. The answer is Appius Claudius Caudex, consul in 264, the opening year of the war. Indeed, Seneca knows an explanation of the cognomen “Caudex” that makes it into a monument commemorating his shipbuilding activities. Allegedly, *caudex* (or *codex*) refers to a structure made from

²¹ On the contrast between exemplary and historicist views of the relationship between present and past, see ch. 0.5.3; on the “timeless” quality of exemplary action (implying a proximate, comprehensible past), see ch. 2.2. On the proliferation of “primacy” claims – military, artistic, and literary – that cluster around the first Punic war, see Biggs 2017: 358–64. Beck 2003b: 84–89 offers reflections on “historical turning points” in Roman historiography.

²² Polyb. 1.20.8–9: πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ δι’ ἧς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἐνέβησαν εἰς θάλατταν Ῥωμαῖοι ... τότε πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκάφη (cf. 1.5.1, 1.12.5 on this “first” sea-crossing, and 1.20.9–21.3 on the captured ship’s use as a model). On the “first ship” narrative and its larger cultural context, see Biggs 2017: 350–3.

joining wooden planks together. Other texts, too, assert Caudex's priority in taking the Romans to sea.²³ Yet this is not the only story known to Roman authors. Livy speaks of magistrates called *duumviri navales*, first appointed in 311, who were responsible for fitting out and maintaining a Roman fleet (i.e. ships not supplied by allies). This magistracy may not have been annual, but filled *ad hoc* as the situation required, and the squadrons the *duumviri* commanded would have been small. Assuredly Caudex's fleet, like those built subsequently during the first Punic war, was much larger, involving much greater military ambition, than the small squadrons of the *duumviri*.²⁴ Nevertheless, the disclosure of the *duumviri* suggests that the strong claim that Appius Claudius Caudex was the first (temporally) to put Romans to sea is an overstatement. But if authors (and others) who claimed that Caudex was "first" to take the Romans to sea were aware of the earlier *duumviri* at all, then the claim of "firstness" for Caudex could perhaps be understood in a different way: not as indicating an absolutely novel performance, qualitatively different from any prior performance and falling outside existing categories, but as registering a significant quantitative *advance* within an established category.

In this narrative of naval "firsts," Duilius represents the stage following Caudex: the first to fight and win. At the battle of Mylae he accomplishes this, the historiographical texts say, by eschewing high-skill naval tactics of maneuver and ramming, at which the Carthaginians excelled and for which the Romans were untrained, and employing instead the grappling hooks or boarding-bridges mentioned previously. By these means the Romans ensnared the Carthaginian vessels, allowing legionary soldiers, who were deployed on the decks of the Roman ships, to cross over to the enemy vessels for hand-to-hand combat.²⁵ Several texts remark that these

²³ Sen. *Brev.* 13.4: *hoc quoque quaerentibus remittamus, quis Romanis primus persuaserit navem conscendere: Claudius is fuit, Caudex ob hoc ipsum appellatus quia plurimum tabularum contextus caudex apud antiquos vocabatur.* Claudius' "firstness" is also asserted in Suet. *Tib.* 2.1: *Claudius Caudex primus freto classe traiecit Poenos Sicilia expulit;* likewise Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).4–5 (§4 for the larger "first time at sea" context). Dio (Zon.) 8.8 echoes Polybius in asserting the Romans' total inexperience of seafaring prior to this time. Wallace-Hadrill 2008: 231–7 contends that Roman antiquarianism presupposes rupture; in the terms used in this book it would therefore be a species of "historicism." But as we shall see, claims of "firstness" in general, including in antiquarian investigations, do not typically mark a sharp, qualitative departure from past practices and values.

²⁴ On the evidence for Roman sea power before 260 see Ladewig 2014: 94–100. On the *duumviri navales* and their fleets, see Ladewig 2014: 150–3, Dart 2012, Steinby 2007: 60–4, and Oakley 1997: 3.394–6, with further references. Leigh 2010: 265–70, 278 emphasizes the ancient perception that a "step-change" in Roman naval operations occurred at the start of the first Punic war – not qualitative novelty, but a sudden and substantial quantitative shift.

²⁵ Strauss 2007: 229–36 offers an overview of the alternative naval strategies of maneuver and ramming vs. grappling and boarding.

grappling devices made the engagement like a battle on land, or a clash of infantrymen, thus allowing the Romans to extend their terrestrial military dominance onto the sea. Other texts imply that these devices allowed the Roman soldiers, otherwise frustrated by the maneuvers of naval battle, to exercise their *virtus* – the traditional military valor of the foot soldier – even at sea.²⁶ The “ravens” in particular, which Polybius says Duilius employed, appear elsewhere in both Greek and Latin texts as terrestrial siege engines, and so seem, like the tactics accompanying their use, to have been transferred from infantry warfare.²⁷

The conceptualization of naval battle as a peculiar species of land battle far predates Polybius (and Duilius). Already in Thucydides, the Athenian historiographer of the fifth century BCE, a naval battle in which the ships become tightly pressed together leaves the rowers nothing to do, and devolves into a clash of hoplite soldiers ranging across the decks, “generally similar to infantry combat.” In later texts, too, the paradoxical motif of the land battle at sea features occasionally in descriptions of naval warfare.²⁸ But the analogy has further dimensions, extending well beyond the use of infantry for deck-to-deck combat. Large warships may be likened to fortified cities: they may be equipped with towers that hold artillery pieces, and may themselves be attacked with siege engines; and the first Roman marine to board an enemy ship is awarded the “naval crown” (*corona navalis*), just as the first soldier over the wall of an enemy city receives the “mural crown” (*corona muralis*).²⁹ Indeed, the very order of battle in ancient naval warfare, and the maneuvering tactics that fleets employ, reflect that of infantry. A fleet normally tries to enter battle with its ships drawn up in one or more lines, prows forward, confronting a similarly ordered enemy fleet. The basic tactics of maneuver and ramming require either piercing the enemy line or outflanking it, while a line of ships strives not to be penetrated or broken up by the enemy. Such ordering and tactics echo those of massed infantry battle, where opposing maniples or phalanxes are similarly drawn up, then seek to break through the opposing line or to turn a flank. In the naval battle at Ecnomus in 256, Polybius reports that the Roman fleet was

²⁶ Like a land battle: Polyb. 1.23.7, Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).9, Dio (Zon.) 8.11; Eutr. 2.20. *Virtus* displayed on sea as on land: Frontin. 2.3.24, Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).4.

²⁷ Poznanski 1979: 652–4. On the device and its tactics, Steinby 2007: 87–104, with further bibliography.

²⁸ Thuc. 1.49.1–3: ἡ ναυμαχία ... πεζομαχία δὲ τὸ πλεον προσφερὴς οὖσα; Roman versions include *BAlex.* 15 (*ars* yields to *virtus* in a sea battle in tight quarters), and Luc. 3.565–70 (though not in Caesar’s own version at *BCiv.* 1.58).

²⁹ So Östenberg 2009: 57, who catalogues further parallels between ships and cities, and how they are attacked.

deployed in a formation in which ships in the rearmost line were called *triarii*, borrowing the term used for the soldiers in the rearmost line of the Roman manipular legion (as Polybius himself notes, transliterating the Latin word).³⁰ Thus the Romans could draw a variety of parallels between naval and terrestrial warfare – parallels in which the ships are like individual foot soldiers, or like terrestrial siege engines, or like cities under siege, or (when grappled together) like a floating battlefield on which infantrymen can fight in a relatively conventional way.

The idea that naval warfare transfers aspects of terrestrial warfare onto the sea may provide a key to grasping further implications of the rhetoric of “firstness” that encompasses Duilius. Supposing that an antiquarian scholar posed the question, “How were the Romans able to win their first battle at sea?”, the answer could be, “By turning it into a land battle, the domain in which they already excelled.” By installing and deploying grappling devices and siege engines on his ships to neutralize the enemy’s superior maneuverability and seamanship, and then deploying legionary soldiers to board enemy ships and fight hand-to-hand, Duilius fought what could be regarded as a conventional land engagement on a battlefield that just happened to float. His “first,” then, was achieved by *extending* the familiar, socially valued activity of infantry combat, and its associated moral category of *virtus*, into a new domain, and not by pioneering a new *kind* of activity that falls altogether outside past experience and value categories. In fact, to Roman eyes Duilius’ “firsts” at sea may differ relatively little from his achievements as a commander of land forces in Sicily. For he also raised the Carthaginian siege of Segesta, routed a Carthaginian infantry force, and took the town of Macella.³¹ In these engagements, too, legionary soldiers joined battle, displayed their *virtus*, and deployed siege engines. Correspondingly, the first “naval triumph” (*triumphus navalis*) by which his victory was celebrated was probably not an altogether new *kind* of triumph for a novel *kind* of victory, but rather (and literally) “a triumph for a victory won *on ships*,” differing from a standard triumph perhaps only in displaying distinctively naval spoils (like captured rams and anchors) and in having the ships’ crews, rather than legionary soldiers, march in the parade.³² Even Duilius’ honorific rostral column and statue, the first

³⁰ Polyb. 1.26–8 narrates this battle (1.26.5–7 for *τριόριοι* and other terms). He suggests that some Roman ships were equipped with “ravens,” which were not actively used in this battle (1.28.11). On the order, equipment, and tactics of the manipular legion, including the *triarii*, see Polyb. 6.21–3, Livy 8.8 (both with vast scholarly discussion).

³¹ Polyb. 1.24.1–2, Col. Duil. ll. 1–5; *Fasti tr.*, Dio (Zon). 8.11.

³² This may be the implication of Livy’s (or his epitomator’s) phrasing *navalis victoriae duxit triumphum* (*Per.* 17): not a “naval triumph,” but “triumph for a naval victory.” Ten “naval triumphs” are attested

victory monument in this form, was assembled from preexisting forms, as scholars have noted. Gaius Maenius, consul in 338, had been honored with a column – perhaps surmounted by an honorific statue – for defeating the Latins; it was apparently erected near the prison on the northwest side of the *comitium* (map locations B, D). He also took rams from warships surrendered by the town of Antium under the peace agreement and mounted them on the speaker's platform on the south side of the *comitium* (map location C). Duilius, in affixing rams directly to his column, amalgamated elements from Maenius' two monuments. Despite its novel form, then, the prior monumental use of all its constituent elements surely rendered the Columna Duilia legible to contemporary viewers as commemorating a military victory – and the more so because it was spatially juxtaposed with Maenius' two monuments around the *comitium*, such that all three could be taken in at a glance.³³ In consequence, the “firsts” ascribed to Duilius in the literary and historical tradition mark not a rupture with established practices and values and a new beginning, but rather the *extension* of established practices and values into a new arena, or *going beyond* what previous performers had achieved in a given arena of competition. Far from indicating a distinctive ancient flavor of “historicism,” and the breaking of the exemplary cycle of social and moral reproduction, the *primus* claim – at least regarding Duilius – seems rather to indicate Duilius' outstanding success precisely as an exemplary actor. He is judged as having surpassed previous performers – that is, he is considered the “first” to achieve a certain *level* of performance – within the specified arena. This is a typical aim of the imitator, as described generally in the introduction (ch. 0.3.4) and as observed in previous chapters.

This observation holds true more generally for Romans' claims of “firstness.” Géza Alföldy, in a brilliant study of the numerous inscriptions of the imperial age that credit their honorands with “firsts,” shows that these assertions of firstness generally do not imply that the honorand pioneered new types of action, arenas of competition, or domains of social value. These assertions imply, rather, that the commemorand's performance was thought to fall into a traditional arena, and manifest a traditional virtue,

after Duilius, down to 167. Dart/Vervaeke 2011: 270–5 provide a list with commentary; also *InscrIt* 13.1: 76–81, 548–56. After 167, triumphs granted for naval victories were not called *navales*. For the naval triumph's possible characteristics, see Lange 2016: 43–8, Ladewig 2014: 251–62, Dart/Vervaeke 2011: 275–6, and Östenberg 2009: 46–58.

³³ On Maenius' monuments see Plin. *Nat.* 7.212, 34.20, Livy 8.14.8–12; Schmuhl 2008: 74–78, Sehlmeier 1999: 53–7, Jordan-Ruwe 1995: 54–7, Coarelli, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 212, Torelli, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 301–2. For the column's relation to Duilius' column, Beck 2005: 219.

but in a way that outstrips all prior performers, and so makes him the “first” to reach a certain level – an implication consistent with the logic of exemplarity and the competition it commonly entails. Indeed, the most innovative feature of these *primus* claims is the inventiveness with which fields of action are delimited in order to make the claims defensible. For example, within the traditional moral category of “generosity” (*liberalitas*), the emperor Hadrian may claim to be the “first and only” *princeps* to transfer a particular (gigantic) sum of money to the *fiscus*. A local magistrate or wealthy citizen from a small town may, for his part, claim to be the first to give a (rather modest) sum for purchasing grain; the first to sponsor an annual feast for fellow-townsmen; the first to put on a local show featuring as many as five lions or four pairs of gladiators; and so on. The claim of firstness thus depends, in many cases, upon circumscribing the time, place, or character of the performance so narrowly that there may be few if any other competitors for the crown in question.³⁴ Yet the moral category in which the claimant to “firstness” seeks approbation is always a traditional, well-established, widely agreed social value (*liberalitas*, as in the examples just cited; also *virtus*, *fides*, etc.). The *primus*-claim fundamentally asserts a quantitative rather than qualitative difference relative to prior actors: surpassing or exceeding those who went before, but only within established, traditional categories of social value.³⁵

Ultimately, the rhetoric of exemplarity allows any given claim of precedence to be made in two alternative ways: “better than,” or “first.” The “better than” formulation offers overt comparison to prior performers, as when Cloelia is said to have surpassed Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scaevola in *virtus*, or Augustus implies he has outstripped Appius Claudius Caecus in his achievements as censor.³⁶ The “first” formulation, by contrast, defines a threshold within a traditional moral category that, allegedly, no one has previously surpassed – as if Cloelia were said, instead, to have displayed outstanding *virtus* by being the first *virgo* to swim the

³⁴ Alföldy 1986[1980]: 349–77; see 356–8 for these (and many other) particular assertions of “firstness” within the moral category of *liberalitas*. Mrozek 1971 discusses such assertions in various moral categories. One is reminded of the *Guinness Book of World Records*, and the ingenuity people display in devising categories in which they can claim to have set a “world record.”

³⁵ So e.g. Alföldy 1986[1980]: 365–6: “Whoever wished, within the Roman social order, to become something extraordinary, had to behave in a customary way ... The Roman ideal of individuality was not to be different from those who were other, but to be outstanding among those who were similar.” Similarly Riggsby 2006: 207 asserts that Roman aristocrats (including Caesar) “succeed ... by being uniquely outstanding in terms of extremely conventional categories.” See also Vigourt 2001a: 120–1, and Wiseman 1985a: 3–10. On Greek historians’ view of change as quantitative rather than qualitative, see Grethlein 2011: 260–1.

³⁶ Cloelia: ch. 2.1, with Livy 2.13.8. Augustus and Appius: ch. 3.3-3.

Tiber under enemy fire. Similarly, Hadrian might have cast his claim to outstanding *liberalitas* in “better than” form, naming prior emperors he outstripped in his generosity to the *fiscus*. Instead, he claimed to be the *first and only* emperor to give the specified sum.³⁷ The underlying assertion of priority and competitive success is the same in either formulation. Thus the rhetoric of the *primus* belongs to exemplarity no less than the rhetoric of explicit comparison to other performers; they are merely opposites sides of the same coin, and neither formulation represents any species of historicism. As I will argue later, the kind of rupture or discontinuity necessary to underwrite a historicist view of the relationship of present to past – the sense that the past is different and remote – is a discontinuity in the traditional moral categories themselves. Supposing, for example, that *liberalitas* itself has ceased to be valued and understood, then inhabitants of that post-philanthropic world no longer understand the motivations and aims of past actors who competed for preeminence in that category, nor would they join in this competition themselves.

4.4 Augustan Teleology: Duilius as Precursor

The “firsts” that the tradition ascribes to Duilius indicate that he surpassed all prior Roman commanders in one respect, namely in the extension of Roman military dominance from land to sea. Yet, notwithstanding this surpassing achievement, the competitive logic of exemplarity allows, even demands, that subsequent military commanders seek to surpass him in turn. Augustus took a particular interest in the figure of Duilius, and strove to present himself as having outstripped this hero of old. Indeed, the relative richness of the surviving sources regarding Duilius, from an otherwise ill-lit period of Roman history, is directly attributable to Augustus’ stewardship of the Duilius legend, and to his careful preservation, shaping, and framing of this hero’s monuments – all, as we shall see, in the service of aggrandizing his own achievements.

In 36 a fleet of warships constructed and commanded by Marcus Agrippa, the lieutenant of Octavian (the future Augustus), joined battle with a rival fleet commanded by Sextus Pompeius. The battle took place off the town of Naulochos, which lies about 15 kilometers east of Mylae on the northern coast of Sicily. Given the sprawling scale of ancient sea battles, the latter clash would have taken place on much the same stretch of sea as the former. There was a further resemblance as well: according to

³⁷ *CIL* 6.967 = *ILS* 309; Alföldy 1986[1980]: 356 for discussion.

the historian Appian, Agrippa's fleet employed a novel form of grappling hook, hurled from a catapult, that caught enemy ships at a distance, to the Pompeians' surprise and dismay; and once the ships were drawn together, infantrymen boarded and fought across the decks. The outcome was a decisive victory for Agrippa, hence for Octavian.³⁸

A cascade of monuments followed this victory. Agrippa was awarded the *corona navalis*, and Octavian celebrated not a triumph but an *ovatio* – a kind of “second prize” procession that may not have involved parading victorious soldiers and captured booty, and whose lesser rank perhaps acknowledges the irregular character of the “enemy,” at least some of whom were Roman citizens.³⁹ A further monument to Octavian's victory, according to Appian, was a rostral column erected in the Forum Romanum, surmounted by a gilded statue and bearing an inscription.⁴⁰ An issue of denarii minted by Octavian in the years following the battle bears on its reverse the image of a column with rams and anchors attached, surmounted by a statue [Fig. 4.1]. It is attractive, if no sure thing, to identify this numismatic image with the Naulochos monument Appian describes. This reverse type also bears legend IMP CAESAR: by associating the military acclamation *imperator* with his own name, Octavian is identifying himself as the victor, and taking full credit.⁴¹ Now, the Naulochos monument plainly replicated the Columna Duilia in overall form, while surpassing it in at least one respect (the gilding); also, standing in the same general area as its model (map location D), it must have invited comparison not only of the monuments themselves, but of the victories and perhaps the victory processions

³⁸ App. *BCiv.* 5.118–21; Dio 49.8.5–10.4. The tactics Appian describes are found in Dio's account not of Naulochos, but of an earlier, indecisive battle, itself off Mylae, narrated at 49.3.1–4.1. Location: *inter Mylas et Naulochum*, Suet. *Aug.* 16.1 (perhaps conflating the two battles). Our sources pose many problems for understanding Naulochos and the other naval clashes between Octavian and Sextus Pompeius: Welch 2012: 274–9.

³⁹ *Ovatio*: App. *BCiv.* 5.130, Dio 49.15.1–2, *Fasti tr.*, s.a. 36. The *ovatio* may cohere with Octavian's efforts to present the war against Sextus Pompeius as one against “slaves and pirates,” for which *ovationes* had previously been awarded: see Lange 2016: 115–21 (with 33–9 on *ovationes* in general), Welch 2012: 262–5 (on Sextus as “pirate”), Dart/Vervaeke 2011: 278–9, Gurval 1995: 145–6.

⁴⁰ App. *BCiv.* 5.130: ἐδέχετο ... ἐπὶ κίονος ἐν ἀγορᾷ χρύσεος ἐστάναι μετὰ σχήματος οὐπὲρ ἔχων εἰσηλθε, περικειμένων τῶ κίονι νεῶν ἐμβόλων. καὶ ἔστηκεν ἡ εἰκὼν, ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχουσα, ὅτι “τὴν εἰρήνην ἐστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατὰ τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν.”

⁴¹ For the coin type see *Roman Imperial Coinage* 1² (1984) no. 271; the obverse bears a laureate bust of Octavian or Apollo, without legend. Palombi 1993: 321 n. 4 discusses the possibility that this issue dates to shortly after Naulochos, rather than to ca. 29–27 as generally thought. Discussions of the column and coin by Schmuhl 2008: 143–5, Kondratieff 2004: 9, Sehlmeier 1999: 255–9, Jordan-Ruwe 1995: 64–6 (cf. 66–8 for other imperial rostral columns), Gurval 1995: 58, and Palombi, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 308.

each commemorated.⁴² Specifically, Octavian's column seems to assert that the victory off Naulochos compares favorably with the earlier, similar victory by Duilius on nearly the same marine battlefield – that it matched and surpassed the standard set by its predecessor as a display of Roman *virtus* at sea. While the rams mounted on the Columna Duilia had probably been captured in battle and paraded in Duilius' triumph as spoils, thus causing the column to “cross-reference” the (ephemeral) triumph as well as commemorate the underlying victory, the rams and anchors on the Naulochos monument are also likely spoils captured in battle, making this column too into a monumental cross-reference commemorating at least the victory – and perhaps also the *ovatio*, though it is unclear to what extent this kind of procession included spoils and other elements common in the full-scale triumph. Finally, the coin itself, a monument in its own right, is a cross-reference. It could be expected to circulate widely in Rome, Italy, and the provinces. In circulating, its reverse image brought not just Octavian's column in Rome, but also the underlying victory, before the eyes of secondary judging audiences in many different places, and over a considerable timespan – for as long as the type continued to circulate.

Yet the impressiveness of Octavian's claim to be a great naval victor depended upon Duilius himself being remembered as a great victor: for Duilius provided the standard or threshold of achievement that Octavian through the rhetoric of his monuments claimed to have surpassed. To this end, Octavian (or Augustus, after he assumed this name in 27) took care, in several ways, to secure the memory of Duilius as an exemplary performer. Consider first the inscription from the Columna Duilia. Scholars have long recognized, from its letter forms and from the *luna* marble on which it is inscribed, that it was carved no earlier than the Augustan age. In content and linguistic style, however, it seeks to represent, or at least evoke, aspects of a presumed original of the third century BCE. While scholars have entertained dates for this inscription as late as the reign of Claudius, recent opinion has gravitated toward an Augustan date, with the (re)carving understood in the context of Augustus' wide-ranging restorations of older monuments and his general reconfiguration of the monumental spaces of the Roman Forum.⁴³ Augustus' effort to ensure this monument's survival, and its legibility as an “old” monument in particular (complete

⁴² For the effect produced by these columns' proximity, see Bleckmann 2002: 119, 121; Sehlmeier 1999: 256.

⁴³ Recent arguments for an Augustan date include Bleckmann 2002: 118–24, Chioffi, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 309, and Solin 1981: 111–14. Suet. *Aug.* 31.5 attests Augustus' restorations of old monuments and preservation of their original inscriptions: *opera cuiusque manentibus titulis restituit*.



Figure 4.1 Denarius of Octavian, mid 30s–early 20s BCE

with archaic or archaizing language on the restored inscription), has special point if his own rostral column derived meaning and value from its evocation of and relation to Duilius'. Indeed, by appropriating the iconography of a monument commemorating a famous victory over a feared external enemy, he paraded his own victory, actually won in civil war, as being a proper victory over foreigners – or at least he conveniently elided the distinction between civil and external war.⁴⁴ Augustus' efforts on behalf

⁴⁴ So Bleckmann 2002: 121. The inscription on the Naulochos monument, as reported by Appian – “the peace, long disturbed by factional strife, he reestablished on both land and sea” (n. 40 above) – fully supports this effort at elision by its vagueness, and bears instructive comparison to the Columna Duilia inscription's precise specification of the enemy, the commander, the value of the booty taken, and so on.

of Duilius (hence of himself) did not stop, however, with the column. Tacitus, writing in the early second century CE, reports that the temple of Ianus in the Forum Holitorium was restored and rededicated by Augustus and Tiberius. Tacitus names the temple's original dedicator and occasion – information that likely came from an inscription in the building itself, an inscription no doubt still legible to him thanks to the very restoration he is reporting.⁴⁵

Beyond these restorations, Augustus also created an entirely new monument to Duilius: he included him, like Appius Claudius Caecus, in the gallery of *summi viri* in the Forum Augustum, dedicated in 2 BCE (map location 109). As remarked in chapter 3.3.3, surviving sculptural fragments indicate that the honorands were portrayed by marble statues slightly larger than life size, and that these statues were accompanied both by *tituli* giving the honorands' names and offices held and by *elogia* relating each honorand's main achievements. Duilius' *titulus* is lost, but enough fragments of the *elogium* survive to permit substantial reconstruction of this text. This *elogium* mentions Duilius' military successes, particularly his victory at Mylae, and expressly refers to other monuments that also attest this achievement and its significance.⁴⁶ The monuments certainly referred to are the torch-and-flute procession and the Columna Duilia with its statue (ll. 5–6).⁴⁷ The *elogium* may also mention the temple of Ianus, if Chioffi's bravura supplement of line 7 – based on placing a fragment with a single sure letter – is correct. That Augustus so pointedly mentions the Columna Duilia and perhaps the temple in this context – monuments already, or soon to be, restored – suggests his special interest in ensuring their survival,

⁴⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 2.49: [sc. Tiberius] *isdem temporibus deum aedes vetustate aut igni abolitas coeptasque ab Augusto dedicavit: ... et Iano templum quod apud forum holitorium C. Duilius struxerat, qui primus rem Romanam prospere mari gessit triumphumque navalem de Poenis meruit.* Bleckmann 2002: 124 astutely conjectures that the *elogium*-like language and information concluding this notice ("Gaius Duilius, who was the first to perform a military feat at sea and earned a naval triumph over the Carthaginians") has an epigraphic source – likely an inscription in the temple itself, or possibly the Columna Duilia inscription; I would also suggest the Forum Augustum *elogium* as a possible source (next n.)

⁴⁶ Newest edition and discussion by Chioffi, *CIL* 6.40952 (2000). Her text is roughly as follows: [—] / [—] *navis o[]c[toginta et Macellam] / [oppidum c]epit. pri[m]us d[e] Poeneis n[]aval[em] trium / [phum] egit. h[]uic per[]mis[]sum est u[]t ab e[]pulis domum / [cum tibici]ne e[]t f[]unali rediret. [ei s]tatua c[]um / [columna] p[]rope a[]ream Vulc[]ani p[]os[]t[]a est. / [aedem apud foru]m ho[litorium] ex spoliis Iano fecit.* Kondratieff 2004: 11 n. 40 suggests alternative supplements to ll. 1–2; see also Geiger 2008: 144–5.

⁴⁷ This cross-reference to the Columna Duilia is spatially tight, since the Forum Romanum is only about 200m from the Forum Augustum. The *elogium* thus seems to invite its viewer/reader to walk this short distance to examine the earlier monument.

and his intention to anchor them firmly in the new monumental landscape that he himself was then creating.

This Augustan monumental landscape was, moreover, firmly oriented toward Augustus' own achievements. As noted in the previous chapter, Augustus himself (according to Suetonius) declared that he put forward the great men of the Forum Augustum as *exempla* for himself and other leading men to emulate.⁴⁸ Scholars further note that Augustus claimed, at least implicitly and in other contexts, to have surpassed these old heroes' achievements. The *elogium* for Duilius, in referring to the old column and perhaps to the temple of Ianus, not only reminded its Augustan-era and later viewers of Duilius' achievements and of their prior commemoration in monumental form, but also invited them to go and see those monuments for themselves: thus Augustus places himself and these viewers on the same level as admirers and potential emulators of the exemplary hero. Furthermore, those monuments were there to be seen because they had been restored on Augustus' initiative – which these viewers would no doubt notice, and ponder Augustus' piety and reverence toward this ancient hero. But they would also notice that the Naulochos column was a close imitator of Duilius' column, and recognize Augustus' claim to a greater achievement in the same competitive arena. Thus the new Augustan monuments – the Naulochos column and the Forum Augustum statue and *elogium* – work together to provide a new frame for the Columna Duilia and the temple of Ianus, those old but restored monuments, and to draw them into a new, teleological story. Duilius' victory is decisively (re)affirmed as a great achievement, but is at the same time positioned as a *precursor* to Octavian's allegedly similar yet greater victory. So while Augustus seeks to fix Duilius as a moral canon and as a model for posterity to imitate, thereby renewing the effort Duilius himself made, he does so in order to parade himself, in particular, as measuring up to and surpassing that venerable exemplary standard. Nor, after 31, is Naulochos the only victory in play. For by then the column's naval iconography might have spurred viewers to reflect on Octavian's naval victory at Actium over Marc Antony and Cleopatra in that year – a victory even more ideologically important than Naulochos. Octavian celebrated a magnificent triumph (over "Egypt," a foreign enemy) for this victory. In the Forum Romanum he mounted rams of captured ships on the new west rostra (map location 120), built a commemorative arch, and possibly erected additional rostral

⁴⁸ Suet. *Aug.* 31.5; discussion in ch. 3.3.3, with ch. 4.5 and n. 54.

columns. The iconography of the Naulochos column obviously cohered with this new cluster of naval victory imagery, potentially allowing the column to assume an additional commemorative function.⁴⁹

These monuments and their interrelationships were the easier to notice and to contemplate thanks to reduced visual clutter and ideological competition. As Susanne Muth has shown, the relocation of the rostra and the construction of the Curia Iulia (map location 119), projects completed under Augustus, swept away a large number of republican-era monuments from the environs of the *comitium*. The monuments that Augustus allowed to remain – like the Columna Duilia – loomed all the larger in a less competitive and distracting monumental environment. No doubt one criterion for selecting a given monument for preservation was its usefulness in sustaining Augustus' own vision of, and teleological claims about, the Roman past.⁵⁰

4.5 Moral Improvement and Moral Decline: Models of Change over Time within Exemplarity

It is not only in respect to Duilius that Augustus claims to have surpassed an exemplary standard of old. Scholars have argued that the overall sculptural program of the Forum Augustum subsumes a large swath of Roman past (albeit a carefully selected and curated past), ranging from Mars to Pompey, into a teleological structure of exemplary performances and associated norms all capped by Augustus himself.⁵¹ Beyond this, Augustus also makes many claims of “firstness” in his *Res Gestae*. As discussed above (ch. 4.3), declaring oneself *primus* in some arena of activity implies that the performance so designated surpasses all that went before, however narrowly that arena may have to be defined for the claim to be sustainable.⁵² Viewing the exemplary dynamics of Augustus' self-presentation retrospectively, he appears as an imitator who has matched and surpassed the prior exemplary performers in the fields in which he competes. As some of his models (like Duilius) are very old, it is not clear or necessarily implied that

⁴⁹ Arch, rams in Rome: Dio 51.19.1–2. Schmuhl 2008: 149–54 discusses these and other monuments for the Actian victory in Rome. By far the largest such monument, however, was erected in Nicopolis in Epirus. Further recent discussion of this victory and monuments by Lange 2016: 129–31, 141–53; Dart/Vervaeke 2011: 279–80; Schmuhl 2008: 154–9.

⁵⁰ Muth 2012: 18–23 and *passim*.

⁵¹ Ch. 3.3.3 and the literature cited there.

⁵² On Augustus' assertions of *primus* status in the *Res Gestae*, see Ridley 2003: 232–4, Ramage 1987: 28–32, Alföldy 1986[1980]: 354–6.

improvement has been continuous over time: it may rather be sporadic, and Augustus' own achievements in certain categories (at least as he presents them) may be the first steps forward in a very long time.

Yet Augustus was also well-attuned to the prospective view. He knew, given the competitive dynamics of Roman exemplarity (ch. 0.4), that subsequent generations of Romans would strive to outstrip him in turn, and he claims to have welcomed that prospect. Suetonius, indeed, says that Augustus commended Roman citizens to judge not only himself, but also leading men of future generations, by the exemplary standards that the Forum Augustum honorees set. The Forum Augustum itself was intended to accommodate bronze statues in its central open area, statues of future commanders who would be honored with "triumphal ornaments" (*ornamenta triumphalia*) for their battlefield successes (the full-scale triumphal procession came to be restricted to members of the imperial family). A number of such memoranda from the first and second centuries CE are known or can plausibly be inferred.⁵³ Also, speaking in the *Res Gestae* of his censorial activities, Augustus expressly declares that he himself has given exemplary models to posterity, as if he foresees future rivals for the crowns he currently claims, and recognizes that he may be bested. In the prospective view too, then, Augustus seems to envision the possibility of improvement, whether continuous or sporadic.⁵⁴

Examples of the "improvement" model are by no means limited to Augustus, and could be multiplied indefinitely. But one class of special cases is particularly noteworthy: the idea of more or less continuous improvement in particular, delimited technical fields. Consider the teleological history of oratory and rhetoric that Cicero presents in his dialogue *Brutus*. This history starts with rough beginnings several centuries before Cicero's day and crescendos to Cicero himself standing as the acme of eloquence. A famous dictum from this dialogue, "nothing has been both created and perfected at the same time," tidily encapsulates the presupposition of improvement over time from a lower initial level of performance. Statements about the esteem in which past orators were held are often qualified by phrases like "eloquent, for those days" (*temporibus illis disertus*), which underscore the presupposition of change over time

⁵³ Geiger 2008: 163–78.

⁵⁴ Suet. *Aug.* 31.5: *professus et edicto commentum id se ut ad illorum velut exemplar et ipse dum viveret et insequentium aetatum principes exigerentur a civibus* (Kaster's text). *RG* 8.5: *ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi*. In fact, both the iconography of his forum and the rhetoric of the *Res Gestae* assert that Augustus would be all but impossible to surpass: Droge 2011/12: 91–6, and ch. 3.3.3 n. 55.

underpinning the developmental regime.⁵⁵ Similar regimes of continuous improvement can also be found in treatises on agriculture and architecture.⁵⁶ Overall, then, one evident answer to the question of how social actors operating within an exemplary framework perceive and understand change over time is this: they grasp the possibility of outstripping previous performers, and/or of being a *primus* – but always within moral categories that are long accepted and assumed to be invariant across the ages. As a species of historical consciousness, exemplarity admits improvement (that is, superior performance within a given moral category), whether continuous or sporadic, as a form of change over time. The scope for such change is open-ended, as the striving of future performers to top their predecessors will presumably continue *ad infinitum*.

The dynamics of exemplarity also allow for actors to fall short of, or not to surpass, the standards set by their predecessors. Like the “improvement” scenario, falling short can happen sporadically or consistently. The claim of moral decline is a familiar trope of Roman historiography – i.e. that *maiores* of a more or less remote past achieved feats in various moral categories that subsequent generations of actors have consistently failed to match, let alone surpass. Consider the alternative continuations of the developmental narrative of Cicero’s *Brutus* that appear in Tacitus’ *Dialogus*. This text is itself a dialogue on the condition of Roman eloquence, written ca. 100 CE but set in 75 CE, about 120 years after Cicero’s death. Here one interlocutor, Messalla, argues that the quality of eloquence has declined since Cicero’s day. Another interlocutor, Aper, deems eloquence to have plateaued since the age of Cicero – though his specious contention that Cicero is his own contemporary perhaps betrays an anxiety about conceding a lack of progress over the previous century.⁵⁷ More thoroughgoing is Livy’s announcement in his preface that moral decline is a key theme of his work. By attending to the early history of the city, Livy says his reader can learn the ways of life and the morals by which the city grew great, and then consider how those morals plateaued, slipped, declined, and finally plunged into vice.⁵⁸ Yet the trope of decline is not inherently pessimistic.

⁵⁵ Ciceronian tag: *nihil est ... simul et inventum et perfectum* (*Brut.* 71). On the historical teleology of the *Brutus* and of the qualifying phrases see Dugan 2005: 196–204.

⁵⁶ Walter 2004a: 50–1 nn. 42–3 for references.

⁵⁷ Tac. *Dial.* 25–6 (Messalla), 16.4–18.6 (Aper). On Messalla’s “decline” model see also ch. 6.2.

⁵⁸ Livy pr. 9: *ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit; labante deinde paulatim disciplina velut dissidentes primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est*. Luce 1977: 250–94 argues that the later surviving books (34–45) depict the beginnings of the

After all, narrating the outstanding deeds of the *maiores* is unmotivated if you don't believe that these exemplary models might, against all odds, have a salutary effect on your readers, and inspire them to seek once again to rival the deeds performed and praise garnered by the ancients. To adduce an exemplum and to stress the norm or norms it sets is to imagine that improvement is possible – that at least some members of your audience will take those salutary norms on board, and will act and judge in light of them. This is exactly the benefit that Livy asserts his reader stands to reap from reading this literary monument: encountering the great deeds of past performers and thereby learning what to imitate for the sake of the commonwealth, and what to avoid.⁵⁹ At any rate, the scenario of moral decline does not render past actors incomprehensible to the present, any more than does the scenario of moral improvement. The *maiores* are perfectly comprehensible to secondary audiences, at any later time, as being “better” than those who come after – and, with luck, as providing norms that will enable later generations to reclaim this ancestral virtue. The categories of moral value within which these evaluations take place, and which allow for direct comparison across the ages, are invariable under either the “decline” or the “improvement” model: the same categories whose validity everyone has always accepted persist, and actors past and present are always commensurable within this fixed, unchanging system.⁶⁰

4.6 Obscure Monuments and Evaluations: Hints of Historicism?

Prior chapters have discussed the phenomenon of the potential monument – an enigmatic object conjectured to be monumental, but in

decline of which Livy speaks, whose seeds lie in Rome's intensifying engagement with rich Greek kingdoms. Similar trope of decline at Sal. *Cat.* 52.19–23.

⁵⁹ Livy pr. 10: *hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum* (i.e. in reading his history) *salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta ... intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites*. Thus even Livy's ancient past involves negative as well as positive exempla. Feldherr 2010: 203–5, 213–15 astutely points out the inherent optimism of historiographers who, while positing moral decline, nevertheless bother to present great deeds of the remote past as exemplary for present actors; likewise Morley 2011: 221, Langlands 2008: 173–5, Walter 2004a: 319–29. Meanwhile Wallace-Hadrill 2008: 229–31 and Stemmler 2001: 226, 237 incorrectly contend that exemplarity builds in moral decline by presenting the past as more valuable and virtuous than the present.

⁶⁰ Historiography also sometimes invokes fortune (*fortuna*) as an agent of change over time, as the fortunes of individuals and groups are said to rise and fall. Yet *fortuna* makes changes within the realm of what is already known, hence the movement from “before” to “after” produces quantitative but not qualitative differences. See Grethlein 2011: 260, Feldherr 2010: 213–15, and ch. 5.2.

need of an exemplary performance, whether already known or fabricated *ad hoc*, to be attached to and which it could be regarded as commemorating.⁶¹ Duilius' case presents a variation on this phenomenon: a "known monument" that all observers agree is monumental, but whose precise relationship to the performance it commemorates, and what moral judgment it communicates, are obscure. The monument in question is the fluteplayer and torchbearer that accompanied Duilius home at night whenever he dined out. Eight surviving texts mention this escort, and a ninth may imply it, making this monument as well-attested as the naval triumph, and significantly better attested than the Columna Duilia or the temple of Ianus. Based on this "air time" in surviving texts, it could be deemed the most significant (or at least, the most attention-getting) of all the monuments associated with Duilius – and rightly so, as it is virtually unparalleled in the repertoire of monuments associated with exemplary figures. Its very uniqueness probably accounts for both the attention it receives and the perplexity it occasions regarding what it commemorates and how.

Unsurprisingly, one strand of interpretation regards Duilius' escort as somehow commemorating his victory. The Forum Augustum *elogium* mentions the granting of this escort amidst of a list of monumental devices that otherwise commemorate Duilius' military success: the triumph, the column, and the temple (if indeed it is mentioned). This context seems to imply that the procession is also a victory monument. Valerius Maximus, a generation after Augustus, explicitly deems it such: he says that Duilius regularly enjoyed this escort, which "bore witness to the striking success of his military undertaking" – though he offers no explanation for how it relates to the victory. Two generations later still, Silius Italicus calls the escort an "honor by night," and mentions it along with the rostral column and military spoils the victor dedicated to Mars (if the text is sound). Silius too, then, places this escort in a context implying that it is a type of victory monument.⁶² And Florus, writing in the age of Hadrian, offers the most explicit statement of this interpretation: he writes, "What joy there was [sc. in the victory]! The commander Duilius, not happy with a triumph of a single day, ordered that throughout his whole life, whenever he returned from dinner, torches should shine and flutes should play before him, as though he were triumphing every day." Florus interprets the after-dinner

⁶¹ E.g. chs. 0.5.3 and n. 38, 1.2.2, 1.2.4 and n. 28, 1.2.6, 2.4 and n. 56.

⁶² For. Aug. *elogium* ll. 4–5: [b]uic per[mis]sum est u[t ab e]pulis domum / [cum tibi]ne e[t flunali] rediret (just following the mention of the first naval triumph, and preceding the mention of the column); Val. Max. 3.6.4: *insignem bellicae rei successum ... testando*. Silius 6.663–9.

escort not as an *ad hoc* monument, but specifically as a reperformance, or iterated re-evocation in miniature, of Duilius' triumphal procession. On this understanding, the escort does not commemorate the victory *per se*, but is a monumental cross-reference recalling another monument – the triumph itself – that, being ephemeral, had passed out of existence.⁶³ This idea that the escort evokes, reperforms, or perpetuates the triumph probably derives from Livy, on whom Florus generally depends. Indeed, the surviving epitome of Livy book 17 declares that Duilius celebrated the first triumph for a naval victory, and for this reason (*ob quam causam*) was granted the torch-and-flute escort as an “honor without end.” This phrasing overtly compares the escort to the triumph, indicating that the escort existed in addition to it (*quoque*) and differed from the triumph's singularity by being continuous (*perpetuus*).⁶⁴

Duilius' escort could also be seen as a performance in its own right, one that invites an audience of witnesses to pass moral judgment upon it. Florus, as quoted above, seems to judge this performance praiseworthy: with each repetition of the after-dinner procession, Duilius summons again the joy associated with the victory, as originally expressed in the triumph itself. Two centuries later, Ammianus Marcellinus (26.3.4–5) describes an alleged imitator of Duilius' retinue and procession. A certain senator, contemporary with Ammianus, was convicted of apprenticing one of his slaves to a teacher of poisoning techniques (*malae artes*), but secured impunity with bribes. This senator then paraded about on a decorated horse with a procession of slaves, “as we hear that old Duilius, after that glorious naval contest of his, claimed for himself the right to return to his house after dinner with a fluteplayer going slowly in front.” Ammianus seems to allow that Duilius' procession reflects the glory of his victory, and can be evaluated positively. But the contemporary senator's self-monumentalization, though deemed to be an imitation (if not a very close one), commemorates

⁶³ Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).10: *cuius quod gaudium fuit, cum Duilius imperator, non contentus unius diei triumpho, per vitam omnem, ubi a cena rediret, praelucere funalia et praecinere sibi tibias iussit, quasi cotidie triumpharet.* Being ephemeral, triumphs tended to be richly cross-referenced in other, more durable monumental forms (e.g. statuary, paintings, funerary or other *elogia*, historiography) to maintain their visibility. Alföldi 1934: 116–18, following Mommsen, seeks to explain Duilius' procession by arguing that torch processions (he omits the flutes) were granted to republican magistrates as a right. But if such processions were a regular and familiar element of magisterial ritual, the sources' puzzlement is inexplicable.

⁶⁴ Livy *Per.* 17: *primusque omnium Romanorum ducum navalis victoriae duxit triumphum. ob quam causam ei perpetuus quoque honos habitus est, ut revertenti a cena tibicine canente funale praeferretur.*

a deed Ammianus deems disgraceful. It is therefore a vicious travesty, not a virtuous imitation, of its exemplary model.⁶⁵

In contrast to these morally ameliorative evaluations of Duilius' escort, consider its more ambiguous presentation in Cicero's dialogue *De Senectute* ("On old age"), written in 150, which is the earliest surviving text in which the escort is mentioned. The dialogue is set in 150, and its principal speaker is Cato the Elder. While the dialogue is fictive, Cato as an historical figure (235–149) died the following year and is consequently imagined here as being 85 years old. In §44 Cato asserts that old age neither requires nor desires extravagant dinner parties with excessive food and drink. This life stage does, however, offer the possibility to enjoy (*delectari*) moderate dinners. Cato then adduces an illustrative instance to support these claims. He says that, when he was a boy, he frequently observed the aged Duilius, the first naval victor over the Carthaginians, coming home with his torchbearer and fluteplayer after dining out. He goes on to say that what Duilius actually enjoyed (*delectabatur*), however, was his "wax torches and fluteplayer, which without precedent he had claimed for himself as a private citizen; his glory authorized so much presumption."⁶⁶ In Cato's view, it seems, Duilius' appropriation of this escort as a *privatus* (i.e. without currently holding public office), hence without any legitimate authority, is a presumptuous taking of liberties (*licentia*). As this vice is more closely connected to the immoderate dinners that Cato decries than to the moderate ones he concedes to this life stage, Cato seems to be imputing immoderation to Duilius. Cato then passes on to describe his own convivial practices, which he declares were frugal even when he was young and became only more so with age. His own example seems to provide the "moderate" pendant to the "immoderate" practice of Duilius – counterpoised positive and negative exempla of how old men should dine, illustrating the governing general statements regarding appropriate and inappropriate dining styles for this life stage.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Amm. 26.3.5: *ut Duillium accepimus veterem, post gloriosa illa navalis rei certamina, id sibi sumpsisse ut tibicine lenius praecinente rediret ad sua post cenam*. For another morally vicious (mis)imitation of a virtuous exemplary model, namely Laetorius' imitation of Horatius Cocles (per Val. Max. 4.7.2), see ch. 1.3.

⁶⁶ Cic. Sen. 44: *quamquam immoderatis epulis caret senectus, modicis tamen conviviis delectari potest. C. Duilius M. f. qui Poenos classe primus devicerat redeuntem a cena senem saepe videbam puer; delectabatur cereo funali et tibicine, quae sibi nullo exemplo privatus sumpserat; tantum licentiae dabat gloria* (Powell's text).

⁶⁷ Chaplin 2000: 185–6 and Martina 1980: 143–5 also see Cicero's Cato as offering a (somewhat veiled) negative judgment on Duilius' escort; Powell 1988: 193 sees no such negative judgment.

There is a further point, however, regarding Duilius' authorization to employ this escort. The torch-and-flute procession can only be deemed an inappropriate taking of liberties if Duilius himself created it, as Cicero's Cato claims: it is not presumptuous if it was authorized by a legitimate authority. Valerius Maximus seems to echo Cicero in attributing responsibility for the escort to Duilius himself and considering it a "presumption," *licentia*.⁶⁸ Other texts that mention the escort split on this point, some attributing responsibility to Duilius himself and others implying that another authority granted it to him as an honor.⁶⁹ Indeed, this question of authority may lie behind one enigmatic, decontextualized reference to Duilius. There was a *controversia* – a rhetorical exercise in which students argue one side or the other of a question – on the topic "whether Duilius should be granted a reward" (*an decernendum Duillio praemium*).⁷⁰ This exercise is possibly a back-formation from the split tradition about the authority, if any, on which Duilius began using his escort. Student declaimers would have the opportunity to debate the escort's moral valence, and to make an argument as to whether some legitimate authority could justifiably grant it.

The ambiguity of Duilius' escort – the questions whether it is a monument to his victory, what relationship it has to his triumph, on what authority he employed it, and what its moral valence is – illustrates the interpretive difficulties that past actions sometimes pose for later interpreters.⁷¹ In particular, it raises the larger question whether some other kind of change, more fundamental than decline and improvement, may have rendered these past actions obscure to judging audiences of later ages. Supposing, for example, that the moral categories themselves change over time – the categories that motivate actors, and whose validity audiences confirm with their positive or negative judgments – then secondary audiences at a sufficient temporal remove no longer possess the same value map, hence cannot immediately understand prior actors' motivations or the judgments passed upon them by earlier witnesses. If these later

⁶⁸ Val. Max. 3.6.4 says Duilius "customarily" employed the escort (*ad funalem cereum praeunte tibicine et fidicine a cena domum reverti solitus est*), but the overall rubric for this section (3.6) is "famous men who indulged themselves ... more freely than ancestral custom allowed" (*licentius sibi quam mos patrius permittebat*). The rubric implies the actor's responsibility, and specifies *licentia* as the (dubious) moral value instantiated.

⁶⁹ Duilius responsible: Flor. *Epit.* 1.18(=2.2).10, Amm. 26.3.5. Escort granted to him (by unspecified authority): For. Aug. *elogium* l. 4, Vir. Ill. 38.4. Responsibility unclear: Livy *Per.* 17, Sil. 6.667–8.

⁷⁰ Kohl 1915: 92 no. 367, with references. There is no further context for this declamatory thema.

⁷¹ Chs. 3.3.4 and 5.3.1 discuss additional examples of monuments and actions about which judgment is bifurcated.

audiences recognize that change in the value categories has occurred, and realize that in order to understand their predecessors as actors and judges they must first reconstruct those predecessors' horizons of expectation and possibility, one could say that they have assumed an historicist perspective. They are no longer "secondary witnesses," who are called upon to accept earlier deeds as normative, but "historians" who recognize that the value categories underpinning their own motivations and judgments differ from those of past actors, hence that current performances cannot be measured against earlier ones in the same categories of value.⁷²

In the current case it seems possible, if unprovable, that a changed moral category accounts for the interpretive split among the sources that mention Duilius' escort. As noted earlier, the sources diverge regarding the authority – his own or someone else's – on which Duilius assumed his escort, and divergent moral implications may follow from the different answers. Yet what if choosing one's own honor or reward was a regular and morally approved practice in Duilius' day, and our surviving authors, living in much later and more regimented times, did not recognize this? Or what if the procession possessed a social and moral logic in its own time and place, which was lost already to Romans writing two or more centuries later? That our sources so conspicuously lack a generally shared understanding of the authority for and moral valence of that escort, and of its relationship to Duilius' deeds, perhaps points to such an unrecognized shift. Yet no surviving source addresses this difficulty explicitly, for instance by acknowledging that the monument is no longer easily interpretable. Only in Cicero's *De Senectute*, where Cato's (probably) negative judgment is veiled and nuanced, is the shakiness of the ground perhaps apprehensible. Nor does any source display even a hint of an historicist perspective, so far as I can detect. This perspective would take the obscurity of Duilius' escort as evidence that moral change has occurred over time, would correspondingly recognize the past as "other" than the present, and might spur the Roman reader to seek to reconstruct that past's values as a means to understanding. Instead, the sources seem to double down on exemplarity.

⁷² Alföldy 1986[1980]: 368 stresses the importance of the continuity of the Roman value system over time, in order for claims of firstness and bestness relative to predecessors to be sustained within that system's framework. As an example of discontinuity, Alföldy (373–6) suggests that Christianization fundamentally changed the Roman value map by providing alternative categories in which people may seek distinction. For example, humility and abasement are valued positively and the ambition for honors negatively, reversing the traditional valence (see Petitfils 2016: 174–99 on humility as an exemplary quality in the early Christian text 1 *Clement*). So even if early Christian exemplarity is structurally similar to traditional Roman exemplarity (so Petitfils in general), shifting categories and moral valences may render Christian performances difficult to measure against classical ones.

They create backstories and attribute motivations in an effort to render the escort morally comprehensible to contemporaries in light of contemporary values. The idea does not seem to occur that the underlying value categories may not be the same as they were in Duilius' day.

In the next chapter, however, I will investigate an exemplary performer – Fabius “Cunctator” – whose story not only presupposes moral change over time, but clearly traces a process of such change. Though very limited, this change is thematized in the sources and is recognized by Roman audiences as having occurred, hence as making the present (slightly) different from the past.

Fabius Cunctator

Competing Judgments and Moral Change

5.1 Introduction: On Changing One's Mind

The previous two chapters, which investigated the figures of Appius Claudius Caecus and Gaius Duilius, spotlighted the question of how to accommodate novelty or innovation within the historical and moral armature of Roman exemplarity. In this chapter, I direct my attention to another figure – Fabius *cunctator*, “the delayer” – who is represented as having broken new moral ground in his exemplary performance, yet whose actions remained perfectly comprehensible within the existing moral framework. According to the sources for Fabius’ struggle against Hannibal in the early years of the second Punic war, contemporary witnesses, primary and secondary, almost all evaluated Fabius’ “delaying” strategy negatively, as exemplifying cowardice. Yet the tradition insists that later secondary audiences, looking back from a greater temporal distance, overturned that original judgment and evaluated his performance positively. This change came about, we shall see, because these audiences came to appreciate a moral distinction that they had previously overlooked, and they refined their judgments accordingly. Put another way, the exemplum of Fabius encodes a degree of moral change. This is not a rupture so profound as to render earlier motivations incomprehensible to later ages, but an evolutionary change that registers a difference between earlier and later moral configurations and deems the later stage superior. Built into the Fabius exemplum, then, is the idea that judging audiences can change their minds as a result of moral development, even as past actors and their motivations remain morally transparent to them; hence that “conventional wisdom” can change. In this chapter I analyze this moral development and the associated shift in evaluation, to illustrate how moral change can be accommodated within an exemplary framework.

As a first approach to this moral change, consider the earliest surviving reference to Fabius *cunctator* – a three-line fragment of Quintus Ennius’

historical epic, the *Annales*. These verses were probably composed in the 170s or early 160s, and read as follows (Enn. *Ann.* fr. 363–5 Sk.):

One person, by delaying, restored the commonwealth for us.
 He did not set people's criticisms [sc. of him] before safety.
 Therefore it is afterward, and more, that the hero's glory now shines out.¹

Scholars have observed that these verses are already in the business of mythmaking, of manufacturing Fabius and his strategy of “delay” as an exemplum for subsequent generations of social actors. The speaker of these words places Fabius’ “delaying” in the past, and compares its reception by Fabius’ contemporaries with its reception in later eras. This speaker may be “Ennius” the epic narrator, or (perhaps more likely) a Roman general who appears as a character later in the poem and adduces the example of Fabius to justify his own circumspection.² The second verse hints at the conflict of values and evaluation that we shall see is central to the tradition: Fabius pursued safety (*salus*), evidently by his delaying; and disregarded criticisms (*rumores*) that were presumably propagated by contemporaries who opposed his approach. The third verse, however, asserts that posterity’s view of Fabius’ performance is positive: it is “now” (*nunc*, in the speaker’s present time), and “later” (*post*, after Fabius’ deeds), that the “glory of the hero” (*virī ... gloria*, both words bestowing approbation) “shines forth the more” (*magis ... claret*). This assertion, in turn, explains and corroborates the assertion in the first verse that Fabius “restored the commonwealth for us” – *nobis* signals the importance of Fabius’ achievement for the (post-Fabian) speaker and the Roman community of that later day. This description of Fabius was among the best known passages of Ennius’ poem in antiquity, to judge from the frequency of subsequent quotations or allusions. Evidence for this passage first appears (among surviving texts) in a letter of Cicero to Atticus dating to 59 (*Att.* 2.19.2), where Cicero quotes the first verse in a way that shows it was already proverbial. Cicero also quotes all three verses in a pair of dialogues dating to 44 (*Sen.* 10,

¹ Enn. *Ann.* fr. 363–5 Sk.: *Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. / noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem. / ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret*. On this poem’s date see Skutsch 1985: 4–6, Rebuffat 1982.

² These verses are ascribed by Macrobius *Sat.* 6.1.23 to *Annales* book 12, which deals with events much later than the “delaying” episode. If this ascription is correct, the verses must appear in a context in which Fabius is being invoked as an exemplary model. For the possibilities see Skutsch 1985: 530–1, Rebuffat 1982: 157–65, Stanton 1971: 52, and ch. 5.4 below; on their exemplifying quality overall, Barchiesi 2009: 58–60.

Off. 1.84) – our only sources for the entire set. In subsequent authors there are further quotations, paraphrases, or echoes of the first or second verse.³

As an historical figure, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus “Cunctator” was a leading Roman politician and general before and during the second Punic war. His first consulship was in 233 BCE, when he defeated the Ligurians, celebrated a triumph, and dedicated a temple to Honos (“honor”). Regarding his second consulship in 228 virtually no information is transmitted, though his iteration as consul after just five years suggests that his contemporaries esteemed him highly. His selection as dictator in 217, following the Roman military disaster at Lake Trasimene, was likely due – at least in part – to his prior record of military success, as well as his seniority and experience as a two-time consul. In his third and fourth consulships, during the darkest days of the second Punic war (215–214), he supposedly enjoyed modest military successes in the struggle against Hannibal. In his fifth consulship (209) he recaptured the important city of Tarentum, which had defected to Hannibal several years earlier; for this victory he received a second triumph.⁴ Such a figure would seem to embody perfectly the traditional military virtues of the middle republican noble, and to be unproblematically exemplary for his *virtus* and related moral qualities.⁵

At the heart of the Fabian exemplum, however, lies a moral ambiguity that is central not only to understanding Ennius’ verses but for making sense of the entire subsequent tradition. For the tradition holds that, during the six months of his dictatorship in 217, Fabius confronted Hannibal not by seeking to join a large-scale set battle, but by avoiding it. He merely shadowed Hannibal’s movements, thus “delaying” a major confrontation. In purposefully avoiding what would ordinarily be considered a golden

³ The first verse is recognizable in Livy 30.26.9, Verg. *Aen.* 6.846, Aug. *apud* Suet. *Tib.* 21.5, Ov. *Fast.* 2.240–2, Sen. *Ben.* 4.27.2, Serenus *Med.* 1094, Serv. *Aen.* 8.645, Macrobi. *Sat.* 6.1.23. Looser paraphrases or fainter echoes of the first and second verses are more numerous; Elliott 2009: 533, Skutsch 1985: 529–30, and Stanton 1971: 52–6 list the candidates. Most of these will be discussed in this chapter. Readers will disagree, however, whether any particular proposed echo actually recalls Ennius.

The manuscripts of Cic. *Sen.* 10 and *Off.* 1.84 read *non enim* at the start of the second verse; Lachmann’s restoration of *noenum* (metrical and Ennian) for Ennius himself tends to be cautiously accepted by modern editors. If this conjecture is correct, it remains unclear whether the corruption stood already in Cicero’s own text of Ennius (entailing that *non enim* is the correct reading in Cicero) or occurred later, in the Ciceronian manuscript tradition: see Skutsch 1985: 531, Powell 1988: 125.

⁴ Also censor 230 and dictator ca. 221 (probably to hold elections; he abdicated due to an ill omen: Val. Max. 1.1.5). Basic career information appears in the indices of Broughton 1951; detailed recent discussion by Beck 2005: 274–301 and Feig Vishnia 2007 (alternative view). Beck 2005: 280–1 discusses the significance of his early iteration in the consulship.

⁵ Indeed, my synopsis of Fabius’ achievements nearly replicates Augustus’ own synopsis in the Forum Augustum *elogium* – a text overtly out to exemplify its honorand.

opportunity to lead Roman troops into battle and defeat a particularly fearsome and dangerous enemy, he deprived himself and his soldiers of the opportunity to display valor in battle, collect spoils, celebrate a triumph, win military decorations, and gain the associated renown. He was consequently accused of lacking the virtues and capacities required in a Roman general. Yet the tradition also holds that Fabius defended his unorthodox generalship by criticizing conventional military action and values, and invoking an alternative set of values instead; in time the collective judgment swung around to his viewpoint. The Fabian exemplum, then, stages first a conflict of evaluations, and then a moral change – a refinement of judging audiences' capacity to distinguish among moral concepts.

In analyzing the moral complexities of the Fabian exemplum, I proceed thematically through the constituent elements of the tradition, juxtaposing monuments from all eras in my discussion of each thematic element. While the different monuments, each with its own rhetorical and moral aim, emphasize different aspects of the tradition,⁶ I cannot discern any systematic chronological development in the way these monuments represent Fabius. Indeed, almost all the crucial elements are already present, explicitly or implicitly, in the three verses of Ennius quoted above. One must also bear in mind that both the performance itself and the debates about it, as represented in the sources, possibly bear no relation to Fabius' actual actions or to actual contemporary discourse regarding his strategy; my analysis makes no claims to historical correctness (ch. 0.5.3). I investigate, rather, the ways Romans of later eras imagine those debates to have played out, and the value conflicts that these (imagined) debates put on display. It is these imagined debates and conflicts that make Fabius a useful exemplum, and that offer later Roman actors and judges a touchstone by which to think about value conflicts in their own day.

5.2 *Rumores vs. salus: The Complex Morality of Delay*

Late in June of 217 BCE, the story goes, the awful news reached Rome that a consular army had been crushed in battle at Lake Trasimene and that a consul, Gaius Flaminius, had been killed. In the wake of this disaster Fabius was appointed dictator to face Hannibal; Marcus Minucius Rufus was appointed master of the horse.⁷ Fabius ordered a consultation

⁶ See, for instance, Ridley 2000: 29–31 on the divergent representations of Fabius by Polybius and Livy (with further references), and Beck 2002 on Plutarch's distinctive aims.

⁷ The surviving consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus took up a naval command during the dictatorship, returning as consul after the six months of the dictatorship had elapsed. On the unusual constitutional

of the Sibylline books, after which games and sacrifices were offered and a “sacred spring” (*ver sacrum*) was vowed.⁸ Then he took command of the remaining consular army, raised fresh troops, and marched off in pursuit of Hannibal, who by then had moved into southern Italy. Once in contact with the enemy, Fabius began to implement his distinctive strategy of non-engagement. As Hannibal’s army pillaged and burned, Fabius neither offered nor accepted set battle, and the tradition contains divergent accounts of his willingness to intervene even to protect Roman and allied property from Hannibal’s depredations. The tradition is unanimous, however, in asserting that he kept his own soldiers in camp, apart from sending out well-organized foraging parties and raiding enemy foraging parties that took inadequate precautions. He limited himself to shadowing Hannibal’s movements, pitching camp always within sight of the enemy, yet in the hills to evade the cavalry. This strategy, pursued throughout the six months of his dictatorship, earned Fabius the nickname *cunctator*, “delayer.”⁹

Fabius is said to have justified his “delaying” strategy in two principal ways. Some texts ascribe to him the view that his inexperienced army could best be trained up through skirmishing and micro-engagements; he did not believe his raw recruits could (yet) win a set battle against Hannibal’s hardened veterans.¹⁰ This idea is encapsulated in the widespread assertion that Fabius wanted, above all, to keep his soldiers safe, and lose no more of them than absolutely necessary for the good of the commonwealth (see below). Alternatively, Fabius is sometimes portrayed as holding that, while his own army was well-provisioned, Hannibal’s would weaken and degrade for want of money and supplies, as well as from the small but consistent losses that accompany endless raiding and skirmishing. Thus advantage is gained by the very act of deferring a large-scale engagement. This view presupposes – as the tradition in fact maintains – that no Roman allies had yet defected to Hannibal, hence that all his supplies had to be procured through raiding. Indeed, several texts assert that, at certain points during Fabius’ dictatorship and thereafter, Hannibal was so pressed for supplies that he feared he could not defend his own camp, or was forced to attempt ever more risky ruses in hopes of escaping the Roman noose, or

circumstances of Fabius’ and Minucius’ appointments, already probed by Livy (22.8.5–7, 22.31.8–11), see Beck 2005: 284–6, Lesinski 2002, Hartfield 1982: 495–6.

⁸ Livy 22.9.7–11, Plut. *Fab.* 4.4–7, Sil. 7.74–89; see below.

⁹ Livy 22.12.3–10, Polyb. 3.89–90, Plut. *Fab.* 5.1–3, Sil. 7.90–5, 123–30. Richardson 2012: 58–64 offers a longer summary of this tradition. On the monumental character of the nickname, see below.

¹⁰ Training and encouraging soldiers through skirmishing: Polyb. 3.90.4, Livy 22.12.10; Sil. 7.90–5 (Marius does likewise: Sal. *Jug.* 87.1–3). Not confident that his soldiers can defeat Hannibal’s: Polyb. 3.89.5–8, Polyæn. 8.14.1, Dio (Zon.) 8.25.

contemplated withdrawing from Italy altogether.¹¹ Under either the “training up his soldiers” or “degrading Hannibal’s forces” explanation, Fabius is portrayed as displaying caution and foresight as a commander – a characterization that plays a large role in the tradition.¹²

His “delaying” strategy also reflects a widespread Roman idea about the fickleness of *fortuna*. To this point in the war, Hannibal’s fortune has been spectacularly good and the Romans’ fortune correspondingly bad. But fortune, by its nature, is bound to change sooner or later. Under the “training up his soldiers” explanation of Fabius’ delaying, he is waiting for fortune to change and to smile on the Romans by providing an obviously advantageous opportunity to join battle. In the meantime, it only makes sense to husband Roman troops carefully and prepare them for the eventual clash.¹³ Under the “degrading Hannibal’s forces” explanation, according to which the very delaying of battle stands to defeat Hannibal in and of itself, the awaited change in fortune is already at hand in the form of a commander who brilliantly refuses to engage.¹⁴ For by the end of Fabius’ six-month term as dictator, he can be said to have all but defeated Hannibal despite never having come to blows, and the following year – when he holds no command – he can be imagined as saying to the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus that Hannibal will wither away or leave Italy provided nobody offers him battle that year.¹⁵ While the tradition admits both explanations for Fabius’ “delaying,” it is the latter explanation, ascribing to Fabius the view that Hannibal should never on principle be offered battle, that predominates (ch. 5.3.2).

Whether either explanation of Fabius’ strategy was ever actually propounded in debate at the time is uncertain, and the “degrading Hannibal’s forces” explanation in particular has been impugned on historical grounds.¹⁶ These explanations may, however, be understood as attempts

¹¹ Polyb. 3.90.2–3, Livy 22.15.2, 22.24.9–10, 22.32.1–3, 22.40.7–8, 22.43.2–4; Frontin. *Str.* 1.5.28; Sil. 8.11–15; App. *Han.* 12.49–13.56; Plut. *Fab.* 5.1, 4, *Mor.* 195C–D; Dio (Zon.) 8.26.

¹² On Fabian foresight see e.g. Sen. *Ira* 2.13.4: *turpissimum aiebat Fabius imperatori excusationem esse ‘non putavi’* (“I didn’t expect that”); also Nep. *Han.* 5.2, Cic. *Off.* 1.108, *De Or.* 1.210–11, *Ver.* 2.5.25. This quality is cast in his face in Plut. *Fab.* 7.3: after Hannibal employs a stratagem to escape a Fabian trap, Fabius is mocked for being bested in the one arena where he claimed superiority, namely judgment and foresight (γνώμη, πρόνοια).

¹³ Fabius waits for a change in fortune: Livy 22.12.2, 10; Sil. 7.9–11, 90–3, 234–47. On *fortuna* as an agent of historical change, see Grethlein 2011: 260, Feldherr 2010: 213–15.

¹⁴ In Beck’s (2000: 80) formulation of this alternative, the question is whether Fabius becomes the *cunctator* through “delaying” an eventual, conventional military performance, or whether his “delaying” is itself the performance.

¹⁵ Livy 22.39.13–15, Plut. *Fab.* 14.6.

¹⁶ Erdkamp 1992: 132–6 and Beck 2000: 86–7 point out that the rich Campanian countryside should have furnished Hannibal with abundant and ready provisions, even without local allies. Erdkamp

by later secondary audiences to make sense of a strategy that, on its face, seems a most un-Roman way of confronting a formidable enemy. For by avoiding significant military engagement, Fabius all but eliminated any opportunity for his soldiers, cavalrymen, and officers to display their valor in combat (*virtus*) and gain the renown or positive report (*gloria*, ch. 5.3.3) that serves as the earliest monument to that valor. In a militaristic society in which martial courage is perhaps the highest moral value, to deny one's fellow-citizens the opportunity to display that courage and accumulate the accompanying prestige is a sure route to unpopularity.

Indeed, the tradition holds that Fabius' contemporaries heavily criticized his strategy, labeling his refusal to pursue military *gloria* in the expected way as cowardice (the vice opposed to military valor). Polybius writes that Fabius was at first generally despised and reputed to be cowardly and dumbstruck in the face of danger. Polyaeus says that he was called a coward by his fellow senators, while Plutarch adds that his own soldiers spoke ill of him, and that the enemy too considered him cowardly and contemptible – all except for Hannibal, who alone understood how formidable Fabius was proving himself to be.¹⁷ Fabius' master of the horse, Marcus Minucius Rufus, favored a more conventional strategy of aggressive pursuit and risking battle. In the Fabian tradition Minucius serves as a foil whose character and actions reveal those of Fabius by contrast. As such, he and his allies in Rome feed the prevailing discontentment with Fabius' strategy by stigmatizing him as mean and cowardly, contrasting this characterization with Minucius' own desire to enact traditional military values.¹⁸ This contrast is only strengthened by Minucius' success in a skirmish he conducts, contrary to Fabius' express orders, while Fabius is away from the army. At this point a tribune in Rome, Metilius, proposes

is also skeptical about Livy's claim that the Roman cavalry effectively harried the Carthaginians and thus restricted their foraging (129–31).

¹⁷ Polyb. 3.89.3: τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς κατεφρονεῖτο καὶ παρεῖχε λόγον ὡς ἀποδεδειακῶς καὶ καταπεπληγμένους τὸν κίνδυνον. Polyaeus. 8.14.1: Φάβιος ... μὴ παρατασσόμενος κακῶς ἤκουεν ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ ... ἐν μὲν τῷ παραυτίκα ἐνομίσθη δειλός. Plut. *Fab.* 5.3: οὕτω δὲ παράγων τὸν χρόνον ὑπὸ πάντων κατεφρονεῖτο, καὶ κακῶς μὲν ἤκουεν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, κομιδῇ δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄτολμος ἐδόκει καὶ τὸ μὴδὲν εἶναι, πλὴν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς Ἀννίβου. For enemy leaders as audiences and judges of the virtuous actions of Roman heroes, recall Porsenna's and Pontius' evaluations of Cloelia's deed (ch. 2.1 and 2.3, with nn. 6, 52).

¹⁸ A range of "foil" figures creates a "virtue wheel," as with the figures surrounding Appius Claudius Caecus in Livy's narration (ch. 3.2); on "foils" see Beck 2002: 468–70. Minucius' views and words about Fabius: Polyb. 3.90.6, 3.94.10 (where Minucius' desire to "risk battle," διακινδυνεύειν, contrasts with the avoidance of "risk," κίνδυνος, that characterizes Fabius' concern for safety: cf. Dio fr. 57.11), Livy 22.14.14, Plut. *Fab.* 5.6–8, App. *Han.* 12.51–2. Xenophon 2012: 166–71 contends that Plutarch sharpens the contrast between Fabius and Minucius even beyond what is seen elsewhere in the tradition, with the biographical aim of casting Fabius' character into highest relief.

elevating Minucius to the unprecedented rank of co-dictator; Livy gives Metilius a speech in which he develops further the contrast between the two commanders and their strategies. Metilius argues that the soldiers, along with Minucius himself, had been held by Fabius as if in detention or captivity, and that their weapons had been all but taken away from them. Only in Fabius' absence did they break out and rout the enemy. He implies that Fabius is himself virtually the enemy, imprisoning Roman soldiers to prevent them from displaying their military valor and dispatching Hannibal. Metilius and Minucius thus hold that Roman soldiers are capable of and eager for victory, if only Fabius would allow an engagement; and since he will not, he must be replaced or supplemented by a commander who will.¹⁹ Minucius is then elevated to co-dictator, a move portrayed as the people's rebuke to Fabius for manifesting the wrong moral values, and its reward to Minucius for displaying the right ones.²⁰

A second criticism, related to but distinct from the question of military values, is that Fabius' strategy is dishonorable. The Romans lose face and forsake their obligations, this argument goes, when Fabius gives Hannibal free rein to plunder and burn the property of Roman colonists, Italian allies, and others as he moves without hindrance through Italy. In particular, Hannibal inflicted great suffering on Beneventum, Telesia, and Sinuessa, though for the moment all colonies and allies remained loyal.²¹ In Livy, Minucius makes a speech lamenting that the army has followed Hannibal only to watch from high ground the slaughter and fiery destruction of the allies and Roman colonists at Sinuessa. When Minucius invokes the *pudor* the soldiers should feel in light of that city's suffering, he implies the moral discredit that attaches to their failure to intervene.²² Plutarch gives Minucius similar remarks in shorter compass.²³ In Minucius' and his supporters' view, then, Roman honor demands that the army at least be seen to be trying to protect Italy from Hannibal. This requires military confrontation, aggression, daring, and risk – the very qualities that

¹⁹ Livy 22.25.6–9: *M. Minucium magistrum equitum, ne hostem videret, ne quid rei bellicae gereret, prope in custodia habitum ... exercitum cupientem pugnare et magistrum equitum clausos prope intra vallum retentos; tamquam hostibus captivis arma adempta. tandem, ut abscesserit inde dictator, ut obsidione liberatos extra vallum egressos fuisse ac fugasse hostes*. Cf. Sil. 7.504–10. In Plut. *Fab.* 8.4, Metilius accuses Fabius of treason (προδοσία) even more than cowardice (μαλακία/ἀνανδρία); likewise Dio (Zon.) 8.26. In Polyb. 3.103.2, the Romans conclude that the problem is not cowardice (ἀποδελίασις) by the soldiers, but over-caution (εὐλάβεια) on the part of the commander.

²⁰ Polyb. 3.103.1–4, Livy 22.26.5, Sil. 7.511–18, App. *Han.* 12.51–2, Plut. *Fab.* 10.1, Dio (Zon.) 8.26.

²¹ E.g. Polyb. 3.90.7–14.

²² 22.14.4–5, 7–8; cf. 22.13.10–11.

²³ *Fab.* 5.6.

distinguish men of valor, such as himself, from cowards. The tradition ultimately rejects the accusation of cowardice against Fabius, as we shall see. The question of honor, however, seems more worrisome to the authors who narrate Fabius' dictatorship. Perhaps with an eye toward this problem, some authors credit Fabius with doing his best to offer protection insofar as difficult conditions allow. Polybius says that Fabius wanted the allies to think he was not abandoning the countryside, while Appian avers that Fabius at least kept Hannibal from besieging any cities or ravaging the countryside.²⁴ Dio Cassius, too, reports that, when the people appointed Fabius dictator, they were looking to their own survival and gave the allies no help, though later took consideration for the allies' safety to secure their loyalty.²⁵ These authors thus seek to mitigate the charge that Fabius' strategy is dishonorable, even if they cannot conjure from it a full-scale defense of Italy. The objections to Fabius' strategy, then, are fundamentally moral and social. Judging audiences evaluate his actions negatively in regard to his own courage, that of his soldiers and officers (who would perform better under different command), and the honor of Rome among its allies and colonies. These judgments diminish Fabius' standing relative to other actors advocating more aggressive strategies that more easily or "obviously" admit positive evaluation in these key moral categories.

Yet moral grounds can also be invoked in defense of Fabius' strategy. A distinctive feature of the Fabian tradition is its insistence upon an overarching *cui bono* consideration that subsumes the moral evaluation of individual military performances. In particular, the sources often assert that Fabius is attending to "the good of the commonwealth (*res publica*)," a moral category that stands above and embodies the ultimate aim of all other moral categories. Rather than worry about how individual or collective performances are evaluated by contemporary judging audiences in the category of *virtus*, and what sort of *gloria* consequently accrues to these performers, Fabius looks always to the overarching moral question: does an action benefit the commonwealth? Ordinarily, valor displayed by Roman soldiers and officers in battle benefits the commonwealth by increasing the likelihood of victory. But in the current situation, Hannibal's uncanny

²⁴ Polyb. 3.92.6, App. *Han.* 12.50, 13.57.

²⁵ Dio fr. 57.8, Dio (Zon.) 8.25. Livy 22.8.7 attributes similar motives to the senate. Beck 2000: 87 argues that Minucius' argument makes strategic sense: it is risky to abandon the allies and colonies to their fates; therefore a more interventionist, active strategy is needed. Cf. Rambaud 1980: 120–1. After Cannae, when the Romans' capacity to aid allies was even further reduced, some did defect (Livy 22.61.10–12), and others who appealed to Rome for aid were told to take counsel for themselves (e.g. Livy 23.20.4–10). Yet even then, certain efforts were made to lend aid: immediately after Cannae, a fleet was sent to Sicily at Hieron's request (Livy 22.56.6–8).

success in pitched battles opens a gap between the ultimate good of the commonwealth and the everyday concern to display *virtus* via aggressive military confrontation. The latter, shockingly, has ceased to be a means to the former, and indeed is having the opposite effect. Fabius consequently holds that, if meeting Hannibal in battle entails losses on a scale that puts the very survival of the commonwealth at risk, then the conventional pursuit of *gloria* through displays of military *virtus* must be sacrificed in the interest of commonwealth, and other strategies must be pursued. The legend of Fabius thus builds in the possibility for judging audiences to offer conflicting evaluations: that Fabius' performance is cowardly and dishonorable, or that it attends properly to the good of the commonwealth. Choosing between these options entails some difficulties. A soldier in battle performs specific, concrete, visible actions with decisive consequences; such a performance can be observed and evaluated immediately. But one's success or failure at helping the commonwealth to survive is much less tangible and involves no prescribed set of actions. Furthermore, such a performance can only be assessed retrospectively, over a longer time frame. Thus, even if the long-term judgment on Fabius is positive for preserving the commonwealth, the short-term judgment may still be negative for the cowardly and dishonorable avoidance of battle. This tension between positive and negative judgments is more profound than the tension seen, for example, in the case of Cloelia, whose escape from Porsenna was judged both valorous and perfidious. In her case, the perfidy was repaired by returning her to Porsenna's custody, a measure that did not detract from the valor of her deed.²⁶ In Fabius' case, avoidance of battle is itself the basis for both the immediately negative judgment of cowardice and the eventually positive judgment for preserving the commonwealth. This dilemma leaves no clear way to repair the negative evaluation for cowardice without putting the longer term aim, and the positive evaluation it prospectively warrants, at risk. The discussion to follow will illuminate how these complexities play out.

This Fabian concern for the good of the *res publica* is often expressed in terms of the preoccupation with "safety" noted earlier. One might say that "safety for the good of the commonwealth" is Fabius' guiding principle. The Ennian fragment, as noted earlier, asserts that delaying was the means by which Fabius set the commonwealth back up on its feet (*cunctando restituit rem*), and links this strategy with his concern for "safety" (*salus*).

²⁶ Ch. 2.3 and n. 50 on mixed judgments.

Valerius Maximus echoes and expands the terse Ennian sentiment.²⁷ In Cicero's dialogue *De Senectute* ("On old age"), the principal speaker, Cato the Elder, says that as a youth he ardently admired the much older Fabius. He reports that he once heard Fabius, who was an augur, declare that "whatever was done with the safety of the commonwealth in view was done under the best of auspices, and whatever was done contrary to the good of the commonwealth was inauspicious."²⁸ The "delaying" strategy itself is expressly attributed to this concern for the safety of the commonwealth. Furthermore, following an episode in which Minucius as co-dictator rashly leads soldiers into a Hannibalic trap and Fabius' soldiers must save them from annihilation, several texts say that Minucius' soldiers hail Fabius as their "salvation" or "father" (*salus, parens, pater*); and in Silius, Minucius himself acclaims Fabius as his "fatherland" and as "the walls of the city."²⁹ These metaphors are ameliorative: "father" metaphorically represents "savior" through the idea of owing one's life to someone and feeling correspondingly grateful; and everyone agrees that a city needs a defensive wall. Thus Minucius, once he has accepted that Fabius' approach is correct, abandons his former rhetoric of moral condemnation for one of moral justification (more on these ameliorative representations of Fabius' strategy in ch. 5.4). One imagines that Fabius' opponents could have found ways to invoke the "the good of the *res publica*" in support of an aggressive strategy; perhaps they did so in historical actuality. But in surviving sources, at least, they never do so: the only moral arguments allowed to them are those couched in terms of individual or collective courage, honor, glory, and their opposites; Fabius is given a monopoly on the overarching "good of the *res publica*" argument.³⁰

Finally, Fabius' prioritizing of "safety for the good of the commonwealth" is visible in the particular sort of sacrifice that he vowed, or that was vowed on his delegated authority, soon after he assumed the dictatorship. The sacrifice in question is a *ver sacrum* or "sacred spring," which is unattested at Rome apart from this instance. The *ver sacrum* involves

²⁷ Val. Max. 3.8.2: *numquam a consilii salubritate ne parvi quidem certaminis discrimine recessit ... ita hic non dimicando maxime civitati nostrae succurrise visus est.*

²⁸ Sen. 11: *dicere ausus est optimis auspiciis ea geri quae pro rei publicae salute gererentur; quae contra rem publicam ferrentur, contra auspicia ferri.*

²⁹ Sil. 7.743: *hic patria est, murique urbis stant pectore in uno* (cf. 7.734–5). Also For. Aug. *elogium*: *eo nomine ab exercitu Minuciano pater appellatus est*; Plut. *Fab.* 14.3–5.

³⁰ The idea that the safety of soldiers and commonwealth was Fabius' overriding concern is also thematized in Polyb. 3.89.2; Livy 22.12.8–10, 22.25.15; Sil. 6.619–26, 9.52–5 (and *passim*); Frontin. *Str.* 4.6.1; Dio fr. 57.9–10. This "safety" is contrasted with Minucius' rashness at Livy 22.30.3; Sil. 7.396–400, 705–45; Plut. *Fab.* 10.7, 13.7.

consecrating to Iuppiter all livestock born in Italy in some future spring, on the condition that “the commonwealth survives the next five years in these wars.”³¹ It is entirely consistent with Fabius’ approach that he enlists the gods to the Roman cause through the vow of a *ver sacrum*, rather than through the more conventional, even banal, channel of vowing a temple before or in the heat of battle.³² The vow in battle is a wager on the *virtus* of the current soldiers and officers, a bet that they will display sufficient valor to secure victory in the immediate battle. No explicit reference is made to the long-term welfare of the commonwealth, though victory now is no doubt assumed to benefit the commonwealth in the longer term. The *ver sacrum*, by contrast, is explicitly a wager on the medium- to long-term survival of the commonwealth – after all, Iuppiter gets nothing if the commonwealth does not survive to discharge the vow. But the vow specifies nothing about what commanders, soldiers, or anyone else must do to ensure survival. Hence there is no express privileging of performance in battle, and the door is opened to alternative approaches.³³

5.3 *Gloria through cunctatio: The Paradoxes of Fabian “Delay”*

The competing judgments about Fabius’ strategy are encapsulated in several paradoxical formulations that are spread widely through the tradition. These paradoxes relate to Fabius’ monumental nickname *Cunctator*, to claims about “winning without fighting,” and to expressions about the sources of *gloria*. I survey these formulations in turn.

³¹ Livy 22.10.2–3: *si res publica populi Romani Quiritium ad quinquennium proximum ... salva servata erit hisce duellis* (cf. 22.9.10, with different wording). The “sacred spring” has Sabellic origins, where it is associated with colonization and ethnic identity-formation; recent discussion and further references in Farney 2007: 206–10.

³² Fabius may have done just this in his first consulship of 233, as he dedicated a temple to Honos following his victory over the Ligurians: ch. 5.6.

³³ Livy 22.9.7–10.6 presents a complex votive procedure. Fabius asks the senate to instruct the *decemviri* to consult the Sibylline books. The *decemviri* recommend, among other things, a *ver sacrum*, provided the people approve. The senate instructs a praetor to ensure that everything occurs as the *pontifices* require; the *pontifex maximus* apparently generates the formula put to the people for approval. Once the formula is approved, it is the praetor who actually vows the *ver sacrum*, as Livy tells us later (33.44.1–2). Thus Fabius is the prime mover, but does not pronounce the vow himself. Plutarch (*Fab.* 4.6) simplifies things considerably by making Fabius himself pronounce the vow, though here the stipulation “if the state survives the next five years” is lacking. Polyb. 3.88.7 is more general still. On this *ver sacrum* and its terms see Clark 2014, esp. 415. The sacrifice was finally carried out in 195 (and repeated in 194): discussion in Pina Polo 2011: 52–7.

5.3.1 Cunctator

I begin with the verb *cunctor*, along with its associated nouns *cunctatio* and *cunctator*, in their application to Fabius. These words are ethically versatile, a consequence of their apparent lack of inherently strong positive or negative connotations. Their moral valence therefore can switch between approbative and pejorative, and Fabius can correspondingly be revalued, as context requires.³⁴ First for the pejorative uses. The *De Viris Illustribus* says that the tag *cunctator* was bestowed by Fabius' critics, which implies that it was "originally" intended as a reproach.³⁵ Indeed it is so used throughout the tradition. Livy's Minucius hurls this word against Fabius on two different occasions. While the Roman army follows Hannibal toward Campania without intervening to prevent the devastation of the Italian countryside, Minucius laments the "delaying and indolence" (*cunctatio et socordia*) that has allowed an enemy from so far away to storm into the very heart of the Roman confederation. Thanks to Fabius' delaying (*cunctatio*), says Minucius, it was for Hannibal that our ancestors repeatedly saved Italy.³⁶ The ascription of this whole sorry state of affairs to the commander's (in)action, as well as the explicit glossing of *cunctatio* with the unambiguously negative term *socordia*, ethically blackens the word and renders it a term of reproach. Later, after being elevated to co-dictator, Minucius is made to say that he will follow his own counsel "if the dictator persists in that delay and sloth (*cunctatio ac segnitie*) that has been condemned by the judgment of both gods and men."³⁷ Here again the generally reproachful context, along with the specific glossing of *cunctatio* with the pejorative "synonym" *segnities*, casts the word in a negative light and seeks to pin it to Fabius as a reproach.³⁸

³⁴ For what follows, compare Elliott 2009: 532–5. She regards *cunctari* as "originally" pejorative (535), until redeemed by Ennius and/or its Fabian associations. This supposition is possible but unverifiable, given the sparseness of pre-Fabian or even pre-Ennian Latin (the two Plautine occurrences of *cunctor* are not illuminating). Hence I prefer to say that the word can always be used either pejoratively or approbatively, depending on context.

³⁵ *Vir. Ill.* 14.6: [sc. *Fabius*] *Cunctator ab obtrectatoribus dictus*. Similarly Dio (Zon.) 8.25: διὸ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν αἰτίαν εἶχεν, ὥς καὶ μελλήτης ἐπονομασθῆναι. Thus the nickname μελλήτης (i.e. *cunctator*) was a "reproach" from his fellow-citizens.

³⁶ Livy 22.14.5–6, 10: *Poenus advena, ab extremis orbis terrarum terminis nostra cunctatione et socordia iam huc progressus? tantum pro degeneravimus a patribus nostris. ... quam* [sc. *Italiam*] *vereor ne sic cunctantibus nobis Hannibali ac Poenis totiens servaverint maiores nostri*.

³⁷ Livy 22.27.4: *si dictator in cunctatione ac segnitie deorum hominumque iudicio damnata perstaret*.

³⁸ Similar "reproachful" usages: Livy 27.21.2, where a tribune accuses the nobility of *cunctatio* and *fraus* in allowing Hannibal to linger in Italy; also Sil. 9.52–5, where Aemilius Paullus replies to Terentius Varro's criticism that Fabius is *cunctator et aeger* (feeble) by invoking the "safety" argument: at least Fabius' soldiers are now present to take up arms, in contrast to Flaminius'. In Dio fr. 57.11, Fabius himself invokes the "safety" argument against the negative characterization of his delaying: ἐγκλημα

Similar contextualizing moves may also, however, render *cunctatio* approbative. Livy, in his authorial voice, says that Minucius “abused Fabius as being not a delayer (*cunctator*) but slothful (*segnis*), and not as cautious (*cautus*) but as fearful (*timidus*), imputing vices adjacent to his virtues.” Here Livy implies that the words *cunctator* and *cautus* name virtues, while the words *segnis* and *timidus*, which he says that Minucius maliciously applied to Fabius, name the “adjacent” vices.³⁹ With this description Livy undercuts in advance the criticisms he later puts in Minucius’ mouth: for two chapters later, Minucius does apply the word *cunctatio* to Fabius, glossing it with *socordia* and *segnities* to render it a vice, as just discussed.⁴⁰ Minucius thus misunderstands the word’s true value and meaning – previously vouched for by Livy’s authorial voice – when he deploys it pejoratively to characterize his colleague. Livy also vindicates *cunctatio* as a virtue when he asserts that Fabius’ “clever delaying” (*sollers cunctatio*) gave Italy a brief respite from its disasters.⁴¹ The emphasis here on the benefits of the strategy, and the presence of the unambiguously positive modifier *sollers*, renders *cunctatio* approbative. Morally positive *cunctatio* also appears in Silius, who writes that Fabius “surpassed the splendid achievement of his ancestors [sc. the famous 306 Fabii] by delaying ... and matching Hannibal in generalship.”⁴² Here it is the competitive advantage brought by *cunctatio* – by this, Fabius outstrips past heroes – that marks it as a desirable quality. And while *De Viris Illustribus* declares that Fabius received this nickname from his detractors (see above), Florus asserts exactly the opposite. He says, “Fabius thought up a novel way to defeat Hannibal, namely by not fighting; hence his novel cognomen, bringing safety to the commonwealth, *Cunctator*.”⁴³ Florus seems to imagine that this designation originated as an honorific cognomen (so he expressly calls it), one pointing

γούν ἔχω ... ὅτι βραδύνω καὶ ὅτι μέλλω καὶ ὅτι τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν ἰσχυρῶς αἰεὶ προορῶμαι. In non-Fabian contexts too, *cunctatio* can be presented as a vice or failure of a general, soldier, or statesman. One side’s *cunctatio* can bring it disgrace and/or danger, or encourage and embolden the other side: Sall. *Hist.* fr. 1.77.17M, Livy 7.23.10, 8.15.5, 34.46.6, 35.35.17, 37.34.2, 42.57.3; Curt. 4.6.13; Frontin. *Str.* 2.8.4, 8. It may also cause one’s own side to miss an opportunity: Caes. *Gal.* 3.23–4, Val. Max. 3.2.17. Cf. n. 45 below for *cunctatio* as a general’s virtue.

³⁹ Livy 22.12.12: *pro cunctatore segnem pro cauto timidum, adfingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat*. Similarly 22.39.20. On Minucius’ rhetoric see Levene 2010: 229.

⁴⁰ Livy’s description of Minucius’ criticisms at 22.12.12 looks most directly ahead to 22.14.14, where Minucius says *audendo atque agendo res Romana crevit, non his segnibus consiliis quae timidi cauta vocant*. Here Minucius “misapplies” the terms *segnis*, *timidus*, and *cautus* exactly as Livy “foretold” two chapters earlier.

⁴¹ 22.23.1.

⁴² 6.638–40: *pulcherrima quorum / cunctando Fabius superavit facta ducemque / Hannibalem aequando*.

⁴³ *Epit.* 1.22(=2.6).27: *Fabius ... qui novam de Hannibale victoriam commentus est, non pugnare. hinc illi cognomen novum et rei publicae salutare Cunctator*. Similarly Ampel. 18.6.

to Fabius' military success and to the safety he conferred upon the commonwealth (*rei publicae salutare* – safety, again, being Fabius' leitmotif).⁴⁴ Indeed, Florus' phrase *rei publicae salutare Cunctator* may be a grammatically transfigured paraphrase of Ennius' *cunctando restituit rem*: the Ennian *restituit* is interpreted as *servavit*, "saved," which is then converted into the adjective *salutare*; and the Ennian gerund *cunctando* has become the noun *Cunctator*. At any rate, both Florus and Ennius render *cunctatio* a positive quality by stressing its utility to the *res publica*.⁴⁵

It is clear, then, that the word *cunctator* and its cognates can be enlisted on both sides of the debate about the ethics of Fabius' strategy. Through glossing and contextualization, these words can be positioned as pejorative or approbative depending on the author's or speaker's viewpoint and the rhetorical needs of the immediate context. Insofar as *Cunctator* is considered a cognomen monumentalizing Fabius' famous strategy, then the tradition stages a fierce competition over how this monument and the performance it commemorates is to be evaluated: as indicating the vice of cowardice, or the virtue of attending to the safety of the commonwealth.⁴⁶ As we shall see, an important refinement in the community's capacity to make moral judgments – a kind of moral change – ultimately resolves this competition in favor of judging Fabius' *cunctatio* a virtue.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ On whether *cunctator* functions as a descriptive appositive noun, a "nickname," or (/and) a cognomen, see Rebuffat 1982: 165 n. 32, and Stanton 1971: 49–52. Beck 2005: 270 dates the development of this cognomen to the Augustan age; Stanton dates it much later.

⁴⁵ For Florus' phrasing see Bessone 1996: 183–4. Seneca's paraphrase of the Ennian line (or its then-conventional sentiment) at *Ira* 1.11.5 likewise stresses Fabius' utility to the collective: *quo alio Fabius adfectas imperii vires recreavit quam quod cunctari et trahere et morari sciti ...*? Here, not only the verb *cunctor*, but also *trahere* and *morari*, are vindicated as military virtues under the criterion of "good for the state" (here called *imperium* rather than *res publica*). Further examples of the approbative use: Livy 22.15.1, 28.40.7; Val. Max. 7.3(ext.).8; Quint. *Inst.* 8.2.11; Sil. 7.126; Frontin. *Str.* 1.3.3; Ampel. 46.6. In non-Fabian contexts, *cunctatio* can be presented more generally as a general's virtue. Tactical delays may improve the chances for victory, even when the soldiers object: Livy 10.29.8, Frontin. *Str.* 1.11.1, Tac. *Hist.* 3.20; cf. Livy 44.38–9, Val. Max. 4.1.2. Yet delaying battle for tactical reasons is not the same thing as refraining from battle in principle: the "strong" Fabian sense of *cunctatio*, as meaning "in principle never to join battle," seems to be unparalleled. Cf. n. 38 above for *cunctatio* as a general's vice.

⁴⁶ Chs. 3.3.4 and 4.6 offer further examples of contestation over a monument's (and deed's) moral valence.

⁴⁷ Two authors explore the paradoxical, even droll, idea that the *Cunctator* is rash or hasty. Seneca (*Ben.* 4.27.2) discusses the orthodox Stoic position that all men who are not "wise" (i.e. everyone in the real world) are afflicted by every possible vice. An imagined critic ridicules this position: "What, Achilles is fearful? Aristides is unjust? And Fabius, who 'restored the state by delaying,' is rash?" (*et Fabius, qui cunctando restituit rem, temerarius est?*) Seneca then explains that not all vices are equally prominent in all men. Silius too depicts a "hasty Fabius" following Cannae: he takes stock and cries out to his stunned countrymen, "There is no justification for delaying" in fortifying the city (*celer omnia lustrans / clamitat attonitis Fabius: Non ulla relictā est, / credite, cunctandi ratio. Adproperemus ...*; 10.593–5). Is the audience "stunned" by the military crisis, or by the sudden appearance of a

5.3.2 *Winning without Fighting*

A second set of paradoxical formulations asserts that Fabius “wins without fighting.” These formulations are always approbative, as they credit Fabius with “victory” in the sense of successfully defending the commonwealth – but without aggressive warfare, hence without displaying the *virtus* that is normally the means to victory. This formulation first appears in a passage discussed earlier from Cicero’s dialogue *De Senectute* of 44. Cato, again speaking admiringly of how Fabius conducted himself in old age, declares that he “waged war like a man in his prime, when he was really quite old; and he softened up [or emasculated] Hannibal, who was running riot in a youthful manner, by his patience.” Cato then quotes the Ennian fragment to support his assessment of Fabius’ achievement; perhaps Cato (or rather, Cicero) believes the “winning without fighting” paradox is already latent there.⁴⁸ In Varro’s dialogue on farming (*Res Rusticae*) of 37, one interlocutor cites what he calls an old proverb (*vetus proverbium*), namely, “The Roman conquers by sitting still” (*Romanus sedendo vincit*, 1.2.2; see ch. 5.5). The reference must be to Fabius, who alone was proverbial in this way; also, the ablative gerund *sedendo* cannot help recalling the Ennian formulation with *cunctando*. A handful of additional passages in other texts also deploy *sedendo* as a (near-)synonym for *cunctando*. In Livy, as Fabius urges the next year’s consul Aemilius Paullus to carry on with the delaying strategy, he asks, “Do you doubt that we will overcome him [sc. Hannibal] by sitting still (*sedendo*), since he grows weaker by the day?”⁴⁹ And in Silius, Hannibal laments that “while he [sc. Fabius] restrains himself and we are worn away by inactivity (*sedendo*), a type of winning has been contrived (*inventum*).”⁵⁰ The novelty that Silius’ Hannibal perceives in Fabius’ strategy is integral to other expressions of this paradox as well: as noted earlier, Florus credits the nickname *Cunctator* to Fabius’ “novel” strategy for defeating Hannibal,

Fabius who is *celer* and expressly foreswears *cunctatio*? (Tipping 2010: 119–20, 134–6 discusses additional “swift Fabius” moments in Silius).

⁴⁸ Cic. *Sen.* 10: *hic et bella gerebat ut adulescens, cum plane grandis esset; et Hannibalem iuveniliter exultantem patientia sua mollebat*. The contrast in age that Cato constructs is appropriate to the topic of this dialogue, but is not present at all in the Ennian fragment he adduces to support the claim. For this virtuous form of *patientia*, whose paradoxical effect is to “soften” the enemy, see Kaster 2002: 136–8.

⁴⁹ 22.39.15: *dubitas ergo quin sedendo superaturi simus eum qui senescat in dies ... ?*

⁵⁰ 7.151–2: *inventum, dum se cohabet terimurque sedendo, / vincendi genus*. It is unclear whether *sedendo* here refers to Hannibal’s enforced inactivity or to Fabius’ strategy. Perhaps both understandings are available. Elsewhere, *sedendo* clearly applies to Fabius: besides the passages of Varro and Livy just quoted, see Sil. 8.12–15 on Fabius’ “science of inactivity” (*ars sedendi*), and 16.673–4.

namely not fighting.⁵¹ Again, examples of formulations that ring changes on the “winning without fighting” paradox – often, though not always, with an ablative gerund – can be multiplied.⁵²

Two noteworthy lexical items occur with some frequency in “winning without fighting” formulations: the verb *frangere*, which typically connotes violent, destructive activity (“break, smash”); and the noun *mora*, which suggests hesitation and reduced activity (“delay, retardation”). The frequency with these words occur in the Fabian tradition leads me to suspect that they derive – like the other Fabian keywords *cunctor*, *res (publica)*, *salus*, *gloria* (ch. 5.3.3), and their variants – from an Ennian description of Fabius, though one that is distinct from the surviving fragment and does not itself survive in its original form.⁵³ Indeed, the early Augustan poet Propertius declares that among the themes Ennius sang were the “victorious delays of Fabius” (*victricis ... moras Fabii*, 3.3.9). As he claims to describe Ennian themes, Propertius may also be echoing Ennian phrasing in his use of *mora*. A generation later the poet Manilius, listing the heroes whose souls reside in the Milky Way, includes “Fabius unconquered thanks to (?) his delaying” (*invictus ... mora Fabius*, 1.790). Florus uses both terms in his description: “Fabius ... wore Hannibal out to such a degree that he who could not be broken by valor (*frangi virtute*) was pulverized by delay (*mora comminueretur*).”⁵⁴ The author of *De Viris Illustribus* likewise combines these terms, twice declaring that Fabius received his nickname because he “broke Hannibal by delay” (*Hannibalem mora fregit*, 14.6, 43.2). Here, the suggestion that retardation (*mora*) can lead to violent breaking (*frangere*) conveys the “winning without fighting” paradox with striking point and concentration. This paradox can also be rendered in Greek. The historiographer Appian, in his narrative of the second Punic war, speaks

⁵¹ n. 43 above.

⁵² E.g. For. Aug. *elogium*: *Hannibalem ... subsequendo coercuit*; Plin. *Nat.* 22.10: [*sc. Fabius*] *qui rem omnem Romanam restituit non pugnando*; Val. Max. 7.3.7: *Fabius ... cui non dimicare vincere fuit*; Sil. 7.15: *lento Poenum moderamine lusit*; 7.91–2: *Fabius ... procedens ... arte / bellandi lento similis*; 7.124–5: *domat exultantia corda / infractasque minas dilato Marte fatigat*; Eutr. 3.9.2: *Fabius ... eum differendo pugnam ab impetu fregit*. Elliott 2009 discusses the “Fabian” ablative gerund in Ennius and beyond.

⁵³ Rebuffat 1982: 162 n. 21 already suggests that *mora* may have stood in Ennius, given its wide distribution in the Fabian tradition; I would suggest the same for *frangere*. *Frango* is an attested Ennian word (*Ann.* fr. 177, 395 Sk.), while *mora/moror* is unattested in surviving Ennius unless it lurks in the corruptions at *Op. Inc.* fr. 2 Sk. and *Trag.* v. 391 Jocelyn. One might expect *cunctatio* to be the standard Fabian noun for “delay.” But *mora* covers much the same semantic territory, and is about equally common in Fabian contexts.

⁵⁴ *Epit.* 1.22(=2.6).28: *itaque [sc. Fabius] ... sic maceravit Hannibalem ut, qui frangi virtute non poterat, mora comminueretur*; see Bessone 1996: 184.

of “wear[ing] down Hannibal by (means of) time” (ἐκτρύχειν Ἀννίβαν τῷ χρόνῳ, *Han.* 13.53) which looks like a direct translation into Greek of the Latin phrase *frangere Hannibalem mora*. The Greek verb ἐκτρύχειν refers to a grinding, wearing activity, rather than to violent breaking: yet this “grinding” sense is also in the semantic range of *frangere*, which can be used (for example) to describe the milling of wheat.⁵⁵ Thus the Greek translation spotlights a different dimension of the Latin phrase, while also confirming the connection of these words to the Fabian tradition.⁵⁶ In any case, these formulations stress that Fabius made hesitancy and delay into the means to victory, while *virtus* was not and could not be that means. This point is always implicit, if not always expressly stated, in the paradox of “winning without fighting.”

5.3.3 Gloria

The third set of paradoxes through which the competing judgments about Fabius’ strategy are expressed involve claims about *gloria*. *Gloria* is the positive reputation, or praise, that circulates within the community when one is judged to have performed outstandingly in one or another moral category. Thus it is a type of monument – perhaps the very first monument to any performance judged positively, coming into existence as cries of wonder and approbation from the watching eyewitnesses and persisting for as long the deed is commemorated. The Fabian tradition calls *gloria* and its sources into question, focusing on the matter of valorous performance in battle – this being a type of performance that receives abundant and varied monumentalization, and one to which *gloria* (or its opposite) is especially likely to attach.⁵⁷ Since Fabius holds (as discussed in ch. 5.2) that the

⁵⁵ *Frangere* as “grind,” “wear down:” *OLD*³ s.v., senses 3, 7. While this understanding of *frangere* seems to fit better with the connotations of *mora*, Florus embraces the paradox in his phrase *mora comminuere* (see previous note), where the verb *comminuere* refers unambiguously to violent breaking and crushing (*OLD*³ s.v., senses 1, 2).

⁵⁶ The phrase *mora frangere* (or the like) crystallizes in later Latin as a standard description of Fabius’ performance. Besides *Vir. Ill.* 14.6 and 43.2, see Ampel. 18.6, 46.6 (both *mora fregit*), 46.6; Eutr. 3.9.2 (*differendo ... fregit*); Amm. 29.5.32–3, Claud. *Carm. Mai.* 8.407 (*mora perfringat*).

⁵⁷ On military performance as a source of *gloria* in the middle to late Republic see Harris 1979: 18–34; for the word’s semantics, Thomas 2002: 28–31, 38–42; for its “zero-sum” quality, Habinek 2000: 267–77. The impression that *gloria* derived from valor in battle is chiefly an aristocratic concern (Harris 1979: 30, Habinek 2000: 267) is due to the generally elite orientation of surviving texts: but see Caes. *Civ.* 2.39.3, *Gal.* 7.50.4, [Caes.] *Hisp.* 23.8 for its attribution to centurions and other non-elite soldiers, with Plaut. *Stich.* 281 for its (parodic) attribution to slaves; also chs. 0.4 and 1.3 (on Scaeva).

moral criterion of “the good of the *res publica*” overarches and subsumes all other moral criteria, including that of valor displayed in battle, he must equally hold that *gloria* – positive renown – properly attaches to actions that tend to benefit and preserve the *res publica*, and not to those that do not. Normally, valor displayed in combat tends to benefit the commonwealth, and thus is a legitimate source for *gloria*. But under the extraordinary conditions that obtain during Fabius’ dictatorship, joining battle puts the commonwealth in mortal danger. Therefore *gloria* does not attach to it. To insist on seeking opportunities for battle under these circumstances, in the belief that one will thereby win *gloria*, is to confuse means with end in a potentially catastrophic way.

Earlier I examined the objection that Fabius’ strategy is cowardly. The circulation of such criticism constitutes the bad reputation, which Ennius calls *rumores* – the opposite of *gloria* – that Fabius incurs for not leading his soldiers into battle. Many texts, however, reflect on the sources of Fabius’ *gloria*, and respond precisely to the accusation of cowardice. A particularly telling passage is in Livy. When Minucius is elevated to co-dictator to reward his daring, Fabius informs the senate that “having preserved the army is more glorious than having killed many thousands of enemies” (22.25.15).⁵⁸ Fabius is rejecting the basis of Minucius’ own current *gloria*, the grounds for his promotion. For Livy has already reported (22.24.14) that Minucius’ victorious skirmish with Hannibal cost 5,000 Roman soldiers against 6,000 enemies, a negligible difference. Fabius implies that the greater *gloria* – or perhaps, the proper footing for *gloria* – would be to have kept those Roman soldiers alive and well (*servasse exercitum*). The number of enemy dead (*multa milia hostium occidisse*), a traditional proxy for the *virtus* of one’s own soldiers, is the wrong basis for *gloria* at least for now. A fragment of Dio Cassius transmits the same Fabian sentiment, though in rhetorical mirror image, focusing on reproach rather than praise. Here Fabius remarks that he is “reproached” for his delaying and concern for safety, rather than for rushing into battle and losing many soldiers, provided he can kill many enemies, in the quest to be acclaimed *imperator* (αὐτοκράτωρ) and win a triumph.⁵⁹ Thus, he suggests, the traditional

⁵⁸ *Servasse exercitum quam multa milia hostium occidisse maiorem gloriam esse*. Similarly Sil. 7.396–400: it will be glory enough (*erit haec sat gloria*) to keep his soldiers safe in camp.

⁵⁹ Fr. 57.11: ἔγκλημα γοῦν ἔχω οὐχ ... ὅτι διὰ κινδύνων στρατηγῶ, ἵνα πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποβαλὼν πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκτείνας αὐτοκράτωρ τε ὀνομασθῶ καὶ τὰ ἐπινίκια πέμψω.

“valor in battle” route to glory, and the monuments by which that positive renown is traditionally propagated (*imperator* proclamation, triumph), ought rather to be grounds for reproach, while his own approach ought to accrue praise rather than blame. Later in the same fragment Dio inflects this thought somewhat differently: “Fabius wanted the commonwealth to be safe and victorious, but not that he himself be of good renown.”⁶⁰ This does not mean that he despises a good reputation in principle, but that he rejects it when it rests on the “wrong” basis – any that he deems incompatible with the safety and ultimate victory of the commonwealth. Finally, in Plutarch’s life of Fabius, Fabius responds to his critics by saying that experiencing fear on behalf of the fatherland is never shameful, and that one who holds high office should never be perplexed by the slander and blame one may receive.⁶¹ Thus he admits to feeling fear, as his critics allege (for they accuse him of cowardice) – but since that fear is felt exclusively for the commonwealth, it brings no shame, and any accompanying ill-repute should be disregarded. Later in this text, after Minucius is elevated to co-dictator, Fabius speculates that his colleague will fall into disaster, being “mad with empty renown and prestige.”⁶² Minucius’ renown is “empty,” presumably, because it derives from his and others’ mistaken valuing of valor displayed in combat above the good of the commonwealth. Other texts contain similar assertions about proper and improper sources for praise and blame; examples can be multiplied.⁶³ Their point, however, is always the same: to draw attention to the conflict in values, and in value judgments, that erupts when martial valor decouples from the good of the commonwealth. The tradition, indeed, depicts Fabius alone as understanding that the good of the commonwealth is a basis for moral judgment distinct from (and superior to) martial valor; he is an innovator in morality no less than in military strategy. But how and when does the community at large come to appreciate this Fabian moral nuance, and thereby refine its own capacity to make moral judgments?

⁶⁰ Fr. 57.16: τὸ γὰρ κοινὸν σώζεσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὸς εὐδοξεῖν ᾗθελεν. Cf. fr. 57.21.

⁶¹ *Fab.* 5.7–8: καίτοι τὸ μὲν ὑπὲρ πατρίδος οὐκ αἰσχροὺς δέος, ἡ δὲ πρὸς δόξαν ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαβολὰς καὶ ψόγους ἑκπληξίς οὐκ ἀξίου τηλικαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀνδρός.

⁶² *Fab.* 10.4: ἔκμανεῖς ὑπὸ κενῆς δόξης καὶ ὄγκου. Polybius (3.105.9) had already contrasted the recklessness and vainglory of Minucius’ soldiers (προπέτεια καὶ κενοδοξία) with the foresight and calculation of Fabius: see n. 67 below.

⁶³ E.g. Cic. *Off.* 1.84 (ch. 5.4); Livy 24.9.11, 27.40.8, 28.41.1, 44.22.10; Sil. 7.396–400, 16.672–6. The paradox is formulated very compactly at Livy 22.3.8 and Val. Max. 3.8.2, where things that are *speciosa* (“good to look at,” i.e. superficially praiseworthy) are contrasted with things that are *salutaria* (beneficial or “safety-bringing”); similarly Livy 28.40.7 (*speciosiora* – *meliora*).

5.4 *Post, magis, nunc: Fabius Revalued*

The most detailed exposition of the alternative forms of glory is found in a speech Livy gives to Fabius, one in which he encourages Lucius Aemilius Paullus, one of the consuls of 216 (the year after Fabius' dictatorship) to follow his example and adopt the strategy he pioneered as dictator. "The matter stands thus: the only method of waging war against Hannibal is the one I employed" (22.39.9). But Hannibal is not the only problem. Fabius had to contend with his *magister equitum*/co-dictator as well, and he remarks that Paullus will face similar opposition from his own consular colleague Gaius Terentius Varro. "But you will withstand them (i.e. Varro and Hannibal)," says Fabius, "if you stand firmly enough against [sc. bad] reputation and people's criticisms (*famam rumoresque hominum*), and if neither your colleague's empty glory (*vana gloria*) nor your own false ill-repute (*falsa infamia*) troubles you."⁶⁴ This, of course, was Fabius' own approach, despising as false the *infamia* that was heaped upon him and deeming Minucius' *gloria* to be "empty" (*vana*) – both reputations, in his view, standing on incorrect moral bases. He summarizes this train of thought with a strikingly sententious, paradoxical pronouncement: "he who spurns <empty> glory will have the real thing."⁶⁵ Here Fabius confidently predicts that the currently pervasive derivation of *gloria* from displays of valor in battle will eventually be abandoned as incorrect, and that avoidance of battle itself will come to be deemed a "correct" source for *gloria* (presumably by satisfying the "safety first/good of the commonwealth" criterion). Thus he foresees both his own and Paullus' transition from standing as negative exempla (of cowardice) to positive exempla (of prudence and concern for preserving the commonwealth). This transition requires, however, that the moral stance underpinning the "delaying" strategy gain widespread acceptance – which will come only with the recognition, over time, that this strategy does indeed preserve the commonwealth.

The tradition insists that Fabius won this ethical battle – that his contemporaries and successors did, eventually, revalue his performance as morally positive, and those of his detractors as negative, at least under the

⁶⁴ 22.39.18: *resistes autem, adversus famam rumoresque hominum si satis firmus steteris, si te neque collegae vana gloria neque tua falsa infamia moverit*. On Fabius' rhetoric see Levene 2010: 189 n. 57. Paullus and Varro are contrasting "foils" who structurally replicate the contrast between Fabius and Minucius.

⁶⁵ 22.39.20: *<vanam> gloriam qui spreverit veram habebit*. Muretus' supplement *<vanam>* creates a neat parallel with *veram*. But it is not necessary to the sense, which must be the same with or without the supplement, and most editors reject it.

conditions that then obtained. The idea that he eventually gained *gloria* (of the “true” variety) is already present in the Ennian fragment. Here the speaker says that Fabius made safety (*salus*) his top priority, and that therefore (*ergo*), in the speaker’s own day (*nunc*), which is after Fabius’ day (*post*), Fabius’ *gloria* “shines out the more” (*magis ... claret*).⁶⁶ Other texts indicate more explicitly that such a revaluation occurred. When Polybius introduces Fabius and his strategy for the first time (3.89.3), he remarks that the initial unpopularity of this approach later turned to admiration. Polybius indicates more precisely the circumstances of this revaluation in narrating how Fabius saved Minucius and his soldiers from Hannibal’s trap. He says that observers of the battle saw, and people in Rome also recognized, that Minucius had been rash and reckless, while disaster was only avoided thanks to Fabius’ caution and foresight. Thus the primary audience of eyewitnesses, as well as a contemporary secondary audience in Rome, revalue Minucius’ actions as vicious and Fabius’ as virtuous.⁶⁷ However, the *dénouement* of Fabius’ conflict with Minucius is not the only moment of revaluation. For, as noted above, this same conflict is replayed the following year between the consuls Paullus and Varro. Its outcome – the catastrophic Roman defeat at Cannae – spurs yet another affirmation of Fabius’ approach as virtuous rather than vicious. Plutarch relates that what had previously been regarded as cowardice and sluggishness in Fabius was deemed after Cannae to be a sort of divine intelligence, and no mere human calculation, that could foresee this future disaster. Therefore, he says, the Romans now placed themselves entirely in Fabius’ hands.⁶⁸

Sometimes the revaluation of Fabius is expressed in specifically military terms. I noted earlier that, in Silius, Minucius changes his tune after being saved by Fabius. He declares, “here is our fatherland: the city’s walls stand in this one breast.”⁶⁹ The metaphor of Fabius being, or containing,

⁶⁶ Fr. 364–5 Sk.; n. 1 above.

⁶⁷ 3.105.8–9: τοῖς μὲν οὖν παρ’ αὐτὸν γενομένοις τὸν κίνδυνον ἦν ἐναργὲς ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὴν Μάρκου τόλμαν ἀπόλλωλε τὰ ὅλα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν τοῦ Φαβίου σέσωσται καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καὶ νῦν· τοῖς δ’ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τότε ἐγένετο φανερόν ὁμολογουμένως τί διαφέρει στρατιωτικῆς προπτείας καὶ κενοδοξίας στρατηγικῆ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμός ἐστὼς καὶ νουεχῆς. For similar sentiments, Livy 22.29.8–9, 22.30.7; Polyaeus. 8.14.1; Plut. *Fab.* 13.2. At Livy 28.40.7, Fabius says that others’ plans have often seemed more attractive at first sight (*speciosiora primo aspectu*), but his are shown by experience to be better (*usu meliora*). The change in valuation over time is implied in the contrast between first-sight attractiveness and the lessons of experience.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Fab.* 17.5: ἡ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς μάχης Φαβίου δειλία καὶ ψυχρότης λεγομένη μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθύς οὐδ’ ἀνθρώπινος ἐδόκει λογισμός, ἀλλὰ θεῖόν τι χρῆμα διανοίας καὶ δαιμόνιον, ἐκ τοσούτου τὰ μέλλοντα προορωμένης. Xenophonon 2012: 173–4 correctly notes the contrast Plutarch draws between the immediate surface impressions and the genuine state revealed over time. However, this contrast is part of the Fabian tradition more broadly.

⁶⁹ 7.743: *hic patria est, murique urbis stant pectore in uno.*

city walls confers a specifically military validity upon his strategy, since a wall is part of the basic defensive infrastructure of any ancient city. Thus the Fabian strategy of pursuing safety for the commonwealth, previously condemned as cowardly, is repackaged as a legitimate defensive military strategy and its ethical valence is thereby reversed. Another legitimating military metaphor links Fabius with Marcus Claudius Marcellus – another aggressive commander who serves as a foil to Fabius and the Fabian strategy. This metaphor makes Fabius the “shield” of the Romans, while Marcellus is the “sword” – again underscoring the defensive, protective character of Fabius’ approach, but without devaluing it relative to Marcellus’ aggression. Since a legionary soldier’s basic armament includes a shield *and* a sword, each with its distinct yet necessary function, this metaphor suggests that the approaches of Fabius and Marcellus are complementary, compatible, equally legitimate, and equally essential to Rome’s military success.⁷⁰ Some passages offer no such justifications, but simply assert that Fabius was an outstanding general, on par with Hannibal or any other.⁷¹ Finally Pliny the Elder, in a discussion of herbs, remarks on the “grass crown,” also called “siege crown,” that soldiers bestowed upon a commander who had liberated them from a siege. Among the recipients of this honor, Fabius is deemed especially outstanding because the crown was awarded – Pliny expressly declares – not by Minucius’ army after he saved it, but by all of Italy, after Hannibal finally withdrew from the peninsula. Thus the general who refused to fight is granted one of the highest military honors to monumentalize the success of his approach.⁷²

The tradition reports other miscellaneous honors, which collectively indicate the high value later accorded to Fabius and his strategy – the *gloria* he won, paradoxically, for spurning *gloria*; the fruit of his revaluation from coward to hero. For instance, when Livy weighs the odd constitutional

⁷⁰ Shield and sword: Plut. *Fab.* 19.4, *Marc.* 9.7 (citing Posidonius for the metaphor); Flor. *Epit.* 1.22(=2.6).27. Also belonging to the moral stratum of valuing both approaches is Cic. *Rep.* 5.10 fr. 1, which reads (in its entirety) *Marcellus ut acer et pugnax, Maximus ut consideratus et lentus*. On the studied *synkrisis* between Fabius and Marcellus in Silius, see Fucecchi 2010; for this *synkrisis* in Plutarch’s *Lives* of these figures, see Beck 2002 – esp. 468–70 on how they function as “foils” to one another (“Folienfiguren”). Livy’s narrative, however, tends not to present these figures as sharply contrasting; Levene 2010: 197–210.

⁷¹ E.g. Cic. *Off.* 1.108, *De Or.* 1.211; Nep. *Han.* 5.2; For. Aug. *elogium: dux aetatis suae cautissimus et re[i] militaris peritissimus*; Quint. *Inst.* 8.2.11; Frontin. *Str.* 1.3.3, 1.8.2; Plut. *Fab.* 23.2. These passages variously describe Fabius as a clever, cautious, or experienced commander; as having many virtues; as being the best; etc.

⁷² Plin. *Nat.* 22.10. On the *corona graminea* see Maxfield 1981: 67–9, 118–19. Gellius, who briefly discusses this crown at 5.6.8–10, names only Fabius as a recipient, as if his achievement eclipsed all others.

circumstances of Fabius' appointment as dictator, he concludes that Fabius was actually appointed "acting dictator" (*pro dictatore*) but was wrongly remembered as being a full-fledged dictator due to "his magnificent achievements and outstanding glory as general." That the higher office was mistakenly ascribed to him, Livy suggests, reflects the honor, however inadvertent, paid to him subsequently by people who assumed that the loftiest achievements require the loftiest position. The mistake itself thus attests the positive moral evaluation that later judging audiences conferred upon Fabius and his deeds.⁷³ In a different vein, Plutarch (*Fab.* 24.1) reports that Fabius' son was elected consul for 213, as an honor to his father – as if he could not have been elected in his own right. And in the census of 209, Livy reports, Fabius was selected as the leading member of the senate (*princeps senatus*) over a rival with greater seniority as censor, the traditional criterion for granting this highly honorific title. Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, one of the current censors tasked with making this decision, argued for Fabius against the objections of his traditionally minded colleague Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, by asserting that Fabius "would win out as the leading man in the state, even in Hannibal's judgment." The implication is that Fabius' achievements in the war against Hannibal have garnered prestige that overshadows the candidate technically senior to him.⁷⁴ Finally, Valerius Maximus says that the entire *populus* contributed money for Fabius' funeral, to make it as grand and showy as possible. Valerius relates this story under the rubric "On those who display gratitude" (*de gratis*), for he asserts that the Roman people were thanking Fabius "for his five consulships discharged with such concern for the safety of the commonwealth."⁷⁵ Plutarch also mentions these funerary contributions, saying that Fabius was regarded as "father of the people." This parental metaphor – which Minucius' troops also allegedly used – implies gratitude, since those who give the gift of life are quintessentially the persons to whom gratitude is owed.⁷⁶

⁷³ 22.31.11: *res inde gestas gloriamque insignem ducis ... ut qui pro dictatore <creatus erat, dictator> crederetur facile obtinuisse*. Livy may be wrong, and Fabius was quite possibly appointed simply as dictator (n. 7 above). But the logic of Livy's argument is what matters here, not the correctness of his conclusion.

⁷⁴ 27.11.11: *Q. Fabium Maximum quem tum principem Romanae civitatis esse vel Hannibale iudice victurus esset*. Five years later Fabius was renewed in this post, according to the Forum Augustum *elogium*: *princeps in senatum duobus lustris lectus est*.

⁷⁵ 5.2.3: *quinque consulatibus salutariter rei publicae administratis*.

⁷⁶ *Fab.* 27.4: ὡς πατέρα τοῦ δήμου. For. Aug. *elogium*: *ab exercitu Minuciano pater appellatus est*. On gratitude owed to parents, see Roller 2001: 188–9, 249–50.

This revaluation of Fabius' "delaying" performance yields a broadened moral perspective that enables Romans to assess their commanders more acutely. Henceforth, a general who is eager for battle could either be admired for his valorous actions and disposition, or suspected of recklessness. For instance Livy, describing the consular election for 207 (27.33.6–11), says that the senate and people selected consuls whose valor they deemed "safe" from Carthaginian trickery (*consules ... quorum virtus satis tuta a fraude Punica esset*). The consuls of 208, Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Titus Quinctius Crispinus, had fallen into a trap and died in their "overeagerness to join battle" (*nimia cupiditate conserendi*). Their deaths left their armies perilously exposed and leaderless, a terrible outcome for the commonwealth (*duo consules ... interfecti velut orbam rem publicam reliquerant*). Fortunately their rashness redounded only on their own heads, for once, and did not lead to the armies' destruction (*deos immortales ... pepercisse innoxiiis exercitibus*). Consequently, the voters now held that overhasty, hot dispositions in commanders had proven "destructive" (*damnosa*) throughout the war. Fabius is not mentioned in this description of the voters' reasoning, but the perspective he championed – prioritizing "safety" over sheer valor, and adducing "the good of the *res publica*" as an explicit criterion for moral judgment that is distinct from the "valor in battle" criterion – is clearly in the air. Performance in battle is not being rejected altogether as a basis for conferring value: everyone acknowledges the martial courage of Marcellus and Crispinus (e.g. Livy 27.26–7). But that judgment is itself now being subordinated to the overarching "good of the commonwealth" criterion, which is offered as the most authoritative grounds not only for conferring praise and blame on a commander, but also – in this situation – for granting or withholding the honor of a consulship. The Romans' newfound capacity to make such distinctions and judgments, and to invoke "safety" and "the commonwealth" as legitimate bases for moral judgment, is the fruit of their revaluation of Fabius.

5.5 Having One's Own "Fabian Moment:" Exemplarity through the Looking Glass

Fabius poses challenges for Romans who might seek to identify a norm (at least, a morally positive one) in his "delaying" performance. For built into the Fabian exemplum is the idea that an actor does *not* seek approbation from contemporary judging audiences (the usual motivation of the actor who imitates a performance that was itself praised: ch. 0.3.4), and even courts their condemnation, in the belief that the values underpinning that

negative judgment are incorrect. The actor holds that the judging community will *come* to value his performance positively, once it has learned to make appropriate moral distinctions. This approach to exemplary performance is not only counterintuitive – exemplarity through the looking glass, as it were – but risky: for there is no guarantee that the community will *ever* undergo the projected moral development and revalue the performance from negative to positive. In that event, the negative moral evaluation persists, and the actor goes down in posterity as a negative exemplum – perhaps even a villain, such as the “kingship aspirants” discussed later (ch. 7.3), whose actions are held up as paradigmatically destructive to the commonwealth. Yet, despite these pitfalls, Fabius is invoked with surprising frequency as a positive exemplary model to authorize one or another course of action. I turn next to examining some of these invocations, to illuminate how and why this exemplum is so productive.

As discussed earlier (ch. 5.4), Livy’s Fabius presents his strategy to Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the consul of 216, as the model for how to wage war against Hannibal. When Paullus falls at Cannae, he avers with his last breath that he lived and now dies mindful of Fabius’ precepts.⁷⁷ Even before this, however, the consuls who assumed command late in 217, after Fabius’ dictatorship expired, allegedly continued to pursue the Fabian “delaying” strategy.⁷⁸ And even during Fabius’ dictatorship, according to Livy, Hannibal himself was occasionally reduced to employing the “Fabian arts” of delay and inaction.⁷⁹ Thus the Fabian strategy is depicted as an effective model for other generals, Roman and enemy, to follow in waging the second Punic war. Indeed, military contexts seem to provide the best “fit” for the Fabian exemplum, accounting for most of its invocations: generals of every era who conduct their campaigns cautiously and prudently can adduce Fabius to justify their approach, especially when facing criticism from soldiers and officers who are eager to join battle. For example, when Livy describes (in book 44) the events leading up to the battle of Pydna in 168, he portrays Lucius Aemilius Paullus, a consul of this year and the eventual victor, as operating in a Fabian mold – like his homonymous father, the consul who died at Cannae. In an acute analysis of

⁷⁷ Livy 22.49.10; similarly Plut. *Fab.* 14.7, 16.8–9.

⁷⁸ Livy 22.33.1–3, Dio fr. 57.21. Fabius’ six-month term as dictator expired in late December, but in this era new consuls entered office on March 15. In the interval, the surviving elected consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus resumed command, along with the suffect consul Marcus Atilius Regulus (replacing the dead Gaius Flaminius).

⁷⁹ 22.24.9–10: *Hannibal ... artibus Fabi, sedendo et cunctando, bellum gerebat*; also Sil. 7.151–2 (n. 50 above). Fabius can deploy Hannibalic arts as well: Livy 22.16.5, 27.16.10 (Levene 2010: 230); Plut. *Fab.* 23.1. Thus the two great generals follow one another’s example.

this passage, René Rebuffat observes that Paullus explicitly invokes Fabius when addressing the people in Rome before departing for Macedonia (44.22.10). Rebuffat also demonstrates that Livy's 44th book contains additional thematic and verbal echoes of book 22, suggesting that Paullus instantiates Fabian wisdom and cunning.⁸⁰ Indeed, Rebuffat suggests that Livy's depiction of Paullus as a new Fabius derives ultimately from Ennius' *Annales*: in his view, the famous *unus homo* fragment with which this chapter began comes from a speech Ennius attributes to Paullus before the battle of Pydna, in which the consul justifies his cautious strategy. This suggestion, though highly speculative, indicates the kind of context that would suit the Ennian fragment's retrospective, admiring invocation of Fabius' achievement.⁸¹

Another cluster of invocations of Fabian generalship date to the early Julio-Claudian period. Appian, in his account of the interactions between Fabius and Minucius, notes parenthetically that Augustus often recalled the Fabian precept that one should join battle with a military genius only under dire necessity. For Augustus, like Fabius, was not reckless and preferred craft to daring in battle.⁸² Augustus also cast his adopted son and successor Tiberius in a Fabian mold, as a letter quoted by Suetonius indicates. Hearing of Tiberius' care in arranging a summer camp for his army, under difficult conditions and while his soldiers loudly objected to his caution, Augustus praises Tiberius' manifest prudence and declares that the famous verse could, by general consensus, be applied to him: "one person, by being watchful (*vigilando*), restored the commonwealth for us."⁸³ With "watchfulness" (in the inevitable ablative gerund) standing in for "delay" (*cunctando*), Tiberius is presented, in Ennian language, as a Fabian preserver of the commonwealth. Velleius Paterculus, an officer under Tiberius, also uses Fabian language to praise Tiberius' generalship: never was an opportunity for victory bought at the cost of lost soldiers; the safest course

⁸⁰ Rebuffat 1982: 157–8.

⁸¹ Rebuffat's suggestion entails that Ennius' poem included (or ended with?) the battle of Pydna, hence that the poet was still living in mid-168; it also requires emending the book-number for these fragments, as given in Macr. *Sat.* 6.1.23, from XII to XVII(I) – all controversial views. For alternative suggestions and bibliography see Paladini in Flores 2000: 4.300–1, Skutsch 1985: 530–1.

⁸² App. *Han.* 13.55–6. Augustus' praise of Fabius as "the most cautious commander" (*dux cautissimus*) in the Forum Augustum *elogium* (n. 71 above) is proof that he deployed Fabius as an exemplum of military caution, establishing Fabius as an imitable model for himself and others; see also Suet. *Aug.* 25.4.

⁸³ Suet. *Tib.* 21.5: *ordinem aestivorum tuorum ego vero <laudo>, mi Tiberi, et inter tot rerum difficultates καὶ τοσαύτην ἀποθυμίαν τῶν στρατευομένων non potuisse quemquam prudentius gerere se quam tu gesseris existimo. ii quoque qui tecum fuerunt omnes confitentur versum illum in te posse dici: unus homo nobis vigilando restituit rem* (*laudo* is Stephanus' conjecture, printed by Kaster).

of action (*tutissimum*) was deemed glorious (*gloriosum*); Tiberius always privileged his own judgment (*conscientia*) over his reputation among others (*fama*); he always favored what was useful (*utilia*) over what was superficially attractive (*speciosa*). Fabius is not mentioned by name here, but his influence is felt in the language and categories by which Velleius evaluates Tiberius' generalship.⁸⁴

Augustus also included Fabius in his gallery of *summi viri* in the Forum Augustum (map location 109). As discussed in chapter 3.3.3, these were past heroes honored with statues, inscribed *tituli* giving their names and offices, and *elogia* describing their principal achievements. While only a single fragment of Fabius' *elogium* survives, its complete text – like that of Appius Claudius Caecus (ch. 3.3.3) – is preserved in a copy from Arezzo.⁸⁵ As discussed in previous chapters, Augustus presented the Forum Augustum commemoranda as normative, imitable exempla for other aristocrats, while implicitly or explicitly claiming to have surpassed their achievements himself. Fabius' *elogium* states that he was chosen as leader of the senate (*princeps senatus*) for two five-year terms (n. 74 above). Meanwhile Augustus reports in his *Res Gestae* (§7) that he himself was *princeps senatus* for forty years. Even as he honors Fabius' achievement in the *elogium*, then, Augustus permits attentive readers to recognize how far he himself has surpassed Fabius' standard.⁸⁶

Three and a half centuries later, Fabius appears in Ammianus' history as a model for the Roman general Theodosius, the father of the homonymous emperor, as he campaigned against Mauretanian tribes late in Valentinian's reign (ca. 373–5 CE). Theodosius kept his small force in the town of Tipasa for an extended period as he sought to overcome a more numerous enemy through stratagem and diplomacy rather than risking set battle – “like the Cunctator of old,” says Ammianus.⁸⁷ After a lacuna, Ammianus goes on to say that Theodosius (apparently: the subject of the sentence is lost) proceeded “by trickery and delay (*mora*), in hopes of defeating an enemy who

⁸⁴ Vell. 2.115.5: *nihil ... mirari magis potui quam quod imperatori numquam adeo ulla opportuna visa est victoriae occasio quam damno amissi pensaret militis, semperque visum est gloriosum quod esset tutissimum, et ante conscientiae quam famae consultum*. 2.113.2: *imperator ... utilia speciosis praeferens* (for the Fabian character of these contrasts, see n. 63 above).

⁸⁵ *CIL* 6.40953 (Rome fragment), 11.1828 (Arezzo copy) = *InscrIt* 13.3.14, 80; *ILS* 56; Geiger 2008: 145–6.

⁸⁶ On the exemplary aim of the gallery of *summi viri*, see Suet. *Aug.* 31.5; also chs. 3.3.3 and 4.4–5 with the literature cited there.

⁸⁷ Amm. 29.5.32: *ubi [sc. Tipasae] diutius agens, ut antiquus ille Cunctator, pro negotio consultabat, commentis potius et prudentia quam periculosis congressibus hostem ... oppressurus*. Ammianus greatly admires Theodosius, and elsewhere portrays him as successfully imitating exemplary generals. See Den Boeft et al. 2013: 159–60, 193–4; Kelly 2008: 278–9.

kept foiling (*frangentem*) his attacks, as Pompey once did to Mithridates."⁸⁸ Though Pompey is the explicit comparandum here, the Fabian words *mora* and *frangere* characterizing Theodosius' strategy must have come into Ammianus' mind via the *cunctator* legend, which he invoked just previously. That legend was over 500 years old by Ammianus' day, if indeed the Ennian passage is its formative moment.

The Fabian exemplum can also be invoked in non-military contexts, as a model for how other civic duties or domestic activities might be carried out. In these cases, removed as they are from the sphere of generalship, arguments about goodness of fit are more likely to arise. In a passage mentioned earlier from Varro's agricultural dialogue *Res Rusticae*, the interlocutor Agrius invokes Fabius with tongue firmly planted in cheek. On the occasion of the Sowing Festival (*feriae sementivae*), Agrius, Varro, and several others have gathered in the temple of Tellus (Earth) for a feast, at the temple-keeper's invitation. The keeper himself, their host, has not arrived yet, so Agrius suggests that the company put into practice the old proverb, "the Roman conquers by sitting" (*Romanus sedendo vincit*), and wait on a nearby bench for the keeper's arrival.⁸⁹ This comparison of great things with small – suggesting that the guests should imitate Fabius by sitting and waiting not in order to save the state, but to obtain their dinner – is clearly humorous. Yet the leisure time so created, in the temple of Tellus during an agricultural festival, provides a highly suitable occasion and setting for the dialogue on agriculture that follows.⁹⁰

Cicero's fertile political imagination finds several occasions to adduce the Fabian model in situations that have nothing to do with generalship, though which (he suggests) might be compared to it. In his dialogue *De Officiis* ("On moral duties"), written in 44, Cicero speaks of two Spartan generals, Callicratidas and Cleombrotus, who he says sacrificed the good of the state in pursuit of personal military glory. But Fabius did much better, as Ennius shows – and here Cicero quotes the three famous Ennian verses.⁹¹ The point, of course, is that Fabius sacrificed his immediate glory for the good of the state – precisely the opposite of what the Spartans did – and

⁸⁸ Amm. 29.5.33: <...> *ulterius per ambages et moras hostem frangentem suos impetus oppressurus, ut quondam Pompeius Mithridatem.*

⁸⁹ Var. *Rust.* 1.2.1–2: *vultis igitur interea vetus proverbium, quod est 'Romanus sedendo vincit,' usurpemus dum ille venit? ... ad subsellia sequentibus nobis procedit.*

⁹⁰ In the end, however, the Fabian model fails them; they do not "win by sitting." For book 1, and the dialogue it contains, ends (1.69.2–3) with the arrival of a weeping freedman who announces, shockingly, that the temple-keeper has just been stabbed to death by an unknown assailant. The guests/interlocutors thus depart without receiving dinner or meeting their host.

⁹¹ *Off.* 1.84: *quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius: 'unus homo ...' (etc.).*

thus gained greater glory in posterity. At this point, however, Cicero does something new: he extends the Fabian example from the military arena to the civic one. He says, “This type of error [i.e. worrying more about one’s own reputation than about the common good] must be avoided in civic affairs too. For there are people who dare not say what they think, however excellent it is, for fear of incurring ill-will.” That is, the Fabian predicament – the reckoning of personal reputation against the common good, when the two do not coincide – may confront orators or magistrates who speak in the senate, courts, or assemblies, no less than generals who fight in the field.⁹² Elsewhere, Cicero does indeed describe (non-military) political squabbles and maneuvering in Fabian terms. In his dialogue *Brutus*, written in 46, Cicero refers to the famous political conflict of 133 between the reforming tribune Tiberius Gracchus and his opponent Marcus Octavius, another tribune who interposed his veto against Gracchus’ agrarian reform and refused to back down. Octavius, says Cicero, was an upstanding citizen who “broke Gracchus by his patience” (*fregit ... patientia*). This is tell-tale Fabian language, which also appears in Cicero’s description of Fabius himself in the *De Senectute* of two years later.⁹³ In the Gracchan context, where Cicero paints Gracchus as a destructive citizen and wrecker of the commonwealth, Octavius is correspondingly imagined as a Fabian type whose resolution (*constantissimus*) in following his own path “saves the state.” A similar situation is described in a letter from Cicero to Atticus in 59, commenting on the current political situation in Rome. Cicero writes, “Bibulus is in heaven [i.e. in high esteem or honor] – I don’t know why, but he’s praised as though he were the ‘one man’ who, ‘by delaying, restored the commonwealth for us.’” Consul along with Gaius Iulius Caesar that year, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (in)famously stayed at home and watched the heavens for ominous signs, seeking to obstruct his colleague’s agrarian law and other initiatives.⁹⁴ Whether the Ennian verse represents the actual terms of public praise Bibulus received (“people are seriously comparing him to Fabius!”), or rather represents Cicero’s own ironic commentary on the situation (“as if, by such antics, he were ‘saving the commonwealth’ à

⁹² *Off.* 1.84: *quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. sunt enim qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audent dicere.* Elliott 2013: 164–5 discusses the exemplifying effect of Cicero’s framing of the Ennian quotation.

⁹³ *Brut.* 95: [sc. he was an elegant speaker] *qui iniuria accepta fregit Ti. Gracchum patientia, civis in rebus optimis constantissimus M. Octavius.* Cf. *Sen.* 10: [sc. Fabius] *Hannibalem ... patientia sua mollebat* (ch. 5.3.2 and n. 48). On the Gracchi and Octavius, see ch. 6.2 at n. 40.

⁹⁴ *Att.* 2.19.2: *Bibulus in caelo est, nec qua re scio, sed ita laudatur quasi <qui> ‘unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.’* On Bibulus’ obstruction of Caesar in 59, see still Münzer, *RE* 3 (1899): 1368–9; relevant texts listed in Broughton 1951: 2.187–8.

la Fabius”), is unclear.⁹⁵ In either case, however, Cicero is rejecting, even mocking, the application of the Fabian model to Bibulus’ obstructionism. While neither the conflict of Octavius and Gracchus nor that of Bibulus and Caesar involves generalship, Cicero seems to consider the former case, but not the latter, a tolerable “fit” for the Fabian exemplum. Within certain bounds, then, civic affairs (*res urbanae*, as he says in *De Officiis*) may indeed present statesmen, magistrates, and orators with their own “Fabian moments.”

The passages discussed here show the different ways in which posterity found Fabius “good to think with.” Any Roman, considering taking socially significant action, might someday need to deliberate whether to “join battle” now and gain immediate approval – i.e. undertake the sort of social performance normally expected in this situation – or to pursue a larger, more distant end through different means, withholding the expected social performance and incurring (at least short-term) ill-repute. Such a deliberation necessarily brings alternative sets of values into competition, one set more familiar and accepted, and the other less so; it also, inevitably, implicates one’s personal reputation. Military commanders may provide the best “fit” to the Fabian situation, but the model is extendable to statecraft, as Cicero shows. The value of the Fabian exemplum lies precisely in its modeling of how to weigh such alternatives, and of what consequences may follow from choosing the one or the other. Fabius is “good to think with” because any Roman aristocrat may, on campaign or elsewhere, eventually confront the Fabian predicament for himself.

5.6 Traces of a Different Fabius

Seldom do modern readers have the chance – or can they even dream – of peeling an historical figure apart from an exemplary figure of the same name. In the cases of Horatius Codes and Cloelia, there may be no historical figure corresponding to the exemplary figure at all. In the cases, of Appius Claudius Caecus, Gaius Duilius, and (in chapter 6) Cornelia the Mother of the Gracchi, probably no one doubts that there is an historical figure to whom an exemplary performance, or cluster of performances, eventually attached. But we moderns struggle to locate that historical

⁹⁵ This comparison, if pressed, casts Caesar as Hannibal – a comparison Cicero makes overtly a decade later, as he watches Caesar invade Italy from the north (*Att.* 7.11.1). Yet Caesar, writing his own account of the civil war several years later, appropriates the Fabian exemplum and casts himself in this mold: François 2009.

figure within or around the totalizing impact of exemplarity, with its propensity to select and fabricate information that supports its logic.

With Fabius, however, it may just be possible to identify features of an historical figure distinct from the exemplary one. The formative impact of exemplary logic is pervasive, to be sure: it is visible in such details as Fabius' alleged "slowness" as a child, and in his opposition in old age to Scipio's more aggressive strategy – attempts, perhaps, to bring an entire narrative of Fabius' life into focus around the characteristic of *cunctatio* and how others misunderstand it.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, enough elements discordant with the "delayer" tradition are transmitted that we may imagine, at least, that we are seeing traces of a different Fabius, one who appears to be a surprisingly conventional mid-republican aristocrat. In his first consulship, in 233, Fabius defeated the Ligurians, received a triumph, and dedicated a temple to Honos, the divinization of the abstract virtue "Honor." Nothing is known about the circumstances of this dedication beyond the bare fact of it. Yet one may conjecture that, at a crisis during a climactic battle, the consul restored Roman fortunes by vowing a temple to the divine manifestation of the military quality that was most needed at that very moment, and so inspired his soldiers to carry the day. At any rate, the victory, triumph, and temple dedication make Fabius look like a "normal" mid-republican *nobilis* who seeks to fuse personal aggrandizement with service to the commonwealth precisely by leading troops to victory in battle⁹⁷ – the very fusion of means and end that Fabius *Cunctator* explicitly rejects. The modern historian who wishes to tell a coherent story can perhaps posit that Fabius developed from a youngish first-time consul, pursuing *gloria* in traditional ways, into the mature senior statesman-general who realized that circumstances in the Hannibalic war were different.⁹⁸ Yet in 214 Fabius reportedly stormed towns that had defected to Hannibal, while his consular colleague Marcellus was inactive, reversing the "sword and shield" metaphor. And in his fifth consulship, in 209, Fabius recaptured Tarentum and received his second triumph. He also removed from that city a colossal statue of Hercules, which he dedicated on the Capitol in Rome along with a bronze equestrian statue of himself. The victor's dedication of

⁹⁶ Details: Plut. *Fab.* 1.5; 25–7; see Xenophontos 2012: 162–3, 174–9; Beck 2005: 269–70, 301; 2000: 90.

⁹⁷ Ligurian victory: Plut. *Fab.* 2.1, For. Aug. *elogium*; Cic. *ND* 2.61 attests the temple dedication in connection to this victory. On the temple in general, and on the competition it later engendered between Fabius and Marcellus, see McDonnell 2006: 212–28, Beck 2005: 276–7, Palombi, *LTUR* 3 (1996): 31–3, Ziolkowski 1992: 58–60.

⁹⁸ The usual age for first consulships among nobles of this era is ca. 40 (e.g. Beck 2005: 272–4). Feig Vishnia 2007 proposes, however, that Fabius was 15–20 years older in his first consulship, making him quite old – in his 70s or beyond – during his years of great eminence (ca. 217–209).

war-booty, accompanied by explicit self-monumentalization in an established commemorative form, is another familiar, even banal, mode of self-advertisement among Roman *nobiles* of the middle Republic.⁹⁹ The tradition about the fall of Tarentum holds, moreover, that Bruttian soldiers betrayed the city to the Romans, and that Fabius ordered or countenanced the slaughter of all Bruttians in the city in hopes of effacing that story and causing the city to appear to have been taken by force. But why should the *Cunctator* of legend be ashamed to be known to have taken Tarentum by craft?¹⁰⁰ Our modern historian might now posit that Fabius' "delayer" phase had only to do with the crisis of 217–216,¹⁰¹ after which he reverted to pursuing traditional forms of military glory in traditional ways (including the preference for *virtus* over stratagem). Yet even this is no clean solution, for the "delayer" tradition keeps resurfacing thereafter. For instance, Fabius is presented as urging non-engagement upon Livius Salinator, a consul of 207, and also upon the senate in 204 when arguing against Scipio's proposal to invade Africa.¹⁰²

The intertwining of these inconsistent strands, and their failure to present an overall narrative arc or progression, suggests to me that the "delayer" tradition did not quite manage to efface an alternative figuration of Fabius, that of a rather traditional successful general of the middle Republic. This figuration may, just possibly, capture some aspects of an historical Fabius, for two reasons; first, it is consistent with the everyday military values of the middle republican nobility more generally, and makes Fabius appear less of an outlier; and second, it is inconsistent with the exemplary "delayer" figuration, which – characteristically of exemplarity – filters for and fabricates elements aligning with itself.¹⁰³ Yet the *cunctator* figuration of Fabius is what mattered to later generations: the Fabius who advocated a distinctive approach to confronting Hannibal,

⁹⁹ Fabius' aggression in 214: Livy 24.20.3–8. Dedications: Strabo 6.3.1, Plin. *Nat.* 34.40, Plut. *Fab.* 22.8, *Vir. Ill.* 43.6; cf. Livy 27.16.8; discussion by Schmuhl 2008: 90–1, Sehlmeier 1999: 125–9. On equestrian statues see ch. 2.4 and 6.3.

¹⁰⁰ Fall of Tarentum, motivation for the slaughter, Fabius' desire for (traditional military) *gloria*: Livy 27.16.6, 27.40.9; Plut. *Fab.* 22.5. On the conventionally competitive character of Fabius' conduct here, see McDonnell 2006: 226–7, Hölkeskamp 2003: 223; also Levene 2010: 202, 209.

¹⁰¹ Or perhaps until 214, when the "Fabius as shield / Marcellus as sword" metaphor still presupposes Fabius the *cunctator*. But Livy presents Fabius as aggressively active in 214 (24.20.3–7), and he is widely credited with "traditional," personal military valor even during his dictatorship, when he rescues Minucius: Plut. *Fab.* 12.3–4, Sil. 7.592–616 (Fabius' epic *aristeia*). On Fabius the epic hero see Littlewood 2011 *ad loc.*, Tipping 2010: 133–7, Fucecchi 2010: 221–30.

¹⁰² Salinator: Livy 27.40.8–9 (Levene 2010: 191–2). Scipio: Livy 28.40.3–28.42.22.

¹⁰³ Beck 2005: 301 similarly contends that there is a gap between the exemplary "delayer" and the historical person (traces of which he attempts to recover, 269–301).

an approach based on a particular interpretation of the proper sources of and bases for *gloria*; and whose views, at first reviled, came in time to be accepted as valid. This Fabius identified a moral nuance, and by illuminating it for his fellow-citizens not only preserved the *res publica*, but durably (if modestly) changed the moral system, enabling Romans to make certain kinds of moral judgments in a more refined and critical way.

*Cornelia**An Exemplary matrona among the Gracchi***6.1 Introduction: On Becoming “the Mother of the Gracchi”**

Plutarch, in his biography of the Gracchi, discusses the motivations that may have spurred Tiberius Gracchus to propose his agrarian law immediately upon entering office as Tribune of the Plebs in 133 B.C.E. Tiberius may have been incited by his teachers Diophanes the rhetorician and Blossius the philosopher; or by rivalry with another ambitious aristocrat called Spurius Postumius; or by his own observation of the Tuscan countryside; or by the people’s urging (§8.6–10). Plutarch also reports (§8.7) that some writers say that Tiberius’ mother Cornelia spurred him on, by “reproaching her sons that the Romans still addressed her as the mother-in-law of Scipio [Aemilianus], and not yet as the mother of the Gracchi.”¹ In a perceptive discussion of this passage, Burckhardt and Von Ungern-Sternberg observe that it is too early for Tiberius’ mother to demand great things of her elder son. Any contemporary aristocrat would have lodged hopes for making a great name not in the lowly tribunate, but in the consulship with its possibilities for military command.² Tiberius, about 30 years old in 133, was a decade from being eligible to stand for the consulship; his brother Gaius, nine or ten years younger, was two decades away (note that this maternal rebuke is directed at *both* sons). Cornelia’s reproach, on the eve of Tiberius’ entry into the tribunate, seems to imply her *foreknowledge* that her sons – both of them – would make their names precisely and most unexpectedly as tribunes, one of them in the upcoming year, and the other

¹ Plut. *Gracch.* 8.7: ἔνιοι δὲ [sc. λέγουσι] καὶ Κορνηλίαν συνεπαιτιῶνται τὴν μητέρα, πολλάκις τοὺς υἱοὺς ὀνειδίζουσιν, ὅτι Ῥωμαῖοι Σκιπίωνος αὐτὴν ἔτι πενθεράν, οὕτω δὲ μητέρα Γράγχων προσαγορεύουσιν.

² Burckhardt/Von Ungern-Sternberg 1994: 111–12. This is why Cornelia’s daughter Sempronia’s marriage to the much older Scipio Aemilianus (*RE* Cornelius (335): cos. 147, 134; vanquisher of Carthage in 146 and Numantia in 133; twice triumphator) could seem to be Cornelia’s most important current connection, as she is made to imply. The point may be that she is prodding her sons into action by comparing them unfavorably with their sister.

a decade later. Historically speaking such a reproach, directed at even her elder son (let alone both) in 134 or 133, is utterly improbable.

Cornelia's rhetoric provides a hint as to what is going on. The logic of exemplarity, as noted elsewhere in this book, allows for an attribute or moral quality of a person evinced in one situation to be projected onto other aspects of that person's existence, thereby organizing a consistent image of the person's life – a kind of “biography” – around that attribute. This is one manifestation of the “timelessness” of exemplary performances: they are deemed relevant not only to other people at other times and places, but to the performer him- or herself at earlier or later times, who can thus follow his or her own example.³ Here, Cornelia is allegedly eager to become known as “mother of the Gracchi” (μήτηρ Γράγχων = *mater Gracchorum*), one of her chief attributes in the tradition. Yet she cannot assume this identity until *both* her sons – one is not enough – come into their own traditional figuration as “the Gracchi” (plural), which they will do by holding the tribunate. Cornelia demands that her sons hurry up and become what they “really are,” or must be, in the sense of inhabiting their eventual, timeless identities, so that she, in turn, can come into her own timeless identity as *mater Gracchorum*.⁴ Both she and they are thus depicted as striving to become what they always already are. The simultaneously retrospective and prospective logic of exemplary time, where any given performance looks both backward to past models and forward to future imitations (ch. 0.4), makes such an ambition perfectly comprehensible, however improbable it may be from an historical point of view.

In this chapter I examine how the figure of the “mother of the Gracchi” is constructed and deployed in texts and other monumental forms, and I consider the exemplary uses to which this figure is put. In some respects this chapter forms a pendant to chapter 2. Both deal with exemplary females – one in the stage of life preceding marriage, and the other in the stage following. Unlike Cloelia, however, no one doubts that behind the exemplary figure of Cornelia stands an historical person: a daughter of Scipio Africanus, who married Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a leading general and politician of the first half of the second century BCE,⁵ and from this union produced (among other children) the famous and controversial Tribunes of the Plebs Tiberius and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus.

³ Thus Plutarch attributes “slowness” to Fabius even as a child (ch. 5.6 at n. 96), and the cognomen “Cocles” can be thought to indicate that Horatius had already lost the use of one body part before losing the use of another on the pons sublicius (ch. 1.2.4).

⁴ So Burckhardt/Von Ungern-Sternberg 1994: 111–12, and Münzer, *RE* 4 (1901): 1593.

⁵ *RE* Sempronius (53): Consul 177 and 163; censor 169; twice triumphator.

Yet, as with other exemplary figures examined so far, it would be difficult to write a “biography” of Cornelia based on the information transmitted about her. Some is undoubtedly historically “true,” but much – like the anecdote from Plutarch just discussed – is improbable at best. In Cornelia’s case, however, even the likely true information seems to have been selected and transmitted precisely when it was already consistent with a discourse of idealized motherhood and matronal conduct – as a wife and particularly as a widow – that characterizes the overall exemplary figuration of Cornelia.⁶ This figuration is transmitted via a collection of monuments: a pattern of nomenclature, an honorific statue, and a variety of texts that narrate or refer to her matronal achievements and also cross-reference the naming pattern and plastic monuments. Some of these monuments, as we shall see, present Cornelia injunctively as model for conduct or standard of evaluation in specific contexts, aimed at specific audiences, to achieve specific purposes.

6.2 *Mater Gracchorum* as Name and Exemplum

Because their participation in civic affairs was limited, few female figures of the republican era were positioned to perform actions that were sufficiently visible to judging audiences as to yield norms. Women were excluded from the military, judicial, and governmental activities that furnished most of the performances for which men were praised, commemorated, and monumentalized – valor in battle, success as advocates, discharging magistracies. Very rarely they might appear in court as defendants; only as mourners and in cult practice did they regularly play roles of civic consequence (to the extent of participating in funerals and helping to maintain the *pax deorum*, i.e. proper relations between gods and Romans).⁷ In exceptional cases, female figures might attain exemplary status by performing an action in a “manly” sphere, or in a manner that could be described in masculine value terms. Thus, for example, Cloelia could be deemed exemplary for her *virtus*, whether this *virtus* was regarded as identical to a man’s, or as a female “equivalent” (ch. 2.3). There are, of course, domestic and sexual

⁶ Thus Hänninen 2007: 84 goes astray, in my view, saying “[m]otherhood really made Cornelia immortal.” The Cornelia of the late Republic and beyond is not a “biographical” one who is merely most famous in a particular role. Rather, a discursively constructed matronal ideal has generated, or transmitted only after filtering, virtually all surviving information about this figure. Better is Von Hesberg-Tonn 1983: 70: “Cornelia represents a female type whose principal purpose is to embody customary moral value concepts.”

⁷ Valentini 2012 examines in detail the spheres of public action open to women in the middle Republic.

virtues ascribed to women – *pudicitia* and *castitas*, for example – of which exemplary performances ought to be possible in principle, but which by their nature tend to escape the public eye; only very exceptionally might a performance instantiating such a virtue escape the relative secrecy of the household, come before a judging audience of community members, attain a civic profile, and enter the exemplary canon.⁸ Cornelia falls mostly into this latter category. For the legend credits her with forming, educating, and fostering her sons into “the Gracchi,” a domestic performance whose consequences are deemed to transcend the domestic sphere and assume civic significance. It is primarily for her “mothering” of the Gracchi, and secondarily for other matronal virtues, that Cornelia receives monumental commemoration and assumes exemplary status.

I begin with Cornelia’s nomenclature, and the particular virtues it is said to monumentalize. The predicate “mother of the Gracchi” (*mater Gracchorum*, μήτηρ Γράκχων, or with the words reversed) functions monumentally, behaving like an honorific cognomen of the sort that decorated the names of certain middle to late republican aristocratic males. Some cognomina were adopted by their bearers to commemorate their success (real or alleged) as military commanders. They name the people defeated or land subdued: Africanus, Hispanus, Asiaticus, Macedonicus, Numidicus, Creticus, Achaicus, Cimbricus, Isauricus, and the like. Such names function monumentally by summoning the bearers’ purported feats of military valor to conscious recollection, and making those achievements available for exemplary comparison with other performances. Functioning similarly are other, more heterogeneous cognomina or nicknames that commemorate some notable performance, office, or personal quality of the bearer: Torquatus, Corv(in)us, Caecus (ch. 3.3.4), Cunctator (ch. 5.3.1), Sapiens, Pius, Felix, Magnus, and Augustus, for example. Both types probably originated as epithets bestowed by soldiers or friends. Eventually, however, they gained broader currency and became more or less regular elements of the bearer’s nomenclature – meaning they occur with some regularity in texts referring to the bearer. The epithet *mater Gracchorum*, I suggest, functions like a member of the latter, more heterogeneous group

⁸ One instance is the story of Lucretia, as narrated by Livy (1.58): the rape that takes place in secret is exposed by the victim to the “public” eye (the men she assembles to hear her narrative of the rape), and monumentalized in her theatrical suicide before this same audience. Generally speaking, the domestic sphere is the normal “arena” in which women’s virtues are performed; these virtues can only be praised once brought out into civic view. Hence the paradox of praising women for their invisibility: Roller 2014.

of honorific names.⁹ Exactly when this epithet entered wide usage is difficult to say. Its earliest surviving occurrence is in Cicero's *Brutus*, dating to 46 (see below). But it may be considerably older: its *terminus post quem* is Gaius' emergence as a political figure similar enough to his brother that the two can be spoken of as "the Gracchi" (plural), as if they were a single force in the political culture of their era – conceivably as early as the mid-120s.¹⁰ At any rate, the secondary, "derived" character of Cornelia's monumental name entails that she can assume her exemplary figuration as "mother of the Gracchi" only *after* her sons are themselves monumentalized and attain their own exemplary figuration as "the Gracchi."¹¹ As a monument, the epithet *mater Gracchorum* serves to summon Cornelia's performance, or rather a set of related performances of the maternal and matronal role, to the awareness or recollection of a judging audience, and to set those performances up as models for imitation or as standards against which other performances may be measured.

Cornelia's actions as a pedagogue are the most prominent of these exemplary, norm-setting performances. This role is highlighted in Cicero's *Brutus*, a dialogue on the history of oratory that – as just noted – contains the earliest surviving occurrence of the epithet *mater Gracchorum*. In this dialogue the character Cicero remarks that a child's familial interlocutors critically influence his or her eventual oratorical ability as an adult: "it matters greatly whom each person hears every day at home, with whom he speaks from boyhood on, how fathers and pedagogues and even mothers speak. I have read letters of Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi: it is patent that her sons were raised less in their mother's lap than in her speech."¹²

⁹ On such names see Ov. *Fast.* 1.587–615; Montanari 2009: 185–219 engagingly discusses the origins and transmission of cognomina in general. Other scholars have remarked upon the "honorific" quality of the epithet *mater Gracchorum*: e.g. Bettini 1998: 111 (noting that this is a teknonym, derived from the name of one's child: these are vanishingly rare at Rome, while patronyms, derived from the name of one's father, are common); Rieger 1991: 49.

¹⁰ Plutarch's report that Cornelia was called "mother of the Gracchi" already during Gaius' tribunate (*Gracch.* 25.4 = *Gaius* 4.4) has some chance of being historically correct. On Cornelia's monumentalization of her sons, hence of herself, after their death, see ch. 6.6.

¹¹ Despite the Roman view that one's own ancestors furnish compelling exemplary models, hence that particular qualities or performances run in families (ch. 1.3 and n. 53), pluralized names commemorating multiple family members who share a quality or performance are relatively rare: the two (or three) Decii, the 306 Fabii, the two (but which two?) Scipios. These "true" plurals are theoretically distinguishable from "typological" plurals such as Livy's *Coclitēs Muciosque* (ch. 2 at n. 11), indicating "performers of the same sort" but not necessarily multiple members of the same family. However, this distinction can be difficult to make in practice and authors exploit the ambiguity for literary and ideological effect (see Feeney 1986: 5–14 on Vergilian instances).

¹² Cic. *Brut.* 211: *magni interest quos quisque audiat cotidie domi, quibuscum loquatur a puero, quem admodum patres paedagogi matres etiam loquantur. legimus epistulas Corneliae matris Gracchorum: apparet filios non tam in gremio educatos quam in sermone matris.* Two rhetorically dazzling epistolary

The rhetorical (de)crescendo “fathers, pedagogues, even mothers” presents the latter as the least likely to matter in their children’s oratorical formation. While Cornelia is adduced here to exemplify “mothers who matter,” the context suggests that she matters precisely in the *absence* of a father and a pedagogue, which allows her to take the leading role. Indeed, the legend maintains that Cornelia was widowed, and assumed responsibility for raising and educating her two exceptional sons largely on her own.¹³ Cicero then cites further instances instantiating the same model. He says that Laelia, the daughter of Gaius Laelius (a contemporary of Cornelia), spoke with her father’s *elegantia*, as did her daughters the Mucia and her granddaughters the Licinia. One of these Licinia married a Scipio and bore a son, named Crassus upon adoption by his maternal grandfather, who is himself deemed eloquent; eloquent too is her other son Metellus Scipio (these men are Cicero’s contemporaries).¹⁴ It is no accident that Cicero provides this lineage immediately following his invocation of Cornelia. For the passing down of eloquence in this matrilineal family tree, with three generations of women providing the links in the chain of transmission, supports Cicero’s general assertion that a person’s eloquence is decisively shaped by his or her home environment as a child – an assertion exemplified in the first instance by Cornelia and her two famous sons. The final link, where Licinia, having inherited her father Crassus’ eloquence, is implicitly credited with making her two sons eloquent in turn, and there being no indication that her husband Scipio played any role, recapitulates

fragments, attributed to Cornelia, survive in the manuscript tradition of Cornelius Nepos (fr. 59 Marshall). These have received extensive scholarly attention, but cannot be discussed here.

¹³ On Cornelia’s widowhood, and raising and educating her two famous sons alone, see Plin. *Nat.* 7.122, Plut. *Gracch.* 1.6–7. Tiberius *filii*’ excellent education: Cic. *Brut.* 104 (*a puero doctus et Graecis litteris eruditus*). In Cic. *De Or.* 1.38, the interlocutor Scaevola compares Tiberius Gracchus *père*’s eloquence unfavorably with that of his sons – a position that makes room for Cicero to credit the sons’ eloquence to their mother, as at *Brut.* 211 (previous n.)

¹⁴ *Brut.* 211–12: *hanc [sc. Liciniam] vero Scipionis etiam tu, Brute, credo, aliquando audisti loquentem. – ego vero ac libenter quidem, inquit Brutus, et eo libentius quod L. Crassi erat filia. – quid Crassum, inquam, illum censes, istius Liciniae filium, Crassi testamento qui fuit adoptatus? – summo iste quidem dicitur ingenio fuisse, inquit; et vero hic Scipio, collega meus, mihi sane bene et loqui videtur et dicere.* Cicero goes on to say (212–13) that the young Crassus received the eloquence of his grandfathers, great-grandfathers, and great-great-grandfathers – his father, again, is omitted, while his mother Licinia was previously credited as the vector of this ancestral eloquence.

In Cic. *De Or.* 3.45 the interlocutor Crassus dilates on Laelia’s eloquence, claiming that she, like many women, displayed an *antiquitas incorrupta* transmitted from her early learning and unsullied by contact with other contemporary orators. Hence he imagines that her father and other ancestors, as the sources of her speech, spoke similarly themselves. Combining this with *Brut.* 211, one might infer the following Ciceronian “theory” of female eloquence: women learn and faithfully reproduce their fathers’ eloquence, which they may then transmit to their own sons if circumstances allow (i.e. in their husbands’ absence).

Cornelia's formation of her own sons, and so exhibits the exemplary reproduction of the "mother of the Gracchi" educational ideal.

Although Licinia appears to replicate Cornelia's achievement, Cicero does not expressly declare Cornelia's achievement a model for her or the other women he names: the exemplary dynamic is merely implicit in the structure of his exposition. Quintilian, however, in his reworking of this Ciceronian passage, takes this additional step and expressly pronounces Cornelia's transmission of eloquence to her sons normative. He declares that fathers and mothers *should* be as learned as possible, to imbue their children with eloquence; and he invokes Cornelia to attest the benefits of the learned mother, supplying her monumental name clearly but with fractured syntax.¹⁵ He then repeats Cicero's example of Laelia, who displayed her father Laelius' elegance in speaking; and he adds a post-Ciceronian example of his own creation – Hortensia, Quintus Hortensius' daughter, whose speech before the triumvirs survives and is read. Three instances, then, of children – a pair of sons, then a daughter, then another daughter – who display the admirable eloquence of one or the other parent; these instances illustrate the preceding claim about the desirability of parental eloquence, of which the Mother of the Gracchi provides the first, and normative, instance.¹⁶

Tacitus too, in his *Dialogus* ("Dialogue on eloquence"), presents Cornelia in an exemplary educative role as he further reworks the Ciceronian locus. One participant in this dialogue, Messalla, discusses the reasons for oratory's supposed decline from its mid to late republican apex to its current poor situation (§25.1–2). The dramatic date of this dialogue, hence the notional nadir of eloquence, is 75 C.E. According to Messalla, the roots of any individual's eloquence lie in the home environment. In the good old days, children were raised "not in the room of a purchased (slave-) nurse, but in the lap and at the breast of their mother, who sought praise above all for watching over the house and tending the children." With the domestic pedagogical ideal so formulated, it is no surprise to find Cornelia leading the list of mothers who exemplified this ideal. Along with her, Messalla cites Aurelia the mother of Caesar and Atia the mother of Augustus: all

¹⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.6: *in parentibus vero quam plurimum esse eruditionis optaverim. nec de patribus tantum loquor: nam Gracchorum eloquentiae multum contulisse accepimus Corneliam matrem, cuius doctissimus sermo in posteros quoque est epistulis traditus.* Her monumental nomenclature is visible in the words *Gracchorum ... Corneliam matrem*, though *Gracchorum* is grammatically dependent upon *eloquentiae*. Her normativity is explicit in the optative subjunctive *optaverim*: "In parents, I would want there to be ... , and I am not speaking only of fathers."

¹⁶ On the dynamics of exempla in lists, see ch. 0.5.2 and n. 28; also ch. 1.3.

three “oversaw their sons’ educations and so produced children of the first rank,” presumably meaning in their oratorical capabilities.¹⁷ The order and formulation of the three mothers’ names – *Cornelia Gracchorum*, *Aurelia Caesaris*, *Atia Augusti [mater]* – presents the latter two mothers as successors and imitators of Cornelia. For not only is Cornelia named first, but she is granted her monumental nomenclature, on which model the other two mothers’ designations are also formulated.¹⁸ A further parallel, not stated here, is that Aurelia and Atia were widowed before their sons reached maturity, perhaps giving these women extraordinary opportunities (like Cornelia) to impact their sons’ oratorical formation. Nowadays, of course (§29.1: *at nunc* ...), such ideally rigorous home practices are not maintained, and for this and other reasons both morals and the quality of oratory have declined. It is consequently unclear whether Cornelia can in fact provide a model for today’s mothers (or fathers) who may wish to set their sons on a path for lofty eloquence: Messalla concedes that many other preconditions for good oratory have also changed (§33.4–41.5). Yet elsewhere Tacitus states that his own father-in-law Iulius Agricola (b. 40 CE) received a rigorous moral upbringing and splendid education under his mother Iulia Procilla’s oversight, after losing his father in the first months of his life (*Agr.* 4.1–4). Although Tacitus does not expressly invoke Cornelia here, he presents the paradigm of the widow virtuously tending the education of a son bound for greatness as still enactable in the reigns of Claudius and Nero, when Agricola was a youth; and still resonant as an ideal at the time of Tacitus’ writing, ca. 98 CE.¹⁹

¹⁷ Tac. *Dial.* 28.4–6: *nam pridem suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptae nutricis, sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur, cuius praecipua laus erat tueri domum et inservire liberis. ... sic Corneliam Gracchorum, sic Aureliam Caesaris, sic Atiam Augusti [matrem] praefuisse educationibus ac produxisse principes liberos accepimus.* That Tacitus has Cic. *Brut.* 211 in mind here is proven by the general context, the verbal echos (*gremium*, forms of *educare*, *Cornelia Gracchorum*), and by Messalla’s explicit, detailed discussion of this Ciceronian dialogue just two chapters later (§30.3–4; also Mayer 2001: 14–16 with further references).

¹⁸ In §28.6 *matrem* is firmly attested in the manuscript tradition, yielding the formulation *Corneliam Gracchorum ... Aureliam Caesaris ... Atiam Augusti matrem*. Cornelia thus receives her full honorific nomenclature, while the other two women are represented as following her example by extension of the formula. However, some editors bracket *matrem* as an interpolation by a scribe who failed to recognize that the names in the genitive depend upon *educationibus* (so Mayer 2001 *ad loc.*). For the formulation *Cornelia Gracchorum* (without *mater*) see ch. 6.4.

¹⁹ On women taking responsibility for their sons’ education as widows or in the father’s absence, see Scholz 2011: 94–6 (cf. 91–6 on early education in the home), Hemelrijk 1999: 67–70, Bonner 1977: 14–15, with further references. In the Republic this maternal role cannot have been unusual, for demographic studies suggest that between a quarter and a third of children had lost their fathers by age 15 (Scholz 2011: 94–6). On Cornelia’s value as sole parent see (e.g.) Valentini 2012: 227–9, Harders 2010: 55–7, Burckhardt/Von Ungern-Sternberg 1994: 108–9. Dion. Hal. 8.51.3 likewise presents Veturia as a young widow devoted to rearing her son Coriolanus: she declares that she functions not only as his mother, but as father, nurse, and sister to boot.

Cornelia's monumental nomenclature is also deployed to commemorate additional virtues tied to motherhood. "Poverty" may seem an unlikely maternal virtue, but this is the category – *de paupertate*, "on small means" – to which Valerius Maximus assigns an anecdote about Cornelia that he relates early in his fourth book. Cornelia is visited by a wealthy Campanian matron who shows off her spectacular jewelry, the loveliest of the time. Cornelia protracts the conversation until her children return from school, and then declares, "these are my jewels."²⁰ Valerius does not specify which children in particular, or how many. The legend maintains that Cornelia bore her husband twelve children, of whom nine died early, leaving just three to grow to adulthood – the two future Tribunes, and their sister Sempronia.²¹ But the tag *Gracchorum mater*, as we have seen, points specifically to the two famous sons who are themselves monumentalized as "the Gracchi." Valerius' readers, if they think of any particular children, would surely be thinking of these two. Now, as Martin Bloomer shows, this anecdote is a *chreia* – a kind of rhetorical exercise – on the theme of the value of children and education.²² It also engages a moralizing discourse about women and jewelry. Valuing jewelry is potentially vicious and dangerous, as exemplified in the legend of Tarpeia betraying the citadel in exchange for the besiegers' gold torques. Conversely, shunning or yielding up one's jewelry may instantiate great civic virtue, as the legend of the matrons contributing their jewelry during the Gallic siege exemplifies.²³ Cornelia, despising both the jewelry and values of her guest, and locating value in her children, thereby exemplifies a maternal ideal; Valerius chooses to express this ideal by classifying her performance under the rubric of *paupertas*.²⁴ But there is more: the anecdote seems to

²⁰ Val. Max. 4.4.pr.: *Cornelia Gracchorum mater, cum Campana matrona apud illam hospita ornamenta sua pulcherrima illius saeculi ostenderet, traxit eam sermone dum e schola redirent liberi, et 'haec' inquit 'ornamenta sunt mea.'*

²¹ For Cornelia's children and the deaths of most, see Plin. *Nat.* 7.57; Plut. *Gracch.* 1.5–7; Sen. *Marc.* 16.3, *Helv.* 16.6; perhaps Juv. 6.167–77 (comparing Cornelia to Niobe). Scholarly discussion by Dixon 2007: 7, Beagon 2005: 220–1, Moir 1983 (especially), and Carcopino 1928: 71–6.

²² Bloomer 2011: 29, 209 n. 25, noting similar stories in other texts that suggest its conventionality. On the features of the *chreia* see Hock/O'Neil 1986: 23–7.

²³ On greed, jewelry, gender, and the state see Welch 2015: 45–59 (focusing on Tarpeia). For matrons, their gold, and the civic good, see e.g. Diod. Sic. 14.116.9; "Laudatio Turiae" (*CIL* 41062 = *ILS* 8393), col. 2.1–4; Livy 5.25.8, 5.50.7–8, 34.5.9; Sen. *Helv.* 16.3; Plut. *Cam.* 8.3–4; with Hänninen 1999: 47–50.

²⁴ This classification turns on the vaguely Stoicizing notion that "externals" lack moral value, hence that wealth, health, honors, and other things that can be capriciously bestowed or stripped away by fortune are properly regarded as morally worthless. Indeed, Valerius generalizes from the Cornelia anecdote as follows: *omnia nimirum habet qui nihil concupiscit, eo quidem certius quam <qui> cuncta possidet, quia dominium rerum collabi solet ...* (4.4.pr.). However, the remaining exempla in this chapter instantiate *paupertas* in a more conventional, monetary way.

link the children's "jewel-like" quality specifically to the education they have been receiving; otherwise the school's presence in the story is unmotivated (Cornelia could simply have been said to point to her children while delivering her *bon mot*.) In this respect, the anecdote connects to the Ciceronian tradition that Cornelia as a widow took responsibility for and fostered her two sons' education. For all the exemplary and ideological weight this story bears, however, it is very unlikely to be historically true.²⁵

Further virtues associated with Cornelia's mothering, and with the monumental name *mater Gracchorum*, are fortitude and courage – virtues ascribed specifically for how she responds to her famous sons' deaths. The younger Seneca refers to Cornelia in two consolatory dialogues: *Ad Marciam De Consolatione*, addressed to a female friend grieving her son's death, and *Ad Helviam De Consolatione*, audaciously consoling his own mother for the "loss" of Seneca himself during his exile in Corsica. It is obviously an apt strategy in such texts to adduce examples of women who bore the loss of sons bravely. In *Ad Marciam*, Seneca expressly says he will produce "examples of women who suffered bravely the loss of their nearest and dearest" (*exempla ... feminarum quae suos fortiter desideraverint*, §16.3), where the adverb *fortiter* reveals that the virtue on display is *fortitudo*, (moral) courage. The first such example he adduces is Cornelia, monumentally named *Scipionis filiam Gracchorum matrem*. Her twelve births, he says, yielded twelve deaths, including the two great men whom she saw murdered and left unburied. Thus not only the deaths themselves but also the manner of death – murder and corpse desecration – are miserable. Yet (Seneca continues), when people gathered to console her, she declared, "I will never call myself unfortunate, I who bore the Gracchi."²⁶

²⁵ The historiographical problems raised by Valerius' anecdote are these: (1) When could Tiberius and Gaius have been in school together? If Gaius began formal schooling at the usual age of 7 (Bonner 1977: 35), Tiberius was already 16, the age he undertook military service under his brother-in-law Scipio at Carthage (Plut. *Gracch.* 4.5, with Scholz 2011: 223). (2) Cornelia allegedly procured choice Greek tutors for her sons. So why send them to school outside the house? (3) Cornelia was a scion of the loftiest Roman urban aristocracy. How could her jewelry be inferior to that of a municipal noblewoman from Campania? But to ask such questions is to press the anecdote too hard. The boys' actual age difference is neglected because they are already imagined in their legendary guise as an equal and matched pair; their absence and return is a dramatic device by which Cornelia's riposte is framed and underscored, to point up the value of motherhood and education; and the guest is Campanian because of that region's association with (vaguely Greek) wealth and luxury, thereby positioning Cornelia as a representative of old Roman values that despises foreign frippery and embraces virtuous poverty (so Bloomer 2011: 29–30).

²⁶ Sen. Marc. 16.3: *duodecim illa partus totidem funeribus recognovit ... Tiberium Gaiumque ... et occisos vidit et insepultos. consolantibus tamen miseramque dicentibus 'numquam' inquit 'non felicem me dicam quae Gracchos peperit.'* This exemplum follows directly upon that of Cloelia (16.1–2), discussed in ch. 2.2. Cloelia's deed is adduced to support the claim that women are as capable of displaying *virtus*

She is presented, then, as admirably courageous (*fortis*) for focusing on her good fortune in having borne such sons, rather than, as her consolers expect, on her bad fortune in having lost them (an idea developed more generally at §12.1–2). But there is a further point: Cornelia here speaks of her sons in their monumental guise as “the Gracchi,” the toweringly great men of their day. She does not call them, for example, by their praenomina Tiberius and Gaius, as might be expected among family and friends (though this is how Seneca himself refers to them), or by a kinship term such as *tales filios*. Thus the comfort she takes appears to derive from their having entered into their monumental name and exemplary figuration as “the Gracchi” – which brings Cornelia into her own exemplary figuration as *mater Gracchorum*, as Seneca called her earlier. One might say, then, that Cornelia declares herself “never unfortunate” (*numquam non felix*) because she has achieved what *she herself* wanted, namely to become “Mother of the Gracchi” in the fully monumental, exemplary sense of the epithet. Marcia’s son, by contrast, died too young to be a “great man;” hence Marcia cannot share the comfort Cornelia is implied to find in being “mother of ...” But Seneca’s argument proceeds *a fortiori*: Marcia can still take comfort, he suggests, in reflecting that even Scipios have been struck by this same blow of fortune.²⁷

In the dialogue *Ad Helviam De Consolatione*, Seneca places Cornelia into a moral category of “women whose admirable courage (*virtus*) ranks them among the great (male) heroes.” Earlier, regarding Cloelia (ch. 2.3), I explored the paradox of women being credited with *virtus*, which is typically tied to male military performance and is etymologically related to the word for “man” (*vir*).²⁸ Unlike Cloelia, however, whose deed was at least performed in wartime and amidst armed conflict, Cornelia is credited with *virtus* for her brave endurance of her sons’ deaths. Seneca writes (Sen. *Helv.* 16.6):

Cornelia ordered those who stood around her weeping and bewailing her fate not to make complaints against the fortune that had given her the Gracchi for sons. This was the right mother to bear a man who could say, in a public speech, “you slander my mother, who gave birth to me?” The mother’s utterance seems to me much more spirited: the son highly valued

(of a “manly” sort) as men; this gender-bending quality may also be visible in the *fortitudo* (also typically a manly quality) ascribed to Cornelia here.

²⁷ Too young: *Marc.* 21–4 (conventional praise in 23.3–24.4 notwithstanding). *A fortiori* argument: 16.5.

²⁸ Sen. *Helv.* 16.5: *feminas quas conspecta virtus inter magnos viros posuit*. While there is a hint here of gender transgression, elsewhere – or in other moods – Seneca can deny that *virtus/virtutes* is/are a masculine preserve: e.g. *Marc.* 16.1–3.

the birth of the Gracchi, while the mother highly valued their deaths as well.²⁹

Seneca's point seems to be that son and mother both regard producing "the Gracchi" (again bearing their monumental, "great men" nomenclature) as proof positive of the mother's high, even heroic, virtue. The son regards the virtue so demonstrated as placing her beyond criticism in the give and take of political oratory; hence here, in a speech delivered to a public assembly (*contio*), he rebukes an opponent for speaking ill of Cornelia, possibly in a public speech of his own.³⁰ Yet Seneca declares Cornelia's utterance more courageous (*animosior*) than the son's. In so saying, he defines the specific virtue – being *animosus*, "spirited" – that Cornelia is supposed to exemplify for Helvia. It is easy, Seneca implies, for a son to say how fine it is that his mother bore him. It takes much more "spirit" for the mother to affirm that same value after watching her son(s) die. Were she less spirited, she might lament her fortune and regret ever bearing children who would predecease her, like her misguided consolars.³¹ These consolars exemplify the wrong attitude toward fortune – allowing their *animus* to fail – while Cornelia, in correcting them and bearing herself otherwise, exemplifies the correct attitude. Indeed, Seneca's Cornelia presents herself here as an exemplary Stoic. She recognizes that her children are no less subject to the vicissitudes of fortune (*fortuna*) than any other possession; they too are "externals" whose bestowal and removal at fortune's whim should not shake her equanimity or cause her estimation of her own condition to change. If she is grateful for having been given the Gracchi, her gratitude is in no way diminished by their removal.³² This constancy in the face of

²⁹ Sen. *Helv.* 16.6: [sc. Cornelia] *flentibus tamen circa se et fatum eius execrantibus interdixit ne fortunam accusarent quae sibi filios Gracchos dedisset. ex hac femina debuit nasci qui diceret in contione: 'tu matri meae male dicas quae me peperit?' multo mihi vox matris videtur animosior: filius magno aestimavit Gracchorum natales, mater et funera.* As Duff 1915 *ad loc.* points out, *se* and *eius* in the first clause both refer to Cornelia.

³⁰ The son here is usually identified as Gaius, who is named as the speaker in the similar Plutarchean passage (see below). Within Seneca's logic, however, either son could be imagined to speak these words.

³¹ I interpret *mater* [sc. *magno aestimavit*] *et funera*, "the mother highly valued their deaths as well," to mean that she continued to be glad to have borne them even after seeing them die (similarly Meinel 1972: 202–3, Duff 1915: 287). This interpretation is difficult, assuming the text is sound, but renders the thought consistent with the statement Seneca has just ascribed to Cornelia, "not to complain of the fortune that had given (*dedisset*) her the Gracchi." Bentley and Madvig conjectured *ademisisset* ("took away") for *dedisset*, seeking to make her words correspond better to the later claim that she "valued their deaths" (Duff 1915: 286). But this conjecture does not make that claim's interpretation easier.

³² For family connections as Stoic "externals" subject to capricious removal by fortune – a trope obviously at home in the genre of consolation – see e.g. Sen. *Marc.* 10.1–6, *Helv.* 1.1, 2.4–5. For the

shifting fortune is characteristic of the Stoic sage (*sapiens*).³³ So too, presumably, should Helvia bear up under her own loss: she should thank *fortuna* for the time she had with Seneca, rather than reproach it for taking him away.

Quite another, rather unexpected, aspect of Cornelia's mothering receives exemplary commemoration in a passage of Plutarch, relating words spoken by her son Gaius (Plut. *Gracch.* 25.5–6):

(5) Many statements about her by Gaius are recorded, spoken against one of his enemies in the vulgar style of public assemblies: "You revile Cornelia," he said, "who gave birth to Tiberius?" (6) And since this reviler had been maligned as being "soft" [i.e. sexually receptive to other men], Gaius said, "what cheek you have, comparing yourself to Cornelia! Have you brought such children into the world as she has? Besides, all Romans know that she has been without a husband longer than you have, man though you are." Such was the bitterness of his words, and many similar examples can be taken from his writings.³⁴

According to this account, Gaius invokes his mother by name in a speech addressed to a public assembly, as he also does in the Senecan passage just discussed. Gaius claims his opponent has likewise mentioned her, perhaps in a similar setting. It is worthwhile to examine the particular exemplary mode(s) in which these adversaries invoke Cornelia (according to Plutarch). Gaius' opening question – "you abuse Cornelia who bore Tiberius?" – is obviously a variant of the question reported in Seneca's *Ad Helviam*: "You revile my mother, who bore *me*?" In either version, the son who speaks this *bon mot* can be seen as inflecting the monumental epithet *mater Gracchorum* to fit it for use by one of "the Gracchi" themselves. That is, the speaker implies that the extraordinary stature and civic importance of the (Gracchan) son should exempt his own mother (i.e. the mother of the Gracchi) from being dragged into the mudslinging of contional

argument that one should be grateful for having had something even after it has been lost, see Sen. *Marc.* 12.1–2, *Ep.* 98.11.

³³ On the constancy of the Stoic sage see especially Seneca's *De Constantia Sapientis*; also ch. 8.3. Plutarch's account of Cornelia's later years (ch. 6.6) is consistent with Seneca's representation; see Dixon 2007: 42–3 on Cornelia and Stoicism. Other authors, however, including Gaius Gracchus himself, present her as lamenting her sons' deaths: C. Gracchus *ORF* no. 48 fr. 61 = Cic. *De Or.* 3.214; [Sen.] *Oct.* 882–3; Jerome *Ep.* 54.4.

³⁴ Plut. *Gracch.* 25.5–6 = *Gaius* 4.5–6: (5) ἀπομνημονεύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦ Γαίου πολλὰ ῥητορικῶς καὶ ἀγοραίως ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰρημένα πρὸς τινα τῶν ἐχθρῶν "σύ γάρ" ἔφη "Κορινθίαν λοιδορεῖς τὴν Τιβερίον τεκοῦσαν;" (6) ἔπει δὲ διαβεβλημένος ἦν εἰς μαλακίαν ὁ λοιδορηθεὶς, "τίνα δ'" εἶπεν "ἔχων παρρησίαν συγκρίνεις Κορινθίᾳ σεαυτόν; ἔτεκες γὰρ ὡς ἐκείνη; καὶ μὴν πάντες ἴσασι Ῥωμαῖοι πλεῖω χρόνον ἐκείνην ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οὔσαν ἢ σὲ τὸν ἄνδρα." τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ πικρία τῶν λόγων ἣν αὐτοῦ, καὶ πολλὰ λαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἔστιν ὁμοία.

oratory.³⁵ Yet it is remarkable that she is brought in at all: I can find no close parallel for an opponent's mother being attacked, or even mentioned, in extant Roman deliberative or forensic oratory.³⁶

The next statement that Plutarch ascribes to Gaius (§6) helps illuminate the character of this attack. Gaius indignantly accuses his opponent of comparing himself (συγκρίνεις) to Cornelia. Whether this comparison reflects more positively on her than the "abuse" (λοιδορία) that Gaius had just said this opponent had hurled is unclear. But it is hard to imagine why an elite male orator would claim to be competing with a *matrona* in morals or achievements. Rather, if the story is credited at all, one may suspect that Gaius is polemically (mis)representing whatever his opponent "actually" said, precisely to assert that this opponent cannot measure up, in morals or achievements, to this *matrona*. For according to Gaius, Cornelia's matronly achievements outstrip this opponent's own efforts in two particular respects. First, the (male) opponent cannot rival Cornelia in the quality of the children each has borne;³⁷ and second, she has been without a husband for longer than he has, male though he is. Cornelia is therefore "exemplary" for Gaius' opponent in that her sexual traffic with men (or rather: *one* man) was more fruitful and beneficial than his; and because she achieved her excellent child-bearing results relatively quickly and has now taken a long hiatus from men, while the opponent's sexual activity with other men has been ongoing. On the one hand, then, Gaius invokes the *univira* ideal of the Roman matron, which implies chastity and sexual restraint. For a *univira* is a woman who marries only once, and does not

³⁵ Sen. *Marc.* 17.7 suggests that well-regarded sons may insulate their mothers from being spoken ill of, while ill-regarded sons are a curse (sc. to the mother) all by themselves. But Seneca may thinking here of rumors and innuendo rather than attacks delivered in a public speech. Bauman 1992: 44 senses an "official," exemplifying quality to Gaius' use of Cornelia's nomen (Κορνηλία) rather than the kinship term "my mother" (cf. *matri meae* in the Senecan passage). But reference to a woman by her nomen is standard and unmarked, regardless of the context or relationship (Kajava 1995: 20–6, Kajanto 1977 esp. 150–1; cf. Dickey 2002: 73–6, 270–2). That Gaius refers to his brother by praenomen only (Τιβέριος) is also unexceptional, as brothers routinely address and refer to one another in this way in intimate communication: Dickey 2002: 266–7, 1996: 59–60; Adams 1978: 147–8, 161–2.

³⁶ While insults directed at "your mama" are widely diffused in some sectors of modern society, and also occur in Greek oratory (e.g. Aeschin. *Ctes.* 171–2), the only *matronae* subject to insult that I have discovered in surviving Roman oratory are Clodia Metelli in Cicero's *Pro Caelio* (discussed in ch. 3.4) and Sassia in his *Pro Cluentio*. But even these women are not the mothers of Cicero's opponents, and these speeches are forensic not contional. On insults directed at Cornelia in general, see Beness/Hillard 2013, esp. 61–5.

³⁷ The verb τίκτω in post-Homeric Greek usually refers to the female role in procreation, while the male role is indicated by γεννάω or φυτεύω. I suspect that, in Plutarch, τίκτω is marked for female

remarry upon her husband's death.³⁸ On the other hand, and in sharp contrast, he portrays his opponent as being *mollis* (here μαλακός), i.e. a *cinaedus*, an adult male who desires to be sexually penetrated by other males. Tarring an opponent as a *cinaedus* is a common invective trope in Roman oratory and satire of all periods, with a surprising number of parallels even in the fragmentary texts surviving from the late second century.³⁹ Here, however, Gaius hurls the insult in a most inventive way. He presents his opponent as attempting, but failing, to measure up to the exemplary standard Cornelia has set for how to have (and stop having) sex with men, and for how to bear children. The sexual norms Cornelia sets can be inferred from the character of her children (hence from her mothering), and from the *univira* ideal she maintains by not remarrying.

A final excerpt from Plutarch shows how Cornelia's exemplary mothering, rhetorical prowess, monumental name, and presence in civic discourse all come together to generate a new monumental form. Plutarch relates that Gaius announced in a public assembly that he would withdraw legislation he had promulgated against Marcus Octavius, an opponent of his brother Tiberius, as a favor to his mother at her express request.⁴⁰ Plutarch then describes the reaction of the assembled people – presumably the *concilium plebis*, the legislative assembly a *tribunus plebis* had the power to convene – upon hearing Gaius' announcement. "And the people marveled/were glad, and assented [sc. to his request to withdraw the legislation], and honored Cornelia for her sons no less than for her father – at any rate, they later erected a bronze statue of her and inscribed it 'Cornelia mother of the Gracchi.'"⁴¹ Gaius presents his climb-down on prosecuting Octavius as a matter of filial piety, of deferring to his mother's wishes

procreative activity and its application here to a man frames his sexual role as "womanly." See Amigues 1982: 39–40.

³⁸ Plutarch says that following her husband's death Cornelia declined a marriage proposal from "king Ptolemy" (*Gracch.* 1.7). On the linkage between *pudicitia* and being a *univira* see e.g. Livy 10.23.9; scholarly discussion in Valentini 2012: 225–7, Dixon 2007: 51–2, Langlands 2006: 61–4, Treggiari 1991: 233–6.

³⁹ For near-contemporary *cinaedus* accusations in Roman oratory see Cato *ORF* no. 8 fr. 213, Scipio Aemilianus *ORF*² no. 21 fr. 17, 30, with Koster 1980: 107, 111–12; in satire, Lucil. fr. 32, 1140 Marx. On the cultural and political implications of this accusation, see Williams 2010: 197–218, Corbeil 1996: 147–69, Edwards 1993: 63–97. In [Cic.] *In Sall.* 9, "Cicero" makes the same riposte to "Sallust," who has alleged that Terentia and Tullia, Cicero's wife and daughter, committed sexual transgressions: Cicero says, *quae facilius mulieres se a viris abstinerunt quam tu vir* (cf. [Sal.] *In Cic.* 2). This undatable text may be derivative of Plutarch (or his source), or may independently attest the fame and wider application of this *bon mot*.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Gracch.* 25.1–3 = *Gaius* 4.1–3. On the conflict between the Gracchi and Octavius, see Flaig 2005, Rieger 1991: 103–16.

⁴¹ Plut. *Gracch.* 25.4 = *Gaius* 4.4: καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἠγάσθη καὶ συνεχώρησε, τιμῶν τὴν Κορνηλίαν οὐδὲν ἥττον ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων ἢ τοῦ πατρός, ἧς γε καὶ χαλκῆν εἰκόνα στήσας ὕστερον ἐπέγραψε Κορνηλίαν μητέρα Γράγγων.

(albeit at the expense of fraternal piety, for he has given up trying to avenge his brother). He has brought this domestic transaction, and its familial rationale, into civic view by presenting it in the plebeian assembly. This assembly, representing the civic community, appropriately stresses the civic face of the transaction: it deems Cornelia's intervention sufficiently beneficial to merit a distinctively civic honor – a statue – granted by its own authority (presumably via a *plebis scitum*, the legally binding action the *concilium plebis* is authorized to take). This context points to a specific rather than general interpretation of the “motherhood” for which she is honored. The point is not that she (merely) bore, raised, or educated great men, but that she compellingly performed the maternal role in one particular situation: for she persuasively presented familial moral imperatives to Gaius in a way that aligned with the public good. This is how a mother's “private” words to her son come within a popular assembly's cognizance to evaluate as a civic deed.⁴²

In describing how Cornelia came to be monumentalized as “mother of the Gracchi,” Plutarch resolves the challenge that he says she issued to her sons on the eve of Tiberius' tribunate, in the passage examined at the start of this chapter (*Gracch.* 8.6–10, ch. 6.1). There, Plutarch credits Cornelia with spurring Tiberius to seek the tribunate by reproaching him (and his brother) that the Romans addressed her as mother-in-law of Scipio, but not yet as the mother of the Gracchi (μητέρα Γράγχων). Cornelia is thus projected as imagining that she will gain her honorific nomenclature through her sons' achievements, i.e. through their own self-construction as “the Gracchi.” I also argued that the plural “Gracchi” (Γράγχων) is inappropriate, as only Tiberius was about to enter a magistracy; and indeed it is unlikely that the tribunate could have been foreseen to be a vehicle for achieving greatness. Yet, in the current passage, the Roman people fulfill Cornelia's wish by granting a statue that bears precisely the nomenclature she supposedly longed for eleven years earlier. However, the grounds for this monumentalization have shifted. Her sons indeed had to become “the Gracchi” before she could become “mother of the Gracchi.” But she gains

⁴² The clause ἥς γε καὶ χαλκῆν εἰκόνα στήσας ὕστερον ἐπέγραψε (“at any rate, they later set up a bronze statue of her and inscribed it”), gives Plutarch's justification for his claim that the people honored Cornelia specifically for her sons: i.e. Plutarch deduces the statue's occasion from its inscription. For this “limitative” use of γε following relative pronouns, see Denniston/Dover 1950: 141–2; also Holden 1885 *ad loc.* Scholars have remarked that Cornelia enters civic discourse here for the first time, being spoken of by name in a *contio* and being said to influence the actions of a sitting magistrate: Dixon 2007: 21–2, Burckhardt/Von Ungern–Sternberg 1994: 112–14, Kreck 1975: 79–85.

her title not just by virtue of raising famous sons, but by virtue of her own *performance* of motherhood via rhetoric – her success in persuading Gaius to back down regarding Octavius.⁴³ Also, the plural form “mother of the Gracchi” (μητέρα Γράγχων) is as incongruous in the current passage as in the former, for here Cornelia has rhetorically performed her motherhood only in respect to Gaius. Tiberius, long dead, is relevant only as the cause of the old enmity Gaius is now agreeing to set aside. What the plural seems to signal, in both passages, is the telescoping, synchronic temporality that often characterizes exempla – the collapsing of an exemplary actor's entire “life story” into each individual moment of that story. Since each of the Gracchi is also at the same time the other (for in their exemplary figuration they exist largely as a matched, interchangeable pair), then for Cornelia to act as mother to either is automatically to act as mother to both.⁴⁴

6.3 Cornelia's Statue and the Politics of Porticos

Further dimensions of Cornelia's exemplarity emerge from closer consideration of her statue and its changing urbanistic context. As just noted, Plutarch says that a bronze statue, inscribed “Cornelia mother of the Gracchi,” was erected by “the people” to honor her “for her sons no less than for her father” (*Gracch.* 25.4 = *Gaius* 4.4). The Elder Pliny also mentions this monument in his discussion of metals, which includes the use of bronze in statuary (Plin. *Nat.* 34.31):

We know of loud complaints by Cato during his censorship [in 184], that statues were being erected in the provinces to Roman women; however, he was not even able to prevent them from being erected in Rome itself, like the one to Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi, who was the daughter of the elder Africanus. In a seated posture, and notable for its strapless sandals, it was set up for her in the public portico of Metellus; the statue is now [70s CE, the time of Pliny's writing] in the edifice of Octavia.⁴⁵

⁴³ Perfect responson of the current passage (*Gracch.* 25.4) with the previous one (*Gracch.* 8.7) would require that the assembly here refer to her son-in-law rather than her father. But with her son-in-law now dead, perhaps her father – also dead, but a closer relative – looms larger (n. 2 above).

⁴⁴ For the brothers' similarity or interchangeability, see C. Gracchus *ORF* no. 48 fr. 17, Plut. *Gracch.* 22.7 = *Gaius* 1.7, Cic. *Div.* 1.56, Val. Max. 1.7.6 and 4.4.pr (with n. 25 above); Bannon 1997: 127–8, 135. They can be distinguished, however, when an assertion of difference confers greater explanatory or persuasive power (as e.g. at Plut. *Gracch.* 2–3).

⁴⁵ Plin. *Nat.* 34.31: *exstant Catonis in censura vociferationes mulieribus statuas Romanis in provinciis poni; nec tamen potuit inhibere, quo minus Romae quoque ponerentur, sicuti Corneliae Gracchorum matri, quae fuit Africani prioris filia. sedens huic posita soleisque sine ammento insignis in Metelli publica porticu, quae statua nunc est in Octaviae operibus.* Bettini 1998: 109–12 (with notes) discusses possible implications of the strapless sandals.

The base of this statue survives: a large block of Pentelic marble, bearing an Augustan-era inscription “Cornelia, daughter of Africanus, of the Gracchi” (*Cornelia Africani f(ilia) / Gracchorum*), was discovered in 1878 on the site of the porticus Octaviae, precisely where Pliny places the statue [Fig. 6.1].⁴⁶ Pliny and Plutarch appear to reflect this inscription’s wording in their descriptions of the statue. Pliny’s phrase “Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi, who was the daughter of the elder Africanus” reads like an elaborated paraphrase. For it reverses the order of the Gracchi and Africanus, specifies which Africanus, and adds *mater* to make the maternal relationship explicit. Meanwhile, Plutarch’s assertion that the statue “honored Cornelia for her sons no less than for her father” seems likewise to describe the inscription’s contents. His statement in the next sentence that the inscription read “Cornelia mother of the Gracchi” is then not quite accurate, either in excluding Cornelia’s filiation or in including the word for “mother.”⁴⁷ However, Plutarch likely did not know the monument at first hand, and received his information from an intermediate source; Pliny, by contrast, certainly knew the monument from autopsy.⁴⁸

The historicity of honorific statues of women in republican Rome has been vigorously debated. Unquestionably historical are the statues granted in 35 to Octavia and Livia (see below). But authors of the late Republic and of the Empire report, probably incorrectly, that up to five republican-era women may have received honorific statues, including Cloelia (ch. 2.4) and Cornelia. These statues are now usually thought to represent misunderstandings of earlier statues of female divinities, or misdatings of statues erected long after the alleged heroic deed. In Cornelia’s case, some scholars hold that an honorific statue of a woman (or of *this* woman) is possible by the late second century, and that Cornelia’s honor paved the way for the one granted to Octavia and Livia nine decades later. Others contend that Cornelia’s statue, like the earlier statues allegedly honoring women, is a case of mistaken identity.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *CIL* 6.10043 = 6.31610 (most recently discussed by Chioffi and Alföldy, *CIL* 6.8.3 (2000): 4772) = Degraffi, *InscrIt* 13.3.72 = *ILLRP* 336 = *ILS* 68, now in the galleria lapidaria of the Capitoline Museums; further discussion in ch. 6.4.

⁴⁷ See n. 41 above for the text of Plutarch, and ch. 6.4 on the omission of *mater* from the inscription.

⁴⁸ See Coarelli 1996[1978]: 288–90, 296 for a suggestion regarding the transmission of Plutarch’s information.

⁴⁹ Valentini 2011: 201–22 and Flory 1993: 288–92 discuss the early alleged honorific statues for women, including Cornelia’s; Hemelrijk 2005: 310–15 argues that all alleged honorific statues for women prior to 35 are later inventions, perhaps intended to provide specious precedents for those granted that year to Octavia and Livia. See also Sehlmeier 1999 on each statue.



Figure 6.1 Base of Cornelia statue

I myself accept the “mistaken identity” thesis, but to justify this view requires detailed discussion of the statue’s architectural context. In 148 the praetor Quintus Caecilius Metellus defeated the Macedonian royal pretender Andriscus, celebrated a triumph, and adopted the honorific cognomen Macedonicus. He brought a large quantity of booty to Rome, including a spectacular masterwork by Lysippus, which he looted from the sanctuary of Zeus in Dion. This was the so-called *turma Alexandri*, a group of twenty-six life-size bronze equestrian figures representing Alexander the Great and those of his companions who died in the battle of the Granicus.⁵⁰ To provide a gallery and frame for this and other looted works

⁵⁰ Vell. 1.11.3–4, Plin. *Nat.* 34.64, Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.4. Scholarly discussion and further references in Viscogliosi, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 132, Celani 1998: 248–9, Coarelli 1997: 532–3, Calcani 1989 (at length). On the group’s impact, and on a smaller-scale marble group at Lanuvium which Coarelli suggests is copy or imitation, see Bergemann 1990: 72–8, Coarelli 1987: 144–61.

of art, Metellus erected in the Circus Flaminius an ample quadriporticus subsequently known as the porticus Metelli (map location 32). This portico enclosed a preexisting temple of Iuno Regina; a matching temple of Iuppiter Stator seems to have been erected at the same time as the portico, standing next to Iuno and likewise enclosed by the portico (map locations 32a–b). The complex was completed by the 130s, if not earlier.⁵¹ In 70 Cicero mentions that the porticus Metelli contained high-quality Greek sculpture (*Ver.* 2.4.126–7). Velleius Paterculus, writing around 30 CE, says that the turma Alexandri was on view in the porticus Octaviae (1.11.3), which succeeded the porticus Metelli on the same site; and the Elder Pliny, some forty years later still, mentions a number of Greek sculptures on display in the porticus Octaviae (*Nat.* 36.15, 22, 28–9, 35). Collectively these texts indicate that the turma Alexandri persisted through the portico's transition from honoring Metellus to honoring Octavia, and hint that a variety of other Greek or Greek-appearing sculpture also made this transition. Most of these works were probably looted by Metellus from Macedonia, though some may have been purpose-made for the porticus Metelli by Greek sculptors residing in Rome and working in Greek styles.⁵²

Regarding the seated bronze “statue of Cornelia” in particular, Pliny says (as just noted) that it was originally installed in the porticus Metelli, and in his day was in the “buildings of Octavia” (*in Octaviae operibus*, n. 45 above). This suggests that it was carried over from the preceding to the succeeding structure, like the turma Alexandri. The statue's base [Fig. 6.1], a block of Greek (Pentelic) marble, was necessarily imported to Italy either before or after carving. It is furthermore framed by upper and lower moldings executed in a typically Hellenistic form. The base has been thought to bear traces of an erased inscription near the top of the front face, just underneath the band below the upper molding – a typical location for second-century inscriptions, in contrast to the Augustan practice of centering the inscription on the stone's face (as seen in the extant Augustan inscription). The contents of any such inscription, if it existed, can only be guessed at. On the band just below the upper molding is an additional inscription, reading *opus Tisicratis*, stylistically dated to the third century CE. This later inscription, (mis)attributing the statue to a

⁵¹ On this complex Vell. 1.11.2–5, 2.1.2 is foundational. Recent scholarly discussion by Albers 2013: 80–1, 260–1; Ruck 2004: 482–3, Coarelli 1997: 529–31, Viscogliosi, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 130; *LTUR* 3 (1996): 126–8, 157–9; Calcani 1989: 21–6.

⁵² On the sculptures in the porticus Metelli/Octaviae and their origins, see Bravi 2012: 121–9 and Celani 1998: 153–61.

particular sculptor, is not relevant to the current discussion.⁵³ The statue's seated posture, attested by Pliny, may reflect one of several Classical and Hellenistic seated female types. The base's shape, and the position of the statue's anchorings in its upper surface, best accommodate seated types known for the goddesses Demeter, Cybele, and Hera; the base's dimensions suggest that the female figure would have been slightly larger than life size.⁵⁴ Pliny specifically says that various images of goddesses stood in the porticus Octaviae (hence, probably, in the porticus Metelli): two statues of Iuno, one being the cult statue in the incorporated temple; and as many as four Venuses, all by different sculptors (Plin. *Nat.* 36.15, 35). Given the strong representation of goddess statues in this complex, as well as the types of female figure that could fit the surviving base, it seems entirely possible that the statue of Cornelia "originally" represented a goddess. It was either made in Greece, looted by Metellus, and brought to Rome as war booty, or was made in Rome by Greek artists working in Greek styles (and, for the base, with Greek marble as well), to enhance the decoration of the new portico.⁵⁵

In time, then, one of these goddess statues came to be identified as Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi, in the monumentalized, legendary figuration that emerged by the middle of the first century BCE. In the Augustan age the base was (re)inscribed – any older inscription having been removed – to name the female figure whom the statue was now thought to represent. How such a reidentification came about is unclear, but a parallel is the possible reconstrual of an archaic equestrian statue in the forum as the legendary heroine Cloelia, as discussed in chapter 2.4. Further instances of existing statuary receiving new identifications can be

⁵³ On the base's form, date, and original inscription (if any), see Ruck 2004: 479–85, Coarelli 1996[1978]: 287–90. Chioffi disputes the erasure in *LTUR* 4 (1999): 358, but accepts it in Chioffi and Alföldy, *CIL* 6.8.3 (2000): 4772. My own inspection of the stone convinces me that there is no depression, which an erasure typically produces, in the upper portion of the front face. Either there was no erasure, or the entire front face was refinished to render it uniformly flat and eliminate any erasure-created depression before the current inscription was added. A finer tool and different chiseling technique was used to finish the portion of the front face above the current inscription and below the *opus Tisicratis* band than was used on the remainder of the front face. This finer tool was also used on the *opus Tisicratis* band itself, as well as on the continuation of that band on the left and right side faces of the block and also and directly below that band on both side faces, where no erasure would be expected. So I do not think the use of this tool on the block's front face (or side faces) can ipso facto be taken to indicate an erasure. I thank Werner Eck for discussion of these matters.

⁵⁴ Ruck 2004: 485–7; cf. Coarelli 1996[1978]: 291–2.

⁵⁵ On the statue's possible origins, see Ruck 2004: 483, Chioffi and Alföldy, *CIL* 6.8.3 (2000): 4772, Chioffi, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 358.

adduced from outside the city of Rome.⁵⁶ It is just conceivable that the “statue as Cornelia” was first identified as such only in the 30s BCE, precisely to create an exemplary model for Octavia and for the public statue with which she was honored (more on this below). But once identified as Cornelia, the statue was assumed to be honorific, and the expectation that the operations of exemplarity are interlinked required a deed for the statue to commemorate. This is what Plutarch or his source provides, when he reports that the people honored Cornelia with a statue for intervening with her son Gaius regarding Octavius. Modern scholars suggest other occasions for the erection of this statue, and so follow the same exemplary logic as Plutarch. But if any of the scenarios presented above are correct, the statue did not “originally” represent Cornelia at all, or at least not in her own day, and therefore is not a monument erected by her contemporaries to commemorate a notable performance. Nor need one puzzle over when and why her statue was placed in the portico of Metellus Macedonicus, a great enemy of her sons.⁵⁷ In this case, Plutarch’s account of the performance in the public eye for which Cornelia was honored with a statue shows, once again, how the logic of exemplarity can manufacture connections among possibly unrelated events, actions, and objects, and even cause elements of an exemplary cycle to be created *ex nihilo* to fill out the four operations. Specifically, Plutarch’s account reveals what a Roman of the high Empire *imagined* was a suitable occasion for an honorific statue of a woman – or at least of *this* woman, the legendary Mother of the Gracchi. If Plutarch’s account is historically false, its very falseness provides rich insight into the assumptions Romans held about how gender roles frame action, evaluation, and commemoration in the first two centuries CE.

In the late 30s to early 20s, the porticus Metelli was renovated and renamed for Octavia, the sister of Octavian/Augustus and, until 32, the wife of his rival Marcus Antonius. This renovation created a new architectural and ideological context for the portico’s statuary, and especially for the statue identified as Cornelia. Dio Cassius (49.38.1) reports that, in 35,

⁵⁶ Platt 2007: 252–6 (and *passim*) and Blanck 1969: 71–84 adduce examples from Athens, Rhodes, and other Greek cities of statues reinscribed with the names of Roman magistrates and their wives, causing them to appear as honorific “portraits” regardless of their prior identification, purpose, and function.

⁵⁷ So Hemelrijk 2005: 313–15. For interpretations of the statue as an authentic second-century honorific portrait of Cornelia, which was placed for political reasons in the porticus Metelli at the time of its manufacture, see Flower 2002: 175–9, Sehlmeier 1999: 187–8, Burckhardt/Von Ungern-Sternberg 1994: 128–31, and Coarelli 1996[1978]: 293–7, all with abundant speculation on motive and opportunity. For Metellus’ opposition to the Gracchi, see Cic. *Brut.* 81, Plut. *Gracch.* 14.4 (Tiberius), Cic. *Phil.* 8.14 (Gaius).

Octavia and Livia (Octavian's wife) were simultaneously granted tribunician sacrosanctity, freedom from *tutela*, and public statues. The novelty of these grants to women in the Triumviral period cannot be overstated. The first had previously been reserved for Tribunes of the Plebs – elected male magistrates. The second, exempting these women from legal oversight by male kin, gave them full and complete control over their own property, which in law if not in practice was unobtainable for women in this period.⁵⁸ And regarding statues, social actors who had hitherto received this form of commemoration were overwhelmingly male, and it was most commonly a military achievement that was so monumentalized. These extraordinary grants to Octavia and Livia honored them equally as wives of the two triumvirs, and protected them from outrage. However, the sources suggest that Octavian sought to gain politically from his sister Octavia's conspicuous wifely loyalty to Antony and his children, and to cast Antony in the role of neglectful and unfaithful husband.⁵⁹ The decision to name a portico for Octavia and possibly her son Marcellus, probably taken in the 30s (with the dedication taking place in the early to mid-20s), can be understood as promoting these same official and unofficial aims.

This portico was created as follows. According to Dio Cassius (49.43.8), Octavian oversaw a complete renovation of the porticus Metelli and its temples, which he paid for from the spoils of his military victories in Dalmatia. The work must have begun in or around 33, the year these campaigns ended. The quadriporticus structure and at least some of the pre-existing sculpture was retained: at any rate, the turma Alexandri and "statue of Cornelia" are said to have persisted, as we have seen. An exedra, a Greek library, and a Latin library were eventually added. Officially Octavia was the work's patron, and subsequent texts refer to the renovated portico as the porticus Octaviae, Octaviae operae, or the like.⁶⁰ A statue of Octavia

⁵⁸ Apart, that is, from the Vestal Virgins, whose extraordinary status in this respect Octavia and Livia now shared: see Gardner 1986: 5–29 on *tutela mulieris* in this period.

⁵⁹ On the grants of 35, and on Antony's mistreatment of Octavia as element in Octavian's propaganda campaign, see Dio 49.38.1–2, Plut. *Ant.* 53–4, 57; also Hemelrijk 2005: 309, Flower 2002: 160–2, Flory 1993: 292–6, Bauman 1992: 91–8.

⁶⁰ On the rebuilding and renovation see Albers 2013: 106–8, 262–3; Viscogliosi, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 141–5, Coarelli 1997: 534–7; on the decorative program see especially Bravi 2012: 117–29, with Macaulay-Lewis 2009: 8–11 and Pape 1975: 185–7. Woodhull 2003: 23–5 weighs the difficult and contradictory reports regarding whether Octavia or her brother paid for the work and took the leading role as patron. In any case Octavia's personal contribution was substantial: she allocated at least three freedmen to maintaining the libraries, as their epitaphs, from the columbarium of her daughter Marcella minor, indicate (*CIL* 6.4431–5). See also Hemelrijk 1999: 107.

was almost certainly installed in the portico, presumably bearing the portrait type created in 35.⁶¹

This portico was the first public building in Rome to bear the name of a female patron; the second such building, dedicated in 7 BCE by Livia, was also a portico.⁶² That porticos in particular might have women as patrons or dedicators in this period may be no accident. Porticos were “public” in the sense of being open to all who wished to enter and use them. But they were not “civic” in the sense of being programmed for particular activities relating to government, the courts, commerce, festivals, or cult practice, as was the case for other common building types like fora, basilicas, and temples.⁶³ Porticos are typically said to contain works of art and libraries, to be ideal for leisured strolling, and – according to Catullus and Ovid – to be fruitful for soliciting sexual liaisons. They are thus coded as places of leisure, *otium*, and not as places of “serious” activity, *negotia* or *officia* (so also Vell. 2.1.1–2). This coding also has gendered implications, for the “serious” activities of government, advocacy, and the like were reserved for men, but activities associated with *otium* were open to both sexes. So if a woman’s name was to be associated with any type of public building, a portico may have seemed the most suitable.⁶⁴ But there is more. The grants of statues, sacrosanctity, and freedom from *tutela* to Octavia and Livia in 35 bestowed some of the privileges and honors associated with holding magistracies and priesthoods, but not the actual offices, powers, and responsibilities. Thus these two women themselves took on distinctively “public but not civic” roles, the same quality manifested in porticos as such: the persons and the structures are metonymically associated by sharing this quality. Indeed, the very act of paying for and dedicating a portico manifests this quality. Such sponsorship and oversight confers public visibility, but does not require current or past tenancy of magisterial or priestly office. The articulation of Octavia’s role as “public but not civic,” supported by the exemplary

⁶¹ For Octavia’s sculptural and numismatic portraits, see Wood 1999: 41–63 with further bibliography. The Velletri–Smyrna type, almost certainly to be identified as Octavia (Wood 1999: 52–4 and pls. 11–15), may be the type created in 35 that would have featured in this portico.

⁶² On the porticus Liviae in general, see Panella, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 127–9 with further references; on Livia as dedicator see Milnor 2005: 60–4.

⁶³ Porticos dedicated by individuals often enclose or include one or more temples, creating complex interactions between public but “sponsored” space and sacred space: Russell 2016a: 120–6, Jenkyns 2013: 95.

⁶⁴ That said, all porticos prior to Octavia’s (including Metellus’) were dedicated by and named for men, and commemorated military victories: Senseney 2011: 423–7. On the decoration, uses (including leisured strolling and eroticism), and gendering of porticos, see Russell 2016b: 172–3, Jenkyns 2013: 94–101, O’Sullivan 2011: 132–4, Macaulay-Lewis 2009: 4–14, Milnor 2005: 53–64, Pape 1975: 46–7.

model of Cornelia who is portrayed as playing a similar role, well served the ideological aims of Octavian/Augustus in the Triumviral and Augustan periods.

6.4 *Cornelia Gracchorum* and Octavia as Exemplary Augustan Matrons

Inside the porticus Octaviae, the statue of Cornelia found itself in a context saturated with Augustan concerns. Its surviving Augustan-era inscription is presumably contemporary with the renovation and reprogramming of the portico, and may be surmised to bear significant ideological weight. First, whatever this statue was previously thought to represent – whether it was identified as Cornelia already in the era of the porticus Metelli, and what the base's original inscription (if any) read – from the moment the Augustan inscription was completed the statue simply “was” the Cornelia of legend. Second, as a monument created or remade in the Augustan age to commemorate an exemplary figure from the past, this statue bears closest comparison to the *summi viri* in the Forum Augustum (map location 109). Those statues were of marble rather than bronze, likewise somewhat larger than life size, purpose-made as decorations for the newly built forum. As remarked in previous chapters, each statue was graced with an inscribed *titulus* providing the honorand's name and offices, and an *elogium* narrating his principal achievements.⁶⁵ Although Cornelia's statue differs from these in its material, in probably having preexisted under whatever identity, and in providing only her name with no list of offices (of which she held none) and no *elogium*, I will argue that her nomenclature as given in the inscription communicates by implication precisely the womanly achievements and values most relevant to Octavia in particular, and to the female side of Augustan moral program in general.

The inscription reads *Cornelia Africani f. Gracchorum*, “Cornelia, daughter of Africanus, of the Gracchi.” Other evidence for women's naming formulae from the middle Republic to the Augustan period casts light on how to read this short text. Surviving funerary and dedicatory inscriptions indicate that women are most commonly identified by their *nomen gentilicum*, perhaps along with a praenomen if they have one. This name may be expanded by an element indicating filiation: an appositional *filia* (usually abbreviated as *f*) with the father's praenomen in the genitive (likewise

⁶⁵ On the *summi viri*, see ch. 3.3.3 with references. Cornelia's husband Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was among them: Geiger 2008: 123–6, 151–2; *InscrIt* 13.3 nos. 25, 82.

usually abbreviated). Alternatively or additionally it may be expanded by a gamonym, which consists of her husband's gentilicum or cognomen in the genitive, positioned either immediately following the woman's own gentilicum or following her filiation. Thus, completely unexceptional nomenclature for our Cornelia would be *Cornelia P. f. Gracchi*, "Cornelia, daughter of Publius, (wife) of Gracchus" – precisely the structure found, for example, in the mid-second century epitaph from the Tomb of the Scipios, *[P]aulla Cornelia Cn. f. Hispalli*, "Paulla Cornelia, daughter of Gnaeus, (wife) of Hispallus."⁶⁶ Against such a standard, our inscription appears unusual in two respects. First, Cornelia's father is designated not by his common praenomen Publius or cognomen Scipio, but by his distinctive honorific cognomen, Africanus. This is easily explained: uniquely identifying her father helps to individuate Cornelia among the many possible Corneliae; also, the cognomen's grandiosity helps to elevate and monumentalize Cornelia herself, as the subject of this honorific statue. Second, and more strikingly, in the *sedes* of the gamonym stands not a genitive singular, but the genitive plural *Gracchorum*. Since the "monumental" name *Cornelia mater Gracchorum* was well-established by the Augustan era, any Augustan or imperial-era reader of this inscription would have inferred (like all modern scholars) that her two famous sons are implied in this plural. However, since the word *mater* is absent, and especially since the structure of the naming formula causes the reader to expect a gamonym in this *sedes*, I believe that those same Roman readers understood that her husband, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus *père*, is also included in this plural. I discuss his relevance in the context of the porticus Octaviae below.

Represented in this porticus by a statue bearing this inscription, Cornelia offers an exemplary model to Octavia with striking parallels to the latter's own situation. Each woman was given in marriage to the political enemy of a close male blood relative, to betoken and guarantee the antagonists' reconciliation. Cornelia's father betrothed her to his opponent and rival Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, and thereby confirmed the resolution of their quarrel.⁶⁷ For Octavia the relevant marriage was her second, to Marcus Antonius in 39, and its purpose was to announce and secure

⁶⁶ *ILLRP* 317 = *ILS* 10 = *CIL* 6.1294 (see Caldelli, *CIL* 6.8.3 (2000): 4673–4). The commemorand's husband, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Hispallus, is presumably the cousin of Scipio Africanus (cf. Kajava 1995: 178). The commemorand herself, otherwise unattested, is likely a distant relative of our Cornelia and of her own husband. In general on women's naming formulae in the republican period, see Kajava 1995: 19–26.

⁶⁷ For this quarrel and its resolution, see Cic. *Inu.* 1.91, Livy 38.57.2–8, Val. Max. 4.2.3, Sen. *Cont.* 5.2.3, Gell. 12.8.1–4, Dio fr. 65.

the recent agreement of cooperation between Antony and Octavian. Also like Cornelia, Octavia raised a large number of children – at least nine – substantially without a husband present. Her three children by Gaius Claudius Marcellus (*RE* Claudius (216)) were born in the latter half of the 40s; these were Augustus' heir presumptive Marcus Claudius Marcellus, along with two daughters, Marcella maior and minor. Marcellus *père* died in 40. Marrying Marc Antony the next year, she bore him two daughters, Antonia maior and minor, before the couple separated in 37 (though legal divorce came only in 32). Antony's younger son by his previous wife Fulvia, Marcus Antonius Iullus, born after 46, was raised in Rome by Octavia during Antony's long sojourn in the east. And following Antony and Cleopatra's deaths in 30, Octavia took in that couple's three children as well: the twins Alexander Helios and Cleopatra Selene, born in 40; and Ptolemy Philadelphus, born in 36.⁶⁸ Thus Octavia assumed responsibility for raising this clutch of children, all born within a ten-year span, through the 30s and 20s. These children's fathers could not have been present beyond their first years, due to the timing of Marcellus' death and Antony's serial absences from both Rome and Alexandria. While not technically a *univira* like Cornelia, then, Octavia's concern for *all* of Antony's children, and her advocacy with Octavian on Antony's behalf despite Antony's insults and slights to her, suggests a loyalty approaching that which Cornelia showed to her own husband's memory in refusing to remarry. A further key similarity is that, among their many children, both women bore and raised sons who were destined for greatness but died young, arguably before achieving their full potential. In Octavia's case, the "great" son Marcus Claudius Marcellus died in 23, aged 19, before entering upon the lofty station Augustus had slated for him. Each mother was then left to cultivate the memory of her son(s), and each was renowned – in contrasting ways – for how she bore her loss. Finally, both women were highly educated themselves, are said to have patronized philosophers, writers, and artists, and took charge of their children's education. Octavia's dedication of Greek and Latin libraries inside the porticus Octaviae in memory of her son Marcellus is one way

⁶⁸ On Octavia's parental role see Plut. *Ant.* 87.1–3. Evidence for these children's birthdates is scattered and in some cases imprecise, but see Pelling 1988 on the relevant passages of Plut. *Ant.*, esp. on 28.7, 54.7, 87.1–3; and the *RE* articles on each person. Hemelrijk 1999: 67, 293 n. 45 includes a tenth child – Marcus Antonius Antyllus, Antony's older son by Fulvia – among those Octavia raised. In fact he seems to have accompanied his father to Alexandria, where he is glimpsed repeatedly during this period: Plut. *Ant.* 28.7–12, 57.4, 71.3, Dio 51.8.4.

in which her own pedagogical and literary engagements were concretely monumentalized.⁶⁹

A key aspect of Octavia's monumentalization as an exemplary wife and mother, then, is her association with Cornelia – the latter certainly, and the former most probably, represented with a statue – in the portico bearing Octavia's name. Indeed, these two figures work to construct one another as exemplary models, the better to promulgate Augustan values. Octavia's presentation as "ideal wife," as just noted, was particularly valuable to Octavian during his struggle with Antony in the 30s, when the decision to create this portico with its particular program of decoration (some new, some carried over from the porticus Metelli) was taken. Her performance as Antony's wronged but loyal spouse, so familiar to contemporary Romans, may have spotlighted or (re)activated the less prominent *univira* aspect of Cornelia's legendary figuration. Following Antony's defeat, and continuing into the 20s when the portico's renovation was completed and it was rededicated under Octavia's name, the presentation of Octavia as "ideal mother" underpinned Augustus' dynastic aims by honoring the parent of his designated successor Marcellus. In this respect, Octavia's juxtaposition with the Cornelia of legend (as represented in the portico) spotlighted Octavia's maternal performance, first in relation to her children with Antony, and then in regard to her "great" offspring Marcellus. For Augustan purposes, then, it was convenient to frame Cornelia as a precursor to and imitable model for Octavia in the categories of "loyalty to one's husband" and of "service to one's children." It is this dual purposing of Cornelia in the context of the porticus Octaviae, I suggest, that accounts for the studied ambiguity of the epigraphic formulation *Cornelia ... Gracchorum*. As discussed earlier, the plural form *Gracchorum* – recalling the monumental designation *mater Gracchorum* without the word *mater*, while sitting in the usual position of the husband's name – both allows and encourages the reader to understand that her husband is meant no less than her sons. This "wife and mother" message is precisely what the Augustan program requires in general, and of Octavia in

⁶⁹ Ruck 2004: 489–90, Woodhull 2003: 25–6, and Flower 2002: 174–5 discuss the parallels between Cornelia and Octavia. Hemelrijk 1999: 104–8 examines Octavia's patronal activities; for Cornelia's education and pedagogical and patronal activities, *ibid.* 64–8 and Dixon 2007: 41–8. Woodhull 2003: 28–32 describes the commemorative functions of the libraries. Bravi 2012: 122–6 argues that the presence of a statue of Cupid in the portico, along with the four Venuses, emphasizes the theme of ideal motherhood via a divine paradigm that is particularly relevant to the *gens Iulia*, as descendants of Venus and Aeneas.

particular.⁷⁰ One might even speculate that Octavia's statue was a pendant to Cornelia's: likewise seated, at a similar scale, and suitably inscribed.⁷¹ If so, formal resemblances would have underscored the purported parallelism in their situations and achievements as mothers and wives.

After Marcellus' death in 23, the figuration of Octavia and Cornelia as ideal wives and mothers found yet another kind of contemporary relevance. For in the Augustan marriage and adultery legislation of 18–17 (with additions and revisions as late as 9 CE), the themes of chastity, loyalty to husbands, and valuing of procreation and child rearing took on a more articulated, wide-ranging, and intrusive form. Scholars have observed that these laws all but dissolved the traditional boundaries between the domestic and civic realms. By requiring husbands to take legal steps if they apprehended their wives committing adultery, and by stipulating social, legal, and financial rewards for marrying appropriately and procreating plentifully (and penalties for failing to do so), these laws declared that matters traditionally handled within families or households were of civic consequence and concern, and were henceforth subject to state intervention.⁷² Cornelia and Octavia, now paired paragons of wifely *and* maternal achievement, worked together to exemplify the values promulgated in the Augustan legislation. They provided models for other women to imitate, or canons by which other women's maternal and marital performances could be measured. In having their traditionally domestic virtues represented and celebrated publicly, these women, together with Livia, perfectly symbolized the newly legislated porousness of the old boundary between the civic and domestic spheres.⁷³

⁷⁰ Kajava 1989: 130 n. 30 saw the logic of the plural, but his insight has to my knowledge never before been taken up. Val. Max. 6.7.1 offers a possible parallel, speaking of Cornelia's own mother: *Tertia Aemilia, Africani prioris uxor, mater Corneliae Gracchorum*. This formulation of Cornelia's nomenclature may reflect the inscription's logic (if not its influence) given this passage's focus on both the spousal and parental relation.

⁷¹ In Octavia's case, however, the father of her famous son is not identical with the husband to whom her display of loyalty mattered. Hence an inscription closely paralleling Cornelia's – say, *Octavia C. f. Marcellorum* – would omit the crucial husband.

⁷² The bibliography on this legislation is vast. Helpful overviews in English include, on the adultery laws, McGinn 1998: 140–215 (legal perspective), Edwards 1993: 34–62 (cultural perspective), and Treggiari 1991: 277–98 (legal perspective); and on the marriage laws, Treggiari 1991: 60–80 (legal perspective). Severy 2003: 51–6 notes the mutual intrusion of the civic and domestic realms entailed by this legislation (cf. 134); she also notes (93) the usefulness of Cornelia in shaping Octavia's public image as an exemplary mother.

⁷³ Also Woodhull 2003: 26–7. The Cornelia of Prop. 4.11, an aristocratic Augustan *matrona*, is represented as embodying Augustan marital and maternal values, though those values hardly receive ringing endorsement: see Coutelle 2015: 293–9, with further bibliography. Coutelle (290–3) also compares this figure to our Cornelia.

6.5 *Mater Gracchorum* after Augustus

Subsequent generations could easily have forgotten the topicality of the “ideal wife and mother” themes in Augustan Rome, rendering the porticus Octaviae’s intended message opaque and leading to a reinterpretation of the monument overall, the statue(s) it contained, and the Cornelia inscription in particular. A century and more later, when the Elder Pliny and Plutarch supply the words *mater*/μήτηρ in their paraphrases of that inscription, it is because they were looking for Cornelia’s exemplarity only in her maternal role, which remained central to her legend in their day, and not in her wifely role, which was no longer as topical or significant as it had been in the 30s–10s. Modern scholars have done the same, expressing perplexity at the omission of *mater* in the inscription and occasionally supplying it in their edited texts.⁷⁴ But to supply *mater*, which precludes understanding the husband as well as the sons, is fundamentally to alter the Augustan message of the Cornelia monument in the context of the porticus Octaviae, and to omit the wifely (as opposed to strictly maternal) values with which Octavia and Cornelia together were originally charged.

Indeed, later writers could present Octavia, as well as Cornelia, in ways strikingly inconsistent with the Augustan figurations they assume in the porticus Octaviae. We saw earlier (ch. 6.2) how the younger Seneca presents Cornelia as exemplary for the courage she displayed in enduring her sons’ deaths. In his dialogue *Ad Marciam De Consolatione*, Cornelia is not the only such figure; Seneca presents other mothers too who lost promising sons as young adults. Receiving praise for their fortitude are Livia, who moderated her grieving for her son Drusus and took joy in his memory (§3.1–2), and Cornelia the mother of the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus (§16.4–5). The negative exemplum Seneca provides is none other than Octavia (§2.3–5). He says that Marcellus was indeed a promising young man, already serving as a prop to Augustus and possessed of every virtue (§2.3). Upon his death Octavia entered lifelong mourning (says Seneca), never ceasing to weep and refusing all consolation. As she was at his funeral, so she remained for the rest of her life. She could bear to see no images of her son, nor to hear any mention of him, and resented other mothers, Livia most of all. Yet all this time she was surrounded by her other children and grandchildren, whom she offended by deeming herself childless even as

⁷⁴ E.g. Dessau, *ILS* 68: “Matris vocabulum omisum esse plane mirum est;” Degrassi, *ILLRP* 336: “Scil. mater;” Lewis 1988; *Année épigraphique* 2004.196 (supplying *mater*).

they all lived.⁷⁵ Seneca directly contrasts Octavia's deportment with Livia's, which he describes in the next section (§3.2; explicit discussion of the pairing at §2.2, 3.3–4). Yet a more distant contrast with Cornelia may also be perceived. As noted earlier, Cornelia in this dialogue is said to have seen all twelve of her children die, yet counted herself fortunate (*felix*) for having borne the Gracchi, rather than unfortunate for having lost them.⁷⁶ So if the Augustan programming of the porticus Octaviae equated Cornelia and Octavia as canons of female virtuosity in their loyalty to husbands and in their bearing and raising of children, in the *Ad Marciam* Seneca drives a wedge between these figures by focusing on maternal deportment following the deaths of sons, particularly sons who could be counted as "great men."

In this text, in fact, Octavia and Cornelia appear at opposite ends of a moral spectrum of mourning, within which Seneca's addressee Marcia must locate herself as she mourns her own son's death. Livia, who is directly contrasted with Octavia, is also on this spectrum, standing closer to Cornelia. If I may import and apply the distinction Seneca makes in the *Ad Helviam De Consolatione* between the number of deaths and their value (*funera numerare* vs. *funera aestimare*, *Helv.* §16.6), it becomes possible to distinguish between how many children each woman lost, and how costly any individual loss was – that is, to distinguish between "ordinary" deaths and the deaths of "great men." Octavia lost one of the five children she personally bore, namely Marcellus, presented here as a "great man;" she never stopped grieving. Cornelia lost all twelve of her children (on Seneca's counting at *Marc.* 16.3, evidently ignoring Sempronia), among whom were two "great men." Thus her losses, both in total and in "great men," were greater than Octavia's – not even to mention that her famous sons were murdered and their corpses desecrated,⁷⁷ in contrast to the highly honorific interment the younger Marcellus received. Yet, Seneca insists, Cornelia bore herself admirably in the face of such misfortune. Livia stands in between, losing one of two sons, namely Drusus – assuredly a "great man" – but leaving Tiberius, another great man, alive. Seneca declares that Livia's loss,

⁷⁵ Sen. *Marc.* 2.4. Seneca may be exaggerating, the better to construct the moral contrast with Livia (so e.g. Hammond, *RE* 17.1864 (1937); *contra* Shelton 1995: 175). If so, Seneca's description of Octavia's behavior may simply be an elaboration of the famous anecdote that she wept or fainted when Vergil recited the Marcellus passage from *Aeneid* 6 (Serv. *in Aen.* 6.861; Donat. *Vit. Verg.* 109–12 Brummer).

⁷⁶ Sen. *Marc.* 16.3, quoted n. 26 above. Though textually distant from Octavia and Livia as they are compared in *Marc.* 2–3, both Cornelias discussed in §16 are expressly presented as exemplary, and fit neatly into the same moral spectrum.

⁷⁷ Sen. *Marc.* 16.3: *viros ... magnos ... et occisos ... et insepultos*.

both overall and in “great men,” is numerically equal to but proportionally heavier than Octavia’s,⁷⁸ though still lighter than Cornelia’s. Yet Livia too, Seneca says, bore her misfortune with greater dignity than Octavia.

On this spectrum, where does Seneca’s addressee Marcia fall? She has lost two of four children: two sons are dead, leaving children of their own; two daughters and their children still live (*Marc.* 16.5–8). Neither dead son is a “great man,” despite Seneca’s praise of the more recently deceased youth (§23.3–24.4). When “counting the deaths,” then, Marcia’s loss is proportionally heavier than Octavia’s, equal to Livia’s, but much lighter than Cornelia’s; and when “valuing the deaths” (i.e. assessing the “greatness” of the deceased sons), Marcia’s losses are the lightest of all. So will she take the implicitly vicious path of Octavia, who Seneca portrays as grieving disproportionately to her loss, or the virtuous path of Livia and Cornelia, who lost more yet grieved less, deeming themselves fortunate for what they had received? The risk is that Marcia will do the former: for Seneca says that she has already spent three years in mourning since the second son’s death, and he explicitly declares that such deep-seated grief needs to be vigorously attacked, like a deep-seated vice (§1.7).⁷⁹ In arraying three exemplary figures along a moral spectrum, and thereby providing a graduated series of possible canons and models for his addressee, Seneca is deploying a “virtue wheel,” a device discussed in chapter 3.2, that encourages and enables a reader to exercise her or his faculties of moral discrimination.⁸⁰ While the “virtue wheel” function may be evident to some degree in any list of exemplary figures gathered under a single moral rubric, in the *Ad Marciam* the educational and persuasive force of the device is especially well developed: Seneca overtly exhorts his addressee to emulate the

⁷⁸ So I interpret the phrase *pari ... casu, maiore damno* (§2.2), which I take to mean that the raw number of deaths is the same, but the proportional harm is greater (the whole being smaller). For other interpretations see Wilcox 2006: 85–6, Manning 1981: 36.

⁷⁹ *Marc.* 1.7: *tertius iam praeterit annus, cum interim nihil ex primo illo impetu cecidit ... quemadmodum omnia vitia penitus insidunt nisi dum surgunt oppressa sunt, ita haec quoque tristitia ...* Thus Seneca compares Marcia’s grieving to a vice, without quite declaring it a vice. Such rhetoric persists in the subsequent sections: at §3.3 Seneca says (speaking generally) that to show oneself unwilling to live in Marcia’s situation is “utterly shameful” and “totally foreign to a spirit known [sc. to incline] toward the better” (*turpissimum, and alienissimum ... animo ... in meliorem noto partem*; also §2.5, 3.4) – implicit criticism of both Octavia and Marcia. By contrast, Cornelia is expressly credited with the virtue of *fortitudo* at §16.3. On Seneca’s handling of these figures and of womanly virtues in general, see Wilcox 2006: 81–7, Mauch 1997: 82–7, 99–102, Shelton 1995: 171–6, Von Hesberg-Tonn 1983: 94–5.

⁸⁰ Ch. 3.2 and n. 19. Here there is an additional comparandum or fourth exemplary figure, as Shelton (1995: 185–8) demonstrates: Marcia’s former self, who grieved more appropriately for her father’s death years earlier than she now does for her son’s.

virtuous comportment of Livia in particular, but also of Cornelia at a greater remove, and to shun the vicious comportment of Octavia.

6.6 Communicative and Cultural Memory: The Case of Cornelia's Sons

In the final chapter of his biography of the Gracchi (*Gracch.* 40 = *Gaius* 19), Plutarch turns his attention once more to Cornelia. He asserts that she “bore her misfortunes nobly and with greatness of spirit,”⁸¹ and to corroborate this claim adduces instances of her comportment later in life. Following Gaius’ death, she remained at her villa in Misenum receiving and entertaining friends and guests, including Greek literary figures and even kings; and she described to her visitors the life and habits of her father Africanus, to their great pleasure. “But she was most amazing,” Plutarch continues, “in recalling her sons without grief or tears, and narrating their sufferings and deeds, as though they were men of ancient times, to those who inquired.”⁸² She also declared that the temples in which her sons were killed made “worthy tombs” for the dead.⁸³ The context in which this statement has point, presumably, is that the murdered bodies of Tiberius and Gaius were left unburied, and received no interment within a family tomb or burial complex of the sort that Roman aristocratic families commonly employed.

What does Cornelia achieve by presenting her sons in this manner? It is edifying here to consider Jan Assmann’s distinction between “communicative memory” and “cultural memory.” “Communicative memory” is a type of shared memory dependent on everyday forms of communication: recollection of personal experience, conversations, jokes, and the like, exchanged among family and friends. It is closely tied to individual memory, hence does not extend beyond two or three generations into the past, the outer length of a single person’s lifespan. “Cultural memory,” by contrast, is the crystallization of communicative memory into objective cultural forms like narratives, texts, tombs or other built structures, rituals, honorific names, and the like – the things that in this book I call “monuments.” Transmitted through such means, this kind of memory transcends

⁸¹ Plut. *Gracch.* 40.1 = *Gaius* 19.1: τὰ τ’ ἄλλα τῆς συμφορᾶς εὐγενῶς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως ἐνεγκεῖν (as Seneca’s consolations also insist).

⁸² §3: θαυμασιωτάτη δὲ τῶν παίδων ἀπενθῆς καὶ ἀδάκρυτος μνημονεύουσα καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ἀρχαίων τινῶν ἐξηγουμένη τοῖς πυνθανομένοις.

⁸³ §1: καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐν οἷς ἀνηρέθησαν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἀξίους οἱ νεκροὶ τάφους ἔχουσιν.

everyday communication and the single lifespan; its temporal horizon can reach arbitrarily deep into the past. Assmann suggests that these two memory realms are separated by a “floating gap,” the point at which living memory fades out and some elements pass into monumentalized, “cultural” forms.⁸⁴ Cornelia’s modes of commemorating her kin, as Plutarch describes them, provide an interesting test case for Assmann’s taxonomy of memory. Plutarch says that Cornelia told tales about her father, presumably derived from her own memory – the realm of “communicative memory,” in Assmann’s terms. Presumably she did, or could have done, the same regarding her sons, who were even closer to her own and her visitors’ present. For she herself, and no doubt many of her visitors, vividly recalled Tiberius and Gaius, and the events of their tribunates. But Plutarch pointedly says that Cornelia “spoke of her sons as if they were ancients,” suggesting she employed a rhetoric more typically used of figures from the distant past, beyond the range of living memory. Her declaration that particular temples served fittingly as their tombs – adverting to monuments that commemorate their lives and deaths – seems consistent with this general rhetorical and commemorative strategy. Her approach, then, seems to belong to Assmann’s realm of “cultural memory:” she is entrusting the memory of her sons to objective cultural forms, locking “the Gracchi” into place as permanent fixtures with indefinite temporal horizons, even though they assuredly persist in living, communicative memory at the same time. As a knock-on benefit of this strategy, Cornelia – while alive and well – also installs herself in cultural memory as “mother of the Gracchi,” the figure responsible for forging these great men. Her monumental name *mater Gracchorum* is the objective cultural form this commemoration takes. She, too, then, exists in both of Assmann’s memory realms at once. In modern terms, this is the condition of being “a legend in one’s own time.”

Plutarch’s account of Cornelia’s later days thus leads me to think that Assmann’s distinction between communicative and cultural memory is not quite right, at least for Rome. Certainly monuments – Assmann’s “objective forms” of cultural memory – are the only form of memory transmission available, once living memory has failed. But regarding the recent past no such exclusion holds. Cornelia’s strategy for commemorating her dead sons involves monumentalization, even while they persist

⁸⁴ E.g. Assmann 1988a: 10–16, 2011[1992]: 34–41; also ch. 0.5.3 and n. 40.

in communicative memory (including in her own, personal memories).⁸⁵ Broadly speaking, the commemorative strategies and devices that Assmann calls “cultural memory” are those that I associate with exemplarity – in my terms, the process by which the vast flow of human action is filtered, and some vanishingly tiny fraction of that flow is selected and laden, via monumentalization, with moral weight and cultural significance (ch. 0.3.2). This process is distinct from living memory, whereby an individual recalls a great many events in which she or he participated – most utterly lacking in larger societal significance – until death clears the slate. But in Rome, at least, “cultural” and “communicative” memory can and do coexist in the recent past; or, in the terms used in this book, actions may be monumentalized and come to serve as moral canons or models for imitation in short order, sometimes almost immediately – well within the living memories of the original actors and judging audiences.

The two regimes of memory may also compete, as a final Gracchan anecdote illustrates. In 102 or 101, one Lucius Equitius appeared on the political scene claiming to be the son of the tribune Tiberius Gracchus. The tradition stresses that this claim was patently false. He was evidently attempting to seize the mantle of the “the Gracchi” in their monumentalized, exemplary figuration as reformist tribunes, in order to gain popular favor and empower himself to pursue similar political objectives.⁸⁶ How better to do this than to claim to be a lost son of a Gracchus, given the Roman expectation that exemplary performances run in families? At a certain point Sempronia the sister of the Gracchi, now in her 60s and surely one of Rome’s grandest dames, appeared before a public assembly and disavowed Equitius as a member of her family. Thus Equitius’ attempt to mobilize the cultural memory of the Gracchi to his own and his allies’ advantage in the social struggles of the hour was defeated by information deriving from the communicative memory of a surviving family member.⁸⁷ Yet Equitius’ effort itself may attest to Cornelia’s success in rapidly monumentalizing “the Gracchi” as exemplary performers of socially significant deeds. Had they not been installed in cultural

⁸⁵ Other scholars too have observed that Assmann’s taxonomy fits ancient Rome rather poorly: ch. 0.5.3 and n. 40.

⁸⁶ *RE* Equitius (3) for full sources. He was successful in getting elected tribune for 99 along with his ally Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, who had himself carried out a turbulent tribunate the previous year; both were murdered upon entering office.

⁸⁷ For the story, Val. Max. 3.8.6 (cf. 9.7.1–2, 9.15.1), *Vir. Ill.* 73.3–4 (where Sempronia is monumentally called *soror Gracchorum*, “the sister of the Gracchi”), and possibly the Forum Augustum *elogium* for Metellus Numidicus, *CIL* 6.40942 = *InscrIt* 13.3.16.

memory during the period in which communicative memory was still active, Equitius would have had no exemplary models to claim to imitate in the first place. Should conflicts between communicative and cultural memory arise during their period of coexistence, then, either may, in a given situation, triumph over the other.

Cicero's House and "Aspiring to Kingship"

7.1 Introduction: Doing Battle through Exempla

This chapter unfolds differently from those preceding. Instead of examining the rhetorical, moral, and historiographical purposes to which a particular exemplary figure is put, as evidenced by monuments, my focus here is how two particular historical actors, Marcus Tullius Cicero and his bitter enemy Publius Clodius, deployed a certain set of exemplary models against one another in one particularly fraught political dispute. Clodius was elected Tribune of the Plebs for 58. He succeeded in aligning key political actors – specifically the consuls Gabinius and Piso, and the triumvirs Caesar and Pompey – to support or at least acquiesce in his own agendas, and in February of that year introduced legislation requiring that anyone who had put Roman citizens to death without trial be exiled. This was a direct attack on Cicero and his handling, as consul in 63, of the Catilinarian conspirators. Unable to counter this threat, Cicero fled the city in March and went into voluntary exile; he spent most of the next sixteen months in the cities of Thessalonica and Dyrrachium in northern Greece. Upon his departure, Clodius' gangs plundered and burned Cicero's townhouse (*domus*) on the Palatine hill. Subsequently Clodius erected and, with the help of appropriate religious personnel, in this case a *pontifex*, dedicated a shrine to the goddess Libertas (freedom) on the site. A year and a half later the political situation had changed, and Cicero had recovered sufficient political and legal support (in the form of a new law) to obtain his recall. Arriving in Rome in early September of 57, he faced the challenge of recovering his property, obtaining compensation, and finding a path – religious, legal, and practical – to rebuilding his house. In a series of speeches delivered to various audiences in the weeks and months following his return, and particularly in the speech “on his house” (*De Domo Sua*) delivered in late September of 57, Cicero provides much information about the struggle with Clodius over the fate of his house and other property.

This story has long engaged scholars as a case study in political violence and legal-religious wrangling in the late Republic, and many adequate treatments of the situation, both overall and in its particulars, already exist.¹ In this chapter I pursue a very specific aim: to expound how both Cicero and Clodius (as Cicero portrays him) invoked, in their struggle for political advantage, a series of exemplary figures from the past who were regarded as criminals for “aspiring to kingship” or related transgressions, and whose houses were demolished when their wicked aims had been crushed. It is clear that Clodius tried to “fit” Cicero into this series of exemplary malefactors, while framing himself as the “liberator” who should receive credit for defeating the would-be “king.” His attack on Cicero’s house and other property is consistent with his general use of “kingship” discourse and symbolism – including house demolition – to Cicero’s disadvantage. Cicero, for his part, vigorously disputes this presentation of himself and his actions. He confronts Clodius’ accusations head on, rejecting outright any claim of a “fit” between himself and the exemplary kingship aspirants of old. He insists, rather, that he saved the *res publica*, far from threatening to overthrow it, and he adduces alternative exempla of his own in support of this counter-narrative. This chapter, then, provides a case study in how high-stakes political competition can be carried out in exemplary terms – a situation adumbrated in the introduction (ch. 0.5.1) – as Clodius and Cicero adduce and interpret exempla in one way to support a particular argument, and in another way to support an opposing argument.

Central to this discussion is a passage in Cicero’s speech *De Domo Sua*. This speech was delivered before a panel of *pontifices*, priests who were empowered to determine whether the shrine to the goddess Libertas that Clodius had erected and dedicated on Cicero’s house site could be removed so that Cicero could reclaim his property and rebuild his *domus*. In the passage in question, Cicero adduces and discusses a series of “kingship aspirants” and similar malefactors, to whom Clodius may previously have assimilated him. As this passage provides the *explanandum* for the current chapter, I provide it in full (*Dom.* 101–2):

(101) an ego tantam aut animi durtiam habere aut oculorum impudentiam possim ut, cuius urbis servatorem me esse senatus omnium adsensu totiens iudicarit, in ea possim intueri domum meam eversam, non ab inimico meo

¹ On the overall situation see e.g. Mitchell 1991: 127–61, Gelzer 1969: 123–51, or any standard biography of Cicero. Tatum 1999: 150–93 discusses Clodius’ role, and Strohm 2004: 316–18 analyzes the legal dispute over Cicero’s house.

sed ab hoste communi, et ab eodem exstructam et positam in oculis civitatis, ne umquam conquiescere possit fletus bonorum? Sp. Maeli regnum adpetentis domus est complanata, et, quia illud 'aequum' accidisse populus Romanus 'Maelio' iudicavit, nomine ipso 'Aequimaeli' iustitia poenae comprobata est. Sp. Cassi domus ob eandem causam <est> eversa atque in eo loco aedis posita Telluris. in Vacci pratis domus fuit M. Vacci, quae publicata est et eversa ut illius facinus memoria et nomine loci notaretur. M. Manlius cum ab ascensu Capitoli Gallorum impetum reppulisset, non fuit contentus benefici sui gloria; regnum adpetisse est iudicatus; ergo eius domum eversam duobus lucis convestitam videtis. quam igitur maiores nostri sceleratis ac nefariis civibus maximam poenam constitui posse arbitrati sunt, eandem ego subibo ac sustinebo, ut apud posteros nostros non exstinctor coniurationis et sceleris sed auctor et dux fuisse videar? (102) hanc vero, pontifices, labem turpitudinis et inconstantiae poterit populi Romani dignitas sustinere, vivo senatu, vobis principibus publici consili, ut domus M. Tulli Ciceronis cum domo Fulvi Flacci ad memoriam poenae publice constitutae coniuncta esse videatur? M. Flaccus quia cum C. Graccho contra salutem rei publicae fecerat ex senatus sententia est interfectus; eius domus eversa et publicata est; in qua porticum post aliquanto Q. Catulus de manubiis Cimbricis fecit. ista autem fax ac furia patriae cum urbem Pisone et Gabinio ducibus cepisset, occupasset, teneret, uno eodemque tempore et clarissimi viri mortui monumenta debebat et meam domum cum Flacci domo coniungebat, ut, qua poena senatus adfecerat eversorem civitatis, eadem iste oppresso senatu adficeret eum quem patres conscripti custodem patriae iudicassent.

(101) Could I possibly have such thick skin, or eyes so insensitive to propriety, that in a city where the senate by universal consensus has so often declared me its savior, I could look upon my townhouse (*domus*) overturned by my opponent – no: by our collective enemy, and built up by him and planted in full view of the citizens, so that the lamentations of good men may never fall silent? The *domus* of Spurius Maelius, who aspired to kingship, was flattened and, because the Roman people deemed that this was a "fair" (*aequum*) thing that happened "to Maelius" (*Maelio*), the justice of the punishment was attested by the very name *Aequimaelium*. The *domus* of Spurius Cassius was overturned for the same reason and the temple of Tellus was planted on that spot. In the meadows of Vaccus was the *domus* of Marcus Vaccus, which was made public property and overturned, so that this man's misdeed would be censured by the recollection and name of the place. Marcus Manlius, although he had repelled the Gallic assault from scaling the Capitol, was not content with the glory of this great service: he was judged to have aspired to kingship, and therefore you see his *domus* overturned and covered over by the Two Groves. The punishment, then, that our ancestors considered the most severe that could be imposed on criminal and sacrilegious citizens – is that what I will have to submit to and

endure, so that to posterity I will seem to have been, not the destroyer of conspiracy and criminality, but its author and leader? (102) Can the grandeur of the Roman people really sustain this shameful disgrace and flip-flopping – at least while the senate still breathes and while you [i.e. the *pontifices*, Cicero's addressees, a number of whom are also senators] take the lead in public deliberations – that the *domus* of Marcus Tullius Cicero be seen as conjoined with the *domus* of Fulvius Flaccus, regarding the memory of a punishment imposed by the people? Marcus Flaccus, because he acted with Gaius Gracchus contrary to the welfare of the *res publica*, was killed by decree of the senate. His *domus* was overturned and made public property; and in it Quintus Catulus somewhat later built a portico from the spoils of his Cimbric victory. Now, *this* firebrand and Fury of our country [i.e. Clodius], once he had seized, occupied, and held the city under the command of Piso and Gabinius, at that very same moment blotted out the memorials of that illustrious hero, now deceased [i.e. Catulus]. He also joined my *domus* with the *domus* of Flaccus, so that the same punishment that the senate had imposed on that subverter of the state, he might impose – having squashed the senate – on the man whom the senators had judged to be the protector of our country.

This passage raises questions that structure the discussion in the pages to follow. I begin by considering some practical and symbolic functions of the Roman aristocratic townhouse (*domus*), to clarify what is at stake in demolishing one. I then examine the traditions surrounding the five figures whom Cicero cites here (presumably responding to Clodius) as having suffered house demolition for “aspiring to kingship” or another crime. I consider how this punishment relates to the crime(s) in question, and then how the criminal, crime, and punishment are all commemorated via monuments subsequently attached to these house sites. This background prepares me to investigate the political competition between Clodius and Cicero as represented in the passage of *De Domo Sua* just quoted, and as elaborated elsewhere in this speech and others. Specifically, I consider how the demolition of Cicero's house and the erection of the shrine of Libertas on the site figures Cicero as a particular kind of transgressor and Clodius as the suppressor and avenger of Cicero's transgression; and how Cicero, in turn, strives to counter this positioning and reverse its associated moral valences.

7.2 The Elite *domus* and Social Power

To grasp what is at stake in demolishing the house of an “aspirant to kingship” or similar malefactor, I must first sketch briefly the social and

symbolic functions of the elite *domus* of the late Republic and early Empire. A large house endowed with ample reception spaces, enhanced with prestigious architectural and decorative elements, and located near the political and legal arenas of the Forum Romanum, was a sign that its occupant possessed, or wished to be seen as possessing, significant social power.² In particular, a large atrium implied that he had numerous clients and friends to attend his morning reception (*salutatio*), conduct business with him, and support his various enterprises. Likewise, large and elaborately appointed colonnades, gardens, and associated reception rooms advertised his capacity to host groups of peers and underlings at evening convivia, to preside as a judge in legal hearings, and to host meetings of priestly colleges or other groups of civic significance to which he might belong, all in suitably sumptuous style. Such features of course afforded practical as well as symbolic benefits, provided that the owner actually possessed the kind of social network these spaces implied and used them accordingly.

Furthermore, certain features of the house symbolized the continuity of the owner's lineage and the sociopolitical power that his family had exercised over time: the wax masks (*imagines*) of ancestors who had held curule magistracies, looking down from cabinets in the atrium; the family trees (*stemmata*) that were perhaps painted in the *vestibulum* near the entrance; and in some cases the spoils – captured arms, plundered statuary, and the like – installed in the atrium or *vestibulum* by the owner himself or an ancestor who had won a military victory and celebrated a triumph. Moreover, the elite *domus* had a religious dimension: it was the abode of the domestic *Lar*, the *Penates*, and the *Genius*. The functions of these domestic divinities, and the cult practices associated with them, are represented in our sources in diverse and sometimes contradictory ways. But they undoubtedly linked the owner with other members of his household, since everyone living under the same roof, free and slave, shared in these cults. They also linked the household with the physical structure of the house, since it was the seat of these divinities and the site of their cult. Thus, through domestic cult practice as well as architecture and decoration, the elite *domus* articulated its owner's relationship to his family and ancestors, peers and supporters, dependents and slaves, in ways that underpinned his claims to social power and prestige. It monumentalized

² Not all elite occupants have to be owners, though ownership is the typical form of occupancy in this social stratum (Rawson 1976: 87; also Wallace-Hadrill 1994: 103–10). But whether through ownership, rental, or other means, lofty Romans sought to occupy houses that met their social needs. Indeed, aristocratic houses frequently changed occupants in the late Republic and early Empire, through sale, rental, and confiscation: see Papi 1998: 46–8, Eck 1997: 187–90, Rawson 1976: 85–7.

him by bearing the imprint of, and providing a template for, the social activities and relations that defined him as an aristocrat in Roman society and as a particular individual within the aristocratic group.³

Demolishing an elite *domus*, scholars have surmised, must somehow negate the structure's social functionality and/or symbolism. In the context of the "aspirants to kingship" that Cicero and Clodius invoke, I will argue that surviving texts and other monuments point to one especially important practical effect of house demolition, along with a particular range of symbolic effects.

7.3 "Aspirants to Kingship" and Similar Malefactors

In the passage of *De Domo Sua* quoted above Cicero adduces five (negative) exempla, figures from the past whose houses were demolished in return for specific misdeeds. Three of these figures comprise what might be called the canonical trio of "aspirants to kingship," whose deeds the historical tradition locates in the fifth and early fourth centuries: Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius, and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus.⁴ The remaining two figures, Marcus Vaccus and Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, are not said to aspire to kingship, but likewise suffered house demolition. Cicero suggests that Clodius, in demolishing his house, symbolically assimilated him to these malefactors – and he expressly asserts that the demolition linked him to Fulvius as the recipient of punishment for acting "contrary to the welfare of the *res publica*." Clodius may well have deployed some or all of

³ A great deal of scholarship, particularly from the 1990s and 2000s, has examined the practical functions and monumental or commemorative dimensions of the elite *domus*. Works I have found useful include Beck 2009, Bücher 2006: 110–18, Von Hesberg 2005, Stein–Hölkeskamp 2005: 116–58, Hales 2003: 40–60, Guilhemmet 2001 and 1996, Tatum 1999: 159–62, Papi 1998, Rilinger 1997, Bodel 1997, Eck 1997: 176–90, Flower 1996: 217–20, Wallace-Hadrill 1994: 3–61 (and *passim*), Saller 1994: 88–95 and 1984: 349–55, Edwards 1993: 150–63, and Wiseman 1987b.

⁴ Cassius, Maelius, and Manlius first appear together (in surviving texts) here in *Dom.* 101–2; they are later adduced as a clear threesome by Cicero at *Rep.* 2.49, *Phil.* 2.87, 114; and by imperial authors as well. Vigour 2001b: 281 suggests that Cicero was the first to link these three together as kingship aspirants, precisely for the sake of the argument in *Dom.* 101–2 (also Pina Polo 2006: 87 and Chassignet 2001: 87–9; cf. Neel 2015, Panitschek 1989, Mommsen 1871 for diverse interpretations of this grouping). But Cicero may be responding to Clodius' prior use of this trio. Scholars conventionally use the noun phrases *adfectator regni* and *adfectatio regni* to designate these figures and their misdeed. Yet the latter phrase is unattested in classical Latin, and the former occurs only once, at Quint. *Inst.* 5.13.24, referring only to Maelius. Verbal and participial formations such as *regnum adfectare*, *regnum appetere*, *crimen adfectati regni*, and *spes adfectandi regni* occur more widely. But the modern use of the nominalized forms distorts ancient usage and leaves the false impression that the Romans had formulated a well-defined category of crime and criminal (see e.g. Kaplow 2012, Vigour 2001b and Lovisi 1999: 26–8, 54–6). Here I avoid misleading Latin terms and use "kingship aspirant" or similar English phrases to underscore that this is a modern, not Roman, category.

these exempla in his own speeches attacking Cicero before, during, and after the latter's exile. Though only the barest scraps of Clodius' political rhetoric survive, it seems certain that Cicero's own words reflect (or refract) Clodius' rhetoric and argumentation, at least in certain passages.⁵ The text quoted above is among the earliest surviving sources for these malefactors. All receive more elaborate treatment in later texts, however, and Cicero's deployment of them presupposes knowledge of their stories that is supplied in these later texts. Fuller accounts must, therefore, already have been current in Cicero's and Clodius' day. So while the narratives and understandings presented in the discussion to follow derive mostly from post-Ciceronian accounts, they seem to reach back to the late Republic if not earlier. I focus on those aspects of each malefactor's story that directly illuminate Cicero's deployment of that figure in his dispute with Clodius; this focus entails omitting discussion of aspects that may loom large in other authors and texts.

7.3.1 *Spurius Maelius*

Spurius Maelius is the first "kingship aspirant" to suffer house demolition whom Cicero adduces in our passage (*Dom.* 101). Maelius may be considered the "best example" of the "kingship aspirant," hence his importance to Cicero here and elsewhere (for he also appears in other speeches and theoretical works), and probably also to Clodius.⁶ It is consequently worth the effort to reconstruct in some detail the characteristics of the exemplum he provides. Livy's account (4.13–16), written a generation after Cicero's speech, narrates a full-scale sedition by Maelius in the year 440. Livy briskly expounds Maelius' aims at the beginning of his account. He says that Maelius was an equestrian, and very wealthy by the standards of his day; that he alleviated a grain shortage in Rome by purchasing grain abroad with his own money, employing his interstate network of guest-friends and clients; that he distributed this grain to hungry plebeians at home, thereby attaching them to himself as supporters; and finally that,

⁵ For the fragments of Clodius' oratory see *ORF* no. 137. Stroh 2004: 332–8 seeks to reconstruct elements of the content and structure of the Clodian speech to which Cicero's *De Domo Sua* responds.

⁶ Cic. *Cat.* 1.3 is the earliest reference to Maelius in surviving Latin, dating to December 63 (of course his story is older: see Dion. *Rom.* 12.4 2–5, citing Cincius Alimentus and Calpurnius Piso). In *Cat.* 1.3 Cicero compares himself to Ahala, Maelius' killer, while Catiline stands as Maelius; Lowrie 2007: 94–6 shows how Clodius later turns Cicero's comparison around, casting Cicero as Maelius to Clodius' Ahala. Later appearances of Maelius in Cicero include *Mil.* 72 (Clodius as Maelius, Milo as Ahala), *Sen.* 56, *Am.* 28, 36, and the passages cited in n. 4 above. The demolition of Maelius' house, however, is mentioned by Cicero only at *Dom.* 101.

carried away by his good fortune, he came to hope for “what was not permitted,” namely to make himself king (§13.1–4). Thus Livy’s reader can view every event in the subsequent narrative with the foreknowledge that Maelius was “aspiring to kingship” and basing his hopes for success upon his great personal following. At this point, Maelius’ house enters the story as one of the stages on which this political drama plays out. Minucius, the *praefectus annonae* – the magistrate officially responsible for procuring grain, as Maelius was doing privately – learns that in Maelius’ house weapons are being collected, meetings are being held, and plans for a *coup d’état* are being finalized.⁷ Leading senators then complain that the consuls have allowed grain distributions and gatherings of plebeians to take place in a private citizen’s house (§13.10). To deal with the emergency, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus is appointed dictator and Servilius Ahala master of the horse. When the dictator summons Maelius, he attempts to hide behind his retinue of supporters (§14.1, 4 – though Livy does not specify whether this group is at Maelius’ house, in the forum, or elsewhere). In the ensuing confusion Ahala stabs Maelius to death with a dagger. Cincinnatus then delivers a speech that repeatedly accuses Maelius of attempting to make himself king, and compares him to figures from the past who suffered exemplary punishment for making similar attempts (§§15.1, 4, 5, 7, 8). The speech concludes with the declaration that expiation of this awful portent (*pro monstro habendum*, §15.7) requires not only the malefactor’s blood, but also that “the roof and walls within which such madness was begotten be utterly destroyed, and his possessions, defiled by being the currency for purchasing kingship, be made public property.”⁸

In Livy’s representation, the demolition of Maelius’ house seems to have one potentially practical effect, along with (perhaps) two symbolic meanings. First, the house is portrayed as the logistical base in which its owner nurtures his social network and from which he projects his social power out into the civic sphere – familiar functions of aristocratic *domus* in Livy’s (and Cicero’s) day. Indeed, Livy stresses the unity of Maelius’

⁷ Livy 4.13.9: *tela in domum Maeli conferri, eumque contiones domi habere, ac non dubia regni consilia esse*. Minucius gets his information, says Livy, from people who frequented both houses on account of Minucius’ and Maelius’ parallel activities in procuring grain (§13.8). These gatherings are portrayed as taking place fairly openly, though it is more typical of Roman conspiracy narratives for plotters to assemble secretly, often by night, in the recesses of a ringleader’s house. See e.g. Cic. *Cat.* 1.8–9; Sal. *Cat.* 20.1 (Catiline holds a meeting *in abditam partem aedium* ... *omnibus arbitris procul remotis*), cf. 27.3, 40.5; Asc. 83C; Dion. *Rom.* 5.7.2 (imagining a Greek house); Dio 37.32.3. See also Oakley 1997: 1.525, Guilhemet 1996: 192.

⁸ Livy 4.15.8: *id ... nec satis esse sanguine eius expiatum, nisi tecta parietesque intra quae tantum amentiae conceptum esset dissiparentur, bonaque contacta pretiis regni mercandi publicarentur*.

social network, and its alarming degree of personal loyalty, by referring to its adherents with the possessive formulations *Maeliani* (§14.1) and *caterva suorum* (§14.4).⁹ Demolishing the house might have the practical effect of disrupting this network and curtailing its sociopolitical power, for demolition sweeps away the domestic spaces in which this would-be *rex* assembled and organized his clients and friends, hatched plots, and collected weapons. Maelius' quick death, however, decapitates his social network and spares him the inconvenience and embarrassment of losing his reception spaces. A symbolic dimension is thus brought forward instead: the demolition of the house functions metonymically, as a surrogate for the destruction of its owner, his social network, and that network's political aims. Livy's Cincinnatus makes this metonymic meaning explicit in what follows: "[sc. Cincinnatus] then ordered the house to be demolished forthwith, so that the open lot might be a reminder of the crushing of a wicked aim."¹⁰ Cincinnatus' use of religious language hammers this point home. As noted above, he calls Maelius' aim a *monstrum* – a disruption in the fabric of nature, hence an indication that the proper relations between gods and mortals (the *pax deorum*) have been disturbed. Expiation, which is ritual action aimed at mending such a rupture, merely begins in this case with blood sacrifice (i.e. Maelius' murder), then proceeds through the "dispersion" (i.e. demolition) of "roofs and walls within which so much madness was conceived," and ends with the confiscation of Maelius' "contaminated" goods. Under this ritual armature, Maelius and his property become one, to be destroyed as one.¹¹ House and contents become an extension of their owner, infused with his character.¹² Demolition, then, combined with capital punishment, graphically symbolizes the civic community's judgment that the conspirator and his social network have attacked the community's very fabric, while affirming that the community has put an end to him, his network, and the threat they pose. Other texts that treat Maelius more briefly also present the demolition of his house as a punishment for his

⁹ For partisans labeled with an adjectival form of their leader's name, see Cic. *Cat.* 1.10, *Manliana castra*; Sal. *Cat.* 16.4, *Sullani milites*; Livy 6.16.8, *turba Manliana* (ch. 7.3.4); Plut. *Luc.* 35.4, οἱ Φίλιππειοί.

¹⁰ Livy 4.16.1: *domum deinde, ut monumento area esset oppressae nefariae spei, dirui extemplo iussit.*

¹¹ Passage quoted n. 8 above. For Cincinnatus' religious language see Fiori 1996: 395–6, Salerno 1990: 83–5. On the expiation of *monstra* or *prodigia* in general see Engels 2007: 276–8, Corbeill 2005, Rosenberger 1998: 132–4, MacBain 1982: 127–32.

¹² The destruction of statues can likewise be seen as a surrogate destruction of the persons depicted and of their ideological substance: Hölscher 2001: 207–9. On memory sanctions in general, with starting points on the substantial bibliography, see Roller 2010: 120–3.

aspiration to kingship.¹³ But Livy's narrative is the only one that sketches out the symbolic and practical relationships between the aspiration and the punishment.¹⁴

The narratives of these events provided by Cicero, Livy, and other authors are themselves monuments by which Maelius is constructed and commemorated as a negative exemplum: his actions in the public eye are described, and the adverse judgment of the eyewitnesses is recorded. Yet narratives are not the only monuments. Livy's Cincinnatus, as noted above, expressly declares that the open lot (*area*) resulting from the demolition of Maelius' house will serve as a reminder (*monumentum*) of the misdeed.¹⁵ But how are future generations to know – once the individuals who personally experienced these events have died – that the open lot was the site of *this* house demolished for *this* reason, and not open for any other reason or simply never built? Livy's explanation follows: "it was called *Aequimaelium*" (*id Aequimaelium appellatum est*). Livy does not explain exactly how this toponym functions as a monument, but other reports of Maelius' sedition provide helpful etymologies. The second element is said to contain the malefactor's name in the form *maeli-* or *meli-*, while the first element is the word *aequus*. Here there are two schools of thought. Varro presents *aequus* as meaning "flat," referring to the leveling of the house via punitive demolition; Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers a similar explanation, translating the Latin word *aequus* with the Greek *isopodon* for the benefit of Latinless readers. Other texts imply the same etymology.¹⁶ Alternatively, *aequus* can be interpreted as meaning "right,"

¹³ Var. Lat. 5.157: *aequata Meli domus publice quod regnum occupare voluit is*. Val. Max. 6.3.1c: *eadem ausum* [sc. seeking *dominatio*] *Sp. Maelium consimili exitu* [sc. execution followed by house demolition] *patria multavit*. Quint. Inst. 3.7.20: *post mortem adiecta quibusdam ignominia est, ut Maelio, cuius domus solo aequata*. Vir. Ill. 17.5: [sc. Cincinnatus] *dictator dictus Sp. Maelium regnum adfectantem a Servilio Ahala magistro equitum occidi iussit, domum eius solo aequavit*. Dion. Rom. 12.4.6 reports the demolition as a sanction for seeking νεωτέρα πράγματα (12.2.4) or ἡγεμονία (12.2.9).

¹⁴ The only other detailed narrative of Maelius' sedition, in Dion. Rom. 12.1.1–4.6, gives the house no symbolic weight. In this account, the sedition unfolds in the Roman Forum – Maelius sits on a tribunal, dispenses advice, convokes assemblies, and drives out naysayers. In Dionysius' telling, then, Maelius' sedition consists partly in usurping magisterial functions (e.g. 12.1.5–6, 10; 12.2.3), and it is his opponents, senators and magistrates among them, who are excluded from the civic sphere and must assemble secretly (12.1.4) or by night (12.2.1). It is they, not he, who behave like stereotypical conspirators (n. 7 above). Maelius' house enters this account only once, as a possible refuge from his attackers (12.2.8).

¹⁵ n. 10 above.

¹⁶ Var. Lat. 5.157: *Aequimaelium, quod a<e>quata Meli domus publice, quod regnum occupare voluit is*. Dion. Rom. 12.4.6: οὗτος ὁ τόπος ... καλούμενος ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων Αἰκυμήλιον· ὥς ἂν ἡμεῖς εἴποιμεν ἰσόπεδον Μήλιον, αἶκον γὰρ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἐσοχὴν καλεῖται. τόπον οὖν τινα Αἶκον Μήλιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς κληθέντα, ὕστερον συμφθαρέντων ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἐκφορὰν τῶν ὀνομάτων Αἰκυμήλιον ἐκάλεσαν. Likewise Vir. Ill. 17.5: *dictator ... Sp. Maelium regnum adfectantem ... occidi iussit; domum eius solo aequavit; unde locus Aequimaelium dicitur*. Quint. Inst. 3.7.20

i.e. that Maelius suffered a just and fitting punishment for his crime. So Cicero interprets it in the passage of *De Domo Sua* quoted above: the people judged that what happened to Maelius (*Maelio*) was "right" or "fair" (*aequum*), hence the name *Aequimaelium*. Valerius Maximus, following if not simply paraphrasing Cicero, declares that the toponym conveys to posterity the rightness or justice of the punishment – though Valerius omits any form of *aequus* and employs the synonym *iustus/iustitia* as a gloss for the *Aequi*- part of the toponym.¹⁷ But under either explanation for its first element, the toponym contains *in nuce* the whole story of Maelius' sedition and the resulting house demolition. The toponym functions monumentally by causing the open lot to bear the trace of its purportedly built past (hence distinguishing it from a lot open for other reasons, or simply never built), supplementing the absence of the house and its owner with an implied narrative about his deeds and fate. However, the subsequent function of the *Aequimaelium* – Cicero indicates elsewhere that it served as a marketplace for sacrificial animals (map location 163) – does not evidently relate to the story of Maelius, apart perhaps from its now serving a public function rather than the private interests served by the preceding house.¹⁸ More on this "private to public" dynamic below.

7.3.2 *Spurius Cassius*

The second "kingship aspirant" Cicero presents in our passage is Spurius Cassius – though in the historiographical tradition he is the earliest such figure, predating Maelius by nearly half a century. Cicero says only that Cassius suffered house demolition "for the same reason" as Maelius (*ob eandem causam*, i.e. for aspiring to kingship), and that the temple of Tellus was erected on the house site. Greater detail about Cassius' sedition is found in Livy (2.41) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (8.77–80). These authors say that Cassius, as consul for the third time in 486, promulgated a law to distribute public land to the Latini and perhaps Hernici – nominally Roman allies – as well as to Roman citizens. He was accused of

probably implies the same etymology: *et post mortem adiecta quibusdam ignominia est, ut Maelio, cuius domus solo aequata.*

¹⁷ Val. Max. 6.3.1c: *eadem ausum Sp. Maelium consimili exitu* [sc. to that of Spurius Cassius] *patria multavit. area vero domus eius, quo iustitia supplicii notior ad posteros perveniret, Aequimeli appellatorem traxit.*

¹⁸ Marketplace: Cic. *Div.* 2.39. For scholarly discussion of the *Aequimaelium* see Forsythe 1994: 305–7, Pisani Sartorio, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 20–1, Coarelli 1983: 1.285–6; for its monumental quality, Langlands 2008: 179–80. For other monuments to Maelius' sedition that do not pertain to Cicero's dispute with Clodius, see Roller 2010: 147.

attempting, through this act of generosity and other “popular” measures, to attach these allies to himself personally and, with their support, to establish himself as *rex/tyrannos* in Rome. The tradition then offers two *dénouements*: either Cassius was arraigned by the quaestors on a charge of treason (*perduellio*, “being hostile to one’s own country”), tried before the people, convicted, and executed; or alternatively, his father conducted a domestic inquiry and put Cassius to death himself. Both authors deem the former explanation more likely.¹⁹ In either case, though, Cassius’ house was demolished and his *peculium* – the property he controlled but did not own, since his father *ex hypothesi* still lived – was dedicated to Ceres in the form of an inscribed statue. A temple to the goddess Tellus (Earth) was also eventually erected on part of the site.²⁰

The relationship between this temple and Cassius’ demolished house warrants further consideration – for Cicero connects the temple and house site, as we have seen. The circumstances of the temple’s dedication are indicated only by Florus. He says – without mentioning Cassius’ house – that the temple was vowed by Publius Sempronius Sophus, consul in 268, following an earthquake that occurred during a battle between the Romans and Picentes. As the divinized form of earth, Tellus seems a reasonable goddess to appease under the circumstances. It follows that more than two centuries intervened between the notional demolition of the house and the erection of the temple.²¹ Among the texts that expressly assert the coincidence of temple and house site, however, only one hints at a time interval: Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that the site of Cassius’ house still lay open in his day, apart from the temple that was built “in later times” on part of it.²² Other texts allow for a different impression. Not

¹⁹ Livy 2.41.5–6 and Dion. *Rom.* 8.78.3 explicitly link the threat of *regnum/tyrannis* with Cassius’ courting of the Latini and Hernici. The two versions of the legal process are weighed by Livy 2.41.10–12 and Dion. *Rom.* 8.77–9. Val. Max. 5.8.2 and Plin. *Nat.* 34.15 mention only the domestic process, while Cic. *Rep.* 2.60 and Flor. *Epit.* 1.17(=1.26).6–7; see Facchini Tosi 1998 *ad loc.*) seemingly amalgamate the two.

²⁰ Demolition, dedication of *peculium*, statue: Livy 2.41.10–11, Dion. *Rom.* 8.79.3. Also reporting the dedication of the *peculium* are Val. Max. 5.8.2, Plin. *Nat.* 34.15; for the demolition, besides Cic. *Dom.* 101 see Val. Max. 6.3.1b. Cassius is widely named as a would-be king or tyrant: in addition to the texts just cited, see Plin. *Nat.* 34.30, Diod. 11.37.7, Dio 5.19, Cic. *Am.* 36, *Phil.* 2.87, 114. At Livy 4.15.4 he is adduced as an exemplum justifying the punishment of Maelius.

²¹ Flor. *Epit.* 1.14(=1.19).2: *domiti ergo Picentes et caput gentis Asculum Sempronio duce, qui tremante inter proelium campo Tellurem deam promissa aede placavit*. Frontin. *Str.* 1.12.3 apparently describes the same battle, but does not mention the vow. On this temple see Coarelli, *LTUR* 5 (2000): 24–5, Ziolkowski 1992: 155–62. Presumably its dedication followed the vow by a few years.

²² Dion. *Rom.* 8.79.3: μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Κασσίου ἡ τε οἰκία κατεσκάφη, καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε ἀνεῖται ὁ τόπος αὐτῆς αἰθριος ἔξω τοῦ νεώ τῆς Γῆς, ὃν ὑστέροις ἡ πόλις κατεσκεύαζε χρόνοις ἐν μέρει τινὶ αὐτῆς.

only Cicero (*Dom.* 101), but also Livy and Valerius Maximus, mention the temple immediately after mentioning the demolition of the house. Thus they not only suggest a close conceptual connection between temple and demolished house, but also make it possible for their audiences to infer – and perhaps they themselves thought – that the temple was erected shortly after the demolition.²³ Indeed, in Valerius, the actions of execution, demolition, and temple dedication are credited to the same agents, namely the senate and people: three related, evidently *contemporaneous* ripostes by the collective in return for a transgression against itself. What is the significance of dedicating a temple on the site of a demolished house? One answer is that the property thereby transitions from private ownership to sacred space, opening it to certain forms of communal use. Sanctuaries are typically open to most members of the community at least on ritual occasions (and possibly others too), and exist to benefit and serve the community as a whole. Since "aspiring to kingship" can be regarded as an individual's attempt to claim the civic sphere for himself and to bring it under his personal control, this transgression receives an apt symbolic *quid pro quo* when the community seizes that individual's property for its own collective use instead.²⁴ Livy and Valerius, then, like Cicero, are pre-armed with the belief that a temple stands on the site of a demolished house, and they allow their readers to assume both a chronological coincidence and causal relationship. As elsewhere, the logic of exemplarity seems to have manufactured a connection between an object that looks monumental (the temple) and a performance deemed worthy of commemoration (Cassius' sedition and execution), notwithstanding that this particular temple and performance seem logically and symbolically unrelated.²⁵ The idea of the demolished house, which creates the open space necessary for the temple, mediates and facilitates this connection.²⁶

²³ Cic. *Dom.* 101: *Sp. Cassi domus ... <est> eversa atque in eo loco aedis posita Telluris*. Livy 2.41.11: *invenio apud quosdam ... dirutas publice aedes. ea est area ante Telluris aedem*. Val. Max. 6.3.1b: *senatus enim populusque Romanus non contentus capitali eum supplicio adficere interempto domum superiecit, ut penatium quoque strage puniretur; in solo autem aedem Telluris fecit*.

²⁴ On the significance making "public" the formerly private property of certain kinds of malefactors, see Roller 2010: 173, Beck 2009: 370–2, and especially Salerno 1990: 11–22, 91–4, 99. On the communal and political uses of sacred space, see Russell 2016a: 98–105.

²⁵ Some scholars seek to supply the symbolic connection that the sources fail to supply; e.g. Forsythe 1994: 296 and De Cazanove 1989: 106–9. Conversely, Ziolkowski 1992: 155 sees that Florus' testimony (temple vowed by the consul Sempronius in 268) leaves no need for a connection between Tellus and Cassius, and remarks that the story of Cassius' fall "managed to stamp itself on the temple built 200 years later."

²⁶ In contrast to Maelius, however, no surviving account links Cassius' conspiratorial activity with his house in a way that practically or symbolically justifies its demolition. In Livy, Cassius' sedition unfolds entirely within the civic sphere, as Cassius and his principal opponent – his consular

7.3.3 *Marcus Vaccus*

The third figure to suffer house demolition whom Cicero adduces in our passage is Marcus Vaccus. His house, Cicero says, stood “in the meadows of Vaccus” (*in Vacci pratis*) before it was made public property and demolished, and “his misdeed was censured in the memory and name of that place.”²⁷ Cicero does not specify the misdeed supposedly monumentalized in the toponym *prata Vacci*, though the fact that he has just adduced Maenius and Cassius, specifying that they aspired to kingship, may lead Cicero's hearer/reader to infer that this was also Vaccus' crime and that the toponym commemorates it. The only other surviving text to mention Vaccus, however, provides a different story. Livy, at 8.19.4, introduces Vitruvius Vaccus as a prominent man from Fundi who was also visible in Rome: “he had a dwelling on the Palatine hill, which was called the meadows of Vaccus, once the building had been demolished and the ground made public property.”²⁸ Livy then provides the backstory. In 330 Vaccus led the people of Privernum and Fundi, both Roman allies, in a revolt against Roman hegemony; when the revolt was crushed the next year, Vaccus was captured, brought to Rome, and executed following the consul's triumph. Then, Livy says (8.20.8–9), “the senate ... decreed that his house (*aedes*), which was on the Palatine, be demolished, and his goods consecrated to Semo Sancus (/Sangus); and, from the bronze that was realized from those [sc. goods], bronze discs were made and placed in the sanctuary of Sancus, opposite the temple of Quirinus.”²⁹ Within the space of two paragraphs, then, Livy twice notes that Vaccus' house stood on the Palatine. The toponym *prata Vacci*, expressly named in the first passage and assumed to be familiar to his readers, must also lie behind the second mention of the house's location. Livy seems to imply that the aetiology of

colleague Verginius – hold *contiones* (2.41.5–7). In Dionysius' account a reference to “secret plans” (ἀπόρρητα βουλευτήρια, 8.78.3) may invite one to imagine Cassius' house as the locus of plotting. But the house is not mentioned.

²⁷ Cic. *Dom.* 101: ... *ut illius facinus memoria et nomine loci notaretur*. The difficult phrase *memoria et nomine loci* may be understood as hendiadys, “by the recollected name of the place.” Baiter's conjecture *facinoris memoria* for *facinus memoria* et produces admirable sense, but the paradoxos can hardly mean anything different.

²⁸ Livy 8.19.4: ... *Vitruvius Vaccus, vir non domi solum sed etiam Romae clarus; aedes fuere in Palatio eius, quae Vacci prata diruto aedificio publicatoque solo appellata*. Oakley 1997: 2.608 properly defends the paradoxos *quae* against Unger's conjecture *qua*. Regarding the name, Cicero provides only the praenomen Marcus to go with the cognomen Vaccus, while Livy provides only the nomen Vitruvius. Scholars combine this information to generate the “full” name Marcus Vitruvius Vaccus.

²⁹ Livy 8.20.8: *aedes eius quae essent in Palatio diruendas, bona Semoni Sanco censuerunt consecranda. quodque aeris ex eis redactum est, ex eo aenei orbes facti positi in sacello Sancus adversus aedem Quirini*.

the toponym is provided by the story of the revolt, its suppression, and the demolition of his house. The open lot invites the question of why it is unbuilt; its name is imagined (like *Aequimaelium*) to contain the name of a notional prior owner whose house had once stood there. This is consistent with Cicero's statement that the name of the place summons Vaccus' "misdeed" (*facinus*) to recollection, even if Cicero leaves his hearers and readers – at least those who do not know the version Livy relates – to infer that Vaccus was a "kingship aspirant" like Maelius and Cassius.³⁰ Finally, the "private to public" dynamic is again in evidence: Livy says that the grounds were made public (*publicato solo*); the dedication of Vaccus' movable property to the divinity Semo Sancus turns it to communal benefit. Indeed, this god's relevance to the situation is clear from Livy's account. For Semo Sancus Dius Fidius (to provide the god's full name) presides over the sanctity of treaties and interstate alliances. The outrage committed against him is recompensed by his receiving the treaty-breaker's property.

7.3.4 *Marcus Manlius*

The fourth exemplum Cicero adduces of a malefactor who suffered house demolition is Marcus Manlius (Capitolinus). Cicero acknowledges a famous heroic deed attributed to Manlius: he single-handedly repelled a Gallic assault upon the citadel (*arx*) during the Gauls' occupation and sacking of the city in ca. 390. Yet, Cicero continues, Manlius was eventually deemed to have aspired to kingship, his house was demolished, and "two groves" now cover the site (*Dom.* 101). A fuller account is again found in Livy (6.11–20), who provides details of a sedition. The historiographical tradition places this sedition about six years after the Gallic sack (hence ca. 384), making Manlius the last of the three canonical "kingship aspirants." According to Livy, the tale begins with Manlius growing jealous of his fellow hero Camillus' preeminence and seeking to elevate his own stature by cultivating the plebs. First he impugns the senate and proposes debt reform (§11.6–9); then he begins to redeem plebeians from debt-bondage (§14.3–10). He delivers speeches at home, casting reproaches against the senate

³⁰ In the Livian "leader of a revolt" version, the demolition of Vaccus' house lacks the symbolic resonance of the "kingship aspirant" situation, in which the malefactor's *domus* nurtures a threatening social network of clients and may be regarded as taking on aspects of its owner's personality and character. In Vaccus' case (as Livy presents it), his Palatine house evidently is not at the heart of whatever network he activates to raise a revolt of the allies. Perhaps it still can be regarded as an extension of its owner and infused with his character, and therefore be worth demolishing; or perhaps leading a revolt was thought to strike at the community as a whole just as "aspiring to kingship" did, and so justified making the treaty-breaker's property public.

"in the manner of one addressing a public meeting," thereby appropriating into his private domain elements of the civic sphere.³¹ Presumably the audience gathered in his house consists of plebeians whom he has bound to himself by advocating or personally providing debt relief. Later he is said again to hold meetings in his house, by night and day, with plebeians and leading advocates for debt relief.³² The use of the house as the staging area for such activities obviously recalls Maelius, and Livy even labels Manlius' followers with a possessive designation, "The Manlian mob" (*turba Manliana*, §16.8), implying the same alarming degree of personal loyalty as Maelius' supporters, who were similarly labeled, had displayed.³³ Indeed, Manlius and others repeatedly invoke both Cassius and Maelius as exempla in the current situation (§§17.2; 18.4, 9; 19.2). Thus it comes as no surprise when "aspiring to kingship" is explicitly attributed to him (*de regno agendi ortum initum*, §18.16). In due course he is brought to trial, and after several false starts is convicted and executed by being thrown from the Tarpeian Rock (§20.4–12, map location 152).

Manlius' seditious aims and tyrannical aspirations are made even more patent – indeed, are overdetermined – by additional details about his house. First, Livy locates the house on the *arx*, the higher of the two summits that constitute the Capitoline hill. Therefore the senate can portray the meetings held there as a "secession of the plebs to a private *domus*," recalling the traditions about previous plebeian secessions to other nearby hilltops. The senate thus mobilizes the seditious overtones of these secessions, while also calling to mind the Maelian model of the aristocratic plotter organizing his network in and projecting his power from his house. Second, since *arx* is also the generic term for the citadel in any city, it is the location of the fortified house of the stereotypical *tyrannus* (in the Roman sense of "unjust or illegitimate king") that looms so large in the historical imagination and rhetorical exercises of late republican and early imperial Roman aristocrats.³⁴ Given this accumulation of seditious and

³¹ Livy 6.14.11: *ad hoc domi contionantis in modum sermones pleni criminum in patres*.

³² Livy 6.18.3: *advocata domum plebe cum principibus novandarum rerum interdium nocturne consilia agitat*.

³³ Ch. 7.3.1 and n. 9.

³⁴ For these ideas see 6.19.1: *senatus de secessionem in domum privatam plebis, forte etiam in arce positam, et imminenti mole libertati agitat*. Here the word *arx* hovers ambiguously between reference to the specific site of Manlius' house in Rome and the generic site of the stereotypical tyrant's house in any city. Thus the location of the house, in Livy's representation, both assimilates Manlius to the tyrant and poses an explicit threat to *libertas*. For the symbolic associations of the elevated house and the stereotype of the tyrant, see Beck 2009: 361–3, Oakley 1997: 1.552, Tabacco 1985: 42–5; also Jaeger 1997: 83–8 on Manlius and his (potentially tyrannical) fixation on the *arx*.

tyrannical symbolism, one might expect Livy to report that Manlius' house was demolished following his downfall and execution, and his property made public in some way. In fact Livy makes no such statement, but does imply it. He says a law was subsequently passed forbidding patricians to live on the Capitoline hill (6.20.13), and he observes both here and subsequently (7.28.4–5) that the temple of Iuno Moneta eventually stood on the site of Manlius' house, implying that his *domus* had been replaced by a sanctuary open to and serving the community at large (map location 149). More explicit are other texts, both earlier and later than Livy – including Cicero – asserting that Manlius' house was demolished and connecting that demolition with the accusation of aspiring to kingship.³⁵ As in the case of Maelius, here too Livy's account helps explain the symbolic value of demolishing the house of a kingship aspirant – even though Livy never says explicitly that this fate befell Manlius' house.³⁶

One significant divergence between Cicero's account and that of Livy (and other, later sources) is that Cicero says the site of Manlius' house is "covered by two groves" (*domum ... duobus lucis convestitam*). Scholars understand this description as referring to the toponym "between the two groves" (*inter duos lucos*), which in turn is considered colloclal with Romulus' "asylum." This location is in the saddle between the two ancient summits of the Capitoline hill (map location F), i.e. between the Capitol proper where the temple of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus stood (map location 158), and the slightly higher *arx* where the temple of Iuno Moneta stood and where Livy and others placed Manlius' house. For Cicero, then, it is the "two groves" in the saddle of the hill, not the temple of Iuno on the *arx*, that bears the trace of Manlius' demolished house. Like the "meadows of Vaccus," this house site (for Cicero) seems to be marked by its subsequent overgrowth rather than by subsequent constructions.³⁷

³⁵ Cic. *Dom.* 101: *M. Manlius ... regnum adpetisse est iudicatus; ergo eius domum eversam duobus lucis convestitam videtis*. Note that, for Cicero, house demolition follows logically, *ergo*, upon the judgment of having aspired to kingship. Also *Vir. Ill.* 24.5–6: *regni adfectati <suspectus> ... reus factus ... damnatus et de saxo Tarpeio praecipitatus, domus diruta, bona publicata*; Dio (Zon.) 7.23.10; Dio fr. 26.1. Ov. *Fast.* 6.183–90 notes the demolition and the accusation of aspiring to kingship without connecting them closely. Val. Max. 6.3.1a, like Livy, does not expressly mention demolition but notes the temple later erected on the house site.

³⁶ The only other substantial narrative of Manlius' sedition, at Plut. *Cam.* 36, omits the domestic component visible in Livy. The senate infers that trouble is afoot from the tumult Manlius' supporters raise in the forum (36.3–4), not from any activities in his house. The eventual demolition of the house is noted (36.9). But no thematic or symbolic link is suggested between the demolition, any activities that took place in the house, or Manlius' allegedly tyrannical aims.

³⁷ For the *asylum* / *inter duos lucos*, see Wiseman, *LTUR* 1 (1993): 130, Nisbet 1939: 154–5. Cicero's phrasing seems to suggest that the "two groves" succeeded Manlius' house on the same site. But the "two groves" associated with Romulus' *asylum* must have been thought to exist since the mythical

7.3.5 *Marcus Fulvius Flaccus*

The final exemplum Cicero adduces in our passage (*Dom.* 102) to illuminate the situation of his own house is Marcus Fulvius Flaccus. Cicero says that Fulvius was killed by decree of the senate and that his house was demolished and made public property “because he acted together with Gaius Gracchus contrary to the welfare of the *res publica*.” Further detail about Fulvius’ activities is found in the Greek historiographers Appian and Plutarch, whose accounts of the Gracchan turmoil of 121 are the most detailed that now survive. The night before their climactic, violent confrontation with the consul Lucius Opimius, Appian says, Gracchus and his ally Fulvius withdrew to their houses, accompanied by their partisans. The next morning they emerged from their houses, with their partisans now under arms, to occupy the Aventine hill.³⁸ While Appian does not elaborate on the houses’ role, his understatement itself is telling: he assumes any reader would understand that these men’s power derived from the social networks that were nurtured in and projected from their houses. Plutarch’s account of these events (*Gracch.* 35–6 = *Gaius* 14–15) remarks upon the “ultimate” decree that the senate passed against the Gracchans, interpreting it as the senate’s injunction to the consul Opimius to “save the city ... and destroy the tyrants.” Thus Plutarch portrays the senate as holding that Gracchus and Fulvius were aspiring to kingship.³⁹ Plutarch goes on to relate, like Appian, that the supporters of Gracchus and Fulvius gathered in their leaders’ houses the night before the final confrontation, to protect them and accompany them the next morning. He further says that Fulvius’ supporters armed themselves specifically with the Gallic spoils that adorned the walls of Fulvius’ house – spoils he had collected, as victor, from the battlefield and paraded in his triumph two years previously.⁴⁰

foundation of the city. It is unclear how to reconcile the presence of Manlius’ house with the continued existence of these groves on the same site. Fascinating monumental dynamics attend the (non-Ciceronian) accounts that place Manlius’ house on the *arx*, on the site later occupied by the temple of Iuno Moneta: see Roller 2010: 152–6 for discussion and bibliography.

³⁸ App. *BCiv.* 1.25.112–26. 114: ὁ μὲν Γράκχος καὶ ὁ Φλάκκος ... ἐς τὰς οἰκίας διέτρεχον, καὶ οἱ συνθέμενοι αὐτοῖς συνήσαν ἐξ αὐτῶν ... ἡ μὲν βουλή Γράκχον καὶ Φλάκκον ἐκ τῶν οἰκῶν ... ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ σὺν ὄπλοις ἐξέθεον ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀβεντῖνον λόφον.

³⁹ Plut. *Gracch.* 35.3 = *Gaius* 14.3: [sc. the senators] ... ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ προσέταξαν Ὅτιμιόν τῳ ὑπάτῳ σώζειν τὴν πόλιν ὅπως δύναται καὶ καταλύειν τοὺς τυράννους.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Gracch.* 35.5 = *Gaius* 14.5: [sc. οἱ πολλοί] κακίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐγκαταλείποντες τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ προδιδόντες ἦγον ἐπὶ τῶν θυρῶν ... (15.1) ἅμα δὲ ἡμέρα τὸν μὲν Φούλβιον ἐκ τοῦ πότου καθεύδοντα μόλις ἐπεγείραντες ὠπλίζοντο τοῖς περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ λαφύροις, ἃ Γαλάτας νενικηκώς ὅτε ὑπάτευσεν εἰλήφει ... Fulvius (*RE* Fulvius (58)), cos. 125, triumphed as proconsul over three Gallic peoples in 123.

Thus Fulvius’ house, as a monument to its owner that is decorated with the spoils he won and that serves as the nerve center for his network of supporters and clients, is a locus in which one form of symbolic capital is converted into another: Fulvius’ fossilized power as a military commander, deposited as spoils in the house, is reactivated as the live capability to exert armed force through the network of supporters centered there. In such a situation, where factions based in aristocratic houses engage in civil conflict, and allegations of aspiring to kingship are hurled against the aristocrats at the heads of these factions, it comes as no surprise to hear that Fulvius’ house was demolished and made public property following his death.⁴¹ The vicissitudes of this house site are discussed further below (ch. 7.5).

7.4 Clodius and Cicero on Cicero as “Kingship Aspirant”

As noted earlier, Clodius’ gangs plundered and burned Cicero’s Palatine townhouse once he had fled from the city into voluntary exile. What was Clodius’ purpose? Cicero adumbrates possible reasons for the demolition in the passage of *De Domo Sua* quoted above (ch. 7.1), but provides considerably more information elsewhere in this speech and others. The main reason, he surmises, is to assimilate him to the kingship aspirants and related malefactors. Indeed, Clodius and others regularly declared or portrayed Cicero as a “king” or “master” in the years preceding his exile. The basis for this figuration was Cicero’s actions, in the last weeks of his consulship in 63, to end the Catilinarian conspiracy. In particular, he ordered the summary execution of accused conspirators, without trial or the possibility of appeal. Imposing arbitrary corporal punishment upon fellow-citizens is the behavior *par excellence* of the stereotypical “tyrant” of the Roman political imagination – along with living in a fortified house on a height (as discussed regarding Manlius, ch. 7.3.4). Cicero reports that he was accused of behaving like a king or tyrant (implying illegitimate use of force) as early as 62, just months after the crushing of the conspiracy. In 61 he reports in particular that Clodius attacked him the senate with the question “how long will we endure this king?” In demolishing Cicero’s house, then, Clodius was “fitting” Cicero into the king/tyrant/“kingship aspirant” paradigm precisely insofar as house demolition was known to be a characteristic punishment imposed on the kingship aspirants.⁴² Indeed,

⁴¹ *Dom.* 102, 114, *Cat.* 1.4; also *Val. Max.* 6.3.1c (evidently drawing upon Cicero).

⁴² Clodius’ words – *quousque hunc regem feremus?* – from his *altercatio* with Cicero in the senate (as described at *Att.* 1.16.10) may also parody Cicero’s famous *quousque* ... at the start of *Cat.* 1. For

as Cicero adduces these exemplary kingship aspirants in our passage of *De Domo Sua* and describes the house demolitions they suffered, he explicitly acknowledges that his own experience is similar to theirs. Thus he concedes that Clodius has, to some extent, been able to make his accusation stick by successfully assimilating Cicero to these exemplary figures. More on this matter below.⁴³

In a further elaboration of the “Cicero as king/tyrant” figuration, Clodius erected and arranged for a *pontifex* to dedicate a shrine of *Libertas* on a portion of Cicero's house site. This action recalls other temples erected on house sites as discussed above. It thus displays the private-to-public dynamic that marks the punishment of the “kingship aspirants” and other malefactors: the community pushes back against private claims that it deems have pushed too far into the civic sphere by replacing private property with sacred space that notionally benefits the community at large. But there is more. The Roman stereotype of how the tyrant or king interacts with his citizens closely resembles, and frequently intermingles with, the stereotype of the master interacting with his slaves: the unaccountable, arbitrary authority of the dominant party over the subordinate in each pair is portrayed nearly identically. In particular, the power to impose corporal punishment without possibility of appeal is characteristic of the master's authority over the slave. One who treats fellow-citizens in this way is (inappropriately) arrogating master-like power within the civic community, stripping those citizens of their rights. Clodius' shrine of *Libertas*, then, gains its cultural resonance by implying that Cicero behaved like a “master” in his treatment of fellow-citizens, which coheres neatly with the figuration of Cicero as an illegitimate king or tyrant. By its very existence the shrine stresses both that the formerly “enslaved” Roman community has now regained its “freedom,” thanks to the departure of Cicero the king/tyrant/master, and that Clodius himself, the agent of that departure, is the

“kingship” accusations and Cicero's response to them as early as mid-62, see e.g. Cic. *Sull.* 21–2, 26–7, 48. In *Dom.* 75–6 and 94 Cicero registers the tyrant/*rex* accusation, then addresses it at greater length in §§101–2. Scholarly discussion of Cicero as tyrant/*rex* by Sigmund 2014: 97–102, Clark 2007: 209–12, Pina Polo 2006: 96–7, Tatum 1999: 158 and n. 45, 165–6, Nippel 1988: 114–19, Allen 1944: 5–9.

⁴³ Explicit statement at *Dom.* 101: *quam igitur maiores nostri sceleratis ac nefariis civibus maximam poenam constitui posse arbitrati sunt, eandem ego subibo ac sustinebo?* Cicero also links himself to these figures by employing the participle *eversa* (in various cases) to refer to the demolitions of Cassius', Vaccus', Manlius', and Fulvius' houses, as well as his own house, in our passage and again at *Dom.* 147.

community’s “liberator.”⁴⁴ The one-to-one connection between this “liberator” and the master/king he has expelled is established by the fact that the liberator’s shrine to Libertas stands precisely on the expelled “king’s” house site. To be sure, this dedication had the practical advantage, which Clodius no doubt foresaw, that if circumstances should allow Cicero’s return, any attempt he might make to reclaim his property and rebuild his house would be hampered by religious scruples – for deconsecrating a dedicated site is no light matter.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Clodius’ main purpose in dedicating this shrine was probably symbolic, namely to establish and sustain a representation of himself as “liberator” to Cicero’s “master/king.” Borrowing a term from semiotics, one might say that Clodius has placed Cicero’s house *sous rature*. This means that a preexisting sign (Cicero’s house as symbol of his “kingship aspiration”) has been modified, but not completely effaced or obliterated, so as to mark it as inadequate to the current symbolic order even as it remains necessary to explain that order. In this case, Cicero as king/master, represented by and in a sense still present in his house (site), is necessary to account for Clodius’ self-positioning as “liberator.” Yet that very self-positioning requires the threatening king/master to have been ejected already and his house demolished, so that he no longer threatens the civic community. Thus Cicero and his house persist as traces in the shrine that Clodius erected, and Cicero himself is commemorated in a negative ethical mode that assimilates him to a series of exemplary malefactors – precisely the ones he mentions in our passage of *De Domo Sua*.⁴⁶

Elsewhere in this speech Cicero weighs additional motivations for the plundering and destruction of his house. Were the consuls Gabinius and Piso greedy for his furniture, silver, doors, columns, and so on? Perhaps not, since Clodius had granted them entire provinces to plunder as a bribe for their cooperation (§60) – in comparison to which the fittings of Cicero’s house were insignificant. A more likely motivation, in Cicero’s view, is sheer hatred, as when “we” (apparently Romans), following particularly

⁴⁴ Roller 2001: 213–64 discusses the master–slave metaphor in Roman political discourse generally, and its assimilation to the ruler–subject relationship when the ruler is figured as an (illegitimate) “king” or tyrant.

⁴⁵ In the event, Cicero argued that the dedication ritual had been performed incorrectly, and therefore was never valid in the first place. Cicero’s legal-religious arguments are formidably complex and perhaps not coherent: Stroh 2004: 323–31; also 329–30 for the (minimal) semantic differences between *consecrare* and *dedicare*.

⁴⁶ My thinking and language here are indebted to Fowler 2000, esp. 204–5. However, the idea that an act of obliteration must call attention to itself as being such an act, reminding audiences of what has been effaced, is familiar in the literature on Roman memory sanctions: see e.g. Jaeger 1997: 87–8; also ch. 7.3.1 on the toponym *Aequimaelium* as a monument, and ch. 7.5 on the porticus Catuli in relation to the house of Fulvius.

nasty wars, demolish enemy cities out of hatred rather than greed, "since a bit of war seems still to cling to the houses and buildings" (§61). The simile's conclusion is lost in a lacuna, leaving the character of the intended parallel between the destruction of houses and cities somewhat unclear.⁴⁷ However, the idea that the owners' hostility clings to the walls, hence that the buildings are extensions of their owners, is precisely the argument Livy's Cincinnatus offers for demolishing Maelius' house, as discussed earlier (ch. 7.3.1). It is also strongly affirmed elsewhere in *De Domo Sua*, for Cicero himself repeatedly assimilates his person to the structure of his house. At §63, immediately after describing how his house was burnt, he declares that the firebrands were thrown "at me alone" – though he had personally left Rome some hours earlier. At §131 he declares, even more vividly, that Clodius "placed his statue of Licence (rather than Liberty) in the blood and, one might almost say, the bones of a citizen well-deserving of the commonwealth." And at §137 he says that Clodius erected his monument "in the guts of the man who saved the city by his efforts and by the dangers he experienced."⁴⁸ This persistent synecdoche, figuring the house as (part of) its owner's body, lends credibility to Cicero's suggestion that hatred of himself inspired the plundering and destruction of his house. It also draws upon the dynamic previously observed in the accounts of the exemplary tyrant-aspirants whose houses were demolished. In his assimilation of house to self, Cicero reproduces a motif characteristic of these figures and of the explanations for house demolition that sometimes feature in their stories.⁴⁹

Yet, the specific form that Cicero's allegedly tyrannical behavior takes – imposing illegal corporal punishment on citizens while consul – differs from the behavior ascribed to Maelius, Cassius, and Manlius. As we have seen, these malefactors (and Fulvius too) are said to have cultivated large, loyal, and seditious personal followings. House demolition is particularly resonant under these circumstances, as the house's condition

⁴⁷ *Dom.* 61: *ut hostium urbes ... quibuscum acerbum bellum internecivumque suscepimus, non praeda adducti sed odio solemus excindere, ... cum horum etiam tectis et sedibus residere aliquod bellum semper videtur****. On the lacuna and possible supplements, see Nisbet 1939: 128; cf. §143 where the idea is briefly resumed. Cicero elsewhere compares the monumental dynamics of city destruction with those of house demolition: *Leg. Agr.* 1.5, 2.51, 2.87–90, *Off.* 1.35, *Fam.* 4.5.4.

⁴⁸ *Dom.* 63: *in me uno consulares faces iactae manibus tribunicis ... adhaeserunt.* §131: *tu in civis optime de re publica meriti cruore ac paene ossibus simulacrum non libertatis publicae sed licentiae collocasti* (here *paene* apologizes for the vividness of the figure). §137: *in visceribus eius qui urbem suis laboribus ac periculis conservasset ... conlocaris.*

⁴⁹ See Walter 2004a: 170–1 on the monumental dynamics of Cicero's house, standing and demolished; Berg 1997: 137–40 on the "owner is his house" metonymy in *De Domo Sua*; and Bodel 1997: 11–32 for similar dynamics involving rural villas and their owners; also *Cic. Att.* 3.15.6, *Fam.* 14.2.

metonymically represents the condition of the social network nurtured within it, as well as the condition of its owner. Cicero's alleged transgression does not obviously involve the development and exploitation of such clienteles. House demolition therefore seems, on its face, less symbolically apt as a punishment for Cicero's particular flavor of "kingship aspiration."⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Cicero himself goes out of his way to supplement this symbolic deficit by boasting of the vast social network rooted in his house. As he describes it in *De Domo Sua* (53–5), his house was "packed with good men" (*meam domum refertam viris bonis*) and was the center of such men's resistance to the tumult aroused by Clodius and his gangs – who, he says, included slaves as well as free persons, and the "ignorant mob" (*imperita multitudo*). In *In Pisonem* he boasts that, in the face of Piso's attacks, not only his house, but the entire Palatine, was "packed" by the senate, the equestrians, the citizenry in general, and municipal Italians to boot. He implies that his throng of supporters had grown so vast that his own atrium could not begin to accommodate them, so they spilled out and filled the streets of the surrounding neighborhood.⁵¹ Yet, because of threats issued by friends of the consuls Gabinius and Piso, who were collaborating with Clodius, these "good men" were filled with dread of being proscribed. Cicero's support consequently eroded and collapsed, prompting him to flee the city.⁵² The house's subsequent demolition, Cicero acknowledges, inflicted a blow upon his social network (hence upon his own power) that was, if not fatal, at least pragmatically effective and symbolically powerful. At *Dom.* 101 he paints a vivid and pathetic picture of his house "overturned ... and built up" by Clodius (i.e. it was demolished and the sanctuary of *Libertas* was built there), and "placed before the eyes of the citizen body, so that the lamentations of good men (*fletus bonorum*) might never subside."⁵³ Presumably they lament because they interpret the structures

⁵⁰ Fiori 1996: 445–50 also contends, on different grounds, that Clodius ascribes to Cicero a "non-canonical" form of kingship aspiration; Vigourt 2001c: 334–5 discusses large clienteles as characteristic of the would-be tyrant or king.

⁵¹ *Pis.* 11: *erat non solum domus mea, sed totum Palatium senatu, equitibus Romanis, civitate omni, Italia cuncta refertum* (cf. *Att.* 2.22.3, predating his exile, where Cicero describes the throngs at his house and the power they confer). For *salutatores* filling up the streets around the house of a great man, see *Sen. Ben.* 6.34.4, where Seneca generalizes on the basis of the reception practices of Gaius Gracchus and Marcus Livius Drusus. It is a striking coincidence that Cicero's pre-demolition Palatine house was probably Livius' own (Vell. 2.14.3; Papi, *LTUR* 2 (1995): 132, 202–3). Hence Seneca's generic description of massed *salutatores* notionally involves the very same house and streets as Cicero's concrete description.

⁵² *Dom.* 55, *Pis.* 26.

⁵³ *Dom.* 101: *domum meam eversam ... et ab eodem [sc. hoste communi] exstructam et positam in oculis civitatis, ne umquam conquiescere possit fletus bonorum?* Lambinus supplies <*aedem*> between *eodem* and *exstructam*, producing "and a sanctuary built up by him." This supplement is accepted by most

Clodius erected on Cicero's housesite as a monument to their collective defeat, as well as to their champion's personal defeat – a surrogate whose fate is also their own. Hence Cicero insists to the *pontifices*, the principal audience for this speech, that Clodius' sanctuary of Libertas must be deconsecrated (or rather, acknowledged as never having been properly dedicated) and removed so that his house can be fully restored on its original site. Only then, he says – in a passionate assimilation of self to house that fills the peroration of the speech (§§143–7, cf. §100) – will his own personal restoration be true and complete.

Cicero thus aligns himself rather neatly with the paradigm of the “kingship aspirant” and related malefactors to which Clodius sought to “fit” him. In our passage of *De Domo Sua* he shows clearly that these figures suffered house demolition in return for their crimes, and that their situations parallel his own (as Clodius certainly intended). He insists on the size and potency of the network of supporters rooted in his house, and on the blow they suffered when he was driven out and the house demolished – an important theme or subtext in some of the exemplary malefactors' stories. In short, Cicero appears to walk right into Clodius' trap. Affirming that the “kingship aspirant” paradigm fits him would seem, on its face, to justify both the demolition of his house and the capital punishment he suffered. Indeed, he gets off easy with self-imposed exile, while his exemplary models were executed. Why does Cicero put himself in this position?

I suggest that Cicero is, in fact, at pains to distinguish himself in crucial respects from the exemplary malefactors, and thereby seeks to deny the “fit” Clodius implies between these figures and himself. Understanding his argument requires a closer look at how he distinguishes his situation from that of Fulvius Flaccus at *De Domo Sua* 102. As we have seen, Cicero indignantly asks whether the grandeur of the Roman people can endure that his house be joined with Fulvius' as a memorial to a punishment imposed publicly. For Fulvius (Cicero says) was executed by senatorial decree and his house demolished in return for his acting with Gaius Gracchus against the public welfare; now Clodius as an individual has imposed the same penalty on Cicero, *as if* Cicero were also a subverter of the state. Here

editors, but is not (I believe) correct, nor is any supplement necessary. While Cicero often refers to temples as *aedes*, nowhere else in this speech does he dignify Clodius' building with this term – understandably, since he seeks to persuade the *pontifices* that it was not legitimately dedicated. Furthermore, the paradosis reading “house demolished and built up” is not inherently problematic: cf. *Dom.* 147: *domo ... sceleratius etiam aedificata quam eversa*; 105: *domum ... evertisse et ... consecrassse*. Further discussion by Wiseman 2012: 659–60 (supplying *porticum*, but concurring that Cicero did not speak of a “temple” of Libertas); Roller 2010: 136 n. 45, Strohm 2004: 320 n. 40.

is the crucial distinction: the senate had judged Cicero the protector of his country ([sc. *me*] *quem patres conscripti custodem patriae iudicassent*), not its subverter; while Clodius, acting as an individual and by no means representing the senate's will, had in fact "squashed" that body (*oppresso senatu*) as well as Cicero. Far from commemorating the tribune's and consuls' role in defeating a conspiracy against the commonwealth, he says, Clodius' constructions are rather "firmly planted proof" of the tribune's madness, the consuls' criminality, the cruelty of the conspirators (evidently it is Clodius and his allies who are the *coniurati*), and of the disaster that has befallen the commonwealth, not to mention of Cicero's personal suffering.⁵⁴ Cicero also works hard here, as elsewhere in the speech, to distinguish his own supporters' character from that of Clodius' supporters. Cicero repeatedly asserts that his own supporters are the "good men" (*boni*), including most senators and equestrians and all the upstanding municipal Italians. Clodius' supporters, by contrast – the people who constitute his gangs – are thugs hired for pay to attack magistrates and besiege the senate, who do not shrink from murder, arson, and plunder; they are slaves, criminals, and so on.⁵⁵ Thus it is Cicero and his allies who protect the commonwealth while Clodius and his lackeys menace it, not the other way around.

Cicero elaborates this argument elsewhere in *De Domo Sua*, using the language and imagery of "liberty" – a clear counterpunch against Clodius' own deployment of this rhetoric against Cicero. In addition to constructing and dedicating his shrine to Libertas on Cicero's property, Clodius also installed there a statue representing the goddess. These erections provide Cicero the opportunity to dilate on Clodius' own tyrannical propensities. In §§110–11 Cicero asserts that the statue is actually the funerary portrait of a prostitute from Tanagra, stolen from her tomb and shipped to Rome by Clodius' brother Appius Claudius. This statue, Cicero says, Clodius had the effrontery to pass off as "Libertas," when he had in fact banished true *libertas* from the city. For Clodius had kept his colleagues, who were "endowed with the greatest powers," from being "free" (*liberos*), had shut off access to the temple of Castor, ordered his attendants to trample a distinguished (but unidentified) ex-consul, had driven Cicero from the city without due process using a "tyrant-like law directed at a single person"

⁵⁴ Dom. 103: *hanc ... porticum ... furoris tribunicii, sceleris consularis, crudelitatis coniuratorum, calamitatis rei publicae, doloris mei defixum indicium.*

⁵⁵ Dom. 89: *an tu populum Romanum esse illum putas qui constat ex iis qui mercede conducuntur, qui impelluntur ut vim adferant magistratibus, ut obsideant senatum, optent cotidie caedem, incendia, rapinas? ... o ... multitudinem hominum ex servis, ex conductis, ex facinerosis, ex egentibus congregatam!*

(*privilegiis tyrannicis inrogatis*), shut Pompey up in his house, and beset the forum with armed men.⁵⁶ Moreover, Clodius set up this statue of "Libertas" in a house "that was itself a sign of your bloody mastery/despotism and of the wretched slavery of the Roman people" (*quae domus erat ipsa indicium crudelissimi tui dominatus et miserrimae populi Romani servitutis*). Thus Cicero declares that his house functions, in its demolished state, as a monument commemorating the master–slave relationship Clodius has established over Romans in general. Ironically, Cicero concludes, Clodius' Libertas drove out the very man who had "kept the commonwealth from falling into the power of slaves" – apparently a side-thrust at Clodius' low-status supporters. In all these respects, then, Cicero dismisses with bitter irony Clodius' attempts to pass himself off as a "liberator."⁵⁷ Nor is it only Cicero himself whom Clodius' fraudulent Libertas expelled: she also drove out his household gods, his *di penates* and *familiares Lares* (ch. 7.2). Indeed, Cicero augments the pathos of his situation through moving descriptions of the displacement of authentic *religio* (his domestic cult objects and images) by Clodius' false goddess, and by dilating on the kind of refuge – protected by household gods – one's *domus* should be expected to provide, if only it is not assaulted by the likes of Clodius.⁵⁸ Thanks to the close identification of a house's owner with his household gods and cult, Cicero's claim that Clodius attacked these gods is another way of presenting Clodius' attack on the house as an attack on Cicero himself – another variant of the "house is its owner" synecdoche that both Clodius and Cicero seek to exploit for political advantage in this dispute.

Alternatively, Cicero can figure Clodius as an external enemy of the Roman commonwealth, rather than as a personal enemy to himself: more

⁵⁶ The specific references and significance of the elements in this list are not always clear. On the Clodian law directed at Cicero alone (the *privilegium*), see Stroth 2004: 352–4, with further references.

⁵⁷ Clodius' supporters: *Dom.* 110–11; cf. 89, 92, and *Sest.* 47. As an alternative to irony, Clodius' *Libertas* can be recoded as her evil twin, *Licentia* (since the statue does, after all, depict a prostitute), and is then regarded as a perfectly appropriate goddess for Clodius to honor with a dedication: *Cic. Dom.* 131 (cf. 47), *Leg.* 2.42. See Berg 1997: 137–40 on Cicero reinterpreting Clodius' monuments; Clark 2007: 211–13 on these men's competing deployments of the term *libertas*, and Milnor 2005: 72–6 for the symbolics of the feminine gender of *Libertas* and her Ciceronian recodings.

⁵⁸ *Dom.* 108–9: *ista tua pulchra Libertas deos penatis et familiaris meos lares expulit, ut se ipsa tamquam in captivis sedibus conlocaret? quid est sanctius, quid omni religione munitius quam domus unius cuiusque civium? hic arae sunt, hic foci, hic di penates, hic sacra, religiones, caerimoniae continentur; hoc perfugium est ita sanctum omnibus ut inde abripi neminem fas sit.* Cf. §143; Berg 1997: 139–41. Cicero also speaks of his house as refuge at *Cic. Cat.* 1.9–10, 2.1, 4.2, *Sull.* 53; more generally *Leg.* 2.42; see Treggiari 2002: 88–91, 101–6. Notwithstanding such rhetoric, the Roman house is no temple and is technically "profane." Wachsmuth 1980: 37–46. Further discussion and references at Roller 2010: 141–3.

a *hostis communis* than an *inimicus*, as he says at §101. In this conceptual framework, the structures Clodius placed on and around Cicero's house site constitute nothing less than a battlefield monument commemorating his military victory over Cicero and the whole commonwealth (*tropaea de me et de re publica*, §100) – imagery derived from external warfare, not internal political competition. The external victor can, of course, do as he will with the people he has defeated; war captives in Roman society may well be enslaved. The figuration of Clodius as an external enemy who has conquered Rome and enslaved its citizens thus coheres with other imagery Cicero deploys representing Clodius as a tyrant and master, and contributes to Cicero's more general counter-mapping of the master–slave or ruler–subject paradigms – and in particular the “kingship aspirant” paradigm – by which Clodius has sought to stigmatize Cicero. By denying the “fit” between himself and the kingship aspirants to whom Clodius evidently assimilated him, and also by presenting an aggressive counter-image of Clodius himself as a tyrant, master, and external enemy, Cicero seeks to resist, defeat, and reverse Clodius' own exemplum-fueled attack upon him. Both men manipulate the same set of culturally resonant symbols within the same discourse, but freighting those symbols with opposed moral valences in their quest for political advantage.

7.5 The Exempla of Fulvius and Catulus: Demolished Houses as Moral Palimpsests

While discussing the vicissitudes of his housesite in *De Domo Sua*, and describing the sequence of structures that occupied it, Cicero incidentally provides considerable information about other properties in the vicinity. Among these was a *domus* Clodius himself owned (his *domus* seems to have been adjacent, or next but one, to Cicero's house), and the site where Fulvius Flaccus' *domus* once stood, which adjoined Cicero's property. As discussed earlier, tradition held that Fulvius' house was demolished, after he died along with Gaius Gracchus in 121, to signify that “he had acted contrary to the welfare of the *res publica*” (ch. 7.3.5).⁵⁹ This demolition is, however, only the first act in a longer drama of constructions and demolitions on that site, some of which become entangled with Cicero's property. My aim in this final section is to trace this sequence of monuments, and the political positions they entail, as Cicero describes them in *De Domo Sua*. I will also show that the agents of these constructions and

⁵⁹ On Fulvius' house see Papi, *LTUR* 2 (1995): 105.

demolitions provide exemplary models for the political positionings that Cicero ascribes to himself and Clodius.

In *De Domo Sua* 102, Cicero remarks more specifically that Clodius, by demolishing Cicero's house, annexed Cicero's lot, both physically and conceptually, to the adjacent lot of Fulvius. He thereby assimilated Cicero himself to Fulvius, making it appear as if the two were being punished in the same way for similar misdeeds. But this is outrageous, says Cicero, since the senate imposed the punishment of demolition on Fulvius, while Clodius first "squashed" the senate and then unilaterally imposed that punishment on a man who had been judged the state's protector. In Cicero's view, Clodius is attempting to link Cicero and Fulvius as malefactors who both acted to the detriment of the commonwealth and thus equally deserved to suffer the symbolic and practical punishment of house demolition. But Cicero also hints, and makes clearer elsewhere, that Clodius' demolitions actually create a different linkage, namely one between Cicero and Quintus Lutatius Catulus, whose portico he mentions as standing on Fulvius' house site in later times (*in qua porticum post aliquanto Q. Catulus ... fecit*). This linkage plays out much more advantageously for Cicero, and in the end (he insists) shows that Clodius' effort to link Cicero with Fulvius not only fails, but backfires.

The story of Catulus is as follows. As proconsul in 101, Catulus collaborated with the consul Gaius Marius in defeating the Cimbri in the battle of Vercellae and shared with him the subsequent triumph. Cicero says that Catulus erected a portico (the porticus Catuli) on the site where Fulvius' house had stood and filled it with Cimbric spoils, "so that the entire memory of one who had taken measures ruinous to the commonwealth [i.e. Fulvius] might be utterly removed from the eyes and minds of men."⁶⁰ Now, Fulvius' demolished house – whether the lot had been cleared and was entirely vacant, or ruins were visible, or perhaps a toponym preserving his name had come to be attached to the spot (as occurred with the *Aequimaelium* and *prata Vacci*) – is in any case presented here as a monument, informing those who observe it or summoning to their recollection that Fulvius had been condemned for endangering the commonwealth.⁶¹

⁶⁰ *Dom.* 114: *tu, Q. Catule, M. Fulvi domum, cum is fratris tui socer fuisset, monumentum tuarum manubiarum esse voluisti, ut eius qui perniciose rei publicae consilia cepisset omnis memoria funditus ex oculis hominum ac mentibus tolleretur*; also 102 (cf. *Val. Max.* 6.3.1c, next n.)

⁶¹ The word *area*, meaning an open lot in the built environment of the city, sometimes has a name attached, which may be thought to signify the owner of a house that once stood there. For Fulvius Flaccus, see *Val. Max.* 6.3.1c: *ceterum Flacciana area, cum diu penetibus vacua mansisset, a Q. Catulo Cimbricis spoliis adornata est*. Although the phrase *area Flacciana* is otherwise unattested and possibly coined by Valerius, it is precisely the kind of informal "toponym" or designation that could emerge via the word *area*. See Roller 2010: 168.

Cicero's explanation of Catulus' aim in building his portico – to blot out the memory of Fulvius' disgrace – obviously presupposes that the site still served to commemorate that disgrace, even two decades after the demolition.⁶² Why should Catulus wish to “overwrite” Fulvius' demolished house, eliminating a monument that inscribed Fulvius in Roman cultural memory as a negative exemplum? Because, Cicero explains, Catulus' brother was married to Fulvius' daughter.⁶³ Of course Catulus wished to monumentalize himself as a great military victor, which his portico filled with spoils assuredly did (incidentally, perhaps, surpassing the spoils-filled house of Fulvius, to the extent people recalled that feature of the earlier house: ch. 7.3.5). But Cicero's point is that Catulus chose *that particular* site on which to erect his portico in order, at the same time, to bandage a gaping wound in the honor of his sister-in-law's family. In attributing this aim to Catulus, Cicero characterizes him as *pious*, as one who has scrupulous regard for his obligations to family and community. Such a man might reasonably seek to remove monuments commemorating a “wicked” relative who injured the community and besmirched the family's honor, hoping to reduce the malefactor's visibility – though other monuments, such as references in speeches or historiographical narratives, of course still survive. Yet Catulus can only be acknowledged and praised for his *pietas* by means of a narrative or other monument commemorating the occasion(s) on which he displayed that virtue in a noteworthy way. Presenting such a narrative is just what Cicero does here: a narrative that, in commemorating Catulus' pious action, necessarily recommemorates the disgrace of Fulvius whose obliteration is precisely the aim of the pious action being commemorated, and on which that action is predicated. In short, Cicero's sympathetic description of Catulus' aim defeats that aim in the very act of describing it. In any case, the porticus Catuli, as a monument to Catulus' military glory and piety toward his sister-in-law, bears the trace of the monument that preceded it on the same site, even as it purports to overwrite and obliterate that monument – for the moral value of the portico can only be appreciated if the prior existence of Fulvius' house and the reason for its demolition is recollected.⁶⁴

⁶² I assume Fulvius' house was demolished soon after his death in 121, and that Catulus erected his portico on that site soon after his triumph in 101. Hence about two decades of “open lot” or “ruin” intervened between the buildings – Cicero's *post aliquanto* (*Dom.* 102) and Valerius Maximus' *diu* (if the reading is sound; see previous n.)

⁶³ *Dom.* 114: *cum is fratris tui socer fuisset*; see n. 60 above.

⁶⁴ Flower 2014: 38–9 discusses the porticus Catuli in the context of Catulus' other commemorative strategies; Bücher 2006: 116–18 discusses this structure's symbolic dimensions.

Yet the story does not end here: this monumental palimpsest has a further politically sensitive layer, which is critical to the rhetorical situation of *De Domo Sua*. For the shrine of Libertas that Clodius built on the site of Cicero's demolished house is only one element of an ambitious building project that Clodius undertook in 58–57 during Cicero's exile. The shrine seems to have been incorporated into a larger portico that occupied a significant share of Cicero's house site. This portico also extended onto the adjacent site, where Clodius either remodeled the porticus Catuli or demolished and rebuilt it to create a unitary portico complex spanning both properties. Clodius then inscribed his own name on this complex, rendering it unambiguously a monument to himself – in particular, to himself as the “liberator” who expelled the would-be “king” Cicero. Nor is this all. This complex was connected to, and apparently functioned as an extension of, Clodius' own house, which seems to have adjoined both Cicero's house site and the porticus Catuli.⁶⁵ This new, Clodian layer of the palimpsest affords Cicero considerable rhetorical scope. He apostrophizes the dead Catulus, comparing Clodius' new buildings with the porticus Catuli that they displaced. Could you ever have imagined, he asks, that your own monument would be overthrown by a rogue tribune, in defiance of the senate and the judgment of the “good men,” yet with the assistance of the consuls themselves? No, Cicero answers, you could never have imagined such a thing unless the state itself were overthrown.⁶⁶ The succession of these structures represents *in nuce* the travesty whereby a man out to destroy the *res publica* eclipses the kind of men who, in former times, gloriously defended and preserved it. Catulus is such a man, of course, but so is Cicero, as Clodius' attack on both their monuments (the porticus Catuli

⁶⁵ This description of Clodius' complex is pieced together from Cic. *Dom.* 51, 100, 102–3, 116, 121, 137; for general discussion see Strohm 2004: 319–21, Krause 2001: 186–91, Tatum 1999: 163–6, Papi, *LTUR* 4 (1999): 119, Papi, *LTUR* 3 (1996): 188–9, Papi, *LTUR* 2 (1995): 85–6, Berg 1997: 129–34, Picard 1965, Nisbet 1939: 206–9. The topographical location of this complex, which Cicero describes with such tantalizing imprecision in *De Domo Sua* and elsewhere, has received much scholarly discussion. Allen's (1939) reading of Cicero led him, and others subsequently, to locate this cluster of properties on northeast slope of the Palatine, facing the forum or Velia (map location E1); Carandini's excavations later led him to argue for the same general area (1986: 263–8). Alternatively, Tamm 1963: 37–43 located these properties on the northwest heights of the Palatine facing the Capitol, for which Krause 2001 adduced archaeological support (subsequently accepted by Carandini, e.g. 2010: 128–38; map location E2). The question remains open: Wiseman 2012: 657–61.

⁶⁶ *Dom.* 114: *hoc si quis tibi aedificanti illam porticum diceret, fore tempus cum is tribunus plebis, qui auctoritatem senatus, iudicium bonorum omnium neglexisset, tuum monumentum consulibus non modo inspectantibus verum adiuvantibus disturberet, everteret, idque cum eius civis qui rem publicam ex senatus auctoritate consul defendisset domo coniungeret, nonne responderes id nisi eversa civitate accidere non posse?* For the outrage to the heroic victor that this demolition/rebuilding entails, see also §§102 (*clarissimi viri mortui monumenta delebat*), 137; *Har. Resp.* 33, 58.

and Cicero's house) proves. For this attack, as Cicero presents it, aligns Cicero with Catulus on the side of *pietas*, concern for the welfare of the *res publica*, and opposition to tumultuous and wicked citizens, who of course seek revenge on their virtuous opponents. Cicero also thereby implies, *sotto voce*, that his squashing of the Catilinarian conspiracy has a status comparable to the great victory at Vercellae, and makes him a protector of the *res publica* on par with Catulus himself. In this presentation, then, Clodius' attempt to "fit" Cicero into the exemplary sequence of "kingship aspirants"/wicked citizens who appropriately and significantly suffer house demolition ends up backfiring. Rather, Cicero suggests, Clodius' actions assimilate Cicero to the great hero Catulus, whose monument was demolished and overbuilt simultaneously with Cicero's house, and whose heroic actions to save the state were thereby equally disregarded by the *real* tumultuous and wicked citizen, Clodius.

In the succession of monuments erected, demolished, and displaced by other monuments on the site of Fulvius' and Cicero's houses, and more particularly in Cicero's interpretation of the moral and political import of this succession, one can observe how a desperate and vicious political struggle can be waged partly in terms of exemplary figures drawn from the past. Each of the monuments appearing in succession on these sites commemorates a deed performed by a social actor and a judgment passed on that performance by some audience of witnesses. By demolishing Cicero's house and erecting a shrine of *Libertas* on the site, Clodius undoubtedly intended, as Cicero freely acknowledges, to inscribe Cicero into the sequence of exemplary "kingship aspirants" or related malefactors whose misdeeds were morally stigmatized by the demolition of their houses. These are the figures Cicero mentions in the passage from *De Domo Sua* 101–2 with which this chapter opened, and whose stories were examined in greater detail in chapter 7.3. Yet Cicero fights back in several ways. As discussed in chapter 7.4, he insists that his supporters are the "good men" (*boni*), not the rabble that in the exemplary tales supports the demagogic "kingship aspirants." Indeed, he contends that the (contemporary) rabble supports Clodius, and that Clodius is actually the figure who attacks and constrains the freedom of citizens in contemporary Rome, in the manner of a king, tyrant, or master. Thus his own situation does not "fit" the kingship aspirant exemplary model. The correct "fit," rather, is provided by the counterexemplum he adduces – the great hero Catulus, with whom (Cicero insists) Clodius' assaults actually connect him. The deeds Catulus performed on behalf of the commonwealth are rivaled only by Cicero's own deeds, and these two men, precisely because of their services to the

res publica, are equally (and with equal injustice) victimized by Clodius' demolition-and-smear campaign. In the end, Cicero would have his audience believe, Clodius' assault on Cicero via his house fails in good part because, due to inadvertence or incompetence, Clodius actually ties Cicero to the hero Catulus, not to the kingship aspirants Clodius seemingly intended. Thus Cicero hopes to "win" the war of exempla that Clodius launched years before, and in which Clodius' own fortunes reached their high tide with Cicero's exile.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ A somewhat similar "monumental struggle" was waged between Sulla and Marius a generation earlier, with each general erecting monuments to himself and, at the first opportunity, demolishing the other's monuments (Stein-Hölkeskamp 2016: 224–31). Yet those monuments seem to have commemorated only their dedicators; that struggle lacks the exemplary resonances and temporal depth of the one between Cicero and Clodius.

Conclusion

Exemplarity and Stoicism

8.1 Seneca's *Exempla*

It would be impossible, in a concluding chapter, to gather all the strands pursued over the previous seven chapters that illuminate the various operations and dimensions of Roman exemplarity – at least, not without (rather pointlessly) repeating the general survey offered in the introduction. Yet it may be helpful by way of conclusion to examine the one sustained, systematic critique of its logic that survives from Roman antiquity: Seneca the Younger's Stoic assessment of the bases upon which judging audiences assign moral value to actors and performances they observe. Seneca is principally concerned with the moral dimension of exemplarity (as befits a moral philosopher), though he also touches on its rhetorical and historiographical dimensions.

In his prose philosophical works Seneca commonly employs *exempla* in the ways discussed hitherto in this book. Like most authors, Seneca stands as a secondary witness, removed in time and/or space from the exemplary performances he describes. He interprets existing monuments and creates new monuments (writing new narratives of past deeds), through which he fashions past performances as models for future action and as standards for judging those actions. This book has already examined some of Seneca's "conventional" deployments of *exempla*. Chapter 2 discusses Seneca's presentation of Cloelia as a model of courage for contemporary women and men; and chapter 6 shows how he sets up Cornelia, Livia, and Octavia as models of maternal deportment in the face of bereavement – models presented as relevant to two contemporary women, Helvia and Marcia.¹ In two of his "moral letters" (*Epistulae morales*), however, which were written late in his life and are addressed to his friend and Stoic co-striver Lucilius, Seneca subjects precisely this kind of conventional exemplary morality and

¹ Chs. 2.2, 2.4, 6.2, 6.5.

argumentation to a searching critique. These two letters display a particular concern with the dynamics of witnessing and judging – the moments at which the judging audiences, primary or secondary, ascribe moral value to an actor and action they have observed or learned of through a monument. From a Stoic point of view, Seneca identifies a series of inadequacies and deficiencies in the way that judging audiences ordinarily assign moral value. In *Epistula* 94 he contends that conventional exemplary judging routinely miscategorizes actors' performances, mistaking vices for virtues – what I call the “misjudgment” critique. In *Ep.* 120, he argues that conventional exemplary judging is commonly carried out on the basis of inadequate information, hence cannot provide a reliably accurate assessment of a performer's moral status – what I call the “insufficient evidence” critique. Seneca does not abandon exemplarity as a form of moral discourse and argumentation, but rather proposes revisions to the conventional mode of witnessing and judging, to put exemplarity on a footing consistent with Stoic ethics more generally. Seneca's approach thus exposes one limitation of conventional exemplarity as a moral discourse. For the dogmatic underpinnings of Stoic philosophy provide tools with which to challenge conventional exemplary thinking, and also offer an alternative mode of analysis. The result is a “Stoic exemplarity” that resembles conventional exemplarity in some respects but diverges in others.

8.2 The “Misjudgment” Critique

I begin by examining the “misjudgment” critique of exemplary morality that Seneca develops most systematically in *Ep.* 94. This critique is imbedded in a long, overarching defense of the philosophical relevance and effectiveness of *praecepta*, as opposed to *decreta*, in Stoic philosophy – a trajectory I must summarize in order to arrive at the starting point of the critique.² *Decreta* are general principles of universal application, while *praecepta*, operating at a level of greater specificity, recommend particular courses of action for people in particular circumstances or roles. The examples of *praecepta* that Seneca provides in *Ep.* 94 include prescribing how a husband should act toward his wife, a father toward his children, and a master toward his slaves (§§1, 3), as well injunctive statements such as “eat thus, walk thus; this behavior suits a man, a woman, a husband, a bachelor” (§8). Precepts are rhetorically hortatory, and they usually, though do

² *Ep.* 95, similar in length and conception, in turn defends *decreta*: on the interrelationship of these two letters see Schafer 2009: 76–7, Bellincioni 1979: 17–24.

not always, employ deontic language and syntax: imperatives, futures with imperative force, the passive periphrastic conjugation, verbs like *debeo*. Morally, they help their addressee to identify and discharge what Stoics call a “proper function” (*kathekon/officium*) in a given situation.³ One key aspect of preception, as Seneca presents it (§§25–6), is (*ad*)*monitio*, “reminding” or “warning.” When discussing a *praeceptum* he sometimes uses the word (*ad*)*monitio* instead, and he likewise may employ the terms *monitor* and (*ad*)*moneo* instead of *praeceptor* and *praeceptio*, to emphasize this aspect. This semantic nexus underscores that precepts *exhort* their addressee toward particular actions, and – at least sometimes – *remind* them of their duty.⁴

From these associations one may conjecture that the audience for precepts is, in Stoic terms, either rank philosophical beginners or “progressors,” people who have advanced beyond the beginning in their moral knowledge but fall far short of being “sages” (often, but not invariably, called *sapientes*). Sages have acquired all the virtues and are described as being “perfect” or “complete” (*perfecti*); they are philosophically self-sufficient. Beginners and progressors, however, require instruction about what action is appropriate to their current situation.⁵ Seneca says as much in *Ep.* 94, when describing how precepts are dispensed and received: “The way for doing actions must be shown to the person who is imperfect/incomplete (*imperfecto*), but is making progress (*sed proficiente*) ... for those with weaker minds, it is necessary for someone to go in front and say, ‘you’ll avoid this, you’ll do that.’”⁶ The latter instructions are *praecepta*, as their deontic language and their relevance to the recipient’s immediate situation make clear. The person who “goes in front” and delivers *praecepta* to his charge could reasonably be called a *praeceptor*, and indeed Seneca so designates this figure in this letter and elsewhere.

Seneca goes on to spotlight one particular aspect of the *praeceptor*’s advice-giving: he says that “we” need an “advocate” – *advocatus*, in the etymological sense of “one summoned to provide aid” – to “offer precepts

³ For precepts enjoining “proper functions” in particular situations, see *Ep.* 94.32, 37; 95.45; Schafer 2009: 54–8, Inwood 2005: 116–17, Bellincioni 1979: 18.

⁴ On the “reminding” (*admonitio*) function of precepts, see *Ep.* 94.25–6.

⁵ On “perfection” as the acquisition of all the virtues in Stoicism, see ch. 8.3 below. The sage probably has no need for *praecepta* as he can deduce whatever action is required in a given situation from first principles, i.e. *decreta* (e.g. *Ep.* 94.8). For the special pertinence of *praecepta* to beginners/progressors, see Schafer 2009: 109–10, Inwood 2005: 110–11, 115–19, Kidd 1978: 254.

⁶ *Ep.* 94.50: *interim etiam imperfecto sed proficiente* [in contrast to the *perfectus*, mentioned in the previous sentence] *demonstranda est in rebus agendis via. ... inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necessarium est aliquem praere: ‘hoc vitabis, hoc facies.’*

against the precepts of the crowd" (§52). Seneca also calls this person a "guard" (*custos*, §55), whose job is to repel hearsay and contradict what the crowd praises. Thanks to this guard's frequent "warnings" (*monitiones*), he says, the groundless opinions that echo around us are driven off.⁷ By using the first person plural here, Seneca includes not only his nominal addressee Lucilius among the beneficiaries of the *praeceptor's* advice, but also himself and "us," the wider readership of his letters. In Seneca's presentation, "we" are ourselves beginners or progressors who require someone more advanced to show the way, lest we go astray. Seneca further explains how "the crowd," or people in general, produce and disseminate erroneous evaluations and thereby inculcate vice in those not philosophically advanced or strong enough to resist (§§53–5). It is an orthodox Stoic position that the opinions of "the crowd" are vicious and morally ill-grounded; Seneca typically affirms this position by lamenting the value that most people ascribe to riches, beauty, the pleasures of wine and sex, the prestige of holding office, and the like.⁸ From a Stoic perspective, these things are "indifferents" – regarded as neither morally good nor bad in and of themselves, hence whatever advantage or disadvantage they confer is morally insignificant. In §59 Seneca reiterates these points about the crowd's opinions, saying that it is necessary (sc. for the beginner or progressor) to be advised (*admoneri*), to have an "advocate" (*advocatus*) of good mind and, amidst the din of falsehoods, to hear only that person's voice. This voice, he says, will whisper wholesome words when you are deafened by the uproar of *ambitio* – the desire to hold public office and gain prominence in affairs of state.⁹

It is here, where Seneca questions the value of *ambitio* and of the offices and prestige that it pursues, and implicitly criticizes "the crowd's" positive evaluation of these things, that Seneca embarks, somewhat surreptitiously, on his critique of conventional exemplary morality. For the "crowd" or *populus* is nothing other than the Roman community at large,

⁷ Ep. 94.52: *interim omissis argumentis nonne apparet opus esse nobis aliquo avvocato qui contra populi praecepta praecipiat?* 55: *sit ergo aliquis custos et aurem subinde pervellat abigatque rumores et reclamet populis laudantibus ... itaque monitionibus crebris opiniones quae nos circumsonant repellantur.*

⁸ See Bellincioni's (1979) comments *ad locc.* On how we go wrong following the judgments of "the many" or "the crowd," see *Epp.* 75.15, 99.16–17, 123.6; *Vit.* 1.3–4; also Bartsch 2006: 196–8, with further references.

⁹ Ep. 94.59: *necessarium itaque admoneri est, habere aliquem advocatum bonae mentis et in tanto fremitu tumultuque falsorum unam denique audire vocem. quae erit illa vox? ea scilicet quae tibi tantis clamoribus ambitionis exurdato salubria insusurret verba.* Note again that the reader, now addressed in the second person singular (*tibi*), is still being assimilated to the beginner/progressor who needs the *praeceptor's* instruction.

or a representative subset of it, which evaluates actions it observes in terms of the benefit it deems those actions to confer upon itself – the second operation of exemplarity. Meanwhile, those who harvest the fruit of their *ambitio* and gain prominence in affairs of state by holding high office, military commands, and the like, are especially well-represented among the exemplary figures examined in this book. Yet the Stoic *praeceptor*, according to Seneca, is supposed to caution the philosophical beginner/progressor against "the crowd's" false valuations of the fruits of *ambitio*. Starting in §60, Seneca himself takes on the *praeceptorial* voice and provides this very caution. First he exhorts his charge – Lucilius, or "you," the putative moral progressor – not to envy those whom the *populus* calls "great" and "fortunate" (*magni felicesque*), nor to allow a person wearing purple and accompanied by lictors (symbols of political office and power) to cause you to despise your own equanimity. This exhortation itself seems to constitute the "precepts against the precepts of the crowd," mentioned above. For the *praeceptor* is urging his charge not to follow the alleged majority view that considers the pursuit and attainment of political office as a good to be accorded high value and praise.

The *praeceptor* then shifts to a discussion of military commanders (§61). For a Roman, the flow of thought from office-holding to military achievement is natural. Commanding armies is a traditional responsibility and prerogative of high magistrates, and success as a commander is a source of great prestige, as indicated throughout this book. Yet military glory, like office-holding itself, is morally indifferent from a Stoic perspective, and the *praeceptor* duly rejects it as something to be deemed a moral "good." He declares that many people can lay siege to cities and capture them, command armies and navies, and defeat the enemy, yet these same people cannot overcome vice. Indeed, in a paradoxical reversal of active and passive, they suffer from their vices of covetousness, ambition, and cruelty precisely the same bad consequences that they inflict through these same vices upon the enemy.¹⁰ In short, the *praeceptor* alleges that negative moral qualities, not positive ones, may drive military success.

The *praeceptor* (or Seneca) now adduces a series of exempla to corroborate these general precepts about the crowd's incapacity to assess the moral

¹⁰ Ep. 94.61: *ut vincerent hostem, cupiditate victi sunt. nemo illis venientibus restitit, sed nec ipsi ambitioni crudelitatisque restiterant; tunc cum agere alios visi sunt, agebantur*. On the active/passive dynamic, see Bellincioni 1979 *ad loc.*

significance of military success and the moral condition of victors.¹¹ He begins with Alexander the Great (*Ep.* 94.62–3):

(62) A mad passion for devastating other people's land drove unfortunate Alexander (*infelicem Alexandrum*) and hurled him into the unknown ... he took away from each people what was best about them: he bid Sparta to serve, and Athens to be silent ... he spreads his weapons all over the world. In the manner of huge beasts that bite off more than hunger requires, his cruelty nowhere grows exhausted and stops. (63) Already he has put many kingdoms together into one, already the Greeks and Persians fear the same man ... yet he proceeds beyond Ocean and the sun, disdains to turn his victory aside from the path of Hercules and Liber, and readies violence against nature itself. Assuredly he doesn't want to go, but he cannot stand still.¹²

Alexander neatly exemplifies all the *praeceptor* had said via precepts in §§60–1. The *praeceptor* had advised us not to envy those whom the crowd calls *magni felicesque*, “great and fortunate.” Alexander is *Magnus*, “the Great,” by definition. Here he is also preemptively declared “unfortunate” (*infelix*), on the ground that the vice *furor* drove him on (*agebat*). Thus he is unmistakably identified as a specific instance of the type of figure whom the crowd wrongly admires, which the *praeceptor* previously described in general terms. Alexander was of course renowned for his successes as a military commander, duly enumerated here, and to a lesser extent for his statesmanship, which is perhaps referenced by the clause “he put many kingdoms together into one.” Thus he falls into the category of people, mentioned in the precepts, who wield political power and win military victories. Yet the *praeceptor* insists that vices, not virtues, underpinned these achievements. He says that cruelty like that of giant beasts motivated Alexander's insatiable hunger for conquest. He also exhibited a kind of political perversity – making slaves of Spartans; silencing the Athenians; causing Greeks and Persians to fear the same man, thus making allies out of these stereotypical enemies – which may help explain his later, even more perverse desire to transgress the bounds of nature itself. Concluding

¹¹ For exempla conjoined with precepts in paraenetic contexts, see e.g. Sen. *Marc.* 2.1: *scio a praeceptis incipere omnis qui monere aliquem volunt, in exemplis desinere* (note that exempla are here said to share the *monitio* function that is central to *praecepta* in general); see ch. 0.5.2. For scholarly discussion of exempla, *praecepta*, and paraenesis see Schafer 2009: 85–91, Hachmann 1995: 80–1, Mayer 1991: 165–7, Cancik 1967: 22–7.

¹² *Ep.* 94.62: *agebat infelicem Alexandrum furor aliena vastandi et ad ignota mittebat ... quod cuique optimum est eripit, Lacedaemona servire iubet, Athenas tacere ... toto orbe arma circumfert, nec subsistit usquam lassa crudelitas inmanium ferarum modo quae plus quam exigit fames mordent.* (63) *iam in unum regnum multa regna coniecit, iam Graeci Persaeque eundem timent ... it tamen ultra oceanum solemque, indignatur ab Herculis Liberique vestigiis victoriam flectere, ipsi naturae vim parat. non ille ire vult, sed non potest stare.*

the exemplum, the *praeceptor* declares that Alexander himself did not wish to go so far, but could not stand (*non potest stare*, sc. against *furor* and other vicious impulses) – driving home the point that his vices inflicted upon him what he inflicted upon others. Successful commander though he was, Alexander could not command himself. As such he displays the vicious impulses and the active/passive reversal of which the preceding precepts spoke.¹³

As a second exemplum of the crowd's inability to assess correctly the moral status of successful commanders, the *praeceptor* adduces Pompey the Great – the other canonical *Magnus* (*Ep.* 94.64–5):

(64) Nor was it *virtus* or reason that urged wars foreign and civil upon Gnaeus Pompeius, but an insane love of false greatness (*magnitudo falsa*). At one moment he was rushing off to Spain and Sertorius' weapons, at another moment to restraining the pirates and pacifying the seas: these reasons furnished pretexts for holding power without interruption. (65) What drew him to Africa, or to the north, or against Mithridates and Armenia and all corners of Asia? Evidently, an unbounded lust for growing larger (*infinita cupido crescendi*), when only to himself did he seem insufficiently "great" (*magnus*).¹⁴

With a series of verbal plays on the cognomen *Magnus*, the *praeceptor* presents Pompey's military and perhaps political career as unified by a vicious lust for size and for "growing larger." The *praeceptor* insists that it was vices, not any admirable quality like *virtus* or *ratio*, that launched Pompey on his wars external and civil, and drove him to conquer in every direction on land and sea. Pompey's monumental cognomen is thus revalued pejoratively as indicating the scale of his vices, rather than approbatively indicating the scale of his military achievements, as the usual dynamics of exemplarity would lead "the crowd" to imagine.¹⁵ Indeed, the word *virtus*, as Seneca here deploys it, has a double-voiced quality that underscores the *praeceptor's* message. For in its juxtaposition with the word "wars" (*bella*,

¹³ Seneca usually, though not always, judges Alexander negatively: Bellincioni 1979 *ad loc.*

¹⁴ *Ep.* 94.64: *ne Gnaeus quidem Pompeio externa bella ac domestica virtus aut ratio suadebat, sed insanus amor magnitudinis falsae. modo in Hispaniam et Sertoriana arma, modo ad colligandos piratas ac maria pacanda vadebat: hae praeterebantur causae ad continuandam potentiam.* (65) *quid illum in Africam, quid in septentrionem, quid in Mithridaten et Armeniam et omnis Asiae angulos traxit? infinita scilicet cupido crescendi, cum sibi uni parum magnus videretur.*

¹⁵ One might also expect some reference to Pompey's magistracies, to align this exemplum with the devaluation of office-holding articulated in the precepts of §60. The phrase *ad continuandam potentiam* may allude to the magisterial side of his career, i.e. his consulships, triumviral power, and the extraordinary commands he received one after another (of which Seneca is aware, and discusses at *Ben.* 5.16.4).

just preceding), *virtus* seems to carry its traditional military sense of “valor in combat,” and focalizes “the crowd’s” view of Pompey as an admirable and successful commander displayed the commander’s traditional virtue. But in its juxtaposition with “reason” (*ratio*, just following), *virtus* takes on a philosophical flavor – in particular its Stoic meaning of “consistency of character,” discussed in chapter 8.3 below. It is this specifically Stoic sort of *virtus* that the *praeceptor* denies to Pompey, the lack of which makes it possible to aver that Pompey was carried headlong by vices. By this crypto-redefinition of *virtus*, the *praeceptor* deftly depreciates “the crowd’s” judgment and strips Pompey of his central claim to social value – his success as a commander – in one stroke. Pompey too, then, instantiates the precepts given in §§60–1 denying the validity of the crowd’s conventionally positive judgment of magistrates and commanders, and asserting that these figures are more plausibly driven by vices than by virtues.

The *praeceptor* finally adduces Caesar and Marius as additional exempla of the viciousness of famous commanders (§65–6), polemically attributing their political and military successes to *ambitio* and *gloria* (in the negative sense of “lust for reputation,” obviously pursued and assigned on the wrong moral basis¹⁶) rather than to *virtus*. Wrapping up (§67), he reiterates that the active/passive dynamic mentioned among the precepts (§61) applies to all four of these exempla: as these generals shake up everything, so they are shaken up themselves (*concuterent/concutiebantur*); like tornadoes they whirl up everything but are first whirled themselves (*convolvunt/volvuntur*); their force is so great because they cannot control themselves; the evil they do to others redounds upon themselves. And as a parting shot at the alleged judgments of the crowd, the *praeceptor* bids his addressee not to suppose that anyone can become “fortunate” (*felix*) through someone else’s misfortune (*infelicitas*).¹⁷

In the following section the *praeceptor* reflects more generally on the revaluation of “morally good” to “morally bad” that he has carried out via the preceding examples. This reflection is itself couched in deontic language, and so takes the form of a string of precepts directed to “us” as readers no less than to his addressee Lucilius (*Ep.* 94.68):

All such exempla that are forced into our eyes and ears must be unwoven, and our breast which is full of evil speech must be emptied. *Virtus* must be brought into that [sc. previously] occupied space, to root out falsehoods and

¹⁶ For *gloria* wrongly pursued and assigned – which Stoics would therefore deem a vice – see ch. 5.3.3.

¹⁷ §67: *non est quod credas quemquam fieri aliena infelicitate felicem.*

accepted opinions that are contrary to the truth, and to separate us from the *populus* in which we trust too much and restore us to unblemished opinions.¹⁸

The "evil speech" and "falsehoods and opinions contrary to truth," which the *praeceptor*/Seneca says derive from (misinterpreted) exempla of the sort just narrated, evidently issue from, and are forced into our eyes and ears by, the *populus*. Hence we must empty our breasts of such speech, separate ourselves from the *populus*, and "unweave" or "unjoin" (*retexere*) the exempla. This slightly puzzling expression seems to mean, specifically, to break the link whereby positive moral value (e.g. the judgment that someone is *magnus*, or *felix*, or displayed *virtus*) is ascribed on the basis of observed success in the military and political spheres. This ascription, allegedly normal among the *populus*, is indeed characteristic of the "observing and judging" operation of conventional exemplarity (operations 1 and 2, as described in chapter 0.3.1–2). By arguing in the cases of the "Great" generals Alexander and Pompey that vices may or do underpin such success, the *praeceptor* tries to break this characteristic link (hence *exempla retexere*). The *virtus* and the "unblemished opinions" (*sincerae opinioniones*) that will be introduced in their stead will turn out to have Stoic coloring, as we shall see.¹⁹ With his deconstruction of what he presents as the usual way moral value is ascribed to successful generals, Seneca is illustrating a *process* of revaluation – a severing of the link between observed action and ascribed value that characterizes conventional exemplarity, and the forging of new links that are sounder from a Stoic point of view.

Seneca's critique of the moral dimension of conventional exemplarity strikingly fails, however, to extend to its rhetorical dimension. For this critique is itself couched in, and derives its persuasive force from, the conventional rhetoric of exemplarity. To review, the passage of *Ep.* 94 analyzed over the past several pages opens with general precepts about the unreliability of the crowd's moral judgments, and the actual viciousness

¹⁸ §68: *omnia ista exempla quae oculis atque auribus nostris ingeruntur retexenda sunt, et plenum malis sermonibus pectus exhauriendum; inducenda in occupatum locum virtus, quae mendacia et contra verum placentia extirpet, quae nos a populo cui nimis credimus separet ac sinceris opinionibus reddat.*

¹⁹ A Stoic might argue that the military and political achievements of these four generals (and other such figures) are defensible as "proper functions" (*kathekonta*) – actions appropriate to and justifiable in terms of the social roles these figures are discharging. But Stoics also contend that proper functions can be discharged accidentally, spurred by a vice rather than a virtue. Seneca's stress on the vices that motivated these generals' actions may suggest that this is his angle (indeed, Seneca says in *Ep.* 95.65 that Posidonius was concerned to describe each virtue and vice exactly, so that those that were similar could be told apart: Kidd 1988: 650–1, Bellincioni 1979 *ad loc.*). In fact, however, he does not seem to concede even that their actions are "proper," let alone virtuous. On proper functions and social roles, see Long/Sedley 1987: 1.427–8 and Reydam-Schils 2005: 59–69 (who discusses the roles associated with amicable, affiliative relationships rather than hostile ones).

of performers – military commanders in particular – whom the crowd deems virtuous (§§60–1); these precepts are then illustrated with specific instances of commanders wrongly deemed virtuous by the crowd (§§61–6); these instances in turn are followed by a recapitulation of the general statements that preceded the examples (§§67–8). One could hardly ask for a more transparent instance of conventional exemplary rhetoric – a general statement supported by a list of illustrative instances – as described in chapter 0.5.1 and observed elsewhere in this book. In short, Seneca blithely deploys exempla in an illustrative mode, manifesting the logical and rhetorical framework of conventional exemplarity and relying on the persuasive force that framework provides, in support of an argument *against* deploying exempla injunctively, as providing morally sound norms or models, within the moral framework of conventional exemplarity. Thus Seneca decouples conventional exemplary rhetoric from conventional exemplary morality, and turns the former against the latter.

Returning to Seneca's critique, the moral framework of exemplarity projects that any witness to a performance, whether primary or secondary, may himself or herself eventually seek to imitate or emulate that performance – operation 4 as described in chapter 0.3.4. Seneca is alert to this possibility. Toward the end of *Ep.* 94 he considers how “we,” his own readers, may become performers in our own right, with our actions subject in turn to witnessing and evaluation by others. In Seneca's imagining of this situation, however, the moral dynamics of exemplary evaluation are precisely inverted. For Seneca suggests (§69) that “we” should withdraw from the city to the countryside, to avoid the people he styles “encouragers of madness” (*hortatores insaniae*). To be amidst the crowd, with its incorrect values, encourages our vices: when we observe others (wrongly) ascribing positive moral value to “indifferents” like purple clothing and gold tableware, we will pursue such things ourselves due to “peer pressure” as we seek these people's approval. Yet nobody, Seneca declares, engages in such display in the absence of witnesses (i.e. without a judging audience); hence withdrawal from the city and the “crowd” present there removes our stimulus to vice.²⁰ Now, one premise of conventional exemplarity is that the community's evaluative gaze attracts social actors who perform under that

²⁰ This paraphrase condenses *Ep.* 94.69–70: *magna pars sanitatis est hortatores insaniae reliquisse et ex isto coitu invicem noxio procul abisse ... non est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo nec frugalitatem docent rura, sed ubi testis ac spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt ... (70) quis eam quam nulli ostenderet induit purpuram? quis posuit secretam in auro dapem? ... nemo oculis suis lautus est, ne paucorum quidem aut familiarium, sed apparatus vitiorum suorum pro modo turbae spectantis expandit.* Similarly *Ep.* 99.16–17, *Tranq.* 15.6.

gaze, hoping to be judged positively and to gain praise within the community. Seneca agrees that the community’s gaze is attractive to us, and that we are enticed to pursue what the community (Seneca’s “crowd”) values as we seek its approval. But in Seneca’s view, the community/“crowd” incorrectly evaluates the actions it observes because it misunderstands the nature and location of moral value. Anyone subject to its evaluative gaze and seeking its approval will therefore be inspired to perform vicious deeds, not virtuous ones. Hence the imperative to withdraw from that vice-inculcating gaze and seek a morally salutary rural isolation. Seneca draws here upon a traditional dichotomy between city and countryside that ascribes negative moral value to urban pursuits and positive moral value to activities associated with the rural villa – namely farming, and the *otium* that facilitates literary and philosophical activity. Yet Seneca gives that old dichotomy a novel philosophical twist, for he rearticulates it in terms of the presence or absence of a communal evaluative gaze, and thereby enlists it on the side of Stoic ethics against conventional exemplary morality.

But this is still not the end. If one cannot withdraw from the city and the gaze of the many, then one should keep a *monitor* close at hand, to contradict and correct the false valuations that din around one.²¹ As noted above, “advising” or “reminding” is a central aspect of the overall preceptorial function. The *monitor* thus appears to be none other than the *praeceptor* with his “advising” aspect picked out in this particular social context. This *monitor* will not only help us to judge the actions we observe “correctly” (i.e. employing Stoic ethics), but will also, implicitly, serve as an authoritative judge to our own performances: we will not try to please the crowd, knowing that so doing will incur our *monitor*’s disapproval (see further ch. 8.4 below). Hence the moral authority of the community’s judgment in conventional exemplarity is replaced, in Stoic ethics, by the moral authority of just one (properly trained) person’s judgment.

8.3 The “Insufficient Evidence” Critique

I turn next to Seneca’s *Ep.* 120, in which he develops most fully his second major critique of conventional exemplary morality. I call this the “insufficient evidence” critique. Seneca arrives at this critique via a longer path in which he elaborates a Stoic theory of concept formation. He opens the

²¹ *Ep.* 94.72: *itaque si in medio urbium fremitu conlocati sumus, stet ad latus monitor et contra laudatores ingentium patrimoniorum laudet parvo divitem et usu opes metientem. contra illos qui gratiam ac potentiam attollunt otium ipse suspiciat traditum litteris et animum ab externis ad sua reversionem.*

letter by reporting that Lucilius has posed him a question: how have we acquired the concept of “the good” (*bonum*) and “the honorable” (*honestum*)?²² Lucilius speaks to Seneca as one who recognizes that he has already acquired these concepts, but cannot reconstruct how. Seneca’s exposition of the process of acquisition, consequently, is cast entirely in the past tense: he describes a process that unfolds over time but entirely prior to the current moment. Broadly speaking, he argues that we acquired this knowledge through a two-stage process. In the first stage, we gained a rough sense of the concepts by observing or otherwise learning about the actions of others, and by judging those actions. This stage, as Seneca describes it, is virtually identical with exemplary morality as discussed throughout this book: there is a strong focus on the dynamics of witnessing, judging, and norm setting. The second stage involves revision of the impressions gained in the first stage, based on a recognition of certain inadequacies; it is specifically here that Seneca offers his (second) critique of conventional exemplary morality.

Seneca begins by offering definitions of *bonum* and *honestum* (§§2–3) that make his Stoic moral frame explicit. He defines *bonum*, “the good,” by means of a “utility” criterion, and defines *honestum*, “the honorable,” as that for which an account can be given as to why it is the right thing to do. Both definitions are in the mainstream of Stoic understanding.²³ He then turns to concept formation, his main topic (*Ep.* 120.3–4):

(3) Now, therefore, I return to the matter about which you desire discussion, how the initial concept of the good and honorable reached us. (4) ... We [sc. Stoics] believe that the observation and comparison among themselves of deeds frequently done has produced [sc. this concept]; our school judges that both the honorable and good have been comprehended through analogy.²⁴

Seneca claims that the Stoic position, with which he affiliates himself and concurs (*nobis, nostri*), is that we grasp the good and the honorable by

²² *Ep.* 120.1: *epistula tua ... hanc [sc. quaestiunculam] expediri desiderat, quomodo ad nos boni honestique notitia pervenerit*. For scholarly discussion of Stoic ideas of concept formation as presented in this letter, see Inwood 2007: 322–32, 2005: 283–99; also Schafer 2009: 91–2.

²³ *Ep.* 120.2: *bonum putant esse aliqui id quod utile est ... honestum putant cui ratio recti officii constat*. On these definitions and the relationship between the terms, see Inwood 2005: 283–4; also *Ep.* 118.8–12 with Inwood 2007: 310–14, 323. On “the good” in Stoicism more generally, see Long/Sedley 1987: 1.374–6.

²⁴ *Ep.* 120.3: *nunc ergo ad id revertor de quo desideras dici, quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit*. (4) ... *nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se conlatio; per analogiam nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant*.

"analogizing" from our observation and comparison of deeds done. He describes the analogical process as follows (§§4–5):

(4) I will explain what this "analogy" is. (5) We had experience of bodily health: from this we inferred that there is also a kind of health of the mind. We had experience of bodily strength: from this we gathered that there is also strength of the mind. Certain benevolent deeds, certain humane ones, certain brave ones left us awestruck: these we began to admire as though they were complete/perfect (*tamquam perfecta*). Underneath those deeds were many vices, which the appearance and splendor of any particular noteworthy deed concealed: to these we turned a blind eye. Nature bids us to magnify what is praiseworthy; there is no one who has not praised glory beyond what is true. From these things, then, we took in the outward appearance of a great good.²⁵

This exposition reveals two dimensions to the process of "analogizing." The first is that we extrapolated the character of what was abstract or invisible from what was concrete and visible: qualities of mind from qualities of body; moral qualities of the actor from the splendid appearance of the deeds he performs. The second is that we generalized from particular observations to draw conclusions about the whole: we observed certain deeds that manifested particular virtues (*aliqua benigna, humana, fortia*), were duly impressed, and admired them "as though they were perfect/complete," *tamquam perfecta*. *Perfecta* here, as earlier, seems to bear its Stoic meaning of "containing all the virtues," not just the observed ones.²⁶ Meanwhile, *tamquam* underscores the analogical character of this reasoning: we do not actually observe any actions that manifest all the virtues, but we infer what such actions look like by (it seems) mentally combining the characteristics of the various observed actions that manifest particular virtues. On Seneca's telling, then, the process by which we acquire the concepts *bonum* and *honestum* begins with familiar exemplary morality – categorizing individual actions we observe as instances of particular virtues or vices – supplemented by the additional step of imagining a "perfect" action that combines all the virtues.

Seneca now adduces two specific exempla: Gaius Fabricius and Horatius Cocles. Horatius, as discussed in chapter 1, may be considered the

²⁵ Ep. 120.4: *quae sit haec analogia dicam. (5) noveramus corporis sanitatem: ex hac cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus vires corporis: ex his collegimus esse et animi robur. aliqua benigna facta, aliqua humana, aliqua fortia nos obstupescerant: haec coepimus tamquam perfecta mirari. suberant illis multa vitia quae species conspicui alicuius facti fulgorque celabat: haec dissimulavimus. natura iubet augere laudanda, nemo non gloriam ultra verum tulit. ex his ergo speciem ingentis boni traximus.*

²⁶ As it more clearly does in §11, discussed below; see also Long/Sedley 1987: 2.367.

exemplary exemplum in the canon of Roman republican heroes; Fabricius is almost equally hoary. By appending these exempla directly to a general, theoretical discussion of the process of analogizing, Seneca once again – via the standard rhetoric of exemplarity – invites his reader to suppose that these exempla will illustrate that process. His treatment of these exempla is central to my argument, so I quote it in full (§§6–8):

Fabricius rejected king Pyrrhus' gold, judging it greater than royal power to be able to despise royal wealth. Also, when Pyrrhus' physician promised he would give the king poison, Fabricius warned Pyrrhus to beware of treachery. It was indicative of the same character not to be defeated by gold, and not to be victorious by poison. We marveled at this great man, who was swayed neither by promises of the king nor promises against the king, holding on firmly to good precedent, doing no wrong in war (which is very difficult), who believed there were things one mustn't do even to an enemy, who in extreme poverty – which he had made into an ornament for himself – recoiled from wealth no less than from poison. "Live, Pyrrhus, by my gift," he said, "and rejoice in what you have up to now been deploring, that Fabricius cannot be bought." (7) Horatius Cocles filled up the narrows of the bridge by himself, and ordered that his way back be removed from behind, provided only that the enemy be deprived of passage. He long resisted those pressing him, until the beams, wrenched apart, collapsed with a huge crash. After looking back and perceiving that, through his own danger, his fatherland was out of danger, he said, "If anyone wishes to follow me going *this* way, let him come," and hurled himself headlong. In that swift channel of the river he was no less concerned to come out with his arms than to come out alive; retaining the ornament of his victorious weapons, he returned as safely as if he come by way of the bridge. (8) These and similar deeds have shown us the likeness of *virtus*.²⁷

Seneca's narrative of these deeds puts all four operations of conventional exemplarity on display. Each actor's public performance is judged to display a moral virtue: "harmlessness" (*innocentia*) and incorruptibility

²⁷ Ep. 120.6: *Fabricius Pyrrhi regis aurum reppulit maiusque regno iudicavit regias opes posse contemnere. idem medico Pyrrhi promittente venenum se regi daturum monuit Pyrrhum caveret insidias. eiusdem animi fuit auro non vinci, veneno non vincere. admirati sumus ingentem virum quem non regis, non contra regem promissa flexissent, boni exempli tenacem, quod difficillimum est, in bello innocentem, qui aliquod esse crederet etiam in hostes nefas, qui in summa paupertate quam sibi decus fecerat non aliter refugit divitias quam venenum. 'vive' inquit 'beneficio meo, Pyrrhe, et gaude quod adhuc dolebas, Fabricium non posse corrumpi.'* (7) *Horatius Cocles solus implevit pontis angustias adimique a tergo sibi reditum, dummodo iter hosti auferretur, iussit et tam diu prementibus restitit donec revulsa ingenti ruina tigna sonuerunt. postquam respexit et extra periculum esse patriam periculo suo sensit, 'veniat, si quis vult' inquit 'sic euntem sequi' iecitque se in praeceps et non minus sollicitus in illo rapido alveo fluminis ut armatus quam ut salvus exiret, retento armorum victricium decore tam tutus redit quam si ponte venisset. (8) haec et eiusmodi facta imaginem nobis ostendere virtutis.*

during wartime in Fabricius' case, and military valor in Horatius'. Judging audiences are implicitly or explicitly adduced in each case. "We" are, or were, witnesses marveling at Fabricius' deed (*admirati sumus*) – "we" presumably still being, as before, analogizers or beginning moral reasoners. The "we" who marvel may be a primary or a secondary audience to this deed: at this point what matters is that this audience observes and judges positively (perhaps overly so, as we shall see).²⁸ Even Pyrrhus, addressed directly in Fabricius' self-exemplifying quotation, is marshaled as a witness to Fabricius' performance, and invited to approve it (*gaude*). Horatius too has witnesses to his deed: not only "us" readers who encounter his performance through this text, but also the enemy whom he invites to pursue him into the river, should they care to imitate his leap – "imitate me" being a conspicuously self-exemplifying utterance. And finally, Seneca points to monuments by which these heroes' valorous deeds and admirable virtues are commemorated. Seneca has provided each with a laudatory narrative (quoted above), and further notes that each has a *decus* – a concrete, honorific commemorative token monumentalizing the deeds. In Fabricius' case, the *decus* is his poverty (*in summo paupertate quam sibi decus fecerat*), while for Horatius it is the weapons and armor that he managed to hold on to both during his defensive fight on the bridge and during his leap and swim in the river (*retento armorum victricium decore*). Thus these narratives show judging audiences being present and active, virtues being ascribed, monuments being created, and imitation being invited (in Horatius' case). This is conventional exemplarity of the sort discussed throughout this book.

The moral fruit of this discourse, however, is not altogether satisfactory. For when Seneca concludes that "these and similar deeds showed us a likeness of virtue" (*haec et eiusmodi facta imaginem nobis ostendere virtutis*, §8), he seems to hint with the word "likeness," *imago* (as also with the word "outward appearance," *species*, §5) that these are *only* impressions, derived from our analogizing activity. They do not imply direct access to the concepts of *bonum*, *honestum*, or *virtus* as such. In the subsequent sections Seneca pursues this idea further. He explains that evils sometimes provide the outward semblance of the honorable, and that certain virtues and vices are similar enough to masquerade as one another – for example, generosity and prodigality. Such likenesses compel us to look closely (*adattendere*),

²⁸ Our "marveling" at these deeds (*admirati sumus*, §6) may exemplify the more general statement of how fine-appearing deeds "left us awestruck" (*obstupefecerant*, §5) – in both cases, suggesting a blunting of critical faculties in the face of compelling spectacle, and a willingness to ignore evidence inconsistent with our impression.

in order to distinguish things that are apparently (*specie*) neighbors but in fact (*re*) are widely separated.²⁹ These observations recapitulate aspects of Seneca's analysis in *Ep.* 94, where he contends that vices, not virtues, spurred the four famous generals to accomplish their superficially admirable deeds. In the current letter, however, this argument takes on a further dimension. Seneca is instructing us not to be impressed by showy surfaces but to probe critically in quest of those potentially lurking vices. For if we overlook vices, we assign the wrong value to actions and their performers. Thus Seneca is adumbrating a way of moving beyond the analogizing stage with its limitations, and achieving a more sophisticated and philosophically sound moral understanding.

Seneca goes on to describe this second, more advanced stage of concept formation and the evolved process of moral evaluation associated with it (§§9–11):

(9) While we observed those whom an outstanding deed had made notable, we began to remark who had done some deed with noble spirit and great energy, but only once. This man we saw to be brave in war, but faint-hearted in the forum; enduring poverty with good spirit, but ill-repute abjectly: we praised the deed but despised the man. (10) Another man we saw being benevolent toward his friends, mild toward his enemies, performing his public and private duties piously and conscientiously ... moreover he was always the same and self-consistent in all his conduct, no longer deliberately "good" but brought by habituation to the point that he was not only able to act rightly, but could act in no way except rightly. (11) We comprehended that in him virtue was complete/perfect. ... From what, then, have we comprehended virtue? What displays it to us is the man's regularity, propriety, consistency, the harmony of all his actions among themselves, and a greatness elevating itself above all things.³⁰

²⁹ Sen. *Ep.* 120.8–9 (underlined words and phrases suggest deceptive appearances): *adiciam quod mirum fortasse videatur: mala interdum speciem honesti obtulere et optimum ex contrario enituit. sunt enim, ut scis, virtutibus vitia confinia, et perditis quoque ac turpibus recti similitudo est: sic mentitur prodigum liberalem ... imitatur negligentia facilitatem, temeritas fortitudinem. haec nos similitudo coegit attendere et distinguere specie quidem vicina, re autem plurimum inter se dissidentia.* Cf. *Ep.* 95.65.

³⁰ *Ep.* 120.9: *dum observamus eos quos insignes egregium opus fecerat, coepimus adnotare quis rem aliquam generoso animo fecisset et magno impetu, sed semel. hunc vidimus in bello fortem, in foro timidum, animose paupertatem ferentem, humiliter infamiam: factum laudavimus, contempsimus virum. (10) alium vidimus adversus amicos benignum, adversus inimicos temperatum, et publica et privata sancte ac religiose administrantem ... praeterea idem erat semper et in omni actu par sibi, iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus ut non tantum recte facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset. (11) intelleximus in illo perfectam esse virtutem ... ex quo ergo virtutem intelleximus? ostendit illam nobis ordo eius et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens sese.*

The narrative continues in the past tense, but Seneca marks this new stage with a *dum* clause and a verb of beginning (*coepimus*): while engaged in analogizing, we *began* to notice something we had not noticed before. Specifically, we began to notice with what frequency someone's actions displayed virtues, and whether they sometimes also displayed vices. Here Seneca introduces a diachronic dimension, in which we observe an actor over time and we judge a series of actions, not just one. By way of example, he posits a man whom we saw to be brave in battle but timid in political life, and a man who endured poverty with fortitude but wilted when spoken ill of. These scenarios seem to glance back to Horatius and Fabricius, the exempla of military valor and fortitude in poverty previously adduced. The vices he pairs with their virtues are purely hypothetical, for nothing in the stories of either figure supports these ascriptions.³¹ Yet Seneca's aim is not to overturn the conventionally positive judgments on the famous deeds of Horatius and Fabricius in particular (which may be why he does not name them here), but rather to assert more generally that one or two glorious deeds by themselves provide insufficient evidence of the moral condition of the actor's soul or mind (*animus*). Recall that the analogizer, engaged in conventional exemplary discourse, simply marveled at a few showy deeds (*obstupefecerant, admirati sumus*, §§5–6). Now, Seneca suggests, we have moved to a higher level of moral sophistication: we have come to recognize that, to make defensible evaluations of an actor's moral status overall, we must observe his or her conduct in multiple arenas over an extended period. A virtue may be displayed once in one arena, but a vice is displayed in another arena; we have to observe long enough to see and judge the actor in both arenas.³²

Ideally, what this longer process of observation will reveal is consistency (§10): virtuous performance of every action over time, and a consistent

³¹ Seneca in fact stresses the consistency of Fabricius' two actions: *eiusdem animi fuit auro non vinci, veneno non vincere* (similarly at *Prov.* 3.6, where slightly more information about him is given). Since consistency is the mark of the Stoic sage (see below), Seneca may be disposing his reader to think especially well of Fabricius. Furthermore Fabricius is not subject to the active/passive reversals that characterize the vice-ridden commanders in *Ep.* 94.61 (ch. 8.2 and n. 10): while they conquered and were conquered, he is neither conquered nor conquers. Nevertheless, one can posit that vices may be present in other dimensions of his life. On whether Horatius might ever have stood for high office, which would entail activity in the forum, see ch. 1.2.3. The texts addressing this possibility, however, give no indication of *timiditas*.

³² This argument is a new development of his assertion in §5 that the appearance and splendor of noteworthy deeds concealed underlying vices. His claim is now not that vices actually motivated those great deeds (as he contends in *Ep.* 94.60–8, ch. 8.2 above), but only that vices are visible in the performer's other actions. This argument also differs from the claim earlier in this letter (§§8–9) that vices and virtues may resemble one another.

bearing in every situation (*semper idem, par sibi, ordo, constantia, concordia*). Consistency in right action allows us legitimately to infer the presence of “complete” or “perfect” virtue – the presence of all the virtues – in the actor (*intelleximus in illo perfectam esse virtutem*). This is no longer the mere “as though” perfection available to the analogizer (*tamquam perfecta*, §5), nor the “likeness” of virtue that the exempla of Fabricius and Horatius provide (*imago virtutis*, §8), but the real thing, legitimately known (*intelleximus ... perfectam ... virtutem*). This is *virtus* in full Stoic raiment as “consistency of character,” a broad overall quality extending far beyond the narrow, traditional concept of *virtus* as “valor in battle” with which we began in our analogizing stage.³³ The person who has attained it is none other than the Stoic sage, whose characteristics Seneca further describes in subsequent portions of the letter (§§II–I4, 18–22).

In this letter, then, Seneca presents the beginning moral agent, the analogizer, as one whose morality is largely framed by the practices and thought patterns of conventional exemplarity. Seneca acknowledges the necessity of starting this way, but deems this level of moral knowledge insufficient. It is valid, he agrees, to make inferences about an actor’s moral state by observing his deeds. But such inferences are well-grounded only when many actions in different arenas have been observed, and classified as virtuous or vicious, over a period of time. The moral discourse of conventional exemplarity, with its focus on the individual deed and that deed’s relationship to the community’s values, does not automatically meet this standard for well-groundedness. Fabricius and Horatius, Seneca’s exemplary exempla, are cases in point: their one or two famous deeds, constituting all we know about them (in Seneca’s representation, at least), provide too little information for us to determine their moral status overall. This is true even if we grant that their famous deeds were motivated by virtues not vices, which Seneca seems to grant (or does not query) in this letter but would not necessarily have granted in *Ep.* 94. Lacking a broader database of actions observed over time and in various contexts, we cannot determine with sufficient philosophical rigor whether the good, the honorable, or virtue itself really resides in these figures.

In bringing temporality explicitly into the discussion here – asserting that actions must be observed over time – Seneca opens up the opportunity to consider to what extent his Stoic critique of the moral dimension

³³ For Stoic virtue as “consistency of character,” see Long/Sedley 1987: 1.383. *Virtus* so conceptualized is said to encompass the four cardinal virtues of *temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia*, and *iustitia*, as Seneca makes clear in §11: see Inwood 2005: 288–9, Classen 2000: 276–7.

of conventional exemplarity also impacts the historiographical dimension. Brad Inwood has argued, for example, that Fabricius and Horatius fail as exempla in Seneca's view because, being figures from the past, they are not known through the judge's direct experience and observation, which is necessary if that judge's moral inferences are to be well-grounded.³⁴ Is it possible that Seneca is making an epistemological distinction between past figures and contemporaries, deeming the former inherently unjudgable, or less judgable, due to insufficient evidence? Is the past, by its nature, less capable of bearing and transmitting significant moral information than the present? My own view is that Seneca makes no such distinction. Regarding Fabricius and Horatius, he assuredly suggests that we lack the range and number of observations required to support well-grounded moral evaluations of these figures. Their pastness, entailing that contemporary observers cannot add new observations to refine their opinions about these actors, certainly contributes to this problem of insufficient evidence. But it is not decisive. Seneca passes confident moral judgment on other past figures, some of whom are long dead – he presents Cato and Socrates, for example, as Stoic sages, or as close to sages as “real life” can furnish. Even the famous commanders of *Ep.* 94, discussed in chapter 8.2 above, are confidently judged to be vicious, not virtuous, on the basis of a range of actions (evidently sufficiently broad) that are reported in the historical tradition. So while pastness may contribute to moral uncertainty and unknowability, in some cases the historical tradition provides a sufficient density of information about past actors that the Stoic can pass well-grounded moral judgments on them. And there is assuredly no hint of historicism to be found in Seneca's critique – no sense that the reason past actors are difficult to judge is that society and its values have changed. On the contrary: in Stoic morality, as Seneca describes it here, past actors are evaluated according to the same moral categories as contemporary actors. Difficulty arises only when the range of available evidence is deemed insufficient to ground a judgment as to whether virtuous actions have been displayed consistently, in multiple arenas, over time.

8.4 *Exempla and praeceptor*

In letters 94 and 120, then, Seneca delivers a vigorous Stoic attack upon conventional exemplary morality. Exemplary moral discourse,

³⁴ Inwood 2007: 325.

he suggests, may founder on “misjudgment,” when virtues are inferred from actions that are actually motivated by vices; or on “insufficient evidence,” when judges focus on one or two brilliant deeds and omit to consider an actor’s performance at other times and in other dimensions of his life. Yet Seneca by no means rejects exemplarity altogether, in these letters or elsewhere. He makes clear that, if people learn to evaluate correctly and assemble adequate evidence on which to base their evaluations – that is, if they adopt Stoic conceptions of value and standards of evidence – then they can pass valid moral judgments after observing other people’s actions. Those so judged can then serve as morally injunctive exempla providing positive or negative models for others.

Where is the Stoic to find such models? Certain past figures may serve, just as in conventional exemplarity. In particular, Seneca adduces Socrates, Cato, and the leaders of various philosophical schools, among others, as (near-)virtuous figures who can model for us successive stages of philosophical progression. Evidently Seneca thinks that sufficiently plentiful, detailed, and diverse information about these figures exists that well-grounded judgments about their moral status can be passed.³⁵ In *Ep.* 98.13 Seneca particularly emphasizes the normativity of such figures. He adduces examples of past figures who bravely endured various flavors of pain and suffering (“dispreferred” indifferents, not to be valued morally) or who rejected things the crowd incorrectly values. He then writes, “Let us, too, do something with spirit: let us be among the exempla” (i.e. among the sorts of names and actions just mentioned).³⁶ We encounter and learn about these past figures primarily through our reading – i.e. literary texts are the principal monumental form that makes these figures available to us as a secondary audience. Like a conventional social actor in the framework of conventional exemplary morality, then, the Stoic can aspire to enter the canon of (Stoic) exemplary performers by imitating past models encountered in literary texts. We may find the leisure to pursue such reading, if we are aristocrats, at one of our rural villas – another reason to withdraw

³⁵ See e.g. *Ep.* 6.6, 24.3–11, 25.4–6, 95.69–73, 98.12–13, 104.21–2, 27–33, *Prov.* 3.3–14. On taking great philosophers and/or other past figures as one’s models and judges, see Reydam-Schils 2011: 300–2 and Bartsch 2006: 200–2. Inwood 2005: 295 credits the “rich narrative” concerning Cato and Socrates, and their “special status in the philosophical tradition,” with making them available as Stoic exempla. The praise they typically receive in conventional exemplary moral discourse no doubt enhances their *prima facie* credibility as examples of Stoic virtue.

³⁶ *Ep.* 98.13: *nos quoque aliquid et ipsi faciamus animose: simus inter exempla. ... quidquid fieri potuit potest.* Likewise *Ep.* 11.12.

from “the crowd” of the city and seek out better company, paradoxically, in solitude (and in our books).³⁷

The Stoic may also look to his living contemporaries, whose comportment can be observed at first hand and over time, to provide injunctive moral models. In *Ep.* 94.39–40 Seneca recommends that those who have not yet arrived at a “perfect” condition of mind (*perfectum animi statum*, i.e. the mental state that embraces all the virtues) should spend time in the company of “good men.” There is no better way, he says, to clothe one’s soul in what is honorable, or call it back to the right path. He declares, “that [sc. good men] be repeatedly seen and heard has the force of precepts.”³⁸ Of course, no “good men” (*boni viri*) in the strict Stoic sense of “sages” whose virtue is perfect (*sapientes*) are to be found in this world. But Seneca means simply that those who are less advanced should seek out those who are more advanced, who can model for them the next stages of philosophical progress.³⁹ Now, to speak of hearing and observing such people recalls the witnessing and judging operations of conventional exemplary morality, which results in witnesses deriving norms and imitable models from the performances they observe. However, in declaring that one’s model performer is both philosophically more advanced than oneself and that observing this person has “the force of precepts,” Seneca points unambiguously to one figure in particular: the *praeceptor* (or *monitor*) who, as discussed earlier (ch. 8.2 above), will tell us what to do in each situation and keep us from being swayed by the bad opinions of “the crowd.” In suggesting that our *praeceptor* can be our source of norms and imitable actions, Seneca adumbrates a model of Stoic moral exemplarity in which exempla (properly chosen) have the same moral authority and educative effect as precept-giving.⁴⁰ Indeed, in *Ep.* 52 Seneca affirms that we

³⁷ Explicitly at *Ot.* 1.1: *meliores erimus singuli. quid quod secedere ad optimos viros et aliquod exemplum eligere ad quod vitam derigamus licet? quod <nisi> in otio non fit* (similarly *Ep.* 11.9, 25.6–7, *Brev.* 14–15; also *Ep.* 94.72 for the elevated moral status of the person devoted to literature).

³⁸ *Ep.* 94.40: *nulla res magis animis honesta induit dubiosque et in pravam inclinabiles revocat ad rectum quam bonorum virorum conversatio; paulatim enim descendit in pectora et vim praeceptorum obtinet frequenter aspici, frequenter audiri*. Similarly *Ep.* 98.17, 102.30. While Seneca can speak of dead philosophers and other historical figures as being alive and present to the progressor through their writings (e.g. *Ep.* 25.6, 104.21–2, *Brev.* 14–15), in the passages just cited he is clearly talking about living contemporaries.

³⁹ In *Ep.* 94.40 the man with whom you should spend time (clearly a real, living person) is indifferently called *bonus*, *magnus*, and *sapiens*. In “orthodox” Stoicism, such virtue language is only applicable to the sage. But Seneca sometimes applies it more loosely to progressors, as if to give them credit for steps achieved. Roskam 2005: 88–9 discusses this usage in *Ep.* 95 specifically, attributing it to Aristo’s influence. *Tranq.* 7.4–5 likewise recommends choosing the “least bad” man as your friend, in the absence of a (real) sage. I thank Gretchen Reydam-Schils for discussion of this matter.

⁴⁰ At *Ep.* 94.42 Seneca declares that good *praecepta* can be just as beneficial as good exempla (*aeque praecepta bona, si saepe tecum sint, profutura quam bona exempla*). This assertion simply reverses the

may choose our moral helpers from among the living, namely those who, when they say such and such should be done (i.e. give precepts), prove it by doing it themselves, and are never caught doing what they say must be avoided.⁴¹ Seneca himself may even step into this preceptory/exemplary role. In *Ep.* 6, he invites Lucilius to come live with him, declaring that “the journey is long via precepts, but short and efficient via examples.”⁴² To justify this general assertion he adduces several instances of philosophical disciples who benefitted more from sharing their masters’ lives than from hearing their words. The morally effective exemplum Seneca offers to Lucilius, then, is none other than Seneca himself and his pattern of living, which he suggests Lucilius will find more beneficial (or at least faster and more efficient) than waiting for Seneca’s letters to arrive bearing their precepts.⁴³

Yet, as noted earlier (ch. 8.2), Seneca is also alert to the beginner’s or progressor’s role as actor in her or his own right, and not merely as a judge of the behavior and performances of others. Where are *we*, as beginners or progressors, to find morally qualified audiences to judge *us* – judges in whose evaluations we may be confident – given that “the crowd,” whose evaluations encourage vice rather than virtue, is *ex hypothesi* a poor judge? As previously noted, Seneca recommends that one should withdraw from the crowd to avoid falling under its bad moral influence, or failing that, to keep a *monitor* at one’s side to supply correct moral judgments. In letters where he develops this thought further, Seneca reveals that the ideal judges of our own actions are none other than our ideal (Stoic) exemplary models, or possibly our *praeceptor* (who he elsewhere calls a *monitor* or *advocatus*). Seneca urges Lucilius to live as if he were being watched by a *vir bonus* such as Cato or Scipio or Laelius (*Ep.* 11.8–10, 25.5–6), or failing that, by Seneca himself (*Ep.* 32.1). Patently Seneca is not offering himself as a (near-)sage on par with Cato, but merely as someone more advanced, perhaps even

equation he makes two sections earlier (*Ep.* 94.40, n. 38 above) that observation has the force of precepts. See also *Helv.* 18.8, *Ep.* 68.1, and Schafer 2009: 90–2 for exempla replacing *praecepta* or replicating their impact.

⁴¹ *Ep.* 52.8: *ex his autem qui sunt* [i.e. the living] *eligamus ... eos qui vita docent, qui cum dixerunt quid faciendum sit probant faciendo, qui docent quid vitandum sit nec unquam in eo quod fugiendum dixerunt deprehenduntur*. Also *Ep.* 108.36.

⁴² *Ep.* 6.5: *longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla*.

⁴³ Schafer 2009: 67–74 stresses the pedagogical dynamic between Seneca as teacher and Lucilius as ever-improving progressor. This dynamic is assuredly present, but is not the whole story. On friends as mirrors, see Bartsch 2006: 52–4, with references to the Aristotelian background. Bartsch (201–2) further remarks that Seneca rarely offers living figures as possible external judges or exemplary guides. It is true that few such figures are named by name. But the *praeceptor* as a type neatly fills this slot. On the *praeceptor* as model/exemplum, see also Schafer 2009: 90–1, 109.

as a *praeceptor*, who can usefully serve as an interlocutor and mirror. The judgments that a past figure like Cato might pass on oneself can only be imagined; a “judging Cato” must be entirely internalized. Contemporaries like one’s *praeceptor*, however, may serve as “real,” living external judges of one’s actions. In due course, the progressor may advance to the point where he can be trusted to judge himself (*Ep.* 25.6–7). At this point he has so completely internalized the Stoic evaluative gaze that he becomes his own authoritative evaluator, with no need for any other figure, imagined or real, as a prop.⁴⁴

8.5 Exemplarity in Stoic Garb

It is now possible to sketch a Stoic form of exemplarity such as Seneca could endorse, and to consider how it differs from the exemplarity discussed elsewhere in this book. In its rhetorical and historiographical dimensions, Stoic exemplarity displays no significant divergences from conventional exemplarity. As discussed earlier, a Stoic argues the same way (using illustrative examples to support general statements, ch. 8.2), and understands the relationship of present to past via exempla (regarding morals as unchanging over time, ch. 8.3), as conventional exemplarity does. The divergence is in the moral dimension. To probe this divergence, I compare the Stoic and conventional approaches across the four operations of exemplarity as laid out in the introduction (ch. 0.3).

Regarding the first operation – action witnessed by representatives of the community – the Stoic actor does not seek out the public eye, or “the crowd’s” approval. The opinions of “the crowd” are a bad moral influence and a source of corruption. Rather, the Stoic actor seeks to perform “proper functions” consistently and for the right reasons: i.e. as manifestations of virtuous, not vicious, impulses. This standard may, but need not, align with communal values. This performance still takes place under an evaluative gaze, which looms large rhetorically and ideologically for the Stoic actor. But the source of that gaze – this actor’s notional judging audience – is the Stoic “good man,” whether the sage (vanishingly rare in practice, but well-known as a construct in texts), or a living contemporary who is more advanced morally and philosophically than oneself (e.g. one’s *praeceptor*), or an internalized image of one of these figures.

⁴⁴ On external and internalized judges of one’s own actions, see Bartsch 2006: 191–208, esp. 198–202; more briefly, Reidams-Schils 2011: 301–2, Schafer 2009: 109, Roller 2001: 84–8.

Regarding the second operation – evaluation of the action by the judging audience – the Stoic judge attaches little weight to individual actions he observes. For he knows that any given action, however admirable in appearance, may be motivated by a vice rather than a virtue, or that vices may be manifest in other performances by this actor. Instead, the Stoic judge attends to consistency in right (virtuous) action over time and in diverse circumstances. It is not individual deeds, but long-term patterns of action, that reveal the true moral state of the actor. Indeed, there is no way to know other people's internal states, where moral value truly resides, except via long-term observation. It follows that Stoic exemplarity, in contrast to the exemplary morality otherwise examined in this book, does not valorize the battlefield and forum (or any other sites of political and rhetorical contestation among aristocrats) as arenas of especially significant performance. For the Stoics, performances in these traditionally important arenas are no more or less revealing than performances in any other arena. And any given performance, in any arena, is morally significant only when aggregated with other actions performed over time and across multiple arenas.

The third operation is commemoration and monumentalization. If one cannot be a primary witness who gathers evidence of a social actor's moral condition from direct personal observation over time, and instead can only encounter the actor through monumental mediation as a secondary witness, then the preferred monumental mediator (for the Stoic) seems to be the literary text. Only texts, it seems, can provide information in sufficient detail and density to approximate direct observation – enabling secondary audiences to identify patterns of action over time and so to make judgments about the actor's overall moral condition. Other monumental forms may suffice for commemorating the single deeds so beloved of conventional exemplary morality, and may have their uses even for the Stoic – consider how ruthlessly Seneca exploits and inverts the monumental cognomen *Magnus*, attached to Alexander and Pompey, as discussed in chapter 8.2. But literary texts alone, it seems, are able to provide the full panoply of information that Stoic moral evaluation requires.

Regarding the fourth operation, norm setting, the Stoic actor is indistinguishable from the monumentalized performer of conventional exemplarity. The Stoic actor equally provides a standard by which (properly trained, Stoic) judging audiences may evaluate other actors in turn, and/or a model for themselves to imitate.

Thus Stoic exemplarity, as represented by Seneca, is constantly in dialogue with the non-philosophical Roman exemplarity examined elsewhere

in this book. The Stoics appropriate the organization, language, and social positions of conventional exemplarity, its persuasiveness as a rhetorical mode, its presentation of the relationship of present to past, and its sheer familiarity. Regarding ethics in particular, Stoic exemplarity adopts conventional, non-philosophical exemplary morality as a “commonsense” starting point. It then bootstraps itself up from this starting point, progressively modifying key underlying assumptions until it reaches an endpoint significantly different from the starting point.⁴⁵ Thus the Stoics harness elements of the longstanding, widely diffused exemplary moral system to create an alternative, philosophically rigorous exemplary morality that is at once familiar and novel, and which, while grafted onto and growing out of conventional exemplarity, is ultimately supposed to supplant it. Stoic philosophical ethics in this way constitutes yet another potential limit or boundary to the scope of conventional exemplary discourse in its moral dimension. For Stoic ethics provides a theorized, systematic, top-down option for making moral judgments in place of the *ad hoc*, case-by-case, bottom-up approach that, as we have seen throughout this book, characterizes Roman exemplarity in general.

⁴⁵ Stoic ethics regularly employs “commonsense” views as starting points for moral argumentation, only to end up at understandings quite remote from, even paradoxically opposed to, those “commonsense” beginnings. Scholars use terms like “get off the ground,” “launch,” or “bootstrap” to describe how Stoics derive their ethics from “common conceptions:” see e.g. Bartsch 2006: 9, 236, Inwood 2005: 76, Roller 2001: 77; different language but same idea at Schafer 2009: 109. Stoics could also return, through different routes, to “commonsense” notions after making their paradoxical points: see Sen. *Ben.* 2.35.2–3.

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